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ABSTRACT
Exclusionary Zoning and the Urban Ecology
in Springfield, Massachusetts
February, 1982
Emily Fabrycki Reed, B.A., Marquette Universitv
M.P.A., University of Hartford, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor David A. Booth
The conventional wisdom of the last decade or so maintains that
as a result of suburban exclusionary zoning, the urban ecology, i.e.,
the spatial distribution of metropolitan populations, is racially and
economically segregated. An empirical examination of the relationships
among various facets of zoning and various aspects of the urban ecology
of the Springfield, Massachusetts metropolitan area, within the context
of federal and state, legislative and judicial restraints provides only
partial support for this exclusionary zoning hypothesis. Factor analysis
of zoning variables suggests that suburban zoning is systematically more
restrictive than central city zoning. Factor analysis of the urban
ecology indicates that high socioeconomic status populations and few
minorities reside in the suburbs, while low socioeconomic status popula-
tions and the majority of resource poor minorities reside in the central
cities. However, regression analysis indicates that restrictive subur-
ban zoning is only partially predictive of the segregated urban ecology,
that exclusionary zoning is more economically than racially segregative,
and that, contrary to general belief, multi-family zoning policy rather
than large lot zoning, is the most important predictor of racial and
economic segregation. Canonical correlation indicates that dense urban
areas zone for the inclusion of low socioeconomic status populations
and that blue collar areas zone to provide housing for the working
class but not for the really poor.
Qualitative analysis of the zoning policies of two towns which
represent the most and least exclusionary suburbs demonstrates that
historically the one locality intentionally excluded the poor, while
the other was deliberately, economically inclusionary
. Neither town
was explicitly racist.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE MEANING OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
More than a decade has passed since the urban riots of the six-
ties, yet the chronic problems of the cities remain. 1 Urban renewal,
redevelopment, the war on poverty, the job corps, the Comprehensive
Employment Training Act, A-95 review, housing fair share, subsidized
housing, community development, Urban Development Action Grants, all
seem to have made little difference in the problems of the poor and
minorities who reside in the central cities. Urbanologists assign a
myriad of causes to the lingering metropolitan malaise. One of these
is suburban "exclusionary zoning." 2 Some consider it to be a predomi-
nant villain, 3 while others maintain its influence is minor.
*
Zoning, the imposition of use districts and area limitations on
the land, of height and bulk restrictions on buildings, and of density
maximums on population, 5 is said to have been born in exclusionarv mo-
tives. In the early years of this century, zoning 's originators worked
to prevent the erection of skyscrapers in New York City when the "in-
vention^! of the steel frame and the elevator"^ made the destruction
of the city skyscape possible. The charges were that high rise build-
ings would cut off sunlight and air, would strain public utilities to
the fullest, and would create unsafe congestion in the streets. Like-
wise, the Fifth Avenue Association labored to preserve its stately ho-
tels and department stores from the intrusion of the near-noxious gar-
ment industry. If restrictions could be placed on the heights of
1
2buildings, the sewing-room lofts which were proliferating along the
Avenue could be stopped.
8
Thus zoning allegedly originated in the intentions of land-
owners and residents of higher class neighborhoods to remove, sepa-
rate from, or keep out lower class persons and less desirable build-
ings and activities from the best neighborhoods . 9 Exclusion is said
to be as old as zoning itself. At least one commentator even consi-
ders the two to be identical. Bernard Siegan writes:
. . .
all zoning is exclusionary; that is its purpose
and intent. Zoning was created to exclude from communities
that which is undesirable, incompatible and adverse. 10
The exclusionary zoning hypothesis can be stated as follows.
Although zoning' s stated purpose is perfectly praiseworthy, that is,
to promote the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the commu-
nity by preventing depreciation of property values and resultant slums
and squalor,H it has a latent purpose which is far less laudatory.
"
Zoning is a tool of the affluent, propertied, educated upper classes to
protect their financial and social interests in the suburbs. Zoning
carries within it shades of racism, 13 anti-semitism, 1^ elitism, 1^ fas-
cism, 16 socialism, 17 shades perhaps of most of the great ideological
evils of our century.
Further, some of the literature maintains that these conclusions
are no longer questionable. That zoning is exclusionary is "by now ap-
parent and beyond conj ecture. "18 The term has become "a catch
phrase,"! 9 a piece of "conventional wisdom" that has derived its "au-
thority from repetition, familiarity or association with high offi-
cialdom" 20 in urban affairs. The litany of exclusionary zoning
3include the following.
We have deliberately developed class-stratified suburban
areas . 21
Large-lot zoning which effectively excludes the poor by
increasing the cost of house lots, can be used in suburbs
to maintain 'neighborhood character .' 22
If there are some residents or landowners, as well as pub-
lic officials, who wish to keep out lower-income classes,
especially lower-income blacks, zoning to establish very
large lots, on which only quite expensive houses will as
a consequence be built, may be particularly effective. 23
The zoning regulations of many towns exclude
. . . apart-
ments, townhouses, other multiple-family dwellings, or
mobile homes, despite the fact that these may be the only
types of housing that lower-income people can afford. 24
. .
.zoning has provided the device for protecting the
homogeneous, single-family suburb from the city.
. . .
The insulation of the single-family detached dwelling
was the primary objective of the early zoning ordinances,
and this objective is predominant today.
. .
.25
In sum, the accusations are that only the trappings of exclu-
sionary zoning - who is being excluded from where and by what means -
have changed from the early days. Instead of exclusion of tall build-
ings and light industry from the central business district by primi-
tive height and use restrictions, now the poor and minorities are said
to be walled away from the suburban American dream by amorphous legal
and economic barriers. 26 Today the term exclusionary zoning is used
to accuse suburban governments of a multitude of transgressions, all
those mechanisms which comprise land use regulation and which are
alleged to work for the discriminatory purposes of the wealthy subur-
banite against the urban underclass. The suburbs are said to use large
minimum lot sizes, residential minimum floor areas, excessive frontage
requirements, administrative delays, arbitrary discretion in rezoning,
refusal to rezone, exclusion of apartments and other low-cost housing,
limitations on the number of bedrooms, building codes which place con-
struction requirements far in excess of minimum state codes, and a ple-
thora of other indirect devices to raise the cost of suburban housing
and thereby prevent the poor and minorities from migrating outward from
the inner core. 27
However, in spite of the widespread acknowledgement that zoning
is exclusionary, M in the final analysis, there
. . . [is] still
a striking lack of information about the actual consequences of zoning
in the nation's cities. "28
The Douglas Commission described the information situation that
faces the policymaker who would challenge or eliminate the alleged ex-
clusionary effects of zoning.
Data are scarce since few
. . . agencies have attempted to
make consolidated area zoning maps or compile data on the
total zoning pattern in the area. 29
In a day when the efficacy of past programs to cure metropolitan
problems is widely questioned , 30 there is an urgent need for better in-
formation about the nature of "two societies"-^ in metropolitan areas.
If land use regulation is intended to exclude the poor and minorities
from suburbia as litigators and commentators maintain, 32 how effec-
tive is it in actuality? How extensive is the economic-racial-spatial
segregation of population in metropolitan areas? Do zoning and land
use regulation really stand out in the plexus of causes of urban ills?
Or do such factors as income disparity of Blacks and Whites, 33 reluc-
tance of Blacks to leave their inner city neighborhoods , 34 racial steer-
ing by realtors of Blacks to predominantly black areas, redlining of
neighborhoods in which lenders refuse credit, failure of Blacks who
would purchase property in suburbia to qualify for credit, 35 informal
practices of suburban residents who see that their acceptable asso-
ciates purchase homes which come on the market in their areas, lack of
developer interest in building low-cost housing because it involves
extensive litigation and little profit, 36 lack of suburban municipal
infrastructure (water supply, sewage systems, streets, schools, and so
on) to support low- income, multi-family housing, 37 and growth manage-
ment techniques which are legitimately intended to insure planned,
orderly development rather than to promote any discriminatory pur-
pose, 38 result in few minorities and poor residing in suburbia? Can
zoning and land use regulation be systematically implicated as exclu-
sionary? Or exonerated? Are zoning and land use regulation real or
pseudo-villains? Is local land use policy only one minor factor in
the complex of causes which contribute to urban residential segrega-
tion?
Underlying these land use issues are some more basic questions
which have disquieting implications for local autonomy, federal policy
and intergovernmental relations. If suburban zoning is in fact exclu-
sionary, can remedies be derived through court or legislature at the
state level? Are the regional fair share formula, least cost housing
and zoning approaches of the New Jersey and other state courts effi-
cacious? In Massachusetts, is Chapter 774,39 the "so-called 'anti-
snob' zoning law, "40 an effective means to insure equal housing oppor-
tunity? Or is it largely ignored with impunity by local governments?
Is the focus of the law basically sound, and does its failure to
6achieve the intent of the legislature lie in its administrative imple-
mentation? Or is an entirely new concept in order? Must local gov-
ernments then cede all entitlements to regulate the land back to the
states? Or does the failure of state efforts imply the need for fed-
eral action? Is national land use regulation by the federal govern-
ment or other federal action a real possibility?
If local public policy plays a substantial role in fostering
segregation, does this imply that local governmental officials are sub-
ject to the penalties of federal equal rights legislation which forbids
discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin? Is there
a real possibility of federal marshals being sent to exclusionary sub-
urbs to enforce the law of the land as they were in earlier times and
other places to enforce integration of schools and the free exercise
of voting rights?
Are community development, federal housing and employment sub-
sidy programs necessarily doomed to fail in their efforts to provide
equal opportunity for minorities because they are rejected by suburban
jurisdictions? Would not such programs then have to be revised to in-
sure that local governments cannot frustrate federal efforts to esta-
blish a truly egalitarian society? Would such revisions entail en-
croachment by the federal government on those powers reserved to the
states by the constitution?
The general purpose of this research is to seek some "hard"
information about the relationship of zoning to metropolitan living
patterns within the context of federal and state legal constraints.
The purpose is to implicate or exonerate zoning as exclusionary in
effect, with actual information about zoning and its alleged rela-
tionship to segregation.
Charles Lindblom recounts the significance of this type of re-
search.
Of kinds of analysis that are neither synoptic nor incre-
mental in intention, one modest kind frequently makes a
highly valuable contribution to policy making.' It is the
analysis of some one or a few pivotal issues or variables
critical to policy choices. ... It is simply to try to
ferret out some information or develop some understanding
essential to good policy making. These
. . . make the kind
of contribution to which professional research is well suit-
ed. . . .41
Specifically, the analysis will seek to set out the legislative
and judicial context in which local zoning and land use policy operate
The purpose is to explicate the legal framework in order to compare
specific land use regulations to federal and state policy.
The analysis will then seek to describe empirically two facets
of an actual metropolis and to establish a statistical relationship be
tween them. The first facet is what sociologists call the "urban ecol
0gv."42 j_n studies of the urban ecology, the overall metropolitan de-
velopment pattern is generally described as racially and socioeconomi-
cally segregated. This segregated urban ecology is what the zoning
literature alleges to be the exclusionary effect of zoning.
Urban ecology research explicates, compares and contrasts the
numerical values of such variables as income, education, occupation,
and the racial and ethnic backgrounds of the residents of central ci-
ties and suburbs. Central cities are said to contain large percentage
of minorities, the poor, low status workers, and the poorly-educated.
The suburbs are held to contain large percentages of the wealthy,
Whites, high status workers, and the well-educated. In addition, the
living conditions of the central cities are said to be of poorer qual-
ity. Housing is more cheaply constructed, older, more dilapidated, and
overcrowded. In the suburbs, living conditions are considered better.
Housing is largely single-family, new, well-built and maintained, and
spacious. These characteristics of a specific metropolis, the Spring-
field, Massachusetts Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)
,
will be examined to see if, and to what extent, the central city-sub-
urban development pattern holds true to the sociological paradigm and
the political model of segregation.
The second area of empirical description will focus on central
city and suburban land use provisions. Variables of zoning and land
use regulation such as lot size, minimum frontage requirements, re-
strictions on the numbers of bedrooms, and so on, which are alleged
to contribute to the segregated residential pattern will be quantified
for central cities and suburbs.
An attempt will then be made to establish a statistical rela-
tionship between the zoning variables and the urban ecology. If the
specific urban ecology is found to be segregated and this can be sta-
tistically predicted by variations in suburban and central city zoning
and land use policies, then the evidence will indicate that zoning is
exclusionarv. If there is very little relationship between segregation
and zoning, then there will be serious grounds for questioning the con-
ventional wisdom of the zoning literature, that is, that suburban zon-
ing has an exclusionary effect. If the urban ecology is found not to
be highly segregated and zoning has little or no relationship to it,
9then both the urban ecology and exclusionary zoning paradigms are in
doubt. Or alternatively, one might hypothesize that zoning is exclu-
sionary in intent, but it is not effective in carrying out this intent.
If the urban ecology is not highly segregated and zoning explains this
pattern, then there would be positive evidence that suburban zoning is
inclusionary, that is, that it promotes low- income housing and oppor-
tunity for minorities and the poor to reside in suburbia. However, this
possibility seems extreme^/ unlikely.
In sum, the research aims to create a bridge among the three
general categories of literature which deal with exclusionary zoning or
its alleged effects. It aims to question the conventional wisdom of
the political science and legal literatures that zoning is exclusionary
by offering some hard evidence about its actual effects on the urban
ecology. A cross-disciplinary model of land use regulation would
quantitatively link the development patterns described by sociology
to a local public policy explanation within the context of federal and
state legislative and judicial restrictions.
CHAPTER II
THE REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The literature dealing with exclusionary zoning can be divided
for analytical purposes into three general but not mutually exclusive
categories. The political science literature discusses the ramifica-
tions of the discrimination that is allegedly involved in land use con-
trols and proposes a wide variety of remedies for this exclusion. The
sociological and quantitative literature analyzes the spread of racial
and economic segregation in metropolitan areas, develops models for
describing residential segregation, and occasionally seeks explanations
for it. The political science and sociological literatures will be re-
viewed in this chapter. The next chapter will discuss national legis-
lative, litigative and judicial responses to exclusionary zoning. A
final foundational chapter will analyze the legal attempt to deal with
exclusionary zoning of the State of Massachusetts.
The Political Science Literature
That local land use policies have failed to create an orderly
development pattern and to provide equal opportunity in housing is a
persistent theme of the general exclusionary zoning literature. Criti-
cisms fall across the entire spectrum of political persuasions. Reac-
tionaries through Marxists find zoning to be lacking in efficiency,
equity or other public virtues, although they analyze it from differing
perspectives. A review of the literature must necessarily entail a sur-
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vey of these criticisms and of the large variety of remedies offered as
solutions
.
Two major works dealing with two different aspects of the exclu-
sionary syndrome appeared in the middle 1960s. Marion Clawson's basic,
analytical text, Suburban Land Conversion .! described the post-World
War II development of the suburbs. Clawson examined the factors which
contribute to the conversion of rural land on the urban fringe to inten-
sive uses. He emphasized economic and demographic growth trends as the
primary controlling factors of the suburban development pattern. 2 He
found that zoning and land use regulation were not particularly signi-
ficant in shaping the character of metropolitan areas. Zoning was seen
as largely ineffectual. Overzoning in the suburbs for the three basic
uses, residential, industrial and commercial, failed to channel devel-
opment as professionally planned and failed to prevent undesirable
uses. Clawson mentioned deliberate exclusion of the poor and minori-
ties by zoning policy only in passing.
Clawson analyzed Springfield, Massachusetts along with Wilming-
ton, Delaware and Washington, D.C. as typical examples of northeastern
land development The data for Springfield were taken primarily from
the 1960 census, although some later information (up to 1965) was inclu-
ded.
The second major work published in 1966 was Richard ?. Babcock's
The Zoning Game .-' In the nature of an expose of a pragmatic legal prac-
titioner, this book was one of the first to point the accusatory finger
at zoning as contributing to economic and racial segregation. Babcock
dissected the zoning process into various categories of decision maV
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who shape its outcomes. These include suburban residents, planning
commissions, residential and industrial builders, planners, lawyers
and judges. He then arrayed these decision makers around the mostly
unsubstantiated assumption that "the central goal [of zoning is] the
insulation of the single-family district. "6 As a cure for exclusion,
Babcock advocated the institutionalization of a broader, metropolitan-
wide view through state legislation. This regional remedy, or varia-
tions thereof, would be given as standard in the literature through-
out the next decade.''
In spite of its sensationalism, The Zoning Game provided the
jumping off point for others to delve into the specifics of exclusion-
ary zoning.
With the urban riots providing an overwhelming impetus to exa-
mine the spatially segregated metropolis in the late sixties, two pre-
sidential commissions dealt in part with exclusionary land use regula-
tions. The Kaiser Committee^ provided national aggregate data in sup-
port of the exclusionary hypothesis. It made strong recommendations for
federal preemption of those state and local land use regulations which
prevent federally subsidized housing from being built in both city and
suburb.
The Douglas Commission^ took a more detailed look at national
statistics which described the segregated metropolis. Again, the re-
sponsibility for cities separated by both color and income level was
placed squarely on the suburbs. The Douglas Report singled out exten-
sive large-lot: zoning which fails to allow for the building of low-cost
housing as the main exclusionary device.^ Mention was also made
13
"fiscal zoning"ll and of the exclusionary aspects of building codes. 12
The Douglas Commission called attention to the lack of adequate
information about exclusion. 13 Because of the lack of geographically
disaggregated data, the Commission unwittingly made such dubious state-
ments as: "[a]mong the many public and private decisions that produce
urban growth and decay, regulatory decisions play a relatively minor
part," 14 and, M [m]ost jurisdictions have some zoning for multifamily
structures. "15 Availability of more detailed, metropolitan-wide infor-
mation could have provided the foundation for a more accurate assess-
ment
.
In a work published simultaneously with the two federal reports,
Seymour Tolll 6 also reached the conclusion that zoning is exclusionary,
but by a different, historical path. Toll called attention to zoning
as a major instrument of public policy by tracing zoning 's development
from its beginnings in New York City in 1916 to its status in the 1960s.
He described with historian's detail the interpersonal and political
dealings that surrounded the major landmarks of zoning 's evolution. He
enumerated the most common alleged defects of zoning, its failure to
separate uses adequately , 1? its catering to the financial interests of
1 Q
the wealthy,-10 and its failure to be based on adequate information about
development needs and planning for them.l^ He also pinpointed the ear-
ly recognition of zoning f s racial aspects by bigots who would use it to
their own advantage, 20 and egalitarians who would prevent its undemo-
cratic effects. 21 In his final chapter, he concentrated on the accusa-
tions of exclusion current in the sixties, 22 and proposed some fairly
drastic solutions. Zoning should be administered by areawide or state
governments. It should not be predictive but only loosed "when new
development or a change of use was to take place. "23 Districting
should be abandoned, and uses should be mixed intelligently. All de-
velopment controls should be combined into one ordinance in order to
eliminate conflicts. A "community plan" should be mandatory, and regu-
lations should be required to be based on it. Variances and appeals
should be decided by a state or metropolitan administrative review
agency . 24
In 1970, Anthony Downs published the first of two major works
dealing with metropolitan social organization and racial and economic
segregation. Urban Problems and Prospects 25 concentrated on racially
discriminatory motivations through a series of essays on various as-
pects of metropolis, including suburban-central city development pat-
terns, problems of racial ghettoes, racism, housing, transportation and
inner city school systems.
In "Alternative Forms of Future Urban Growth in the United
States"26 Downs made his first call for "opening up the suburbs and
outlying portions of central cities to new low- and moderate- income
housing ."27 He concentrated on a system of incentives for Blacks to
outmigrate from the core city and for suburban communities to accept
them. These would implement "dispersal," one prong of his reform pro-
posals. The other prong, proposed in "Alternative Futures for the
American Ghetto, "2° involved "enrichment" of central city residents. 29
In "Futures" Downs also developed his "Law of Dominance" which states
that middle Americans want to live in neighborhoods in which they are
a cultural majority. Conversely, they will move out if they think the
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neighborhood will become predominantly Black. 30 This ccncept wa£ the
basis for his housing quota systems.
In "Racism in America and How to Combat It,"31 Downs attacked
"institutional subordination" of minorities and developed nine strate-
gies for neutralizing it. 32 One strategy would focus on reducing the
alleged racist effects of public policies, including those of exclu-
sionary zoning.
In "Moving Toward Realistic Housing Goals," 33 Downs discounted
the possibility of reaching the national goal of eliminating substan-
dard housing in the United States by 1980. He listed nine activities
which would be required and the existing conditions that precluded
each. For example, lack of capital to finance expanded housing out-
put, lack of money and the will to provide the tremendous subsidies
needed for low- income households, make it virtually impossible to pro-
vide a decent home and a suitable living environment for every Ameri-
can family. In spite of this somewhat gloomy (and accurate) forecast,
Downs suggested that grants should be offered "to state planning agen-
cies for studies of the socioeconomic impact of existing zoning ordi-
nances," 3 ^ because such analysis is prior to any meaningful reform.
In "Housing the Urban Poor: The Economics of Various Strate-
gies" 3 ^ and "Home Ownership and American Free Enterprise,
"
3 6 Downs re-
commended that high quality building standards and housing codes for
old and new housing, respectively, should be relaxed in favor of mod-
erate standards for some buildings, so that the poor can afford decent,
but not excessively costly, housing. 3 '
The second of Downs' works, Opening Up the Suburbs , 3 ^ is the
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more important of the two. Many of the ideas that were developing in
Urban Problems jelled into solid, systematic proposals, enabling this
work to become a "minor classic. "39 Downs switched his emphasis from
racism to economic discrimination and devices to promote economic inte-
gration, because, at this point, he held income disparity rather than
racial cleavages to be the biggest obstacle to an open metropolitan so-
ciety.
In this work, Downs advocated a "dispersed economic integra-
tion"40 strategy. This is a sort of spread-the-burden approach to the
urban pathology. Through a system of quotas involving specific per-
centages of multi-family housing in each community, of low- and moder-
ate-cost housing in Planned Unit Developments and other projects larger
than twenty-five units, and especially through massive federal rent or
ownership subsidies to the poor, Downs would scatter the "mainstream"
poor 4 ! (those who share middle-class values but lack money) throughout
commuter areas, school districts and even neighborhood blocks. Downs
believed that a small minority of poor are "multiproblem households"^
who would bring with them the crime, drugs and other adverse baggage
that suburbanites fear. A screening process would identify these and
bring aid to them in the central city. Specific minimum dispersal quo-
tas would be used to relieve the pressures on "crisis ghettoes" 4 ^ (de-
cayed inner cities) , while maximums would be required to maintain "mid-
dle class dominance" 44 and to hinder racial and economic tipping (re-
segregation when middle class whites flee integrating neighborhoods.)
The suburbs should be persuaded to accept their social respon-
sibilities and moral obligations, that is, to acquiesce to economic
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integration (given that the quotas prevent loss of neighborhood cul-
tural viability and property value), because the suburban quality of
life has been created by majoritarian public policies which keep the
urban poor in their ghettoes. Since comprehensive strategies that
would implement metropolitan-wide governmental structures have little
immediate feasibility, a "decentralized strategy" involving court at-
tacks on exclusionary zoning, and financial incentives for the poor to
move, developers to build for them, and suburbanites to accept them,
should be used in the interim. 4 5
Downs made a strong call for opening the suburbs to the poor and
provided tactics for doing so. However, he admitted that his strate-
gies have little chance for implementation, because "our society is not
likely to make the policy choice advocated in this book. "46
In the same liberal vein as Downs' works, Modernizing Urban Land
Policy47 is a compendium of essays considering various reform proposals.
Robert C. Weaver48 made two significant synthesizing contribu-
tions in the major article of this symposium. First, he catalogued the
major ways in which zoning purportedly works for exclusion of the poor
from new housing. These included increasing the cost of housing, land
and site improvements, restricting the supply of buildings, and pre-
venting low-cost housing and other lew tax ratables. 4 ^ His second im-
portant listing was an enumeration of other private and public exclu-
sionary devices which are used "to implement or substitute for" zoning.
Among these are "refusal of mortgage credit, obstructive real estate
practices, neighborhood hostility, dedication of proposed sites to pub-
lic use, and even threats of violence and destruction of property,"-^
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Although other methods could be added, Weaver's list called attent
to the growing doubt that zoning itself is the all-important exclu-
sionary device.
In order to bypass the wide variety of local exclusionary regu-
lations, Weaver advocated federal subsidization of housing by payments
directly to builders who would then pass on lower rents or purchase
prices for zoned high-cost housing to low- and moderate- income fami-
lies. He also recommended that all federal programs that affect metro-
politan development patterns, including transportation programs, HEW
funding, and fiscal policy, be revamped to remove their exclusionary
side effects.
In an article x^hich is based on sociological methodology , 51
William A. Steger analyzed national differences in income of Blacks
and Whites in relation to their residential location. Steger con-
cluded that lower income is largely responsible for the confinement
of the majority of Blacks to the central cities.
John W. Reps52 reviewed the history of publicly planned cities
in the United States and elsewhere as a foundation for his recommenda-
tions of widespread public land acquisition, planning for its equit-
able development, and final return to the private sector.
Mason Gaffney53 urged that the property tax be shifted to land
value taxation away from taxation of buildings as a way to ease the
regressive features of the property tax.
As a part of a legal symposium on exclusionary zoning published
in 1971, the Davidoffs^^ made a series of specific proposals to develop
"inclusionary zoning. "55 Enabling legislation should be modified so
that comprehensive planning is inclusionary
, that is, provision should
be made for all housing values and densities. 56 State policy should
terminate "specific discriminatory devices, "57 including prohibition
of multi-family housing and excessive floor and lot area requirements.
Zoning to conserve municipal expenditures (fiscal zoning) should be
maintained but modified "to enlarge
. . . economic access to residence
within the community. "58 Land should not be zoned for commercial and
industrial development without adequate provision for housing for po-
tential workers. Legal standing should be granted to regional non-
residents affected by community zoning. 59 An urban growth fund ghould
be provided to pay for increased "fiscal burdens" of suburbs resulting
from open housing. 60 Last, government facilities should be built only
where there is adequate housing for their employees. Nearly all these
recommendations have been addressed by federal or state courts or legis-
latures in subsequent years. However, few have been adopted or imple-
mented .
Also published in 1971, Robert Goodman's After the Planners 61
was a byproduct of the disaffected generation of the sixties. Goodman
proffered a very sharp, Marxist criticism of the liberal proponents of
social reform from the viewpoint of an architect and physical planner.
He took to task the designers of buildings, urban renewal, transporta-
tion and poverty programs. These aimed more at lining the pockets of
the professionals and financial interests involved in their- promotion
than at aiding the poor and minorities who are their recipients and
supposed beneficiaries. Suburban zoning is one of these tools of ex-
ploitation employed by business interests against the poor. 6 ^
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In lieu of current programs, Goodman proposed a system of "advo-
cacy P lanning"63 and "community socialism'^ in which real control QVer
smaller scaled projects would be given to the poor and to those who use
urban buildings and housing. In this way their needs and interests
would be incorporated within.
After the Planners was a sort of natural culmination of the
leftward trend in criticism of housing, land use and urban policies
brought on by the urban crises of the sixties.
Law prefessor Daniel R. Mandelker in The Zoning Dilemma 6 5 re-
viewed the legal basis of planning and zoning in order to provide an
empirical study of these two processes. By analyzing the Master Plan
of Development for the Seattle, Washington metropolitan area (King
County) and comparing it to actual zoning decisions on applications to
rezone for apartments, Mandelker was able to conclude that there was a
moderate gap between planning and zoning. While planning applied to
the community level and sought the rational allocation of suburban
apartment development (the "urban centers" concept), ^6 zoning decisions
of lay commissions and boards were made in a neightborhood context in
favor of apartments on unplanned-f or sites. Rezonings subverted plan-
ning to some extent because they were subject to developer and other
political pressures.
Although Mandelker did not find either the comprehensive plan or
zoning decisions to be particularly exclusionary , 67 neither. did he find
them highly effective in controlling the development pattern. ° As
evidence he cited the large number of apartment rezones which were not
developed for that use.^ Even if public land use policy is not ex
sionary, racial and economic separation can persist because of private
market forces, particularly those which influence developers to build
or not to build multi-family housing in suburbia. Mandelker's work was
one of the first to question the conventional wisdom of exclusionary
zoning with data analysis, although he did so only in the limited con-
text of exclusion of privately-built, all-cost apartments.
Land Use Without Zoning 70 and its more popular version, Other
People's Property. 71 by Bernard H. Siegan, presented a conservative
economic viewpoint of the defects of zoning. Zoning creates inefficien-
cies in the marketplace and restrictions on housing supply. 7 2 it im-
poses unnecessary costs on developers, property owners, and consumers,
especially poor consumers of housing. Zoning is ineffective, senseless
regulation of the land market. It involves "little more than guesswork"
because planning for specific uses on specific parcels is "such an in-
herently difficult process." 73 Zoning contributes to the corruption of
public officials because countervailing market pressures and readily
available mechanisms for subversion such as variances, special exceptions,
and rezonings, create a climate ripe for malfeasance. 7 ^
Zoning' s essence is exclusion. It is a governmentally sanc-
tioned system for "suburbanites everywhere ... [to maintain] a single-
family character for their community .
"
7 5 It prevents federally subsi-
dized housing in the suburbs. 7 ^ Zoning furnishes a convenient tool for
environmentalists, no growth advocates and other elitists to deprive
landowners of their right to develop their land for its highest and
best use. 77 Lack of intensive development harms the poor and the major-
ity of the citizenry who are deprived of entry into high quality are
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by protectionist policies. 78
By comparing apartment rents in Houston (unzoned) and Dallas
(zoned), Siegan attempted to demonstrate that zoning accounts for
higher rents. Houston and other smaller unzoned communities are used
generally as evidence of viable land development without zoning.
Siegan proposed that zoning in its entirety be abolished. 7 ? He
claimed that market mechanisms such as land prices, developer competi-
tion and consumer demand are sufficient to keep incompatible uses sepa-
rate. J Building and housing codes, subdivision regulations, parking,
traffic and nuisance ordinances, regulation of subsidized housing, and
private restrictive covenants such as are used in Houston suffice to
protect individual property rights and residential neighborhood charac-
ter. OJ- In sum, without zoning, economic growth and physical develop-
ment would be "maximized and exclusion would be minimized ," 8 2
Like Siegan, law professor Robert C. Ellickson is an advocate
of abandonment of zoning. However, unlike Siegan, he grounds his pro-
posals for zoning T s replacement in legal theory and provides more real-
istic instruments as substitutes.
In an article published in 1973 , ^3 Ellickson systematically
dissected existing land use controls and found them lacking in effi-
ciency (they fail to control urban growth) and equity (they create
uncompensated costs for property owners^ and discriminate against the
poor and minor it ies .) 8 ^ Consequently, zoning should be abolished to
remove the inequitable effects of exclusionary controls. To achieve
efficiency, a system of "consensual" restrictive covenants to protect
property values, plus a revitalized nuisance law which would allow for
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collection of damages from nuisance makers, 86 or the imposition of fines
for less noxious uses, should be implemented. Fines would be deter-
mined by "mandatory standards" which would be codified and administered
by local nuisance boards.
^
In 1977, Professor Ellickson expanded upon his land use damages
theory as the simplest and most equitable solution to exclusionary
zoning. 88
Richard Babcock and Fred Bosselman in 197389 enlarged upon the
accepted list of exclusionary mechanisms of land use regulations.
These included total exclusion of multi-family housing and mobile
homes, overzoning for noncumulative industrial and commercial uses,
restrictions on the number of dwelling units per acre, minimum floor
area requirements, required subdivision improvements, large fees and
cash bonds for developers, and excessive building code requirements. 90
Babcock and Bosselman argued the social utility of reducing such re-
strictions and seem to have assumed that municipalities can be persuaded
to lessen exclusion if they perceive the inherent benefits. Suburban-
ites would benefit culturally by living "with people of different ages
and life styles and from different social and racial backgrounds . "93-
Unskilled workers would be provided for expanding suburban industry.
Babcock and Bosselman also questioned the conventional wisdom that
multi-family housing creates higher service costs than it contributes
in tax base. 92 They maintained that higher density developments have
fewer school-age children, require less municipal infrastructure (roads,
sewers, water lines, etc.) and provide more consumers for local com-
merce. 93
As remedies for exclusionary zoning they proposed that state
governments should authorize state agencies to adopt comprehensive
housing policies, 94 and that the "wait and see" approach should be
authorized in state enabling acts. 95 Flapping of zoning districts
should be abandoned in favor of textual zoning ordinances which esta-
blish overall housing policies and which are implemented by such flexi-
ble techniques as Planned Unit Developments and floating zones. These
would reduce industrial and commercial overzoning, prevent skyrocketing
prices for land prezoned for multi-family housing, increase development
densities, and lessen large residential lots which contribute to urban
sprawl. 96 Policy ordinances should include a certain percentage of com-
munity land area for subsidized housing in order to meet regional hou-
sing need. 9/
Attorney Bosselman and David Callies prepared a report for the
Council on Environmental Quality in which they surveyed state and re-
gional legislation which, in a "quiet revolution" of the early seven-
ties, was increasing higher level governmental control over land use. 98
Although they concentrated on such environmental legislation as the
Massachusetts and Wisconsin inland and coastal wetlands acts, and the
Vermont Environmental Control Law, 99 they also reviewed the Massachu-
setts anti-snob zoning law, Chapter 774 of the 1969 Massachusetts Acts,
which is specifically aimed at local exclusion of low-cost housing.
Bosselman and Callies cautioned that increased state regulation of land
use may have regressive effects. The costs of regulation may fall ex-
cessively heavily on the poor and on developers of low-cost housing.
By the middle seventies, the literature dealing with public pol~
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icy and metropolitan development was maturing into scholarly, in-dePth
studies. From data gathered concerning rental housing in New Haven,
Connecticut, King and MieszkowskilOl concluded that Blacks pay more
than Whites for similar housing. A major source cf high black rents
is the "elasticity of supply of black housing , "102 that is> the price
of black rental housing is higher because the supply is limited to
ghetto areas by public policy, and the demand is greater than the sup-
ply in those areas. King and Mieszkowski considered these circumstances
to be inequitable and suggested that a housing policy be adopted which
would open up more of the housing supply to Blacks.
In 1974, Clifford Kaufman, 103 noting that most research deals
with how socioeconomic characteristics affect urban development, called
for investigation of the reverse of the causal order, that is, how gov-
ernmental policy affects urban economic-spatial-racial organization.
Kaufman provided a rationale for using land use policy to explain the
urban ecology. Urban politics involves conflicts over the "allocation
of urban resources," 10^ and over "a currently decentralized metropoli-
tan organization" in which autonomous suburbs protect their own "ad-
vantaged" interests. Since zoning and housing policy are "direct"
mechanisms!06 usecj, f 0r an uneasy resolution of these conflicts, a
"field of political urbanism" should be developed which focuses "on
the extent to which political factors, including policy, contribute
to explanation for variations in urbanism. "107
Also in 1974, Edward M. Bergman^** developed a model for sepa-
rating exclusionary and non-exclusionary zoning ordinances and for pro-
viding estimates of how much of variously costing housing municipal!--
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ties should provide. Bergman's
"workplace-residence performance stan-
dard"^ relates variously zoned residential lot sizes to housing costs
in six Pennsylvania townships. "Zoned housing costs"H0 are then linked
to potential numbers and types of jobs provided in commercial and indus-
trial zoning districts and to potential workers' incomes. A formula is
derived based on these data which determines how much variously costing
housing each township should zone for in order to house its potential
workforce. The formula also evaluates how far off the mark each zoning
ordinance is. Bergman's subject townships were all adjudged to be eco-
nomically exclusionary. They ranged from excluding forty-seven to
ninety-one percent of housing requirements as determined by their indus-
trial and commercial zoning.
Bergman's model suffers from several difficulties. By empha-
sizing each township's responsibility to take care of only its own wor-
kers, Bergman failed to consider regional housing needs. He encouraged
provincialism in an increasingly interconnected urban environment.
Using zoned for workers as the standard for housing supply fails to
account for the almost entirely residentially zoned locality which main-
tains highly exclusionary standards by providing almost no commercial
and industrial jobs. Such localities escape the workplace-residence
standard by having few workplaces.m Bergman's model thus has less
than universal applicability. Although 3ergman continually acknowledged
that nonworker households (the really poor) are not accounted for in his
model, he made no attempt to correct this defect. By using the working
head of household standard, Bergman assumed only one worker and income
per household so that his data base fails to consider the increasing
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numbers of two full-time worker households. As a result, he could be
over allowing housing units or underestimating income. Most important-
ly, Bergman ignored the social and racial aspects of exclusion which
others allege to be at least as important as economic factors.
In spite of its failure as a universal model for measuring ex-
clusion in suburban zoning, Bergman's workplace-residence standard does
illustrate a growing sophistication in data analysis applied to zoning.
It provides an example of one quantitative approach to extraction of
exclusionary factors from zoning ordinances.
In the principal article of The Suburban Seventies
, the first of
two symposiums on metropolitan politics published by the American Aca-
demy of Political and Social Sciences in the late seventies, Karl E.
Taeuber112 documented with national data the wide persistence of racial
residential segregation in the suburbs. Even though black suburbani-
zation is growing, Blacks are confined to suburban enclaves 113 rather
than residence in a "salt-and-pepper" pattern. 114 Taeuber concluded
that the discriminatory intent of the white community, rather than the
relative poverty of Blacks and other minorities, creates metropolitan
segregation. Since Blacks' relative and absolute incomes are rising,
and they are purchasing more expensive suburban housing, yet spatial
segregation persists, the logical inference is that economic conditions
are not primary causal factors. Taeuber 's interpretation that exclu-
sionary devices are primarily racially motivated and effective rather
than economically based 11 ^ became the most widely accepted explanation
of the metropolitan development pattern in the latter part of the last
decade
.
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To the earlier lists of suburban exclusionary mechanisms of
Weaver, and Babcock and Bosselman, U« Taeuber added racial (rather
than social or economic) motivation for such public programs as sub-
sidized housing location, urban renewal, zoning and annexation, and to
such private practices as lending institutions' denial of mortgages
to builders of integrated housing and to would-be black purchasers in
white neighborhoods, realtors' racial steering and blockbusting, and
private property owners' restrictive covenants and refusal to sell or
rent to Blacks. 117
In a second article of the symposium, Birch118 saw the suburbs
as increasingly inheriting urbanization and the problems that accompany
it. Bradford and Rubinowitz 11 ? ±n a final article found that the in-
vestment decisions of lenders and developers contribute to the deter-
iorating quality of living conditions in central cities and older sub-
urban neighborhoods.
Immediately following the suburban symposium, Michael Daniel-
son 120 published a work which provided a superb analysis of the fears
and motivations of suburbanites for using land use controls to exclude
the poor, minorities and low-cost housing from their autonomous commu-
nities. He took a comprehensive view of recent efforts to lessen exclu-
sion and thoroughly documented the politics of recent zoning battles
with many observations from participants.
All those interests which would like to open up the suburbs and
dismantle exclusionary barriers have met with limited success. Acti-
vist civil rights groups such as Suburban Action Institute, the hou-
sing industry, corporations, central city residents and officials, civil
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rights litigants and anti-exclusionary judiciary, federal legislators
and HUD enforcers, regional planners and A-95 review agencies with
metropolitan-wide, housing fair share plans, state legislators with
anti-snob zoning legislation, and public development corporations,
have all made few dents into suburban, economically and racially seg-
regated housing patterns. Grassroots groundswells of suburban oppo-
sition are converted into suburban dominated political processes and
institutions. Increasing numbers of suburban population majorities
in metropolitan areas are electing their own state and federal legis-
lators and placing representatives in key regional, state and federal
administrative positions. 121- Suburban political power then frustrates
the best efforts of inclusionary zoning proponents.
Although Danielson advocated a multi-pronged effort of inclu-
sionary zoning, urban conservation, "strict enforcement of open-housing
laws," 122 massive federal income and housing construction subsidies,
he held out little hope for substantive change in segregated residen-
tial patterns because the real constraints are not practical, but poli-
tical, that is, suburban domination of political processes is used to
perpetuate exclusion.
In 1977, Robert Nelson *" united with other abolitionists in a
call for the abrogation of community-wide zoning because of its exclu-
sionary and other defects. Nelson, like Ellickson, offered a fairly
constructive (if politically unacceptable) proposal as a substitute for
zoning. Under his revised, land tenure system, all privately held pro-
perty rights currently regulated by community zoning would become col-
lectively owned by neighborhood "private tenure institutions" 12 ^ simi-
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lar to home ownership associations. These collectively held rights
could then be sold "to the highest bidder, "125 at the agreement of se_
venty-five percent (or more) of the owners so that orderly neighborhood
transition to diverse uses would be assured. Local governments would
administer the system, while state governments would provide the legal
framework.
In 1978, H.V. Savitch126 wrote from the same Marxist political
persuasion as did Goodman in 1971. He analogized the relationship of
white suburbs with central cities to the European colonization of the
dark continents. His concept of "domestic colonialism" characterizes
the central cities as economically exploited by suburban upper classes
who foster dependency and despair in urban center residents. The colo-
nial relationship is institutionalized by fragmented local power and
suburban "political/legal devices." 127 However, Savitch offered little
convincing evidentiary support for these generalizations.
Lawrence Burrows128 published a survey of public land use re-
strictions from a more neutral perspective. He maintained that the pri-
mary purpose of so-called exclusionary devices is growth management
(planned and timed development) rather than any undemocratic, economic
or racial discrimination. He surveyed traditional methods of control
of development such as public acquisition of open space, zoning mora-
toriums on construction, subdivision regulations, annexation, and so on,
as well as some of the newer methods. These include the outlining of
"urban service areas,
"
12 9 "cap rates" on population, 1 30 Petaluma-plan
type limitations on building permits, 131 and public facilities program-
ming. 132 Burrows' work is a handbook of growth controls that can be
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used for the traditional planning objectives of orderly and phased
development
.
The second major symposium presented by the American Academy of
Political and Social Sciences, Race and Residence . "3 furnished a com-
plete and current series of articles relevant to exclusionary politics.
The theme of the symposium as stated by editor Wade Clark Roof was that
"whites have come to rely less on overt sanctions and more upon infor-
mal [private instruments]
... for maintaining residential segrega-
tion." 134 The symposium mirrored the disaffection prevalent at the
turn of the decade for anti-segregation public policies and legislation
which are for the most part ineffectual in ameliorating metropolitan
residential segregation.
Farley, Bianchi, and Colasanto 135 downplayed the importance of
exclusionary zoning as a contributor to residential segregation. They
considered realtor racial steering and lack of information about the
ameliorating attitudes of Blacks and Whites towards integration to be
more important. This conclusion was based on an attitude survey done
in the Detroit metropolitan area. They emphasized dissemination of
better information about changing racial attitudes as a means of les-
sening segregation.
PettigrewXJD recommended that the structure of national housing
policies be cleansed of segregational aspects in line with his claim
that structural reform invariably precedes progressive social change.
He cautioned that piecemeal reform in metropolitan areas may be counter-
productive.
Mitchell and Smithl37 surveyed the specifics of federal housing
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policy in support of Pettigrew's general conclusion. They urged a hard-
line federal policy in which HUD would require communities to police
the private sector as a condition for receiving community development
funding
.
In a final symposium article, Saltmanl38 reviewed the prelimi-
nary findings of HUD's national audit of housing discrimination in real
estate practices. An attempt was made in this multi-year study to
measure the extent of nationwide racial steering. Preliminary evidence
indicated that racial discrimination in the rental and sale of housing
is widespread in spite of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 forbidding such
practices. Both the law and its implementation are less than satisfac-
tory.
A major work published in 1979 was Fiscal Zoning in Suburbia . 139
Duane Windsor used an extensive data base from New Jersey communities
to question the "fiscal motive theory" of zoning. This theory has re-
placed the conventional exclusionary zoning hypothesis to a certain ex-
tent. According to fiscal zoning, local communities are motivated pri-
marily by property tax considerations rather than discriminatory inten-
tions in zoning for large lots, zoning out multi-family housing, and
overzoning for high tax ratable industry and commerce. ^0
Windsor found that fiscal zoning theories have several fallacies.
Such theories overestimate the fiscal sophistication of suburban resi-
dents and governments. They also contain misconceptions about the true
service costs (lower than low density development) and revenue produ-
cing potential (higher than low density development) of intensive land
uses.
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In a recent article, David Mill s141 identified two economic ef-
fects of zoning. The first, segregation of uses, is beneficial in that
it lessens negative externalities. The second, the "rationing" effect,
restricts specific land uses to specific parcels and thereby limits the
supply of land available for each use. 142 Widespread poor rationing
produces diseconomies, works against the benefits of use segregation,
and serves as a tool of "mercantilism" for local governments 1^ by pro-
moting social inefficiency and inequity. Mills stated that "no optim-
al zoning policy"144 is possible because of zoning 's conflicting effects.
In another 1979 article, William Fischell45 analyzed five major
proposals for zoning reform and found each lacking. Siegan's "aboli-
tionism" discounts the uncompensated losses that property owners would
suffer from loss of their property "entitlements" if zoning were abol-
ished. This Fischel found to be inequitable. 14 6
Reform of the property tax to lessen fiscal motivation for ex-
clusionary zoning suffers two shortcomings. Abolition of the property
tax would reduce the revenue producing choices available to local gov-
ernments and would result in "a substantial loss of efficiency." 147
Communities would be more likely to restrict all development and not
just low-income housing to compensate for this inefficiency. In addi-
tion, loss of the property tax would not eliminate exclusionary moti-
vation but would simply move it up to a higher governmental level.
Fischel postulated that judicial reform of exclusionary zoning
also is ineffectual. Communities devise various "rationalizations"
to avoid such remedies. They shift to no growth policies or claim that
their unique situations exempt them. 14 ^
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Fischel held that Ellickson's proposals to revive nuisance law
and to extend eminent domain with compensatory payments for zoning
"takings" are politically unacceptable.
Nelson's proposal for "salable zoning"^ does not gQ far enQug^
Fischel would extend it by offering "for sale all existing zoning re-
strictions" 1^ rather than just neighborhood packages, in order to
counteract general exclusion (no growth policies) as well as "selective
exclusion" (racial and economic discrimination .) 151 Fischel maintained
that some growth is better than none at all since it contributes to
the filtering down of used housing to low income persons.
To summarize, the political science literature surveys a wide
variety of issues involved in exclusionary zoning. These include alle-
gations of exclusion, surveys of the motivations for the mechanisms
and politics of alleged exclusion, and recommendations for the aboli-
tion or modification of zoning. Assessment of the extent of urban
segregation is left primarily to the sociological and quantitative
literature.
The Sociological and Quantitative Literature
The literature of urban sociology focuses chiefly on statisti-
cal descriptions of the demographic characteristics of metropolitan
area populations. Urban ecology attempts to derive quantitative models
which trace out the interrelationships and urban spatial distributions
of such variables as income, occupation, education, race, national ori-
gin, age and family status. In general, the literature describes the
urban ecology as segregated on the basis of one or more of these var
)CUS
ables. Explanations for metropolitan segregation are sparse and foe
on such variables as population trends, the age of cities and housing,
and the psychology of suburbia. Such explanations usually mention pub-
lic policies, zoning and land use regulation as possible causal factors
only in passing.
Traditional ecological theory maintained that variations in
occupation, education and income, what is generally called socioecono-
mic status, best describe metropolitan spatial segregation . 152 The
central cities were portrayed as home for persons of low status (blue
collar) occupations, low average education, and low income. These
troublesome demographic characteristics were said to account for the
social problems and physical deterioration prevalent in the urban cores
of the nation's cities.
The suburbs were held by traditionalists to be homogeneous en-
claves populated by persons in high status occupations, with college
educations, and higher than average incomes. These earmarks of subur-
bia drew a great deal of criticism from suburbanologists
. The suburbs
were alleged to lack social consciousness, to breed conformity and to
stultify personal development.
David Poponoe's recent article153 is typical of this genre of
literature. He enumerates several disadvantages of urban sprawl, the
low density development which is typified by suburbia. Urban sprawl
intensifies residential segregation by increasing geographic distance
between races and classes. It carries with it a publicly sanctioned,
regressive cost structure that taxes the poor for highways, schools,
utilities, and so on, for the benefit of the rich. It destroys the
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central city by enabling the middle class to abandon the poor who must
remain behind by economic necessity. It engenders disadvantages for
suburban residents. Women, teenagers, the elderly and the poor suffer
from "a deprivation of access. "154 They cannot frequent suburban fa-
cilities and activities because of a lack of transportation. Teenagers
especially suffer from "environmental deprivation, "155 a lack of heal-
thy cultural stimulation.
Scott Donaldson in 1969 attempted to dispel the "suburban myth"
of the traditional literature . 156 He maintained that suburbia as a
phenomenon is the result of a positive nostalgia for the rural life
rather than any negative feelings toward the central city and its in-
habitants. He mainly discounted the exclusionary or discriminatory
motivation of land use controls. Instead, he maintained that suburban
zoning for high cost construction and large lots, for example, is the
result of efforts to remedy the errors of the post-war, mass-produced
Levittowns, and to bring a little of the farm (the primal urge to re-
turn to the land) into an urbanized life style.
Perinl5? in 1977 published a work similar in tone to that of
Donaldson, but different in conclusions. A series of interviews with
various participants in the land use system provided Perin with the
basis for an anthropological look at the metropolitan development pat-
tern. She considered exclusion to be economically motivated. Since
most of a household's money is tied up in the house, a primary concern
is to recoup the house's economic value. Old-timers (those already in
suburbia) fear any devaluation of their property which may devastate
them financially. This fear, the "social meaning of homeownership,"158
presents the basic motivation for racial and economic exclusionary zon-
ing, whether or not "newcomers"^ would actually have the anticipated
effects on property values. 160 Perin did ^ question 20ning , s eff ._
cacy in protecting property values. She assumed that it is effective
in promoting "social exclusion. "161
In a call for a marriage between political science and sociology,
Perin urged that "[l]and use regulation ... be added to the list of
decisively influential man-made factors" that result in "socioeconomic
morphologies ."162
The major body of sociological literature of the 1970s focused
on quantitative descriptions of the metropolitan development pattern
and on expansions of the racial, socioeconomic status and residential
segregation hypotheses. Berry and Horton published seminal research
in this area in 1970.163 They used factor ana lyS is to describe the
metropolitan ecology of the Chicago area. Their investigation of so-
cioeconomic and housing quality characteristics, family status, and
minority composition of the population in the context of political-
geographic units created a "social geography"164 0 f the metropolitan
area. Factors (composite variables) were derived in two stages using
two different data bases - community areas and census tracts.
The community areas analysis broke down the City of Chicago into
seventy-five community areas and included one hundred and forty-seven
suburban municipalities. A total of two hundred and twenty-two data
points and fifty-seven census data variables (1960) served as the basis
from which ten sociological factors were extracted. Factor analyses
were then performed by subfiles for the city itself and the suburbs as
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a whole so that findings could be compared to the metropolitan-wide
pattern.
The derivation of three of the ten factors, Socioeconomic Status,
Race and Resources, and Stage of the Life Cycle, was replicated in the
second stage. Data was coded by 1,324 census tracts for the entire me-
tropolitan area, and variables were limited to twelve.
Six variables were traditional indicators of the socioeconomic
status of a tract's population: median school years completed, percent
white collar workers, percent families with incomes over $10,000, median
annual family income, percent families with income under $3,000, and
percent unemployed workers. Three variables were indicators of the qua-
lity of living conditions: percent housing built after 1950 (new housing
at the time), percent substandard housing, and population per household.
Two indicated the family status or stage of the life cycle of a census
tract's population: percent population under sixteen (an indicator of
what percentage is young families with children) , and percent popula-
tion over sixty-five. One variable, the percent population Negro,
indicated the minority composition of the population.
Variables which loaded high on the Socioeconomic Status Factor
(a .400 correlation or higher was considered to be a high loading) were
median school years completed, median annual income, percent white col-
lar workers, families with income over $10,000 and housing built after
1950. Percent families with incomes under $3,000, percent substandard
housing, and percent unemployed workers had high negative loadings.
Variables highly correlated with the Stage of the Life Cycle
(Family Status) Factor included population per household, percentage
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of the population under 18, and housing built after 1950. Percent popu-
lation over sixty-five had a high negative loading on this factor.
Variables with high loadings on the Race and Resources Factor
included percent Negro population, percent families with income under
S3, 000, percent substandard housing and percent unemployed workers.
Percent families with income over $10,000 and median family income had
high negative correlations with Race and Resources.
Most importantly, census tracts with low Socioeconomic Status
(factor scores of .66 or -.66 were considered to be high or low, respec-
tively,) in later Stages of the Life Cycle, and with high percentages of
Blacks with few resources, were grouped in the center of Chicago and in
the centers of the larger suburban communities. Specific tracts, how-
ever, did not all load highly on all three factors. High status tracts
which were mainly white with substantial resources, and with mostly
young families, formed in general the first ring of suburbs. However,
again specific tracts did not necessarily have high scores for all three
factors. Outlying suburbs were generally in the middle range of factor
scores (-.66 to +.66) for all three factors. 1"65
In sum, the Berry and Horton factors for Chicago do not disprove
the widely held viewpoint-^6 of the metropolitan development pattern
that in general the central city's population is more resource poor,
blacker, older and has poorer quality of living conditions compared
to the suburban population which has more resources, is whiter and
younger with higher quality of living conditions, and that the outlying
suburbs fall somewhere in between. Also, the Berry and Horton findings
suggest that racial and socioeconomic segregation vary together by
AO
metropolitan location.
In the lead article of the legal symposium on exclusionary zon-
ing cited earlier, 167 Williams and Norman did an exploratory quantita-
tive analysis of zoning using New Jersey data and mainly descriptive
statistics. They listed six devices that are potentially used for ex-
clusionary purposes. These were minimum building size requirements,
the exclusion of multiple dwellings, restrictions on the number of bed-
rooms, prohibition of mobile homes, frontage requirements, and large
lot size requirements. Their data revealed several interesting find-
ings. First, large lot size requirements were not imposed on signifi-
cant portions of towns in the four New Jersey counties that they stud-
ied. Second, they questioned the supposed relationship of lot size to
lot price. Smaller lots may actually be more expensive than large lots.
If the supply of small lots is limited by zoning to less than the nor-
mally greater demand for them, the price of small lots will soar accor-
dingly. 168 Last, there was little correlation among the exclusionary
devices themselves. Towns use one or two of them, but rarely all.
In spite of these findings which contradict some of the conven-
tional wisdom of the exclusionary zoning hypothesis, Williams and Nor-
man concluded that the zoning ordinances in the subject towns were high-
ly exclusionary on their face, and that they promoted a "parochial" gen-
eral welfare to the detriment of the general welfare of the region. 16 9
In 1973, Branfman, Cohen and Trubekl70 attempted to analyze the
degree of "income group clustering"!?^ in thirty of the largest metro-
politan areas and to explain variations among the areas by seven varia-
bles, four which measure various aspects of fiscal zoning, and three
other variables. These were the number of zoning authorities, the per-
cent minority population, and the degree of concentration of housing
stock a decade earlier. Branfman, et al., found that the fiscal motive
variables taken separately had little and insignificant explanatory
power. However, all seven variables as a group explained fifty-five
percent of the variance in clustering among metropolitan areas. They
interpreted the somewhat high explanatory power of zoning agency frag-
mentation and earlier availability of housing to indicate that public
policies do affect economic segregation to some extent. The correla-
tion of minority population with income group clustering was interpre-
ted to indicate that racial motivations may be behind public policies.
The Branfman, et al., research design is inadequate for the pur-
poses of this research. The index derived to measure the clustering
of income groups is less than satisfactory. Concentrating on income as
the single measure of segregation ignores the traditionally held, wider
view that residential segregation is racial and socioeconomic, and not
just economic, that is, that residential segregation is also related
to race, education and occupation. The index as coded may have re-
sulted in inflated correlations because it was calculated by "using
municipalities rather than census tracts" and so is "by definition
related to the number of municipalities in an SMSA." 172
A second set of problems deals with the independent variables.
The authors shied away from using specific zoning measures since the
costs of gathering this data for thirty metropolitan areas were pro-
hibitive. In addition, they knew of "no objective method by which all
these devices can be compared, measured and ranked along a single quan-
titative scale.
"
17 3
The first objection to using explanatory zoning variables can
be overcome by limiting data gathering to a single metropolitan area.
What such an analysis gives up in national applicability is outweighed
by the benefits of specificity in pinpointing various exclusionary as-
pects in zoning policies, and by the benefits of cost limitation.
As for the second objection, the major alleged exclusionary de-
vices (lot size, frontage, percentage of land zoned for multi-family
housing, etc.,) do not present insurmountable difficulties in measure-
ment. They are comparable among municipalities at least within states.
State zoning enabling legislation sets out the basic allowable zoning
mechanisms to which localities must conform. Williams and Norman did
an adequate job of measuring the independent side of the exclusionary
zoning equation for four New Jersey counties. 174 Further, although it
may well be impossible to rank manually such measures along a single
quantitative scale so that individual jurisdictions can be ranked as
more or less exclusionary, doing so is not necessary for an evaluation
of the exclusionary effects of zoning when considering metropolitan-
wide areas. Computer procedures such as stepwise multiple regression
and canonical correlation can give a relative order of the explanatory
power of such variables. Factor analysis can possibly develop compo-
site variables which rank the contribution of specific variables to the
factors. Factor scores or canonical variates can be computed for spe-
cific census tracts if an overall rank of jurisdictions on an exclu-
sionary continuum is desired.
That the authors found the number of zoning authorities in an
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area to be directly and significantly related to variations in incc
group clustering among metropolitan areas says nothing about intra-
metropolitan area exclusion, that is, the suburban-central city eco-
logy and its origin. The number of zoning authorities measure lacks
the necessary specificity.
Last, using the race variable in an independent position is not
the usual treatment. That race and income vary together by location
is generally interpreted to mean that urban minorities are a large per-
centage of the poor, that central city minorities have less income than
suburban Whites, and that less income limits minorities to less expen-
sive central city residency. The authors admit that the implication of
public authorities as racist on the basis of the race and metropolitan
fragmentation relationship to income group clustering is tentative at
best
.
The Branfman, et al., study is valuable, however, in that it
provides a conceptual framework for analysis of exclusionary zoning and
residential segregation. One first operationalizes residential segre-
gation variables, combines them into an index, scale, factors, or vari-
ates, and then seeks to explain them statistically by similarly opera-
tionalized or combined zoning policy variables.
The methodological difficulties that Branfman, et al., encoun-
tered are not insurmountable. The concept of income group clustering
can be enlarged to include other ecological variables which can be com-
bined statistically. Data gathering can be limited to one metropolitan
area so that costs are not excessive. Zoning variables can be opera-
tionalized and statistically combined, and their explanatory power can
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be ranked. The logical leaps of interpretation necessitated by their
inability to include specific zoning, independent variables can be
minimized
.
In 1975, Stulll75 anaiy2ed 1960 data for the Boston ^
quantified several land use variables to explain the quality of living
conditions of the area as measured by the median value of single-family
houses. Variables reflecting land use environments and used to explain
median single-family value included the proportions of land in each com-
munity contained in the major land use categories (residential, commer-
cial, industrial, institutional and agricultural), 176 the proportions
of multi-family land, and the proportions of undeveloped land. Stull
found that the value of the typical single-family property depended
significantly upon community land use patterns. 177 Communities that
were zoned primarily residential with minimal commercial uses had high
median single-family values while those that had "large amounts of
multiple-family, commercial, industrial or vacant land" 178 had signi-
ficantly lower median single family values.
Stull 's work did not specifically examine zoning as an exclusion-
ary device. Stull was more interested in examining general land devel-
opment patterns to see if they influence the value of houses. However,
his inclusion of the proportions of multi-family land as a measure of
the land use environment can be taken as a measure of public policy
since zoning regulations are used in a negative manner to exclude this
type of development. 17 ^ His evidence supports the exclusionary hypo-
thesis in this limited sense.
Stull 's research, contrary to the contentions of Branfman, et al„,
-es m
illustrates the possibility of operationally land use variabl.
the context of a single metropolitan area. With slight conversions of
his independent variables from actual development patterns to zoning
for these patterns and inclusion of other zoning variables, his metho-
dology can be used in an exclusionary zoning analysis. On the depen-
dent variable side, median single-family value would be only one mea-
sure of the urban ecology. Use of Berry and Horton 's methodology would
enlarge Stull's description of the metropolitan development pattern.
Also in 1975, Cottingham180 published a study of the patterns of
residence of black income groups in the Philadelphia SMSA. She found
that "black residential decisions are relatively insensitive to in-
come, "181 that is, when Blacks attain sufficient income levels to move
to the suburbs, they do not do so in any great numbers. Cottingham
attributed this to reluctance on the part of Blacks to leave their se-
cure neighborhoods in the central city. 182 An important implication
of the findings is that some Blacks are attaining high enough income
levels to enable them to overcome economic spatial segregation. Yet
income is not sufficient to open the door to upper class, white sub-
urbia.
In 1977, Reynolds Farley-^83 developed an alternative to the
Berry and Horton methodology for measuring the urban ecology. Farley
was able to pinpoint the differences in racial and socioeconomic segre-
gation in suburbs and central city that were implied by the Berry and
Horton and Cottingham analyses. Farley's "indexes of dissimilarity"-'-8 ^
measured socioeconomic status differences of black and white populations
residing in randomly selected central city and suburban census tracts
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throughout the nation. An index of dissimilarity measures what percen-
tage of a given class of persons must be shifted from a census tract to
eliminate its "segregation from all other groups.
"
18 5
Farley found that both Blacks and Whites are somewhat segregated
by socioeconomic status. Percentages ranged from eighteen to twenty-
nine for randomly selected income, education and occupation groups.
The pattern of socioeconomic segregation was similar in both central
cities and suburbs. Social class segregation, although existent, was
not as great as is commonly supposed either within the suburbs or cen-
tral cities taken separately, or between central cities and suburbs
compared to each other.
However, racial segregation among all socioeconomic levels was
far more extensive (in the eighty percent or more range). In addition,
suburban census tracts were more racially segregated than central city
tracts, possibly because there are more racially transitional neighbor-
hoods in the central cities than in suburbs. Most importantly, black
professionals do not reside in the same suburban areas as white pro-
fessionals, nor do black day laborers reside among white day laborers
in the central cities.
Farley concluded that his findings do not support traditional
theories which hold that class status and race vary together by central
city and suburban location. Racial segregation in central cities, and
especially in the suburbs, is far more extensive than socioeconomic seg-
regation.
Farley made no attempt to "indicate what processes produce" resi-
dential segregation, 186 but called for more analysis of the causes of
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this phenomenon. However, his findings and Cottingham's implications
add credence to the Taeubers' hypothesis that residential segregation
is racially motivated and cannot be attributed solely to socioeconomic
differences between the races.
Clay's findings"? supported and refined Farley's conclusions.
He found that when Blacks do move to the suburbs, they are "resegre-
11 1 8 8gated" and not interspersed in white neighborhoods. However, high
income suburban Blacks were not as highly segregated as low and moder-
ate income Blacks.
In 1978, Erickson and Miller 18 ? published a study which repli-
cated the methodology of Berry and Horton and updated it with 1970 data.
They extracted a factor similar to "Race and Resources" but with
slightly different variables loading on it, and with a slightly differ-
ent interpretation. They found that when Blacks suburbanize, they do
not generally escape the lack of resources of Blacks in general. On
the contrary, poverty variables slighly increase their high loadings
on the Race and Resources factor in suburban census tracts. Blacks
who do live in suburbia have slightly lower average incomes than those
who live in the central cities.
Erickson and Miller further dissected the metropolitan develop-
ment pattern by controlling for geographic region. Only in the West did
the pattern of "higher race and resources associations in suburban areas
than central cities" 190 break down. The selected variables had the high-
est loadings on the Race and Resources factor in the suburbs and central
cities of the Northeast and North Central Regions. The highly indus-
trialized areas are the most highly residentially segregated both in
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terms of race and socioeconomic status.
Guestl91 and Guest and Nelson^ sought to explain chang<
time in the socioeconomic status of central city and suburban resi-
dents. Guest suggested that the high rates of population growth in the
suburbs are responsible for their gains in socioeconomic status relative
to the central cities. 193
Guest and Nelson documented suburban gains in socioeconomic sta-
tus. Persons with high socioeconomic status have fled the central ci-
ties. They attributed this migration to political annexation, 194 age,
structural characteristics, population growth rate, density of the sub-
ject metropolitan areas, and to the location of manufacturing. 195 They
saw central cities as losing persons with high socioeconomic status be-
cause the urban cores are physically older, more deteriorated, more
densely settled, have less land available for industrial expansion, and
have smaller population growth rates than the suburbs. Suburbs on the
contrary are gaining persons with high socioeconomic status because in-
dustry and jobs are moving there, land is available for construction of
housing and industry, and federal housing policies encourage suburban
development
.
19 ^
Both studies have at least two problems. First, socioeconomic
status is measured by a single indicator, the percentage of the popu-
lation over twenty-five years with a high school education or more.
Given the wide availability of more detailed indices of socioeconomic
status, use of one variable is less than adequate. Second, the causal
order that is assumed is questionable. An equally plausible interpre-
tation would be that it is the socioeconomic status of already esta~
blished suburban populations which increases their growth rates, and
that high growth rates make suburbs attractive to industry. The sub-
urbs in turn use exclusionary zoning to create their newer and higher
quality housing construction. Stahura,197 ln fact> makes Ms u-t
point. He uses standard regression analysis to explain indices of
socioeconomic status based on both 1960 and 1970 data. He found that
the socioeconomic characteristics of suburban residents persisted over
time and that the variance in current socioeconomic levels is almost
entirely predicted (90%) by four variables, earlier socioeconomic lev-
els, 198 population growth rates, the age of the suburb, and the sub-
urb's distance from the central city. Stahura interpreted these find-
ings in terms of land use regulations:
. . .
as a suburb ages and becomes established in an eco-
logical niche, the mechanisms by which it can regulate who
enters or leaves and how the area develops (e.g. zoning
laws) emerge and come to operate more efficiently. 199
In a last sociological article, Frey200 attempted to explain
rates of white outmigration from the central cities of thirty metropol-
itan areas by percentages of Blacks in those cities. He found that
cities with large percentages of Blacks also had high rates of "white
flight." The strong correlation between these two variables could not
be eliminated by controlling for numerous other relevant variables.
His findings support the hypothesis that the movement of Whites to the
suburbs is racially motivated.
In sum, the sociological literature is gathering growing amounts
of evidence which documents that metropolitan areas continue to be seg-
regated by race, that socioeconomic differences between the races are
not as prevalent or as important as they once were, and that residen-
tial segregation is attributable to racial motivations.
In general, the quantitative literature provides examples of
various research methodologies which are relevant to this research.
Williams and Norman quantified zoning characteristics. However, they
characterized the analyzed zoning ordinances as exclusionary without
reference to the actual development pattern of the metropolitan area
in question. They assumed that residential segregation exists in the
New Jersey suburbs of New York City.
Stull also operationalized land use variables but without speci-
fic reference to exclusion. Stull did attempt to link his independent
variables to at least one characteristic of the metropolitan develop-
ment pattern. Considering Stull 's differing purposes, his methodology
is inadequate for this study. He failed to use available research to
describe the urban ecology.
The works of Williams and Norman and Stull should adequately
dispel any doubts which linger from the objections of Branfman, et al.,
as to the measurability of zoning variables, at least in a given metro-
politan region. Branfman, et al., made an important contribution to
the literature in spite of their less than satisfactory operational
definitions of zoning policy and the urban ecology. They provided a
conceptual framework which can be used in future research. Their ac-
tual research design uses some zoning variables to explain economic
segregation. It needs only to be expanded to include other exclusion-
ary zoning techniques on the independent side of the equation, and to
include other aspects of the urban ecology as quantified and analyzed
by Berry and Horton, and Erickson and Miller, on the dependent side.
The research design used in this study will seek to combine the best
from these earlier studies and to compensate for what is lacking in
them, in order to get a clearer picture of the relationship between
exclusionary zoning and the urban ecology.
However, before the statistical latticework can be erected, the
framework which constrains the hypothesized relationship between zoning
and the urban ecology and which is provided by the law of zoning must
be explored.
CHAPTER HI
THE LEGAL CLIMATE OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES
From the birth of zoning in the early twentieth century to the
present, the power to zone land for various uses has been vested pri-
marily in local government (villages, towns, townships, cities and coun-
ties), State governments have provided enabling legislation which au-
thorizes local governments to zone and which establishes the broad pa-
rameters of the zoning power. Local governmental officials have tradi-
tionally interpreted this authorization to zone as an area of local au-
tonomy. They consider the zoning power to be akin to the right to con-
trol schools, one of those few local prerogatives which can largely be
kept free from interference by higher governmental levels.
Yet this local interpretation of the exclusivity of the zoning
power is less than exact. The fifth and fourteenth amendments of the
federal Constitution, and federal and state laws which deal with pro-
perty rights, racial discrimination and related issues, impinge on the
zoning power. When violations of the Constitution or statutes are
alleged to occur in specific zoning acts, then cracks appear in the
protective shell of local autonomy. Zoning slides into the jurisdic-
tion of the appropriate state or federal court. The interpretations
of the constitutional amendments and these laws in relation to zoning
in federal or state court decisions become highly relevant. Federal
decisions establish what can and cannot be done by localities when
federal issues such as racial discrimination are involved. Likewise,
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decision rules in state cases establish precedent. For the future,
they bring to bear the force of law on all localities in the state.
Thus the constitutional amendments, statutes and case law circumscribe
the local zoning power and make it less than totally autonomous. Con-
sequently, it is important to review both the federal initiative which
deals directly or indirectly with the issue of exclusionary zoning, as
well as the case law in those states in which the judiciary has been
active in dealing with this issue. The purpose of this chapter is to
explicate how the constitutional provisions, federal statutes, and fed-
eral and state court decisions establish the legal climate in which
local zoning operates. In addition, the chapter seeks to discover if
the legal constraints of zoning have clarified the contention of the
zoning literature that zoning is exclusionary and have established con-
clusive proof of the exclusionary zoning hypothesis.
The Federal Initiative
The body of federal provisions which deals implicitly or expli-
citly with zoning is divided into three parts: the constitutional
amendments, congressional legislation, and the case law, both that of
the Supreme Court and of lower federal courts, which interprets both
the constitutional amendments and statutes.
Constitutional provisions
. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
federal Constitution are the most general of the federal provisions.
The fifth amendment prevents the federal government from depriving
citizens of "property, without due process of law."l When a federal
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agency such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
is involved in a local housing decision which affects minorities, then
the fifth amendment becomes applicable. Federal allocation of housing
monies and locational decisions for subsidized housing must treat mi-
norities fairly.
The fourteenth amendment applies the fifth amendment to the states
and provides additional protection. It declares that no state shall
deprive any person of
. . . property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws,
2
The fifth and fourteenth amendment due process clauses, and the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment form the basis for tra-
ditional challenges of zoning as unconstitutional public action in both
state and federal courts. Restrictions on property which make racial
distinctions deny due process. Regulations which discriminate against
minorities on their face deny equal protection of the laws. However,
because few ordinances today discriminate blatantly, 3 and because
judicial interpretations have diluted the efficacy of due process and
equal protection as applied to sub rosa exclusion, 4 stiffer federal
legislation dealing with alleged discriminatory state or local prac-
tices has supplemented the constitutional protections.
Federal statutes . In the post-Civil War period, three federal statutes
were enacted which intended to provide civil and property rights for
freed black slaves. The Civil Rights Act of 1866^ provided for equal
property rights for all citizens under the law, both black and white.
^
It states:
All citizens or the United States shall have the same rightin every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white cTl-zens thereof, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold andconvey real and personal property. 1
The Civil Rights Act of 18708 guaranteed equal contractual and
adjudicatory rights for minorities. 9 The Civil Rights Act of 187110
authorized civil actions and damages for citizens deprived of their
constitutional "rights, privileges or immunities" by state officials.il
In the twentieth century, these statutes had been largely for-
gotten until the nineteen sixties when they were resurrected in exclu-
sionary zoning litigation. Throughout the sixties and seventies they
were used as partial bases for overruling local housing and zoning
decisions which the courts adjudged to be discriminatory.12
Although the early civil rights laws furnished some legal basis
to attack alleged discriminatory zoning, they proved inadequate to deal
with the massive civil rights and housing problems of the sixties. Con-
sequently, Congress passed the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968.
The 1964 law was in part intended to afford equal housing oppor-
tunity for minorities. It states that
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any programs or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. 13
The 1964 Act did not extend to alleged exclusionary zoning per
jse. Since most federal housing funds during the sixties were funneled
into inner-city, minority areas, 14 and since the law provided equal
treatment for minorities only in federally-assisted projects, suburban
communities were able to avoid the law's anti-discriminatory provisions.
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By not zoning any land for multi-family housing, local governments
could thereby refuse to accept federally subsidized housing. Thus they
were able to avoid the question of the race of potential occupants.15
The Fair Housing Act of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Title
VIII) 16 was addressed in part to suburban exclusion itself. 17 Under
the Act all governmental agencies, including housing and zoning author-
ities, must make decisions concerning housing and land use without re-
gard to race. 18 Virtually all-white municipalities cannot deliberately
use zoning to prevent construction of integrated, subsidized low-
income housing. 19 Allocational decisions which perpetuate racial-
spatial segregation, that is, zoning decisions which have a discrim-
inatory effect, constitute "a prima facie violation of the Fair Hou-
sing Act."20
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 was designed
to put some muscle into the civil rights legislation. 2 ! Any munici-
pality which wishes to be eligible for community development funding,
"including the park and street funding suburban communities desire
most, " is required to prepare a housing assistance plan which states
the community's intentions to furnish housing for low income families
"residing or expected to reside in the community . "23 The legislative
intent behind the "expected to reside" phrasing was that suburbs should
do their part to provide housing for low income persons. 24
This framework of federal congressional legislation aimed to
facilitate the desegregation of metropolitan areas. However, the legis-
lation furnishes only the foundation of that intention. The interpre-
tations placed on the legislation by the federal courts, especially the
57
Supreme Court, give flesh and detail to the basic law. Judicial deci-
sions have determined the application and parameters of the legislation.
Consequently, Supreme Court and lower federal court cases which deal
with alleged exclusionary zoning will be sequentially examined.
Supreme Court cases. The Supreme Court dealt with racially discrimina-
tory zoning as early as 1917. The Court ruled in Buchanan v. Warlev 2 ^
that a Louisville, Kentucky zoning ordinance which established white
and black only zoning districts was unconstitutional under the four-
teenth amendment. 26 The Court held that the white plaintiff in the
case was denied property rights without due process of law, and that
Blacks were denied equal protection of the laws. It stated that "[a]
plainer case of racial discrimination cannot well be imagined. "27
In spite of this early ruling, it is alleged that many expli-
citly discriminatory ordinances remained unchallenged and stayed on the
books as late as the 1950s. 28 Thus segregated living patterns are said
to have gained persistence and permanence from institutionalized, al-
though illegal, sanctions.
In 1926, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
zoning itself in the landmark Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty' Co
.
case. 2 ^ The Court held that zoning does not deprive the citizenry of
due process, equal protection, or any fundamental right. Zoning for
the separation of land uses was held to be a legitimate exercise of
the police power as long as an ordinance is rationally related to the
general welfare, health, safety or morals of the locality, that is, to
a legitimate governmental objective. 30 This Euclidean rational rela-
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tionship, police power or due process test established the precedent
of a strong presumption of validity for zoning ordinances, since the
broad term "general welfare" can give legitimacy to almost any govern-
mental purpose. 31 Wide deference must be given to the local legisla-
tive interpretation of the general welfare. 32 The Court win not
scrutinize zoning laws unless they are "clearly arbitrary and unrea-
sonable. "33 it has been said that conS eqUently a provincial concept
of the general welfare in zoning has been safely cloaked under the
mantle of due process and equal protection. 34
Two years following the Euclid case, the Supreme Court held in
Nectow v. City of Cambridge 3 5 that the residential zoning of a small
strip of land deprived the owner of property without due process. 36
The zoning classification as applied to the one-hundred foot strip bore
no rational relationship to the general welfare. It promoted no legit-
imate governmental objective and was clearly arbitrary and unreason-
able. 37
Subsequent to Nectow
,
the Court would adhere faithfully to its
Euclid dictum of deference to the legislature. It would not review
another zoning case for more than forty-five years. The 1970s would
bring an end to that hiatus.
Although zoning itself was not involved in James v. Valtierra ,38
this 1971 case dealt with a related, and crucial, exclusionary issue.
Article XXXIV of the California state constitution requires a majority
of local voters to approve low-income housing, including federally-
subsidized projects, by referendum, before funds can be allocated and
construction can be undertaken. 39 The Court in Valtierra upheld the
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use of the referendum under the presumption of constitutionality rule
of Euclid, what has come to be called the old or traditional equal pro-
tection doctrine. 40 No denial of equal protection wag involved ^
Valtierra
,
because Article XXXIV was entirely neutral on its face.
Nothing in its wording indicated racial animus. 4 1
The Court refused to apply the new equal protection doctrine of
strict scrutiny which it had enunciated in 1969. 4 2 The new equal prQ_
tection doctrine dissolves the presumption of validity of legislation
under the due process or old equal protection rule, when a classifica-
tion based on a suspect criterion (race, alienage or national origin)
is contained in the law, or when a fundamental right is threatened. 43
The burden of proof shifts to the government to justify its legislation
by a "compelling governmental interest." If less "onerous" 44 means are
available to achieve the same legitimate governmental goal, the alter-
native which infringes more greatly on the fundamental right may not be
used. 45
The Court held in Valtierra that Article XXXIV made no classi-
fications on the basis of race. Rather it was confined to "economic
and social welfare issues,"45 that is, classifications on the basis of
wealth which are not suspect, 47 and to access to housing which is not
a fundamental right. 4 ^
Further, California had historically used referenda to approve
a wide variety of local governmental decisions. That the voters should
decide issues which might involve substantial local outlays was entire-
ly appropriate. 4 9 The Court stated that " [pjrovisions for referendums
demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or
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prejudice. "50
Early commentators on the Valtierra reasoning feared that the
case might be indicative of the Court's continuing unwillingness to
address the alleged inequities of suburban zoning policies. 51 The
zoning decisions of the middle seventies were to confirm this sus-
picion.
In 1974 the Court set aside its long refusal to review zoning
legislation and considered the case of Village of Belle Terre v
.
Bpraas.52 Belle Terre> New York had passed & ordinance which
classified all its residential areas as single-family. 53 In addition,
occupancy of single-family houses was limited to no more than two per-
sons unrelated by blood, marriage or adoption. 54 A group of six,
mixed-sex, graduate students who rented a single-family house were
found by the village to be in violation of the ordinance. 55 They
challenged the law's constitutionality.
The Supreme Court upheld the Belle Terre provisions under the
due process or old equal protection doctrine of Euclid . 56 j t held
that the ordinance bore a reasonable relationship to the legitimate
governmental objective of promoting the general welfare. The general
welfare objectives were conceived of here as protection of "social
homogeneity, "57 the "family" character of the community, 58 and the
"peace and quiet" associated with suburban living. 59 gy controlling
population density and growth rate, the potentially detrimental "urban
problems" that accompany high density developments (for example,
traffic and noise) would be abated.
^
In upholding the ordinance the Court used only minimal scrutiny
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and deferred to the legislature. It did not examine the legislative
means nor require the locality to justify its restrictions as com-
pelling governmental interests, because there was no question of a
suspect classification in the ordinance nor were any fundamental rights
involved. 61 The students had alleged that their rights to travel,
association and privacy had been violated. 62 The Court rejected this
claim of fundamentality
.
Belle Terre dealt with "sociological zoning" rather than exclu-
sionary zoning in the traditional sense of economic and racial inequity.
Yet by sanctioning the total exclusion of multi-family housing, the
Court in the Belle Terre case cast an enlarged shadow over efforts of
inclusionary zoning proponents. In effect, the Court gave its impri-
matur to the local public policy of maintaining exclusivity by allowing
only the right kind of people, whether defined as families, the afflu-
ent, or those of majoritarian race or ethnicity, to gain the benefits
of high quality suburban residency.
The Supreme Court further buttressed local autonomy in cases in
which discrimination by local officials is alleged 63 in the school de-
segregation case of Milliken v. Bradlev 64 also heard in 1974. The Dis-
trict Court had ordered metropolitan-wide consolidation of Detroit area
school districts, including suburban districts, in order to overcome
segregation in the schools of the central city. 65 The Court rejected
the multi-district remedy as an unauthorized interference by the lower
court in the operations and structure of localities. 66 Although the
Court recognized that local zoning and housing policy can contribute
to school segregation, 6 '7 it held that no evidence had been given in this
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case to show that suburban school officials or suburban public policy
had in any way contributed to the suburban-central city, segregated
residential pattern and resultant school segregation. There was no
evidence of a constitutional violation by the suburbs. 68 The metro-
politan-wide remedy failed for lack of investigation of the relation-
ship between zoning policy and the segregated urban ecology.
In the 1975 term, the Supreme Court used a procedural gambit to
narrow the justiciable exclusionary zoning issues further. In Warth v
.
Seldin,69 the Court held that nonresidents lack standing t0 challenge
exclusionary zoning regulations. At issue was a restrictive zoning
ordinance of Penfield, New York, a suburb of Rochester. The ordinance
zoned less than one percent of its developable land for multi-family
housing and, by requiring large lots, setbacks and minimum floor areas,
made it practically impossible to build a detached home for under
$29,000.70
Four classes of plaintiffs challenged the ordinance. Nonresi-
dent low-income persons claimed unlawful exclusion. Rochester taxpayers
alleged that they paid inordinately high taxes for city services be-
cause they were forced to support a disproportionate number of low-
income housing projects which were granted tax abatements. Penfield
residents claimed a right to live in an integrated community. Housing
contractors claimed loss of income from not being able to build market-
able and profitable housing.
The Court in its reasoning followed the "causality rule" esta-
blished in Milliken . 72 it held that a "causal link" must be esta-
blished^ between "a purposeful continuing policy of exclusion"^ and
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a real, concrete and personalized harm suffered by those who allege
discriminatory effect. 75 Since the plaintiffs did ^ ^ their
to any specific housing project, and since the low-income nonresidents
could not show that easing of the ordinance's provisions would actually
result in construction of housing which they could inhabit, none of the
plaintiffs had demonstrated a concrete, particularized injury. All
lacked standing to sue in court. 76 In enunciating that a purposeful,
continuing exclusionary policy must be proven, the Court laid the
groundwork for consideration of the exclusionary zoning issue itself
in the 1977 Arlington Heights case. 77 However, by ruling on the stand-
ing issue, the Court at this time bypassed consideration of the merits.
Subsequently in 1976, the Court did squarely address the housing
desegregation issue in Hills v. Gautreaux .78 This case was not con_
cerned with exclusionary zoning as such but with suits against the Chi-
cago Housing Authority and HUD for consistently locating public housing
in Chicago ghetto areas. 79
The Court ruled that this continuous policy of discrimination
by federal and state public agencies violated the fifth amendment of
the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1968. 8 0 It or-
dered a metropolitan-wide remedy. Thereafter, public housing would
have to be located well out in the suburbs, throughout the Chicago
metropolitan housing market, and not just within the Chicago city
limits. 81
In ordering a regional remedy, the Court relied on the Milliken
decision and distinguished the Gautreaux facts from those of Milliken. 8 ^
While the facts in Milliken evidenced no unconstitutional, public dis-
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crimination with areawide impact, evidence of such discrimination was
contained in Gautreaux.33 while che Detroit school ^ ^
statutory authority to operate outside Detroit, the Chicago Housing
Authority was precisely empowered to do so. 84
The Court also addressed the issues of intergovernmental rela-
tions and the powers of the judiciary. While consolidation of school
districts would substantially alter the structure of local governments,
location of public housing by a regionally-empowered housing authority
would not disturb existing governmental structure. 8 5 While court-
ordered consolidation of school districts would involve judicially or-
dered sacrifice of local autonomy (a violation of the principles of
separation of powers and federalism), local autonomy would not be
sacrificed by court mandated regional location of housing. Local
governments would for the most part retain traditional powers to reg-
ulate land use. Local approval for housing projects on specific sites
would still be required. ^6
Although Gautreaux seemed like a victory for open housing ad-
vocates, shortly afterwards in the same term the court retreated from
the promise of Gautreaux in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises
,
8 7Inc. Eastlake was a case parallel to Valtierra
. The plaintiff had
sought and gained a rezoning of property from the Eastlake, California
planning commission and city council in order to build a low-income
housing project. Subsequently, the voters approved by legislative ini-
tiative a modification of the city charter which required referendum
approval of all zoning changes by a fifty-five percent margin. The
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multi-family rezoning was then disapproved by referendum. The Supreme.
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Court upheld the validity of the referendum.
The Court held that the referendum was not an unconstitutional
delegation of the legislative function. Rather, it was a legitimate
and praiseworthy reservation of "power by the people themselves, "89
an appropriate means to assure that community residents would be able
to control the future course of change in their community. Since ref-
erenda were required for all rezonings and not just for low-income
housing, there was no question of racial discrimination which would
constitute denial of equal protection. 90
The 1977 term marked a partial turning point in the Court's
narrow interpretation of the exclusionary zoning issue. In the land-
mark decision of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation^! the Court broadened its interpretation of the
standing issue and considered the merits of the exclusionary zoning
claim itself. However, in the bottom line of the case, the Court found
no proof of exclusion in this instance. It refused to accept the claim
by a developer that the failure by the village of Arlington Heights, a
Chicago suburb, to rezone a parcel of land for federally subsidized,
low-cost housing, was a racially discriminatory violation of equal pro-
tection. 92
The standing issue in Arlington Heights was more broadly inter-
preted than in the Warth case. The Arlington facts were distinguished
from Warth
,
and standing was granted to both plaintiffs, the Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corporation and black nonresidents, who joined
in the suit. 93 Since a proposal for a specific project did exist, and
since the developer corporation had expended considerable funds for
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plans for it, its alleged economic injury was real and specific enough
to warrant standing. 94 Aithough one 31ack who had joined^^ ^
the suit was a nonresident, his grievance was not "generalized," be-
cause he worked in Arlington Heights and commuted a twenty mile dis-
tance. These facts indicated that he had sustained an "'actionable
causal relationship' between Arlington Heights' zoning practices and
his asserted injury. "95 Standing was granted because he was denied
housing near his employment. In granting standing to a nonresident,
the Court implicitly acknowledged that the effects of zoning extend
beyond the borders of the zoning community into the region surrounding
that community.
In considering the merits of the exclusionary zoning claim, the
Court relied on its ruling in Washington v. Davis , 9 6 a case decided
a year earlier. The Court held that a "racially disproportionate im-
pact" of an official action is not sufficient to constitute an equal
protection violation. "Proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose" must be furnished. 97
The Court then set out a series of criteria which could be used
to prove racially discriminatory intent. First, disproportionate im-
pact, that is, discriminatory effect, can be a "starting point. "98
Second, "[t]he historical background of the decision
. . . particularly
if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious pur-
poses'^ is persuasive. Third, discriminatory intent can be shown by
"[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged deci-
sion . . . [for example,] departures from the normal procedural se-
quence . . . [or] substantive departures . . .
,
particularly if the
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factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly
favor a decision contrary to the one reached. "100 Lastj "[ t ] he i egis_
lative or administrative history may be relevant
. . . [including]
contemporary statements by members of the decision-making body, min-
utes of its meetings, or reports.
"
101
Although there was some evidence of disproportionate impact in
the Arlington Heights record, there was no evidence that any of the
other criteria had been met. In short, racially discriminatory intent
had not been proven in this case, and the ordinance and zoning decision
were left intact. 102
Legal commentators have maintained that the Arlington Heights
case was the culmination of the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize
the discriminatory and exclusionary aspects of suburban zoning. The
series of cases of the 1970s which began with Valtierra and ended with
Arlington Heights has been roundly criticized in the legal literature.
The Valtierra decision is said to be "unsatisfying because it
exacerbates the isolation of the poor - especially the minority group
poor long subjected to discrimination because of race - within the
inner city."10^
The Belle Terre holding has been called "a pronouncement by the
United States Supreme Court that municipal parochialism will be judi-
cially tolerated." 104
Lawrence Sager attacked the somewhat circuitous reasoning of the
Warth opinion. He described it as "an analytical embarrassment" that
suggests that "standing doctrine was manipulated to avoid federal ad-
judication of the merits. . . . nl °5 Commenting on both Warth and
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Eastlake
, he said that
[considered in tandem
. . . [these cases] may be read as adirect message
. .
. [that] the federal judiJ ™ "perhaps in the most egregious cases, will simply not be
responsive [to pleas of exclusionary zoning. ]106
In reviewing the Gautreaux and Eastlake cases, Henry McGee
made the point that the Supreme Court does not want to tackle the
tough social issues involved in controversial zoning cases. 107
Robert Schwemm concluded that the Supreme Court has refused to
review the substantive issues involved in alleged violations of the
Fair Housing Act. 108
Another commentator, in considering the Eastlake decision, said
that "the imposition of a majority referendum for all zoning changes
is an unfair burden. "109
Kenneth Pearlman, after reviewing the Belle Terre
. Warth and
Arlington Heights reasonings, censured the Supreme Court for its tabling
of the discriminatory and social justice questions. He concluded that
".
.
.we have a right to expect more than we have received from the
Supreme Court in the last five or so years. "110
Carol Cohen maintained that the Arlington Heights opinion "mili-
tate [s] against the success of an' attack on exclusionary zoning based
on the correlation between racial and economic discrimination. "HI
However, at least one well-respected commentator has reacted
favorably to the trend of these cases. Daniel Mandelker stated that
[t]he Supreme Court demonstrated much perception in Arling-
ton Heights by acknowledging the highly judgmental character
of local legislative processes, such as zoning. ... To
leave the correction of these policy judgments to the poli-
tical arena when socially undesirable consequences occur
seems the wiser course. H2
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A 1976 commentary suggested that the Milliken denial of a
regional remedy "was an object lesson in the care that federalism de-
mands, which must be taken by the federal courts in granting relief
for unconstitutional acts of the state. "113
Although these last two commentators approve of the Court's di-
rection, they do so only on the basis that they think the remedy for
exclusionary public policy is legislative rather than judicial. They
do not question the cant of the substantive issues, that is, they do
not deny the alleged exclusionary and discriminatory aspects of the
zoning involved in these cases.
Summary of Supreme Court exclusionary zoning cases . The reasoning of
the Supreme Court in the housing and zoning decisions of the 1970s has
shown an increasing sophistication in analysis of alleged exclusionary
zoning. The Court has evolved from a narrow to a broader perspective.
Yet it has failed to follow this logical progression to its completion.
In interpreting the due process and equal protection clauses in
the early seventies' cases, the Court held to a strict constructionist
concept. It used the old equal protection doctrine in which public
actions are assumed to be constitutional if the actions are taken in
order to promote a legitimate governmental goal such as protection of
the general welfare. The locality's interpretation of the general wel-
fare as that of its own community interests, rather than that of the
region in which it is located, was accepted without question. The de-
nial of standing to regional residents in the Warth decision further
buttressed the localized interpretation of the general welfare.
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The reasoning for the Court's reliance on the old equal pro-
tection doctrine hinged upon the definition of suspect classification.
The prevention of multi-family, low-cost housing in the suburbs was
considered to be mere economic exclusion (which is permissible) because
the poor who reside in the low-cost housing are not a suspect classifi-
cation. For illegal discrimination to exist, the Court required that
the suspect classification of race be expressly involved in the alleged
violation. In establishing this standard, the Court created a logical,
poor-minority dichotomy which stood in contradiction to the economic-
racial reality of the United States. A poor-minority link rather than
dichotomy exists nationally and in most metropolitan areas, that is,
the majority of urban minorities are poor, and a large portion of the
urban poor are minorities. The Court refused to acknowledge this real-
ity.
The rationale of the poor-minority dichotomy provided suburban
officials with a carte blanche for zoning out subsidized housing. Most
suburban officials were aware of the reality of the poor-minority link,
that which the Court refused to accept. No officials need say that
they do not want subsidized housing because they want to keep out
Blacks or Hispanics. Indeed, in the post-civil rights movement age,
only the most isolated or red-necked official would be politically
foolish enough to do so. The exclusion of low-cost housing by suburban
officials need only be couched in acceptable general welfare language
which states that community character, that is, the localized general
welfare, is being protected from incompatible, multi-family, low-cost
housing. The blanket legal protection of the pseudo, poor-minority
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s
on
dichotomy could be used to activate the real, poor-minority link.
Poor Blacks could be safely excluded.
The acid criticism by the legal community of the Supreme Court
'
old equal protection rationale created the climate for the Court to
retreat from this doctrine in the Arlington Heights case. In Arlingt
Heights, the Court enunciated the disproportionate impact rule. That
the prevention of multi-family, low-cost housing through zoning impacts
Blacks disproportionately became sufficient to invoke strict scrutiny,
that is, the motivation of the legislature could be examined, and the
legislature could be required to justify its actions as a compelling
state interest. In addition, the Court acquiesced to a more regional
general welfare concept. It held that minority nonresidents in the re-
gion have a sufficient legal interest for standing if this interest is
particularized. The use of the new equal protection doctrine combined
with a more regional concept of the general welfare became the dispro-
portionate impact rule. Henceforth the Court would delve into the in-
tentions of public officials when few Blacks reside in a community, but
many live in the region, and when this segregated living pattern can be
related to the lack of low-cost housing in the community. In setting
these standards, the Court abandoned the poor-minority dichotomy and
accepted the poor-minority link.
However, disproportionate impact was held not to be sufficient
to prove illegal discrimination. Additional tests must be applied to
prove racially discriminatory intent. These tests again provide a
ready escape from zoning for multi-family housing for local zoning
officials
.
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If disproportionate impact is acknowledged, then the second
test requires that the historical background of the decision must
reveal a series of official actions for invidious purposes. In this
test, one or two racially discriminatory actions would not be suffi-
cient to invalidate the zoning decision. A series is required. Addi-
tionally, the series must not only be racially discriminatory, but it
must also be invidious. Those who are discriminated against must be
angry and resentful at the injustice, which is the dictionary defini-
tion of invidious. Apparently, a riot is necessary to prove an illegal
series of actions. If a suburb is such a tough nut to crack that minor-
ities have taken their integrative efforts elsewhere, then past, long-
term discrimination would not be invidious.
The third test requires procedural or substantive departures
from normal practices in the "sequence of events'* which led up to the
questioned decision. Examples given cite a sudden change of the land's
multi-family zoning to some other classification, 11^ and refusing to
rezone to multi-family when surrounding areas are so zoned. However,
both these examples have loopholes which allow municipalities to escape
the necessity of zoning for multi-family housing. The fallacy of the
first example is that most suburbs simply do not zone vacant land for
multi-family use. They therefore have no multi-family land co rezone
to some other use in the face of a multi-family proposal.
The second example of refusal to rezone to multi-family use in
the face of a multi-family proposal on the surface has more of a ring
of truth, since this is the primary means used to prevent low-cost
housing. However, in the cited example, the surrounding land was al-
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ready zoned for multi-family use. In exclusive suburbs, that simply
is not the case. They have no existent multi-family zoning, and lo-
cal officials do everything in their power to prevent that initial
project which would open the zoning floodgate to multi-family housing.
Consequently, multi-family proposals must necessarily be in areas where
the surrounding land has a different use, and it will always be incom-
patible with its surroundings. If single-family zoning is normal prac-
tice, then the factors usually considered important by the decision-
maker favor the denial. Those suburbs which have not completely pre-
vented multi-family zoning have typically permitted one or two projects
for the elderly. In order for such a jurisdiction to fail this test,
the denied multi-family proposal must necessarily be adjacent to these
existing projects. However, the jurisdiction could soundly argue that
family housing adjacent to elderly housing is incompatible since this
creates problems of noise and safety for old persons. Children and
teenagers do not mix easily with the elderly. Similarly, sound zoning
policy holds that multi-family housing should not be concentrated in
one area but should be scattered throughout a community. In short,
if multi-family zoning is requested in either single-family areas or
adjacent to already developed multi-family areas, under this test of
substantive departures it can always be denied.
The last test, that in which the administrative or legislative
history must show discriminatory statements of public officials, can
also be easily avoided. Most public officials are astute enough not
to make racist statements when the press is around or when a record is
being made of the proceedings . For example, in the exclusive suburb
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of Wilbraham, Massachusetts, every time the Subject of a pending multi-
family proposal was raised at a a selectmen's meeting, an executive
session was called, the room was cleared, and no record was kept of the
discussion.117 since local officials are skilled at not making racial-
ly discriminatory public statements, a litigant would be hardput to
find this kind of evidence in the record.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in the Arlington Heights deci-
sion made substantial progress from the earlier seventies' zoning and
housing cases in recognizing the realities of the zoning tactics which
are used to prevent minorities from living in suburban communities.
That a community is virtually all-white, and that prevention of low-
cost, multi-family housing perpetuates segregation, now allows the
motives of the local legislature to be scrutinized. That minority
nonresidents have standing if they have some legal interest, such as
employment, in the community, recognizes the regional impact of a
suburb's zoning. Yet the tests for proving discriminatory intent on the
part of local officials still supply adequate cover for all but the
most flagrant and conspicuous discrimination. Under the invidious
series rule, only long-term actions to which minorities strongly ob-
ject are illegal. If a suburb has never been under the threat of
integration, there would be no such invidious series. Under the ir-
regular procedures and abnormal substance rules, the past practice of
preventing multi-family housing sanctions its continuance. Under the
official statements rule, officials need only remain inscrutable, pub-
licly saying little or nothing about their motivation and necessarily
leaving it to be surmised under the previous tests. To require offi-
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cials to incriminate themselves through public word or action is
unrealistic. No official would willingly do so. Thus, once again
the Court has created a dichotomy between fact and reasoning by re-
quiring officials to be outspoken or explicitly discriminatory in
order for their acts to be illegal.
In summation, in the Arlington Heights case, the Court promul-
gated a rationale with ample escape hatches for those who would per-
petuate the segregated urban ecology. The Court challenged the con-
ventional wisdom of the exclusionary zoning literature by failing to
entertain the claim that zoning is exclusionary, unless there is
proof, as the Court defines it, of discriminatory motive behind the
zoning act. In essence, the segregated living pattern of metropolitan
areas, with minorities living in the inner city, surrounded by white
suburbanites, is accepted, since a remedy for zoning which keeps multi-
family housing and the poor minorities who would live in it out of the
suburbs has been denied in the highest court of the land.
Prior to the definitive ruling of the Arlington Heights case
which the lower federal courts are now bound to apply, some federal
courts used different reasoning and reached different conclusions than
the Supreme Court. The reasonings of the zoning decisions of the lower
federal courts (although admittedly moot since the landmark decision)
will be examined in the next section, since they shed light on alter-
native lines of analysis which have been used.
Other federal cases . In the decade or so prior to 1977, in general the
lower federal courts reasoned in zoning cases that proof of discrimina-
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tory effect was sufficient to invalidate a zoning ordinance or decision.
Proof of discriminatory motivation was not required. U8 It was the
reasoning of these lower courts that the Supreme Court rejected in
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights .n 9
In the 1970 case of Southern Alameda Spanish-Speaking Organi-
zation (SASSO) v. City of Union City. 120 a case heard by the N - nth
Circuit, the decisional outcome was in line with the Supreme Court's
general trend of the time of permitting rejection of low- income hou-
sing, although the reasoning was different. In SASSO
,
although a re-
zoning for low-income housing to be occupied primarily by Mexican-
Americans conformed to the Union City, California master plan and was
approved by the City, the voters rejected it by referendum. The Cir-
cuit Court upheld the referendum outcome. Although discriminatory
effect was enough to prove a denial of equal protection, there was no
discriminatory effect in this case, because there was no proof that
substantial amounts of low-income housing did not already exist in
Union City. 121 The Court accepted discriminatory impact as a guiding
rule because it felt that proof of discriminatory motive, in this case
of the voters and not local officials, would be impossible. 122
In Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna
,
123
a 1970
case heard by the Second Circuit, the court found wanting the claim
that lack of municipal infrastructure (sewers in this case) is a com-
pelling governmental interest sufficient to permit zoning out of low-
income, multiple housing. 12 ^ Plaintiffs proposed a development of a
low-income subdivision on a parcel of land zoned for multi-family hou-
sing in a black area in Lackawanna, New York, a Buffalo suburb. The
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City rezoned the land for a permanent park, declared a morator
subdivisions, and refused to grant a sanitary permit for the develop-
ment, claiming that sewer and recreation needs constituted compelling
state interests and justified its actions. 125 The Court ruled that
these arguments were "without merit, "126 and that they constituted offen .
sive "racial discrimination, if not almost complete racial segrega-
tion. "127 The racially discriminatory effect of these actions, the
attempt to remove Blacks from Lackawanna by denying them viable hou-
sing, was a violation of equal protection. 128 It also constituted evi-
dence of discriminatory motivation. 129 The actions themselves, their
effect and intent were not justified by the lack of sewers or need for
park lands. These did not constitute compelling state interests.!30
The Ninth Circuit in 1974 followed the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in sanctioning restrictive zoning when it upheld the constitution-
ality of one-acre minimum lot sizes in Ybarra v. City of Town of Los
TOT
Altos Hills. 1JX The court conceded that restrictive lot sizes discri-
minate on the basis of wealth. However, the Supreme Court had consis-
tently held that wealth is not a suspect classification which triggers
the new equal protection doctrine, that is, requirement that the regu-
lation be justified by a compelling governmental interest. 132 Further,
"[a] statistical correlation between poverty and [the] ethnic back-
ground"133 of the Mexican-American plaintiffs in this case was not suf-
ficient to change wealth into a suspect classification (national origin)
nor to require justification by a compelling state interest. Therefore,
using the due process and traditional equal protection rule of Euclid
,
the court found the ordinance to be rationally related to the legitimate
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police power objective of "preserving the town's rural environment . "134
Also in 1974, the Eighth Circuit ruled in United States v. City
of Black Jackl35 that Black Jack) Missouri> a virtually an_white sub.
urb of St. Louis, violated the Fair Housing Act when it adopted (pur-
suant to a proposal for a low-income housing project) an ordinance
which precluded construction of any more multi-family housing, inclu-
ding federally subsidized housing, and which also made all such exis-
ting housing into nonconforming uses. 136 The court held that local
officials are subject to the non-discriminatory provisions of the Fair
Housing Act; that proof of discriminatory intent was not required under
the Fair Housing Act since "clever men may easily conceal their moti-
vations;" 137 that the discriminatory effect of preventing eighty-five
percent of area Blacks from moving to Black Jack was sufficient to
trigger the compelling state interest test; 138 and that "interests in
road and traffic control," prevention of school overcrowding and the
devaluation of adjacent single-family homes, 13 ^ were not such compel-
ling state interests. 1 "^ 0 The Eighth Circuit found in Black Jack that
concerns of lack of municipal infrastructure are not compelling state
interests which justify exclusion of low- income housing, in spite of
such claims by municipal authorities, just as the Second Circuit had
found in Lackawanna . Like the courts in SASSO and Lackawanna , the
court in Black Jack did not require proof of discriminatory purpose.
The 1976 case of Construction Industry Association of Sonoma
County v. City of Petaluma 1^ 1 dealt with what can be called general
exclusion rather than specific exclusion. General exclusion is the
effort of localities to exclude the general nonresident population
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rather than specific groups by no- or slow-growth land use controls,
that is, moratoriums or limitations on construction.
The 1971 zoning ordinance of Petaluma, California, what is gen-
erally called the Petaluma Plan, limited the number of building permits
which could be issued to five hundred per year for five subsequent years
(1972-1977). The permits were equally divided between single-family
and multi-family housing units. Approximately three hundred could be
issued in the older, developed portion of the city, while those that
could be issued in the newer, developing area were limited to approxi-
mately two hundred. 1*2 In order to set a maximum population figure at
55,000 in the face of projections of a 77,000 maximum, 143 the ordinance
created an "urban extension line" beyond which it would not provide
municipal water and sewage facilities nor annex territory. 144
The Court of Appeals denied challenges to the Petaluma Plan on
two grounds. First, relying on the Warth doctrine, it found that the
resident landowners and builders' associations bringing suit lacked
standing to raise the denial of the right to travel issue because they
had no real or substantial relationship with excluded, third party non-
residents who could legitimately make a right to travel claim. Equal
protection claims were excluded because there was no question of racial
discrimination. Blacks and Whites were equally excluded. However,
plaintiff could raise due process issues. 145
Claims of denial of due process were then rejected by the court
by relying on the Euclid
,
Belle Terre and Ybarra upholdings of the po-
lice power. 146 j-fre ordinance was rationally related to the legitimate
general welfare objectives of "preservation of Petaluma's small-town
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character and the avoidance of the social and environmental problems
caused by an uncontrolled growth rate. "147 Contentions of the city
that it was unable to provide municipal water and sewers were consi-
dered legitimate because multi-family housing was allowed where these
services were adequate. 148 Thus Petaluma was distinguished from Lacka-
wanna and Black Jack in which an alleged inability to provide municipal
infrastructure was used to discriminate against minorities.
In Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo
,
1A 9 the most recent federal
case dealing with exclusionary zoning and the only case to date decided
under the Arlington Heights rules, the Third Circuit held that the
Philadelphia Housing Authority had violated the Fair Housing Act and
the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments by blocking the construction
of subsidized housing in an all-white neighborhood.! 50 The public ac-
tion had a discriminatory effect which was proven by demonstrating that
the denial of the housing project bore "'more heavily on one race than
another. ™151 Ample proof of discriminatory motive, using the tests of
Arlington Heights
, existed. 152 The City of Philadelphia had suddenly
shifted position on the project from "passive acceptance to active
opposition. "l5 ^ Statements of Mayor Rizzo indicated racial bias. There
were also "numerous instances of departures from normal procedural se-
quences," as well as a "substantive departure from normal decision-
makingo"! 5^ Since discriminatory effect and motive were apparent, the
court ordered that the project be allowed to proceed. 155
In sum, prior to Arlington Heights
,
the federal courts of appeals
ruled that evidence of disproportionate impact or discriminatory effect
was sufficient to invoke the new equal protection rule of strict scru-
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tiny. They had required local governments to justify their actions by
a compelling governmental interest when zoning was alleged to be exclu-
sionary. Claims of insufficient municipal infrastructure were adequate
to justify growth management plans (general exclusion) but not restric-
tive devices which impact low-income minorities adversely (specific
exclusion). After Arlington Heights, the lower courts have been com-
pelled to use the "impact-plus" rules.156 These rules w been ^
successfully in at least one case, the Rizzo decision, to find evidence
of racially discriminatory purpose behind a local denial of construc-
tion of integrated housing in a white neighborhood. But the Rizzo
case involved the zoning of a big city and not a suburb. Whether dis-
criminatory purpose can be as easily pinpointed in suburban zoning acts
which involve more entrenched and subtle exclusion is yet to be deter-
mined by the courts.
State Court Cases
Some state courts have taken a more interventionist position than
the federal courts in exclusionary zoning cases because they are not
constrained by the "federalism precept of nonintervention in local mat-
ters. "157 while the federal courts respond only to constitutional pro-
hibitions and congressional elaboration of them, state courts take cog-
nizance of the full spectrum of common law property rights which have
historically been the foundations for court restrictions on state and
local governmental acts. The state courts have formulated plans for
regional distribution of low-income housing and have required suburban
governments to take affirmative steps to follow these plans. The high-
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est courts of the States of Pennsylvania, New York, California and New
Jersey have been the most forthright in accepting the hypothesis that
suburban zoning is exclusionary. They have prepared and enforced reme-
dies for the alleged exclusionary effects of restrictive suburban by-
laws.
Pennsylvania
.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania uses reasoning which
differs from that of the federal courts to overrule restrictive zoning.
Rather than invoking the strict scrutiny test as did the federal appeals
courts prior to Arlington Heights
, it has relied on the due process (old
equal protection) test of Euclid
.
158 While the Supreme Court in the
early 1970s accepted almost any governmental purpose given by local
governments as a legitimate interpretation of the general welfare and
deferred to the local legislative interpretation as long as the provi-
sion of the zoning was rationally related to that objective, 1^ t^e
Pennsylvania court has required a regional rather than local interpre-
tation of the general welfare. Restrictive zoning was held to be "an
unreasonable restriction on the use of property" 16^ because it failed
to promote the general welfare of the region in which the zoning muni-
cipality existed. The Pennsylvania court has found that "population
pressures and the exacerbation of the urban-suburban dichotomy" 161 has
required consideration of the welfare of the total metropolitan area.
The autonomous interpretation of the general welfare to which suburban
communities are prone in their zoning has not been acceptable. Penn-
sylvania suburbs are required to accept a share of regional population
growth, although the share is "unspecified" and is perhaps "minimal."162
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The Pennsylvania court tentatively formulated the regional
interpretation of the general welfare doctrine as early as 1965 in
National Land and Investment r^
r
.„, .. .. h „ m u lnvalidated
four-acre minimum lots because
entrant
°*dinanCe wh°Se P**""7 Purpose is to prevent the
TnlTr V ^mevs in order to avoid future burdens eco-
vices a^d ?acil^
Se
' ^ the *d™^^n of public's^n f ilities can not be held valid. 164
The court held that Easttown Township, a suburban township twenty miles
west of Philadelphia, with rapid population growth, 165 had a "respon-
sibility to those who do not yet live in the township but who are part,
or may become part of the population expansion to the suburbs. "166
Arguments that lack of adequate sewers, roads and water supply required
large lots were not persuasive. »[T]he township has made no plans" to
provide sewers in spite of "the Second Class Township Code" which re-
quired them to do so. 167 Roads were adequate for estimated traffic
volume for at least seven more years, 168 and water CQuld be provided by
a nearby water district. 169 To place these excessive restrictions on
the rights of property owners in the name of preserving "open space,"
"rural character," or "historic sites" was confiscatory. It was "not
a reasonable method by which the stated end could be achieved . "170
General exclusionary purpose was enough to invalidate the ordinance.
The Pennsylvania court elaborated and reaffirmed this reasoning
in Appeal of Girschl 7 ! and Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc .l 72 .
In Girsch, a Willistown Township zoning ordinance which provided
for no apartment zones was considered inherently "unreasonable."!73
Apartments are a legitimate land use which must be accounted for in
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sing was
ose was
zoning. 174 The court found that ^^^^ ^ fflultl_fanily ^
based on intent to exclude nonresidents. Such exclusionary purp
sufficient to make it invalid. 175
In Girsch, the Pennsylvania court was the first to use the "fair
share" terminology that the New Jersey Supreme Court would later define
in explicit terms. 176 It held that suburbs^ &^^
of the burden" of regional growth. It stated that "it is intolerable
to allow one municipality (or many municipalities) to close its doors
at the expense of surrounding communities and the central city. "177
Zoning cannot be used "to avoid the increased responsibility and eco-
nomic burdens which time and natural growth invariably bring. "178
Subsequent to Girsch, Willistown Township amended its ordinance
and zoned one, eighty-acre tract for apartments. The land of the plain-
tlff in township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms. Inc . 179 was not
included in the apartment zone. The court in Willistown considered the
amended ordinance to be mere "tokenism" in that it did "not provide for
a fair share of the township acreage for apartment construction."! 80
It ordered the township to rezone plaintiff's land for apartments.
In Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders. Inc . 181 the Pennsylvania court
declared two- and three-acre minimum lot sizes to be a "completely un-
reasonable" exercise of the police power. It held that the purpose be-
hind the restrictions was "obviously exclusionary." Invoking the strict
scrutiny test, the court said that the township offered no "extraordi-
nary justification" of large lot sizes. i82 Inadequate sewers were not
an extraordinary justification, that is, a compelling state interest.!83
The court concluded that it would "not tolerate
. . . [local govern-
-ents] attempting to zone out growth at the expense of neighboring
eo^onities/'lSA that ls> . regiQnal lnterpretatiQn gf ^
welfare must be used.
Subsequently, the court realized that its reasoning in Kit-Mar
had its difficulties. In stating that the purpose of restrictive zon-
ing provisions is "obviously exclusionary," it had not required sub-
stantiation of exclusion with facts concerning the effect of zoning
on economically segregated living patterns. Consequently, in Surrick
v. Zoning Hearing Board , 185 it retreated from its finding of discrimi-
natory purpose in Ki^-Mar and fell back on an exclusionary effect rule
It said that "evidence of exclusionary motive or intent ... is not
of critical importance."^ Exclusionary effect is sufficient to in-
validate an ordinance.
The court in Surrick also clarified the fair share ruling of
Willistown
,
that is, how exclusionary effect should be determined. A
suburban government must "plan for and provide land-use regulations
which meet the legitimate needs of all categories of people who may
desire to live within its boundaries . "137 In addition, the court set
out a group of seven general criteria to determine if fair share had
been met, or alternatively, if exclusionary effect was involved. The
court did not codify any specif ic formula or percentages for fulfill-
ment of fair share. The court would consider only
whether the community ... is a logical area for development
and population growth.
. . . The community's proximity to a
large metropolis
. . . , the community's and region's projected
population growth figures. ... The present level of devel-
opment within the particular community.
. . . Population den-
sity data
. . . ,
the percentage of total undeveloped land and
the percentage available for the development of multi-family
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dwellings.
. .
.188
Since the township in Surrick was a rapidly developing suburb
of Philadelphia and had a "disproportionately small" amount of land
zoned for apartments, the denial of a variance for apartment construc-
tion to the plaintiff developer was exclusionary and invalid. 189
ex-
NewYork. The leading case in the State of New York dealing with
clusionary zoning is Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ranano .190
Like the Petaluma case, Ramapo involved a phased-growth plan. Ramapo,
New York had adopted a comprehensive plan, capital improvements pro-
gram, and zoning ordinance. The Master Plan involved extensive studies
of existent and projected need for public services, especially sewage
and drainage systems. The capital improvements program was based on
these studies and called for phased development of public services fa-
cilities over an eighteen-year period. The zoning ordinance required
developers of subdivisions in the interim period to obtain a special
permit which would be issued only if the developer could accumulate
"15 development points, to be computed on a sliding scale of values
assigned to" each of the following services:
(1) public sanitary sewers or approved substitutes; (2)
drainage facilities; (3) improved public parks or recre-
ation facilities, including public schools; (4) State,
county or town roads
. . . ; and (5) f irehouses. 191
The developer could provide these services himself if his parcel could
not qualify for the required number of points from available public ser-
4 192vices . 7A
Although the New York Court of Appeals stated that there is
"something inherently suspect in a scheme, which
. . . effects a re-
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striction upon the free mobility of a people until sometime In the
future
. .
.
"193
and ^ l£ Mould ^ ^ ^
guise,
. . .
community efforts at ionization or exclusion
. .
.-194
it balanced the need for strict scrutiny with the Euclid test of defer-
ence to the legislature. In examining the Ramapo Plan provisions, it
found neither their intent nor effect to be to exclude any specific
group.195 The ^m,po plan uas „a reasonable att£mpt ^ ^^^^
sequential, orderly development
. . . m conjunction with the needs of
the community.
. .
."196
In addressing the problem of welfare of the region, the court
said that »[s]tate-wide or regional control of planning would insure
that interests broader than that of the municipality underlie various
land use policies , "197 but it scoffed flt the .,nostalgic lnperative ^
egalitarianism is a function of growth. "198 ^e orderly and controlled
development of Ramapo, "the ultimate good of the community," superceded
any concerns of regional nonresidents or requirement that the town
assume its "fair share of the regional subdivision need. Ml 99
The New York court somewhat modified the lack of concern for
regional needs of the Ramapo decision in Berenson v. Town of New
Castle. 200 piaintiff had wished tQ develop a multi_ famliy condominium
in New Castle, New York, which had no multi-family zoning. The court
adopted a "two-tier doctrine" which required New Castle " 1) to provide
a properly balanced and well-ordered plan for the community
. . . and,
2) to consider regional needs and requirements in view of the needs of
Westchester County.
. .
."201 since the New Castle zoning ordinance
did not provide for a balanced community and did not consider that the
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need for multi-family housing was not being provided for by other
communities in the vicinity, the New Castle ordinance was invalid. 202
This "balanced community with a regional perspective of the
general welfare" formula 203 is the guiding principle for the New York
courts in cases alleging exclusion. The formula requires that a
locality's wish to freeze population and development be balanced by
a regional perspective of the general welfare. 204 The formula falls
short of requiring absorption of a fair share of regional low- and
moderate-income housing need. 205 It requires only a case by case
weighing of community welfare against regional welfare,
California
.
The leading case of the California courts dealing with
exclusionary zoning is Associated Homebuilders of the Greater Eastbay
.
Inc. v. City of Livermore . 206 The Livermore voters had approved an
initiative zoning ordinance which set a moratorium on residential
building permits until schools, water supply and sewage facilities
were considered adequate by the city. 207 The California Supreme Court
upheld the ordinance. Nevertheless, it expanded the Euclidean police
power test to include a regional perspective of the general welfare. 208
A zoning ordinance must "reasonably relate to the welfare of those whom
it significantly affects. "209 Trial courts must use a three part test
to determine an ordinance's constitutionality. They must consider "the
probable effect and duration of the limitation." Next, they must "iden-
tify [and weigh] the competing [local and regional] interests affected
by the restriction." Last, they must determine whether the ordinance
in question "represents a reasonable accommodation of the competing
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interests. "210 Once plaintiff has established a regional effect, the
locality must justify its restrictions as compelling governmental in-
terests, as it did in this case. 211
Thus, the California court, like those of Pennsylvania and New
York, uses the Euclidean due process test. It requires a regional in-
terpretation of the general welfare. Unlike Pennsylvania, it invokes
strict scrutiny when a regional effect is determined. Like New York,
it does not require a fair share accommodation but does require a bal-
ancing of local and regional interests.
New Jersey
.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has taken the most activist
position of the state courts in reviewing exclusionary zoning. It
goes beyond the balancing formulas of the other interventionist states
by requiring absorption by suburbs of a "fair and reasonable share"213
of regional needs for multi-family, low- and moderate-income housing.
In a series of reviews in the early seventies of Robinson v
.
Cahill , 214 a school desegregation case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
set the foundation for its exclusionary zoning cases by requiring al-
ternative funding to the property tax for education. The Robinson plan
provided for state equalization of local school expenditures to be fun-
ded by a state income tax. 215 Implicit in the Robinson holdings was
acceptance of the concept that "inequality of educational resources"
should be a state government concern. 10
? 1 7
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel^'
and Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison 2 ! 8 are considered
to be the landmark state exclusionary zoning cases.
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In Mount Laurel
,
the New Jersey court adopted all the liberal-
ized tests used by other courts and extended these with its own inter-
pretation. The opinion is quoted at length below to illustrate the
comprehensive approach of the New Jersey court.
If an ordinance has the effect of promoting economic discrimi-
nation, that is enough to invoke strict scrutiny. No proof of intent
to discriminate racially is needed. 219 Because
every
.
.municipality must, by its land use restrictionspresumptively make realistically possible an appropriate
'
variety and choice of housing ... at least to the extentof the municipality's fair share of the present and prospec-tive regional need therefor 220
strict scrutiny will be invoked. An obligation is presumptive when "a
facial showing of violation of substantive due process or equal protec-
tion under the state constitution has been made out.
. .
."221
These obligations must be met unless the particular muni-
cipality can sustain the heavy burden of demonstrating
peculiar circumstances which dictate that it should notbe required to do so, 222
that is, a municipality is required to demonstrate a compelling state
interest for its restrictions. Attempts "to keep down local taxes on
property"223 by restrictions which limit the numbers of school children
are not compelling inter ests . 224 Nor are "ecological and environmental
reasons" such as being "without sewers or water utilities ... a suffi-
cient excuse. "225 Such reaSons are "makeweight [s] to support exclu-
sionary housing measures or preclude growth. "226
The general welfare must be interpreted in a regional context.
[Pjroper provision for adequate housing of all categories of
people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the
general welfare.
. . . [T]he general welfare
. . . extends
beyond
. . .
[municipal] boundaries and cannot be parochially
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confined to the claimed good of the particular munici-
pality.
The zoning ordinance of Mount Laurel excluded all multi-family
housing as a matter of right, although some high-cost "multi-family
housing by agreement in planned unit developments"228 had been ailowed
.
Mount Laurel conceded that it had "intentionally excluded" low- and
moderate-cost housing. 229 The township's ordinance was "also restric-
tive in its minimum lot areas, lot frontage and building size require-
ments as to preclude single-family housing for even moderate income
families.
"
23 0 Mount Laurel had overzoned for "industrial and related
uses"231 in order to restrict its population. All these aspects esta-
blished "[a] facial showing of invalidity," and made it "presumptively
contrary to the general welfare." 232
The court concluded its opinion by defining the concepts of
region and fair share. A region "will necessarily vary from situation
to situation." Determination of region can be governed by "no hard and
fast rule" but clearly extends beyond any county and should be
confined "within the boundaries of the state." 233 All developing
municipalities which are absorbing growth from a central city or cities
and their older suburbs should be included. Fair share of regional hou-
sing needs likewise is flexible. "[A] reasonable figure" can be deter-
mined by municipal, county or state planning agencies in each in-
stance. 23 ^ Consideration in determining the figure can include such
factors as percentages of low- and moderate- income families in the
municipality, existing or projected employment, overall population,
amount of substandard housing, percentages of "per capita fiscal
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capacity," the ability of school systems to accomodate note children,
developable land, the capacity of sewage and water systems, and resi-
dential growth rates. 235
Two years later, the New Jersey court expanded, clarified and
modified the Mount Laurel dicta in Oakwood at Madison . A 1973 Madison
township zoning ordinance zoned the majority of Madison land for large
single-family residential lots, more than a minimum of 9,375 square
feet;236 zoned only approximately U5 percent of the township for
apartments; placed bedroom restrictions on apartments which in effect
insured that "only small units (efficiencies and one bedrooms)" would
be constructed; 237 placed costly infrastructure requirements on
planned unit developments ; 238 and overzoned for industrial and com-
merical uses. 239
The court found these restrictions to be exclusionary and in-
valid in intent and effect, mere "fiscal zoning" which did not promote
a "balanced" community .240 i t expanded the meaning of region. Consi-
deration must be given "to areas from which the lower income population
of the municipality would substantially be drawn absent exclusionary
zoning. "241 "Fair share" should continue to be determined by planning
agencies, and the formula created by the trial court in this case, that
is, that the municipality should zone the "same proportion" of low- and
moderate-income housing as its existing low- and moderate- income popu-
lations, 2^2 was considered reasonable but not binding for other munici-
palities. 243
The court also adopted a "least-cost housing and zoning" concept
as an additional restraint on municipalities. Because "private enter-
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units
)e in-
prise will not
. . . without subsidizationa .
.
. . construct new housing
affordable by the low income population , "244 and because> d a o governmental
subsidies
. . . for housing rv,o 1 Lmusi
.
. .
[have] been fragmentary, and federal
sources have recently been restrict-^ "245 , . ,ed, municipalities through
their zoning must facilitate "the 'least-met-' ucost housing consistent with
minimum standards of health and safety, which private industry win
undertake, and in amounts sufficient to satisfy the deficit in the
hypothesis fair share. "246 f„ ^ ^_
vide "a reasonable cushion over the contemplated least-cost
deemed necessary and believed theoretically possible"247 must „,
eluded. Mechanisms to lessen cost include "very small lots,- "a combi-
nation of bulk and density restrictions" for numbers of apartment bed-
rooms, "utilization of density bonuses.^S for exampUi „an addltlonal
single-bedroom or efficiency (in addition to those densities generally
permitted) for every three- or four-bedroom unit constructed'^? and
possibly '"rent skewing,'" that is
the allowance of greater density in either sale or rental
accommodations in exchange for special concessions by thedeveloper of rental or sale price of a limited number of
units. ^jO
Both the Mount Laurel and Oakwood at Madison decisions have been
considered to be substantial victories for inclusionary zoning propo-
nents. Nevertheless, they have also been criticized by leading legal
commentators. Duane Windsor questioned the efficacy of zoning policies
in determining the economically segregated development pattern. He sug-
gested that "income segregation and fiscal disparities are explainable
through market forces without reference to local zoning practices." 251
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Consequently, Windsor did not believe that the "least-cost zoning-
approach or the approach of alternative funding to the property tax
for education adopted in the Robinson cases, will be effective in com-
batting economic segregation in New Jersey. Windsor favored instead
the more interventionist approach advocated by the New Jersey County
and Municipal Government Study Commission which would directly reduce
"zoning barriers and fiscal objections to subsidized housing
. .
.
"252
and which would "have the state partly finance facilities and infra-
structure required by population growth" so that "state aid would
.
rise with population and be tied to subsidized housing. "253
Jerome Rose found that the Madison standards require the quanti-
fication of community and regional, present and future housing needs,
the benefits of innovation, and so on. Consequently, these standards
will involve the trial courts in just as much "statistical warfare"254
as did the fair share formula. Further, since current building prices
for all new housing place it well out of reach of low- and moderate-
income households, providing new housing for the poor would require
massive subsidy programs which are not forthcoming in a recessive econ-
omy. Providing for regional needs requires the delineation of regions,
a difficult task. Predicting future needs is even more questionable
and contentious. Trials will become inordinately long, expensive in
the requirement for expert testimony, and speculative in their fact
determinations. In sum, the Madison exclusionary zoning test makes
least-cost housing practically impossible. It makes the courts "super
zoning boards"255 in disregard of the United States Supreme Court's
warning in Petaluma against doing so. Rose concluded that the Madison
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tests are Ukely t0 slp„, rather than hasten
, the dlsmantUng rf^
sionary zoning.
Conrad Bagne found the judicial remedies of Mount Laurel and
Oakwood at Mad ison lacking.256 Instead} he favored & ^
pretation of the general welfare doctrine as expounded by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in the Livermore case. He would have local com-
munities consider regional analysis by existing regional planning
agencies for those of their activities which have regional impact,
when the court makes a determination of regional impact. All other
land use matters should remain in local hands.
Yannacone, Rahenkamp and Cerchione257 found that thfi New
decisions could be used as a basis for "impact zoning, "258 an alter_
native to standard district zoning. Impact zoning would unite two
apparently conflicting goals of land use regulations, the control of
growth and development with the allocation of regional needs for devel-
opment among municipalities in an SMSA. Development timing devices for
the protection of the public health, safety and welfare, like those
used in the Petaluma and Ramapo Plans would be combined with a Regional
Housing Allocation Program in which local communities develop their own
fair share housing allocations based on their individual community
characteristics.
The criticisms of the New Jersey decisions seem to fall into two
general categories. Some commentators feel that the New Jersey court
has required trial courts to evaluate statistical data which is beyond
the scope and competency of the judiciary. They find that this should
be done more properly by the legislature based on information from
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Planning professionals. Other commentators think that the fair share
and regional interpretation of the general welfare remedies are not
sufficient to insure that housing which is affordable by the poor and
minorities is built in suburbia. They propose that other devices should
also be explored and adopted. The source of these remedies should be
the state legislature.
Summary of state court exclusionary zoning opinions
. Pennsylvania
uses a substantive due process test to scrutinize zoning ordinances
which are challenged as exclusionary. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
requires a regional interpretation of the general welfare without which
ordinances lack a legitimate governmental objective. Only a general
exclusionary effect need be proven. Ordinances need not impact minor-
ities adversely to be invalid. They need only impact the general re-
gional population unequally. Communities must accept their fair share
of regional housing needs. Fair share is to be determined in the con-
text of each locality's vital development needs.
The New York courts require localities to plan for a balanced
community with consideration taken of regional needs. California per-
mits low- and moderate- income housing to be prevented by community
referenda although it requires that an ordinance be rationally related
to the welfare of whomever it affects. Local and regional concerns
must be balanced against each other in making a determination of valid-
ity or non-permissible exclusion.
New Jersey requires developing communities to accept their fair
share of regional housing needs. Communities must zone for a super-
97
fluence of least-cost housing and provide incentives for developers
to construct it. Provisions of zoning such as large lot size, exces-
sive floor area, frontage and setback, requirements of costly ameni-
ties, overzoning for commerce and industry, exclusion of multi-family
housing, bedroom limitations on apartments, and so on, are considered
to be exclusionary on their face.
The remedies of the four activist states for restrictive subur-
ban zoning, in spite of the criticisms of legal commentators that they
are ineffectual, go well beyond those of the federal courts. The bal-
anced community, fair share and least-cost housing doctrines require
suburbs to take positive steps to furnish housing opportunities for
minorities in four of the most populous and urbanized states in the
country. That, at least, is a start. The rationales of these doc-
trines expound a substantially different logic from Arlington Heights
which could well be emulated by other jurisdictions.
However, that these doctrines apply in only four states makes
them somewhat less than universal. That they are questionably effi-
cacious, that they are unlikely to be adopted by other states, and
that they have not been espoused by the federal judiciary, make them
less than likely candidates for a nationwide solution to zoning bar-
riers which prevent urban-suburban residential integration.
Conclusion: The Legal Framework of Exclusionary Zoning
The fifth and fourteenth amendments of the federal Constitution
require that due process of law be granted to minorities in federal,
state and local governmental acts. All governments are forbidden to
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make land use decisions which make racial distinctions in property
rights. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
requires that state and local governments treat minorities and major-
ities equally in their land use practices.
Congressional legislation has expanded upon these protections
which the Constitution grants to minorities. Federal civil rights
legislation and housing laws have attempted to negate those consequen-
ces of local land use regulations which impact minorities unequally.
Although federal statutes such as the Civil Rights Acts, and programs
such as community development have made some headway in modifying urban
segregation, the principles of federalism and reservation of powers to
the states, and their creatures, the suburban cities, towns and vil-
lages, have prevented the Congress from explicitly overriding the local
zoning power.
The Supreme Court has construed the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, and relevant federal legislation, narrowly. In the early 1970s'
cases, the Court refused to scrutinize the local legislature's intent
in zoning, if the local legislature claimed it had a legitimate objec-
tive such as protecting the general welfare, even when the zoning im-
pacted minorities disproportionately, that is, when discriminatory ef-
fect was demonstrated. In the Arlington Heights case, the Court ac-
cepted proof of disproportionate impact as sufficient to allow the in-
tent of the legislature to be scrutinized. However, it additionally
required proof of discriminatory purpose for exclusionary zoning to be
invalidated. The tests that it enunciated make it extremely difficult
to prove discriminatory intent in suburban zoning acts.
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Lower federal courts have not been as restrictive as the
Supreme Court. Prior to Arli^onnei^, in most instances lover
courts required proof of racially discriminatory effect only. After
Arlington Heights
,
they have been required to search for racially
discriminatory intent. Only in one case ( Resident Advisory Board »
Rizeo) has adequate proof of such motivation been found. It remains
extremely unlikely that suburban zoning will be invalidated by lower
federal courts under the Arlington Heiahts' dicta, unless the zoning
is egregiously and explosively racist.
The nexus of circumstances surrounding allegedly segregative
zoning has limited the numbers of federal zoning cases to the tip of
the exclusionary iceberg. Additionally, the nature of the judicial
process has prevented the courts in these few cases from making deci-
sions which affect the zoning of entire metropolitan areas. The courts
are limited to reviewing litigated cases, and only the most blatant ex-
amples with the right convergence of circumstances are litigated. A
specific injury to a specific person by a governmental act of a speci-
fic locality is required for standing and for a case to be considered
on the merits. An individual, poor, nonresident minority must have
suffered a particularized injury when a specific community has denied
permission to build a specific low-cost housing project. He or she
must be willing to litigate and have the financial backing to do so.
Rarely does this right combination occur. Even when it does, the judi-
cial system prevents little more than a case by case appraisal of the
isolated act which is litigated. The less obvious instances in which
one or more circumstances are lacking, or in which the cumulative
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efface* of the zoning of all the suburbs in a metropolitan area are
segregative never reach the federal courts. Thus the federal courts
have been unable to address metropolitan-wide exclusion or derive a
comprehensive solution for it.
Since the state courts do not operate under the same constraints,
some few of them have taken more positive efforts than the federal
courts to overcome metropolitan exclusion. They have required suburbs
to adopt affirmative plans to house minorities and the poor. The
activist state courts have rarely made a distinction between racial and
economic exclusion as a basis for their rulings. While the federal
courts have invalidated only racially discriminatory zoning (whether
it discriminates by intent or effect), the state courts have not re-
quired proof of intended or effective racial discrimination. They
have invalidated zoning practices on a simple basis of economic exclu-
sion. However, the fair share, least-cost housing and balanced com-
munity concepts apply to only the few states in which they have been
enunciated. They provide a very limited solution to metropolitan
segregation.
Evidence of a metropolitan-wide linkage between poverty and
race has not been required by either the federal or activist state
courts. The courts have not examined in detail the urban-suburban
spatial distribution of minorities and the poor nor attempted to make
the relationship between poverty, race and residence explicit, because
the kind of data needed for this type of analysis is simply not avail-
able to them. The courts have been limited to making decisions on the
basis of the evidence which is before them. Since each case is cir-
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cumstantially different, and since comprehensive, metropolitan-wide
evidence has as yet to be presented, the courts have been unable to
reach unanimity in treatment. The result has been a wide diversity
among the reasoning and conclusions. The diversity of case law has
clouded the issue of exclusionary zoning and made judicial interpre-
tations an unreliable source for definitive proof that zoning is exclu-
sionary. Since the courts have been unable to supply comprehensive
and definitive proof of exclusion in their decisions, it logically
follows that their remedies for the inadequately defined problem have
also been less than efficacious.
To summarize the conclusions of this chapter, at least seven
problems have prevented the legal system from definitively proving
the exclusionary zoning hypothesis and from providing an adequate
cure for exclusionary zoning. Constitutional protections are too
general to be adequately applied to any but the boldest exclusion.
The federal Congress is constitutionally prohibited from directly
overriding the local zoning power, while the Supreme Court requires
formidable tests to prove that zoning is exclusionary. The lower fed-
eral courts must abandon prior logic and follow the tests prescribed
be the Supreme Court. State court solutions are not universal and may
be ineffectual. Few cases in proportion to the size of the problem
are litigated because of procedural and circumstantial limitations.
Finally, the courts lack the metropolitan-wide data that would facili-
tate a comprehensive solution.
If the relationship of suburban zoning to the overall metro-
politan development pattern is to be clarified, and if indeed zoning
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is to be implicated as causal in the segregated urban ecology, then
other more definitive sources of proof must be sought. Legal restric-
tions on zoning merely establish the outside parameters of the local
zoning prerogative by preventing blatant racism. What localities do
within this broad circumspection must also be examined. The compila-
tion of data concerning the zoning of all the localities in a metro-
politan area and the explication of how this metropolitan-wide zoning
is linked to segregated living patterns presents one viable alternative
to reliance on the courts for proof of exclusion.
However, before such an analysis can be undertaken, one other
avenue of approach must be explored. Into the void created by judi-
cial disagreement and lack of a judicial solution, one state legis-
lature, that of Massachusetts, has thrust its own definition and remedy
for restrictive suburban zoning. The unique approach to the exclusion-
ary zoning conundrum of the State of Massachusetts will be examined
next.
CHAPTER IV
THE MASSACHUSETTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK*
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, more than twenty
years before the phrase and phenomenon of exclusionary zoning were to
become widely recognized, stated that
[a] zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting
up a barrier against the influx of thrifty citizens who desireto live there.
. . ,
nor for the purpose of protecting
. .large estates. The strictly local interests of the townmust yield
.
. .
[to] the general interests of the public.
. .
.1
In 1942 parochialism in local land use regulation was judi-
cially juxtasupposed to a broad concept of the general welfare. This
early pronouncement by the Massachusetts court provided the theoreti-
cal rationale for judicial and legislative intervention into that
local zoning which excludes outsiders from residency in high status
communities. Yet the court was far ahead of the times. Sparse atten-
tion was paid to the zoning issue for more than two decades after the
pronouncement. During the war years the zoning issue was moot since
resources were funneled overseas, and little domestic development oc-
curred. The post-war years found the zoning issue buried under the
bulldozers of a booming economy and extensive construction of housing
for returning veterans. Developers were absorbed in mass producing
housing in vast areas of the cities that had no prohibitive restric-
tions. Not until the 1960s, when the exhaustion of the supply of easy
land converged with the civil rights' movement and the massive racial
^Portions of this chapter originally were published in Volume 4,
Issue 1 of the Western New England Law Review
.
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uprisings in the nation's cities would attention shift to those areas
which prevented such construction.
In Massachusetts the additional factor of an acute shortage of
urban low-income housing contributed in the early sixties to the sur-
facing of the exclusionary zoning issue. Extensive urban renewal and
throughway development in Boston and other metropolitan areas had dis-
placed thousands of poor and minorities from their urban neighborhoods.
The scarcity of inner city relocation housing caused urban renewal
planners to cast a wary eye in the direction of the low density, spa-
cious (and defensive) suburbs. 2 The suburbs were seen as possibilities
for providing relief from the cities' overwhelming burden of housing
the displaced urban poor. But zoning seemed to prevent the construction
of low-cost housing in the suburbs by requiring large single-family
lots and by prohibiting multi-family housing. At that point, urban
officials could do little but accuse the suburbs of exclusion.
The surfacing of the exclusionary zoning issue brought no solu-
tions for the housing dilemma in Massachusetts. By the mid-sixties
the "long-standing" and "woeful shortage of decent housing" 3 in Massa-
chusetts had reached "crisis proportions." 4 As the 1970s unfolded,
the low- and moderate-income housing crisis did not abate. By the
mid-seventies the Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs (DCA)
estimated that the state's need for low- and moderate-income housing
had risen to more than 400,000 units.
^
The housing figures for one metropolitan area, the Springfield
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) provide a detailed micro-
cosm of the statewide situation. The need for subsidized housing in
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1978 in the metropolitan area was estimated at 35,498 low- and mod-
erate-income units, approximately nine percent of the statewide need.
6
The SMSA had a total of 16,720 subsidized housing units, 7 yet it had
35,498 households requiring housing assistance. No municipality in
the SMSA had adequate amounts of low-cost housing units when the
municipalities' numbers of subsidized units were compared to their
numbers of households who required housing assistance. The suburbs of
Longmeadow and Wilbraham had the poorest records. Longmeadow had no
low- and moderate- income housing, while it had 522 families requiring
housing assistance. Wilbraham provided only 10.5% of its estimated
need for such housing. The cities of Holyoke and Northampton had the
best records, providing 78.2 and 77.5%, respectively, of their esti-
mated needs. None of the municipalities, either central city or sub-
urb, met its need for subsidized housing. Table 1 displays the numbers
of subsidized units by town in relation to the need for such units.
The exclusionary zoning enigma thus presented in Massachusetts
entailed a synergistic combination of factors. A great number of poor
persons and minorities resided in substandard housing in the inner
cities of metropolitan areas where there was a deficit of decent, sub-
sidized low-income housing. The central cities strained their resour-
ces to the limit to provide large amounts of low- income housing, but
their effort was not sufficient to meet the need. Subsidized multi-
family housing was not being built in the suburbs, even though the
suburbs had ample space for it. Suburban zoning was accused of erect-
ing barriers to low-cost construction and of thereby discriminating
against the poor and minorities. The racial overtones of the exclu-
106
TABLE 1
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING UNITS IN THE SPRINGFIELD SMSA TNRELATION TO THE NEED FOR SUBSIDIZED HOUSING (1^78)
Municipality
Springfield
Chicopee
Holyoke
Agawam
E. Longmeadow
Hampd en
Longmeadow
Ludlow
W. Springfield
Wilbraham
Easthampton
Southampton
Southwick
Westf ield
Granby
Hadley
Northampton
S. Hadley
Belchertown
Monson
Palmer
Total Households
Subsidized Requiring
Housing Housing
Units Assistance
Total or
Average
7,762
1,618
2,600
424
279
58
0
172
537
45
370
26
61
851
60
40
1,211
151
144
57
254
16,720
16,069
4,536
3,325
1,283
350
227
522
731
1,743
427
529
86
242
1,140
190
338
1,563
805
302
292
798
Unful- Percent Percent
filled uniui- Need
- » ecu f -J 1 1 ^ Ai liied Ful-
Need fil 1 pH
8,307 51.7 48.3
2,918 64.3 35.7
725 21.8 78.2
859 o /
. u 33 .
0
Z U . J 79.7
169 25. 6
522 0.0
559 /O.J 23 .
5
1,206 O y . Z 30.8
382 1U . j
159 30.1 69.9
60 69.8 30.2
181 74.8 25.2
289 25.4 74.6
130 68.4 31.6
298 88.2 11.8
352 22.5 77.5
654 81.2 18.8
158 52.3 47.7
235 80.5 19.5
544 68.2 31.8
35,498 18,778 52.9 47.1
SOURCE: Lower Pioneer Valley Regional Planning Commission, Area-
wide Housins
"I
g Opportunity Plan (West Springfield, Ma.: n.p.,
ntroduction," pp. 5-17; "Local Subsidized Housing Proera
1978)
g ms," pp. 1-7,
sionary zoning issue further exacerbated the problem of inadequate
housing. Many of the ill-housed were Blacks and Hispanics.
In the 1960s the Massachusetts state legislature recognized the
potential explosiveness of Massachusetts' housing crisis-exclusionary
zoning predicament. In response, it began a search for feasible solu-
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tions. In 1964 the legislature created a Special Cession on Low
Income Housing to make recommendations for legislative remedies to the
housing shortage. In 1965, based on a finding that approximately
260,000 Massachusetts families resided in substandard housing, the
Commission recommended that the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency,
a state rental assistance program, and a new public housing production
program for families be created. 3 Although the Commission did not fo-
cus on dispersal of low- and moderate-income housing in the suburbs, it
did recognize "'the possibility of undertaking a metropolitan ap-
proach. '"9
In 1967 the Massachusetts Senate commissioned the Legislative
Research Council to undertake an in-depth study of the problem, espe-
cially of the influence of suburban zoning on the housing shortage. 10
The resultant report*! contained a strong indictment of zoning as con-
tributing to economic exclusion. Although the Council attempted to
investigate zoning' s alleged racially discriminatory effect, it could
find no "recent comprehensive studies concerning possible 'anti-
minority' uses of local zoning in Massachusetts." 12 The Council was
thus forced to concentrate on evidence of economic discrimination.
Using descriptive statistics, it examined eight alleged restrictive
land use devices and found that four of these, large minimum lot sizes,
minimum frontage requirements, setback requirements, and building height
limitations, added substantially to the costs of construction for
single-family or multi-family housing, thus working to place such hou-
sing beyond the reach of low- and moderate-income households . *3 in
addition, local zoning officials had "an enormous advantage"^ over
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open housing advocates because the Massachusetts Zoning Enabling *t13
provided that zoning amendments must be approved by a two-thirds ma-
jority of the local legislature or town meeting. 16 Mustering such
approval for low-income housing in suburbia was a practical impossi-
bility.
The impact of the Report of the Legislative Research Council was
to send sympathetic state legislators into a flurry of drafting respon-
sive bills. The formats of the proposed legislation were highly influ-
enced by recommendations of the federal Kaiser Committee^ and Douglas
Commission. 18 The Kaiser Committee had recommended that the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development be given limited power to override
zoning ordinances which prevent construction of federally subsidized,
low-cost housing. 19 The Douglas Commission recommended that state
governments create administrative agencies empowered to review local
decisions and "to substitute [their] decisions" for those local poli-
cies which were adjudged to be exclusionary . 20 The concepts of higher
governmental level intervention in local zoning and the creation of a
state agency to do so were incorporated into bills introduced into the
General Court. 2 ! The joint Legislative Committee on Urban Affairs of
the legislature consolidated these into one bill which was reported out
to the full legislature. 22 In August of 1969 this bill became Chapter
774, the commonly named, anti-snob zoning act. 23
The Provisions of Chapter 774
The Massachusetts zoning law was designed to facilitate the con-
struction of low- and moderate- income housing in suburbia. A major
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provision of the law authorized local zoning boards of appeals to issue
comprehensive building permits to qualified developers of any housing
subsidized by the state or federal governments . 24 The authorization
of one, comprehensive permit aimed to simplify the red tape facing a
developer who formerly had to apply for a variety of approvals and per-
mits, including two-thirds approval of the city council or town meeting
if a zoning change was required, subdivision approval, informal appro-
val of the town engineer, approvals of the building inspector, fire
chief and health commissioner, and permissions from electric and gas
suppliers. 25 The new procedure authorized a single permit to be is-
sued in place of these so that construction could proceed without ad-
ministrative delay.
Qualified developers were defined as limited dividend corpora-
tions, nonprofit organizations, and any public agency26 (for an prac_
tical purposes, public housing authorities. ) 27 The comprehensive per-
mit procedure did not extend to profit-making developers because some
legislators feared that such builders would abuse the procedure and
inundate suburbs with low-cost housing for purely speculative gain. 28
The law set out standards by which zoning boards of appeals were
to judge the merits of applications for comprehensive permits. Permits
could be issued in spite of local "requirements and regulations" pre-
venting low-cost housing unless such requirements and regulations were
"reasonable and consistent with local needs. "29 The phrase "consistent
with local needs" was a two-edged sword. It applied both to conditions
which aim to promote dispersed low-income housing (promotional criteria)
and to criteria which legitimize local planning concerns and which
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could conceivably prevent low-cost housing (planning criteria)
.
The promotional criteria held that requirements and regula-
tions are neither reasonable nor consistent with local needs when they
do not account for "the regional need for low and moderate income hou-
sing considered [together] with the number of low-income persons in
the city or town affected. "30 The regional need and number of low-
income persons were operationalized by three numerical minimums. The
housing minimum required that a comprehensive permit be issued when
low- and moderate-income housing is less than ten percent of the num-
ber of housing units in a town or city according to the last decennial
census. Land area miniums required a permit to be issued if low- and
moderate-income housing currently existed on less than one and one-
half percent of land zoned for residential, commercial and industrial
use in a town or city; or if the application would result in the "com-
mencement of construction" of less than three-tenths of one percent of
land zoned for residential, commercial, or industrial uses, or ten
acres, "whichever is larger, in any one calendar year. "31 For most
purposes, boards, towns, and developers have used the ten percent hou-
sing minimum as a measure of whether the town has met its regional need.
Few town governments have more than a hazy conception of how much of a
given town's land area is zoned for residential, industrial and com-
mercial uses. They therefore have been unable to compute whether a
given project would comprise more or less than one- and one-half per-
cent of land so zoned or would result in low- income housing on more
than three-tenths of one percent of these types of zoning in a calen-
dar year. Developers, out of necessity, have stuck to the ten acre
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minimum. If their tract is larger than fcen^ they ^
construction on ten acres and left the remainder as open space. 32
The local planning criteria were intended to balance the promo-
tional criteria.33 The balanclng ^ sought ^ ^
for relieving the "housing crisis'^ with concern for local objections
to subsidized housing. Politically, the test attempted both to assuage
suburban legislators and to negate their opposition.
Under these criteria, requirements and regulations which prevent
subsidized housing are consistent with local needs if they
protect the health or safety of the occupants of the proposedhousing or of the residents of the city
. .
., promote better
site and building design
. .
., preserve open spaces, and
. .
.a
^-
aP
S t ' ' ;
*qUally
* " '
t0 both subsidized and unsub-
sidized housing. 35
These criteria enabled localities to condition housing so as to prevent
substandard construction and total incongruence with local development.
A last major provision of the law provided that a developer may
appeal a denial of a comprehensive permit by the board of appeals to the
Housing Appeals Committee (HAC).36 In addition, a permit could also be
appealed if conditions attached to it made the construction of the hous-
ing project "uneconomic. "37 Construction would be uneconomic if a pub-
lic or non-profit agency would suffer "financial loss," or if a limited
dividend corporation could not "realize a reasonable return." 38
The Housing Appeals Committee was set up as an administrative
agency composed of five appointed members, represented by permanent
counsel, and empowered with qua si-judicial functions. The HAC was
authorized to hold de novo hearings39 and to order a permit to be is-
sued if a zoning board of appeals' ruling was found to be "unrea-
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sonable and not consistent with local needs'^ under the promotlonal
and planning criteria.
The Passage of Chapter 774
That a bill which impinged on local government zoning prerog-
atives could be seriously considered in the Massachusetts legislature
in an era in which the political clout of the suburbs was growing,
^
and when home rule for Massachusetts localities^ which created a
"presumption ... of validity"43 for zoning ordinances had recently
been adopted, was the result of a fortuitous convergence of political
issues and circumstances. The year 1969 in the Massachusetts legis-
lature was one in which the liberal sentiment of the sixties culmi-
nated in a plethora of social welfare legislation. The anti-snob
zoning bill was passed along side such measures as tenants' rights
and consumer protection legislation. 44 The mood of the liberal major-
ity of the legislature in that year was to do its part to deal with
the political unrest which had so characterized the sixties' decade.
Yet the passage of Chapter 774 was anything but smooth. A
vortex of controversy surrounded the zoning bill. The legislative and
public debate of the bill in the early stages was filled with exagger-
ated claims, accusations and empassioned rhetoric. A variety of argu-
ments indicated either less than complete understanding of the con-
tent and intent of the legislation or intentional falsification.
The home rule argument was such an argumentum ad hominem
. This
argument claimed that home rule would be usurped since a state agency,
the HAC, could modify or negate decisions of local boards of appeals.
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It was said that the state would thereby control "planning boards
throughout Massachusetts. "45 One opponent maintained that the bill
"could in time be broadened, permitting government to move into areas
rightfully the business of residents ,"46 and that "the death knell of
local government" would be sounded. 47
In answer to the home rule argument, two state representatives
publicly enumerated the safeguards for local powers which were inclu-
ded in the bill. 48 All localities retained the right to hold compre-
hensive permit hearings, and local "reviewing boards" lost none of
their "ordinary powers" unless they acted "unreasonably . "49 Local
zoning restrictions could not be overruled by the HAC unless peti-
tioners for the permit could persuade the HAC that local restrictions
were unreasonable or would make the development uneconomic. The
town could deny the permit for multi-family housing if it already
had more such housing than the very minimal standards spelled out in
the bill. The right to appeal to the state courts was reserved for
"aggrieved" parties as in "all other zoning decisions. "50 No eminent
domain powers were given to public agencies so that any developer
would be required first to purchase or obtain an option on the land
in question. Local landowners could still refuse to sell. 51 in short,
home rule was adequately protected. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts would subsequently confirm that the zoning law did not
conflict with home rule. 52
A second contention of opponents, the fiscal zoning argument,
was somewhat more plausible than the first. However, it too was later
ruled by the Supreme Judicial Court to be insufficient to negate the
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zoning law. 53
The fiscal zoning argument claimed that suburban taxpayers who
were already financially overburdened with heavy property tax bills
and mortgage payments would be inequitably forced to foot the bill for
additional schools, sewers, roads, police and fire protection, and
other local services which would be required for low-cost housing that
does not pay its own way in tax dollars. 54 The towns would be faced
with "a rash of sub-standard housing, "55 which would create additional
financial costs for local governments. This argument was pushed to
the extreme by some local officials. One pundit in Needham (not co-
incidental^, the locus of the 1942 Supreme Judicial Court litigation
that first addressed the exclusionary zoning issue in the state)
claimed that 3,600 new low-cost units and perhaps 7,000 more school
children would burden the taxpayers of Needham! 56
The fiscal zoning argument blended nicely into the community
character argument which presaged the reasoning of the Supreme Court
in the Belle Terre case. 57 According to this reasoning, the influx
of substandard housing would not only create financial hardship. It
would also endanger "the basic character and social structure of the
community.
"
5 8 Multi-family housing in the suburbs would bring with
it all the urban problems from which suburbanites had originally fled
and would "destroy what in many cases [was] the investment of a life-
time. " 5 9 The proposed legislation was called "pernicious" "demogo-
guery" which aimed to "teach the gentry a lesson," and which played
on "the cancer of class feeling" and
the mindless resentment of those who would rather expend
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their energies hating men who have earned more in material
goods, than in trying to accumulate resources of their own. 60
Proponents of the legislation countered that community charac-
ter would not be destroyed since there would be no flood of substan-
dard low- income housing. Private developers could not build large
numbers of apartments on speculation since developers were limited to
public and semi-public corporations. "Shoddy" projects would be pre-
vented in that developers would be required to adhere to state and
federal construction standards. Only state or federally-assisted pro-
jects would be eligible for approval under the bill. Towns would not
be required to accept units on more than three-tenths of one percent
of their zoned land area in any year, nor overall multi-family units
in excess of ten percent of their total housing stock. 61 Thus ade-
quate protections were provided to prevent a flood of substandard,
slum housing. The small amounts of standard construction permitted
could not be enough to reek the havoc on suburban communities that
opponents contended would result. In fact, some of the more radical
proponents claimed that, if anything, the bill did not go far enough, 62
that it was mere "tokenism. "63 One suburban legislator, recognizing
the minimalist nature of the requirements, justified his aye vote to
his constituency by maintaining that he wished to avoid even stiffer
legislation. 64
The community character argument was closely allied to racial
issues which underlay the zoning controversy. The debate over the
bill took place "within the context of an urban-suburban conflict that
had arisen ... in Boston and other cities"65 over school integra-
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tion three years earlier. In 1966, suburban liberals had succeeded
in passing a racial balance law which required integration of city
schools. 66 An argument for the school integration bill had been that
"you can't love a man unless you know hlm,»67 meaning ^
should be given the opportunity through school integration to asso-
ciate with Blacks in order to reduce racial hostility. Proponents of
the zoning bill claimed that the same argument applied to the suburban
zoning barriers to residential integration. 68 Countering the racial
integration argument, one state senator maintained that the zoning bill
would "redistribute portions of the ghetto, "69 while another Qutspo_
ken opponent called it "perverted social engineering with a ven-
geance. "70 In answer tQ the rac . al undertQnes Qf the . ssue> ^ ^_
passioned liberal representative stated that a negative vote would
"prove that the Negro has a right to hate white people," and that
"there is no hope for the hopeless. "71
Another faction of the legislature, urban representatives who
represented the large ethnic working class neighborhoods of Boston and
other major cities, were not as altruistic in their support of the
bill. They were highly resentful towards the suburban legislators who
had pushed through the school desegregation law and were vindictive
enough to wish to return the integration favor to the suburbs. 72 This
faction lent support to the zoning bill in hopes that it would distri-
bute the poor and minorities throughout metropolitan areas 7 3 and re-
lieve ethnic neighborhoods from taking the brunt of integration.
Some suburban pro-housing liberals, both Democrats and Republi-
cans, in order to ease the fears of suburbanites which were played upon
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by the inflatory rhetoric, maintained that the bill would not pro-
vide housing for urban minorities. It would sinply help co„ ies
to take care of their own by furnishing housing for their resident
Poor. 74 0ne senatQr Qf this uk nzoning ^ ^
riers
.
. .
which force the community's own teachers, police and fire-
men to live elsewhere."75 The elderly and grown children of current
residents could not remain in the suburbs because there was no afford-
able starter and retirement housing for them. 76 Suburbanites them-
selves were said to be pressuring for "less expensive housing" because
of "big mortgages and heavy taxes," and they would be the first to ap-
ply for "pleasant apartments, right in town. "77 This take_care_of _
your-own argument was perhaps one of the most persuasive.
As the debate heated, and the bill progressed towards passage
in both chambers, opposing representatives and senators staged a last
ditch effort to kill the bill. They proposed a "crippling amendment'^
which would have provided for local option, making the law apply to
only those communities which accepted it. 7 9 Supporters of the bill
called the amendment "facetious and asinine," maintaining that the
bill would be rendered "meaningless , "80 which was, of course, what was
intended by the amendment's supporters. The amendment was voted down
by narrow margins in both houses. 81
Essentially intact, the bill came to a vote in the House in the
first week of August. The rollcall was close, 115 to 100 for adop-
tion. 82 Key to the success on the House floor was Speaker David M.
Bartley (D-Holyoke)
,
a powerful liberal and legislative pacesetter. On
a different front in the same year, the House was under the threat of
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having its membership cut by constitutional amendment. Bartley used
his position and personal power to engineer a trade-off of votes for
the zoning bill and other social welfare legislation in return for his
outspoken opposition to the membership reduction. 83
Approval by the Senate was the next hurdle. The bill had been
introduced in the upper chamber late in the legislative session when
hundreds of actions were still pending, and senators were working
nearly non-stop to clear the backlog. Beacon Hill was shrouded in an
August heat wave, legislators were approaching exhaustion, and con-
fusion reigned in the rush to prorogue. 84 Supporters of the bill used
the "almost anything can happen" atmosphere of the last nights of the
session to bring in the necessary swing votes. 85 The various factions
of suburban and urban legislators who for either philosophical or poli-
tical reasons leaned toward passage coalesced in the chaotic atmos-
phere of prorogation into a "'one shot deal
. . . a rather unholy
alliance '"86 t0 pass chapter m> Qn August ^ ^ foUowed
the House's lead and adopted the bill by a narrow margin. 87
In the immediate afterglow of successful passage, staunch sup-
porters of the bill were euphoric. The legislation was called "pio-
neering, "88 "revolutionary, "89 " the first of its kind in the country.*^
and even "an adventure in love. "91 when the bill reached the Governor's
desk for signature, he praised.it as "'no small achievement'" which
would "'broaden the opportunity of better housing for all citizens of
Massachusetts.'" 92 Yet in signing the measure into law, the Governor
also made a carefully reasoned assessment of the law's possibilities.
He stated that Chapter 774 "was neither all that its backers claim it
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to be nor all that its opponents warn that it may be."93 He con-
cluded that it was only '"one element in an effort to meet critical
housing problems. ..,<•< other measures such as reducing "prohi-
bitive construction costs" and "improving building codes" would also
be needed. 94
The caution inherent in the Governor's message foreshadowed
the uncertain future of Chapter 774. On the legislative front, oppo-
nents would continue to work to emasculate or repeal the law, while
liberals would introduce measures to strengthen its provisions. On
the practical front, how the law would be interpreted in specific sit-
uations by local boards of appeals, the Housing Appeals Committee,
and the courts was still to be determined. These interpretations would
establish the climate for the law's operation and would condition its
effectiveness. Whether the law would be narrowed or buttressed by the
legislature, how it would be interpreted administratively and judi-
cially, and what impact it would have on the low-income housing crisis
as the result of legislative, administrative and judicial modifications
were yet to be determined. The action on the post-passage legislative
front will be examined next, while administrative and judicial inter-
pretations, and the effectiveness of the law will be taken up subse-
quently.
Post-Passage Legislative Skirmishes
The legislative battle in Massachusetts over exclusionary zon-
ing did not die with the adoption of Chapter 774. Opponents and pro-
ponents alike continued to offer bills for modification throughout the
1970s' decade. Yet none of these post-passage attempts at modlfica-
tion succeeded.
Within little more than a year's time after passage, liberal
legislators who recognized that Chapter 774 was less than a universal
solution to the housing crisis-exclusionary zoning conundrum, began a
multi-year effort to improve upon their initial success. The lion's
share of the attempts to broaden and strengthen the law's provisions
occurred between 1971 and 1975,
The initial bill for modification was introduced in the Senate
in 1971. This bill permitted private, profit-making developers to uti-
lize the comprehensive permit process in any town in which no applica-
tions for permits had been received by January 1, 1972.95 This bill
was meant to enlarge substantially the field of potential builders of
low-income housing.
By the 1972 legislative session, legislation was drafted which
would have buttressed the weaknesses in the law from several addi-
tional sides. Four bills provided, respectively, for financial penal-
ties, tax equalization, anti-discrimination provisions, and a streng-
thened ten percent minimum.
The financial penalties bill authorized the state "commissioner
of community affairs" to review the low-income "policies or practices"
of any locality in which a comprehensive permit was pending. If the
locality's policies or practices prevented "construction or operation
of" low or moderate-income housing, then the commissioner could with-
hold up to twenty-five percent of the locality's state aid, and up to
ninety percent of its "selected" state aid. 96 The jist of this bill
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was to penalize financially those localities which exclude low-cost
housing. The bill failed in 1972 and was reintroduced in the House
in every legislative session up to 1979, all without success. 97
While the House was using a punitive approach, a Senate bill
addressed the problem from a more positive angle. It provided for
equalization of tax receipts for localities which build low-cost hou-
sing. The state was authorized to make payments to localities "in
lieu of taxes for all real estate
. . . owned by any housing authority
used for the purpose of providing low rent housing. "98 The intent of
this bill was to reimburse localities for property tax receipts lost
from real property taken off the tax rolls by public acquisition. This
bill would have removed some of the sting from the fiscal zoning argu-
ment because publicly-owned housing would be assessed at full market
value, as is private property, and the state would pay its property
tax bill at the going tax rate. 99
The third 1972 bill, the anti-discrimination provisions, made
explicit what was only implied in Chapter 774. It forbad zoning by-
laws or ordinances "by design or effect [to] discriminate against per-
sons because of race, religion, national origin, sex or economic
class. "100 ^ additional provision prohibited zoning from excluding
"multiple-type family housing. "101 The effect of this provision would
have been to require localities to zone at least some land for multi-
family housing.
The anti-discrimination bill was a simple statement of the civil
rights concept that the federal government applied in so many other
areas (for example, education, employment and housing) in the 1970s.
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Yet it was revolutionary in that it forbad discrimination in zoning
.
Zoning to local governments is an autonomous power, a sacred cow that
should remian untouched by higher level governmental interference.
That the state should attempt to apply the fourteenth amendment to
localities' zoning prerogatives was an idea whose time had not yet
come.
The last 1972 bill required "ten percent of all new construc-
tion housing developments in the commonwealth" to be "made available
to persons of low income. "102 This provision was stronger than the
Chapter 774 ten percent housing minimum which only permitted compre-
hensive permits to be issued when less than ten percent of a local-
ity's housing units were low-cost housing. Like the other 1972 bills,
this one was also unsuccessful.
By 1972 the opponents of Chapter 774 had also regrouped suffi-
ciently to introduce a bill to repeal the law. 103 The attempt to re-
peal was tried in at least three subsequent years!04 but was never a
serious threat to the law.
In 1973, another approach to strengthening Chapter 774 was
attempted. The land area minimums in the promotional criteria of the
"consistent with local needs" standard were raised slightly. The re-
quirement that comprehensive permits be issued if low- and moderate-
income housing existed on less than one and one-half percent of zoned
land area was raised to two and one-half percent. The requirement that
permits be issued if the commencement of construction would result in
multi-family housing on less than three-tenths of one percent of zoned
land area in any one calendar year was raised to five-tenths of one
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percent. 105 Even though these changes^ ^ ^
to pass.
The 1974 legislative session saw an attempt by opponents to
strengthen the planning criteria of the consistent with local needs
standard. Requirements and regulations made by local zoning boards
to restrict low- and moderate- income housing to locations "designated
for" such use in a locality's official housing plan would be consid-
ered to be consistent with local needs. 106 In addition> iocalities
would be allowed to attach conditions to comprehensive permits which
would be "designed to prevent an unreasonable concentration of low-
and moderate-income housing in one area. "107 In effect, the first
provision allowed localities to concentrate low-cost housing in des-
ignated areas, while the second provision authorized them to reject
more such housing when there was too great a concentration in the
designated areas. Together the provisions permitted localities to
limit the overall amount of low-cost housing by allowing only limited
amounts in limited areas, thus preserving the remainder of their
areas from multi-family encroachment. Understandably, these provi-
sions were rejected by liberal legislators.
By 1975 no modifications of Chapter 774 had succeeded in the
legislature. In that year, the Massachusetts Zoning Enabling Act108
itself was undergoing major revisions in the legislature in order to
allow localities to take advantage of such newer zoning devices as
cluster and planned unit development , 109 and in order to expedite
general zoning procedures. 13- 0 In revising the general statute, the
entire legislature reaffirmed its commitment to Chapter 774 's status
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<B» by reincorporating the iaw into the general statutes in essen-
tially the same form as the 1969 version. Ill The law took on a new
name and beoame the Low and Moderate Income Housing (new) Act of
1975.H2 Slnce none Qf the proposed nodificatlons Qf the . ncerin
period, even minor modifications such as the raising of the minimum
promotional criteria, were accepted from either the liberal or con-
servative quarter, the law had apparently taken on an untouchable
cast. The legislature was signaling that it would not tamper with
the law as extant.
The 1975 reaffirmation of the status quo for the most part
brought an end to the modifications sought in the legislature, al-
though diehard representatives continued to propose the repeal of
the law throughout the late seventies . 113 These attempts were killed
in the Urban Affairs Committee and never reached the House floor. 114
One other bill was introduced in both 1977 and 1978 which would have
defined regional need in terms of quotas for low-cost housing which
had by this time been calculated for all localities by the state
DCA.H5 This modification was no more successful than its predeces-
sors.
The ending of the 1970s seemed to confirm that the legislature
would allow Chapter 774 to continue to operate as it had done through-
out its first decade. The legislative skirmishes of the seventies had
brought no modifications or clarifications of the law. The failure
to act of the General Court indicated that it accepted the DCA's pro-
mulgation of interpretative regulations, the local zoning boards of
appeals' and the HAC's applications of the statute, and the Supreme
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Judicial Court's interpretations of the correctness of administrative
applications and DCA regulations. Since the legislature refused to
modify or clarify the statute, the actions of other arms of government
were definitive in determining the evolution of Chapter 774. How the
law evolved from the administrative rulings of local boards of appeals
and the HAC, and from judicial interpretations by the courts will be
discussed next.
Administrative and Judicial Interpretations
As a political compromise among various factions of the legis-
lature, the version of Chapter 774 that was finally adopted in 1969
was necessarily vague and ambiguous. For example, ambiguity pervaded
the procedure requiring boards of appeals and the Housing Appeals Com-
mittee to balance the promotional criteria for low- and moderate- income
housing with legitimate local planning concerns. 116 No guidelines
were given as to appropriate weights to be attached to conflicting
regional housing and local planning needs. How a "region" and "re-
gional need" themselves were to be defined was unclear. 117 The phrase
"requirements and regulations" failed to name zoning ordinances or
practices explicitly, so that there was some question as to whether
boards of appeals and the HAC could actually overrule duly passed and
promulgated zoning by-laws and decisions.
i
1 ^ What evidence a devel-
oper was to present, ^9 and what were the specifics of the appeals'
procedure to the HAC were unclear. 1^0 Finally, no mention was made
concerning what property interest a developer was required to have in
a proposed site in order to be granted standing for a comprehensive
permit request or an appeal to the HAC.121
Solutions to the difficulties of interpretation inherent in the
law came from the DCA and from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. The DCA promulgated regulations in 1970 which clarified the
meaning of region and regional need. Need and region were defined as
the shortage of housing for families and individuals
. . .[eligible for] State or Federal Programfs] subsidizingthe proposed housing, for the entire Standard Metropoli-tan Statistical Area of which the city or town is apart
.;^or if the city or town lies outside any sucharea, for the entire regional planning district. .'
.
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Subsequent DCA regulations also spelled out the documentary evidence
(site plans, engineering reports, and so on) which developers must
present to the boards of appeals and the Housing Appeals Committee. 123
Throughout the 1970s a steady stream of cases were appealed from
decisions of the Housing Appeals Committee to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. In the initial case, Hallenborg v. Town Clerk
of Billerica ,124 the CQurt ruled ^ limitations Qn apartment size ar£
not unreasonable under Chapter 774 standards. Billerica had restricted
living units in apartment districts to "three rooms, a kitchen, and a
bath. "125 In effect, Billerica was allowed to limit the size of fami-
lies that would live in apartments by limiting apartments to two bed-
rooms. The court found that such limitations reflected a legitimate
planning concern and were consistent with local needs. 126
Although the case of Bellows Farms v. Building Inspector of
Acton did not directly concern Chapter 774, the ruling in the case
further buttressed localities' use of planning concerns as a rationale
for limiting apartment construction. The state Zoning Enabling Act 128
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permits local planning boards to endorse plans for proposed develop-
ments and to stipulate that additional approval is not required under
subdivision regulations. The proposal of the developer for apartments
in Bellows Farms was certified as conforming to the zoning for the
proposed site and as not requiring subdivision approval. Subsequent-
ly, the town meeting voted several zoning amendments which had the ef-
fect of limiting the number of apartments from 435, the original pro-
posal, to 203.129 The CQurt held that the Zon . ng EnabUng pro_
tected only the proposed use of the site as zoned, and that it did not
"prevent changes which affected the intensity of the use. "130 This
decision is said to have provided towns with "a major weapon" for
restricting, if not eliminating, the construction of multi-family
housing. 131 Together, the Billerica and Bellows Farms decisions
seemed to indicate that the Supreme Judicial Court would construe both
Chapter 774 and the Zoning Enabling Act narrowly. Both decisions
allowed localities to place restrictive limitations on apartments.
These were upheld as reasonable planning concerns.
However, the major judicial interpretation of Chapter 774 which
came in 1973 in the Hanover and Concord cases, 132 would allay the fears
of open zoning advocates which had been engendered by the initial cases,
In these cases, the boards of appeals of two towns, Hanover and Concord,
had appealed from decisions of the HAC ordering that comprehensive
permits be issued for low- and moderate- income housing. By agreement
of all parties, the two cases were argued and decided together. 133
By looking at the legislative history of Chapter 774, the court
early on in the Hanover and Concord opinion dispensed with the argument
that the law's purpose was merely to speed up the permit pr0cess by
authorizing comprehensive permits, and not to give the boards of
appeals and the HAC power to override local zoning. How the law
evolved,134 the record Qf ^ legislative ^^35 ^ ^^
of the Legislative Research Council"* all indicated that the legis-
lature was primarily interested in insuring that low- and moderate-
income housing be built in dispersed locations. Since mere facili-
tation of permits could not possibly result in construction of such
housing if localities retained the power to zone it out, 137 the court
concluded that the intent of the legislature was to give the boards
of appeals and the HAC the power to override zoning. 138
The court also addressed the argument that home rule preven-
ted the state from authorizing a state agency (the HAC) to override
local prerogatives in zoning. Even though local powers were acknow-
ledged as substantial, the court held that they could not be used to
frustrate "the purpose or implementation of a general or special law
enacted by the Legislature.
. .
."139 The legislature retains "su-
preme power" when it is legislating general laws that apply "to two
or more municipalities. "WO chapter 774 is such a general law.
Further, delegation of the overriding power to the HAC was
not an "unlawful delegation of legislative authority" embodying too
much "administrative discretion"!^! because the legislature retains
the right of delegation for its legitimate powers. The statute was
not unconstitutionally vague because the legislature had provided the
HAC with clear standards for the exercise of the overriding power.
The housing and land minimums which specify consistency with local
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needs "define precisely the municipality's minimum housing
. .
,.142 They also deUneate cieariy (fthat ^^
interest must yield to the general public need for housing."^ In
throwing out the unconstitutional-for-vagueness argument, the court
clarified the balancing test. It established the weights to be given
to both the low- and moderate-income housing promotional criteria and
the local planning criteria. If a_ity fails ^^ ^ ^ ^
housing or land area minimums contained in the promotional criteria,
then there would be "a strong basis" to assume that "the regional need
outweighed local planning objectives.
. .
."144 Failure tQ meefc ^
promotional criteria creates a "presumption" that any planning ob-
jectives offered as reasons by a town for denial of subsidized hou-
sing are not consistent with local needs. The town carries the bur-
den of disproving that presumption. 145
In two final points, the court held that authorization by a
board of appeals or the HAC of multi-family construction on specific
parcels is not illegal "spot zoning" because the intent of such zoning
changes is to benefit the "public welfare" rather than to provide eco-
nomic benefit for the property owner. 146 It also ruled that develop_
ers need not have "present title" to the land involved in a proposal
in order to have standing before a board of appeals or the HAC. Per-
mits can be issued conditional to determination of the developer's
eligibility for financing by an appropriate state or federal agency. 147
By implication a developer need only have an option or commit-
ment from the landowner to transfer title to the land upon attainment
of financing and public endorsement.
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The Hanover and Co^ cases addressed many of the Mj or ambi-
guities surrounding Chapter 774. Most significantly, they uoheld the
statute's constitutionality under the state constitution so that devel-
opers could plan and begin to use the comprehensive permit and appeals'
processes with assurance that the law would not be overruled or re-
pealed. Subsequent Supreme Judicial Court cases would further clarify
the parameters and applications of Chapter 774.
In MalM""v V
-
B°ard
"
f Ap° ea1
*
" f HiS£h 148 the court inter-
preted the overriding power of the boards of appeals and the HAC as ex-
tending to subdivision by-laws as well as zoning practices."* The
court also clarified the appeals' procedure. Variations in methods of
appeal do not deny equal protection. Resulting persons or governments
"aggrieved" by the granting of a comprehensive permit to appeal to the
regular courts is essentially the same as authorizing those denied such
a permit to appeal to the HAC. 150
The Winchester case was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of a federal question. 151
In effect, the constitutionality of Chapter 774 was upheld under the
federal Constitution.
In B°ard of Appeals of Haverhill v. Housing Appeals Commit-
tee!52 the court addressed a claim by the ^ ^ inadequate gewerg
made a low-income housing project inconsistent with local needs. The
court ruled that the HAC had attached sufficient conditions to the per-
mit to insure the health and safety of project and town residents, and
that it was clear that the project would be connected with the public
sewer system and would not discharge sewage into public waterways. 153
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By plication, lac, of existing sewers ls not .
consideration to prevent low-cost housing under the conslstencv Bl£h
local needs standard. The regional need for housing outweighs any
such considerations.
In Bailev v. Board of^E£eals_of Holdenl54 the court further
clarified the specifics of the appeals' procedure as well as the nature
of standing. That the board of appeals had failed to hold a public
hearing before issuing the comprehensive permit did not deny due pro-
cess because it was not required to do so by any statute. A public
hearing need not be a part of the appeals' process.
The public housing authority was permitted to seek a compre-
hensive permit even though it did not as yet own the selected site.
The authority had standing before the board of appeals because its
"seriousness" in building was "apparent" from its preparation of "a
thorough site selection study" and comprehensive plans, its contract-
ing with DCA for development, and its prior arrangement for financ-
ing. 1^
Complicated political manipulations resulted in an apparent
anti-housing decision by the Supreme Judicial Court in Town of Chelms-
ford v. DiBiase.156 Subsequent to the landowner's application for a
comprehensive permit, the town meeting voted to take the proposed low-
income housing site by eminent domain for conservation purposes. The
court upheld the taking because it had been done "in good faith." A
town meeting decision to take by eminent domain, if done in good faith,
is not a "requirement or regulation" but a "transfer of ownership"^
which does not fall within the overriding power of the board of appeals
132
or the HAC.
The history of the transaction elucidates the "good faith" rea-
soning. Apparently the landowner used the threat of building public
housing on his land as leverage to get the town to take his land by
eminent domain. He had been negotiating with the town to sell his pro-
perty to it for conservation purposes for several years. Twice the
town meeting had failed to authorize the talcing. The developer then
turned to the alternative low-income housing use as an incentive for
the townspeople to take action on the issue. In its ruling the court
put boards of appeals on notice that the comprehensive permit process
was not to be used as a political weapon against the townspeople for
their failure to support a land use decision that both the landowner
and public officials supported, but that the people were reluctant to
endorse. Although the property owner and the town may have lacked
good faith, the townspeople had acted in good faith because the his-
tory of the negotiations surrounding the parcel illustrated that the
townspeople were accepting a use which they had considered in the past,
and not just turning down a low-income housing project.
The opinion of Board of Appeals of Maynard v. Housing Appeals
Committee!^ clarified three procedural issues and expanded upon the
Hanover interpretation of the balancing test by reaffirming the pri-
macy of regional housing needs over local planning concerns.
Procedurally, three of the five members of the HAC could decide
cases as long as proper procedures for a full and fair hearing were fol-
lowed. 159 The HAC could validly condition a permit upon compliance
with requirements of the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act. 16 0
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Developers can quallfy as an ..organizatlon „^ ^^
^
-ship papers (or by location, articles of incorporation, untll
after the board of appeals' hearing. 161
in interpreting the balancing test, the court designated the
weights to be given to two local concerns. First
,
although ^ ^
had claimed that the low-incorce project involved would result in
"crowding of schools," that is, that the project was not consistent
with local educational needs, the HAC had adequately addressed this
issue and found it to be an insufficient basis for denying a compre-
hensive per.it when it was balanced against the need for low-cost hou-
sing in the region.162 The court held ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^
erate-income housing outweighs local fiscal needs such as prevention
of school overcrowding or increased school expenditures. The town can-
not escape subsidized housing by claiming a need to prevent an influx
of children which would raise educational costs.
Second, in expanding on its "sewer" ruling of Haverhill
, the
court rejected the town's claim that the HAC had violated the planning
criteria of the consistency with local needs standard by authorizing
the proposed project without approval by the town meeting of necessi-
tated extensions of public sewers. 163 Since the developer had agreed
to construct an extension of the sewer line at his own expense and to
post an adequate performance bond, the town would not incur additional
expenses for sewers. The issue was therefore moot. HAC could dis-
pense with town meeting approval "as a requirement or regulation not
consistent with local needs. "164 Again, the promotional criterion of
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the need for housing outweighed the local planning oonoetn. Clearly,
the court was indicating in Mavnard and Haverhill that fiscal zoning
is not to be tolerated if regional housing needs are unmet. The fiscal
zoning argument was laid to rest.
In Board of Appeals of North Andover v. Housing Appeals Commit-
tee^ the court ruled ^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^^
ridden by the HAC. The contended provision of the State Building Code
pertained to procedures for resolving disputes and not to any substan-
tive building regulations. 166 The HAC could not establish alternative
procedures to those of the Code because its power to override extended
only to local requirements and regulations. It was not authorized by
the legislature to override other state laws. 16
"
Two justices dissented in the North Andover case. They empha-
sized that the HAC had required "construction according to the State
Building Code" and had limited the alternative procedures to disputes
between the builder and local officials over code interpretation. The
HAC's alternative procedure did not apply to disputes between the buil-
der and state officials, and therefore did not affect state officials'
powers. 1 68
In a last case, Board of Appeals of Melrose v. Housing Appeals
Committee, 16 9 the court ruled that the HAC does not have to render its
decision within the thirty-day period required by Chapter 774 if the
builder agrees to the delay. The provision requiring a timely deci-
sion is designed to benefit the developer. A board of appeals "has no
standing to complain of the delay. "170
Subsequent to the 1977 Melrose case, the Supreme Court of Massa-
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chusetts has heard no appeals under Chapter 774, although an addi-
tional appealed case was confirmed without comment, also in 1977.171
The dearth of appeals in the late seventies apparently indicated that
local officials and private parties opposed to low- and moderate-
income housing development in suburbia had realized by that time that
most of the justiciable issues under Chapter 774 had been resolved,
that the early uncertainties about the interpretation of the law's
meaning and procedures were sufficiently clarified, and that further
challenges to the law would prove to be costly and fruitless efforts.
Thus by the end of the first decade of the law, the controversy
over Chapter 774 had essentially been played out. The legislature had
refused to repeal or modify the statute. The executive branch had pro-
mulgated regulations and enforced the law's provisions. The Judiciary
had removed any doubts as to the law's constitutionality and clarified
various ambiguities. All technical obstructions to the construction
of low- and moderate-income housing in suburbia within the parameters
of Chapter 774 had been gradually eliminated. The pathway had been
cleared for low-cost housing to be constructed in localities which
lacked it. But whether in fact such construction took place remains
to be clarified. Did the law in its first decade make an impact on
the housing crisis of the state? An assessment of the law's impact
and effectiveness provides an answer to this question.
The Effectiveness of Chapter 774
Ten years after the passage of Chapter 774, the statewide fig-
ures of construction of low- and moderate-income housing in Massachu-
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setts were !ess than impressive. By 19 79, the comprehensive permits'
process had been used in onlv about one-fourth of Massachusetts' 351
municipalities.172 Approxlmately m appllcatlons ^ ^^ ^ ^
jurisdictions. Of the 14 83Q r^„o-r„cn ,8. 9 housing units applied for, only 3,462,
23.3% had been built. 173
The subsidized housing figures for 1978 for one metropolitan
area, the Springf ield-Holyoke-Chicopee SMSA, provide a more detailed
illustration of the general ineffectiveness of the law. 174
From the perspective of the ten percent housing minium of
Chapter 774, the average Springfield SMSA figures look moderately en-
couraging. The SMSA lacked only 2.4% of the subsidized housing units
that it required. Alternatively, 97.6% of ten percent of the housing
units in the SMSA were subsidized housing units.
However, more detailed analysis contradicts these positive fig-
ures. First, a breakdown of the SMSA figures indicates that great dif-
ferences existed between the central cities and suburbs. Two of the
three central cities, Springfield and Holyoke, had more subsidized
units than ten percent of their total housing units (37.8 and 40.8%,
respectively). The central cities together provided 25.9% more units
than their quota. Yet when the suburbs are considered separately, they
had 2,868 subsidized units less than their quota, a 37.7% deficit.
Longmeadow had the worst record, a 100% deficit, since it had no sub-
sidized housing. Wilbraham lacked 86.8% of its ten percent quota.
These figures suggest that by 1978 Chapter 774 had not been successful
in dispersing low-cost housing to the suburbs. The vast majority of
subsidized housing was still being built in the central cities. The
137
TABLE 2
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING UNITS IN TKV nn™^
Municipality
Springfield
Chicopee
Holyoke
Agawara
E. Longmeadow
Hampden
Longmeadow
Ludlow
W.Springfield
Wilbraham
Easthampton
Southampton
Southwick
Westf ield
Granby
Hadley
Northampton
S. Hadley
Belchertown
Monson
Palmer
Cen. City
Total or
Average
Suburban
Total or
Average
Grand
Total or
Average
10% Of
Total
Housing
Units
Total
Subsidized
Housing
Units
5,634
2,038
1,846
708
374
126
448
522
965
341
443
91
194
981
149
124
894
500
158
195
395
9,518
7,608
17,126
7,762
1,618
2,600
424
279
58
0
172
537
45
370
26
61
851
60
40
1,211
151
144
57
254
11,980
4,740
16,720
Deficit or
(Excess) Under
or (Over)
10% Quota
(2,128)
420
(754)
284
95
68
448
350
428
296
73
65
133
130
89
84
(317)
349
14
138
141
(2,462)
2,868
406
Percent Deficit
or (Excess)
Under or (Over)
10% Quota
(37.8)
20.6
(40.8)
40.1
25.4
54.0
100.0
67.0
44.4
86.8
16.5
71.4
68.6
13.3
59.7
67.7
(35.5)
69.8
8.9
70.8
35.7
(25.9)
37.7
2.4
• j 1°
lRCE:
^°
wer Ploneer Valley Regional Planning Commission Area-wide Housing Opportunity Plan (West Springfield, Ma- n p 1978^^^
"Introduction,
" pp. 24-5; "Local Subsidized Hou in^ Program pp' i_ 7
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existing subside housing^ ^ ^ ^ ^
-tai— of the
.unicipalities of the Sprlngfieid smsa ^ i978 ^
provided in Table 2.
The discrepancy between the percent of households in the
.etro-
politan area requiring assistance (35,498) and the numbers of exis-
tent subsidized units (16,720) provides little reason for optiais*.
Table 1 indicates that only 47.U of those households who needed sub-
sidized housing in 1978 were provided with it, while 52.9% of the
households requiring housing assistance were without subsidized hou-
sing.
Additionally, a comparison of the percent households requiring
housing assistance who cannot get it (52.9%) with the percent of the
deficit of subsidized units under the ten percent minimum of Chapter
774 (2.4%) indicates that the ten percent minimum is set too low.
While 18,778 more low-cost units were needed in the SMSA, 2.4% more
of ten percent of the housing units would provide only 406 more units.
From a slightly different perspective, if all municipalities fulfilled
their ten percent minimums, the area would still need 15,173 more low-
and moderate-income units to house its poor adequately. The analyses
of the dispersion of low-cost housing, the numbers of existent units
in relation to the overall need, and the need in relation to the ten
percent minimum, all indicate that Chapter 774 is ineffectual.
Chapter 774 has been criticized for not defining the type of
subsidized housing that must be built. Because the law does not re-
quire that family housing be constructed, the suburbs are said to be
using this definitional loophole to build only elderly housing, thus
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avoiding taking on the general population of the urban poor and avoid-
ing the intent of the law.175 This criticism ^ jugtified ^^
wide figures, but only partially supported by Springfield SMSA figures.
Of the 3,462 subsidized units built by 1979 in the state under Chapter
774, forty percent were elderly housing, thirty-six percent were family
bousing, and twenty-four percent were for mixed family and elderly
use. 176 statewide, family housing was not being built in as great
numbers as was elderly housing.
However, when subsidized housing units built or leased during
the lifetime of Chapter 774 in the Springfield SMSA are considered, it
becomes apparent that the vast majority of such units were family hou-
sing, and not elderly housing. Approximately seventy-one percent of
such units were family housing, while elderly units comprised twenty-
nine percent. Even if the suburbs are considered separately from the
central cities, still family units outnumbered elderly housing (60.4%
to 39.4%, respectively).
Nevertheless, some suburbs in the SMSA have taken advantage of
the definitional loophole. No subsidized housing was built or leased
in two suburbs, Hadley and Longmeadow, during the 1970-78 period, al-
though each had elderly subsidized housing, but no family housing,
built either prior to or after this period. 17 7 In addition, six sub-
urbs, East Longmeadow, Monson, Granby, South Hadley, Hampden and South-
wick, contained substantially greater numbers of elderly than family
units. Most of the family housing built or leased in these suburban
communities was scattered site, rentally-assisted, single-family hou-
sing. There were few, if any, low-cost housing projects in these
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jurisdictions. Thus eieht- «f eght of the Sprxngfield area's eighteen suburbs
can rightly be criticized for escam™ ^ ,caping the intent of the law, and the
criticism that the law la „eak in thi9 ^ par£uuy subscanciated
_
Table 3 divides subsldized housing ^^ ^ ^
^
the Springfield SMSA.
A last means of assessing the effectiveness of the law compares
the numbers of units built prlor to chapter ?„ wi£h ^ ^
units built after its passage and under its auspices. Table 4 fur-
nishes information concerning when subsidized housing has been built
or leased in relation to the passage of Chapter 774. tn the Sprlng.
field SMSA, the majority of low- and moderate-income housing units
(69.5%) has been built since Chapter 774 became effective. This sug-
gests that the law indeed has striated subsidized housing construc-
tion. However, only a minute portion of such housing built after 1969
(2.6%) has been facilitated under the comprehensive permit and appeals'
processes. Only five proposals for such housing have been brought in
the SMSA under the procedures of the law, one in Agawam, two in North-
ampton, one in East Longmeadow, and one in Wilbraham. Of 944 units
proposed, only three hundred (200 in Agawam and 100 in East Longmeadow)
have been constructed. 178 Permlts for 32Q famUy^ ^ Northampton
were denied by the board of appeals. The decision on 150 of these
units was not appealed to the HAC. The HAC upheld the board of appeals-
denial for a permit for the other 170 units. "9 The :54 units pr0_
posed in Wilbraham were granted a conditional permit by the board of
appeals. The conditions were modified by the HAC in 1975, but the pro-
ject has not been constructed. 180
141
TABLE 3
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING UNITS IN THE SPRINGFIELD cmo
a
BUILT OR LEASED 1970-78 BY TYPE OF UNIT
Springfield
Chicopee
Holyoke
Agawam
E. Longmeadow
Hampden
Longmeadow
Ludlow
W.Springfield
Wilbraham
Easthampton
Southampton
Southwick
Westf ield
Granby
Hadley
Northampton
S. Hadley
Belchertown
Monson
Palmer
Suburban Total
or Average
Grand Total
or Average
Elderly Family
Numb er Percent Number Percent
1,281
292
396
176
105
56
0
52
100
0
50
0
49
112
56
0
402
48
48
52
48
22.0
37.0
25.3
61.1
56.1
96.6
0.0
39.4
30.8
0.0
18.6
0.0
80.3
17.9
93.3
0.0
45.5
76.2
33.3
91.2
18.9
4,540
498
1,169
112
82
2
0
80*
225*
5
219
26*
12
515
4
0
481
15
96
5
206
78.0
63.0
74.7
38.9
43.9
3.4
0.0
60.6
69.2
100.0
81.4
100.0
19.7
82.1
6.7
0.0
54.5
23.8
66.7
8.8
81.1
1,354 39.4 2,085 60.6
>
323 28.6 8,292 71.4
Total
5,821
790
1,565
288
187
58
0
132
325
5
269
26
61
627
60
0
883
63
144
57
254
3,439
11,615
wide ZfE: n°Wer Pi°neer Vall6y Re§ ional banning Commission, Area-
n T
Xf!^U !.ln * 0°?°VtUnitV ? lan (West Springfield, Ma.: n.p., 197877"
pp. 24-5; "Local Subsidized Housing Programs," pp. 1-7.
"Introduction,
"
AHOP
*These are derived figures calculated from the totals given by the
;
Introduction, p. 24, and the types of housing given in "LocalSubsidized Housing Programs," pp. 1-7.
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TABLE 4
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING UNITS IN Twr 5BBnwi™^ASEB_BEFO^ AND AFTER CHAPTER^774^
Municipality
Springfield
Chicopee
Holyoke
Agawam
E. Longmeadow
Hampden
Longmeadow
Ludlow
W.Springfield
Wilbraham
Easthampton
Southampton
Southwick
Westfield
Granby
Had ley
Northampton
S. Hadley
Belchertown
Monson
Palmer
Total or
Average
Unit:
p J
uilt Built
Prior t0 After
Ch. 774 (1970) Ch. 774 (1970-78)
1,941
828
1,035
136
92
0
0
40
212
40
101
0
0
224
0
40
328
88
0
0
0
5,105
Percent
Built After
Ch.774 (1970-78)
5,821
790
1,565
288
187
58
0
132*
325*
5
269
26*
61
627
60
0
883
63
144
57
254
11,615
75.0
48.8
60.2
67.9
67.0
100.0
0.0
76.7
60.5
11.1
72.7
100.0
100.0
73.7
100.0
0.0
72.9
41.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
69.5
Lower Pioneer Valley Regional Planning Commission, Area-
ild, Ma.: n.p., 1978)
-zed Housing Units,"
W1M„T n ^ l° ? § ° i
"intrnr^"* °!r
rtUnltv P1 *" (West SpringfielcIntroduction," pp. 5-17, 24-5; "Local Subsidi;
PP. 1-7.
.H.£5"
"8Ur6S 8
,
lven ln Che AHOP, "Introduction," pp. 16-17 differ
have beeped here!'' thSSe th"e t0WM - The hl*h« "««••
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The Springfield area figures for 1970-78 construction indicate
that developers simply have not used the Chapter 774 procedures in any
great numbers, and when they have done so in some few instances, their
chances of bringing a project to completion have been only two in five.
The vast majority of low-cost housing has been built outside of the
comprehensive permit and appeals' processes. One might speculate that
the fact of Chapter 774 has been enough to induce municipalities to
zone land for multi-family housing and to facilitate its construction
in order to avoid the lengthy red tape involved in Chapter 774 proce-
dures and the stigma of having an appeal taken to the HAC, since 97.4%
of subsidized housing built during the lifetime of the statute in the
Springfield SMSA has been outside its auspices. In addition, 3,139
units, no small number in absolute terms, have been constructed in
suburbia without the law. Nevertheless, only 27% of the units built
in this time period without Chapter 774 procedures were located in
the suburbs. The great majority were located in the three central ci-
ties, two of which exceeded the land area minimums of Chapter 774 and
were not subjected to the threat of its procedures. Although Chap-
ter 774 may have some psychological value to induce suburbs to liberal-
ize their zoning practices, the value has not resulted in more than a
token amount of subsidized units in such suburbs as Wilbraham and Long-
meadow, and no units in Hadley. The most exclusionary jurisdictions
have continued to resist the intent of the law. They have not been
pressured by its presence into accepting subsidized housing. In fine,
it seems safe to say that Chapter 774 has had negligible effect on the
construction of subsidized housing in the suburbs of the Springfield
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metropolitan area.
If the law is ineffective in fulfilling the need for low-cost
housing in suburbia, it is even more so in the central cities. Spring-
field and Holyoke were exempt from the ten percent minimum housing quo-
ta, yet they had significant numbers of households which would be eli-
gible for subsidized housing if it existed. Although the central ci-
ties are by no means excluding subsidized housing by zoning, they still
are not meeting their housing needs because they have such large num-
bers of resident poor. For example, although the City of Springfield
had almost 7,800 subsidized units by 1978, more than 5,000 more than
Holyoke, the nearest competitor, it was fulfilling only slightly less
than half of its subsidized housing need. The concentration of poor in
the central cities is poignantly highlighted by these figures. In 1980,
the situation was so critical in Springfield that the Mayor declared a
"housing emergency,"181 and the Springfield Housing Authority stopped
taking applications for subsidized housing because the waiting list was
so long that "new applicants would be unlikely to receive housing with-
in 12 to 18 months.
. .
."
182
If Chapter 774 is not facilitating low-cost housing construc-
tion in either city or suburb, neither is it in any way affecting the
alleged cost-increasing mechanisms of single-family zoning in suburbia.
If suburban zoning does result in economically and racially segregated,
metropolitan living patterns, the Massachusetts Low and Moderate-Income
Housing Act is a poor remedy for that exclusion. Although the general
focus of the Act may be basically sound, its specific provisions and
administrative implications leave much to be desired. In order to
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effective, substantial revisions of the law's substance and elimina-
tion of administrative delays would be required. The criticisms which
have been leveled at the statute and the evidence of its ineffective-
ness provide an agenda for future legislative action. The next section
examines specific inadequacies of the law and provides possible solu-
tions.
The Agenda for the Future
Chapter 774 has been highly praised as a step forward in state
initiative in combatting restrictive suburban zoning, and indeed, it is
that. However, its general ineffectiveness justifies criticisms that
it is an imperfect instrument for that purpose. Criticisms have been
directed at the substance of the law, at procedural aspects of the com-
prehensive permits and appeals' processes, and at the law's adverse ef-
fects on comprehensive planning.
A major substantive criticism emphasizes that the law only fa-
cilitates the construction of low- and moderate-income, multi-family
housing. It is said that in doing so, the law does little more than
"disperse ghettoes. In spite of the Legislative Research Council's
characterization of many of the devices of suburban single-family zon-
ing as exclusionary , 184 chapter 774 makes no attempt to regulate these
devices or to alleviate their exclusionary effects. 185 The statute
thus is less than half a remedy, since excessive requirements of single-
family zoning are thought to be at least as extensive as zoning out low-
cost multi-family housing. If large lot zoning is as prevalent or more
prevalent than exclusion of multi-family housing (and Springfield ai
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suburban zoning statistics indicate that it is!86)
9 additional legis-
lation should prohibit localities from requiring excessively large
lot sizes for single-family homes. Although state courts in Pennsyl-
vania18 ? and New Jersey18 8 have struck down large lot size require-
ments as illegal, this issue has never been addressed legislatively.
It should be placed on the agenda for the future.
A second criticism states that the threshold set by the three
numerical promotional criteria at which the comprehensive permit and
appeals' processes become operative is far too low. Exempting juris-
dictions with ten percent of their housing, with one- and one-half per-
cent of their industrially, commercially and residentially zoned land
for low- and moderate-income housing, or with three-tenths of one per-
cent of their industrially, commercially and residentially zoned land,
or ten acres, already committed to low- and moderate-cost housing in
any calendar year, permits many communities to escape their fair share
of the regional housing need which may be far greater than these small
percentages. 189 Analysis of the Springfield SMSA subsidized housing
figures in comparison to the ten percent minimum and the need for such
housing adds credence to this criticism. The numerical minimums could
be raised to allow more subsidized housing to be built in central ci-
ties and suburbs that have already reached these small minimums. How-
ever, since this approach has already failed in the legislature and
brings strong protests from central city officials, another tactic
based on a different criticism of the minimums could be tried.
An additional criticism of the minimums states that the
two
land area percentages are meaningless standards. They
assume a level
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of statistical sophistication which, although perhaps present in the
Boston capitol, is lacking for the most part in developers' offices,
suburban planning departments, lay boards of appeals, and even the
Housing Appeals Committee. If land area minimums cannot be computed,
they cannot be used to activate the comprehensive permit process or
to determine if regional need is met. In lieu of raising the land area
minimums which seems politically infeasible, these could be eliminated.
Efforts could then be focused on strengthening or raising the ten per-
cent housing minimum which is more easily calculated and more readily
understood. By merely allowing the comprehensive permit procedure to
be activated when less than ten percent of a locality's housing units
are low-cost units, Chapter 774 does not insure that adequate units
will be built. The provision could be changed to require that ten per-
cent or more of new construction be for low-cost housing for a period
of years in order to compensate for past lack of such construction.
Unfortunately, this approach has also been tried in the legislature
without success.
A last criticism of the promotional criteria states that al-
though the statute requires that the number of low-income households
in a city or town be considered when regional need is determined, the
promotional formulas do not include consideration of this variable.
The need for housing by region or municipality is pinpointed only when
the numbers of households requiring subsidized housing in a municipal-
ity or region are related to the numbers of existing subsidized units.
If needy households exceed existing subsidized housing in a region or
individual municipality, then the comprehensive permit and appeals pro
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cedures should apply to all the localities of the region, or at least
to the individual municipality which does not fulfill its need. Such
a standard would be far more realistic than the present promotional
criteria. The bill introduced in the House in 1977 and 1978 190 attemp-
ted to require such quotas based on need, but the legislation also
failed to pass. A more concerted effort to make the quotas mandatory
by legislation rather than just advisory, as they currently are under
DCA regulations, presents a viable policy choice to the current provi-
sions.
The substantive difficulty in the definition of low-cost housing
which allows only elderly housing to be built to the exclusion of fami-
ly housing should also be addressed. The law could specify that con-
struction of elderly housing alone does not fulfill a community's obli-
gation. All localities could be required to permit at least some fam-
ily units, since the need for them is greater.
A last substantive criticism maintains that because the law
limits qualified developers to public and semi-public agencies, it un-
necessarily eliminates profit-making developers who could provide sub-
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stantial amounts of much needed low-income housing. The possibility
that such developers would inundate suburban communities with low-cost
housing is adequately prevented by the thresholds which foreclose in-
vocation of the law when low quotas have already been met. Even if,
as stated above, higher minimums were required, private developers
could be made eligible without any undue effects.
Several criticisms are aimed at procedural aspects of the com-
prehensive permit and appeals' processes. A major criticism hold:;
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the entire process from application to construction takes too long.
Even though the law specifies tine limitations on each stage of the
comprehensive permit and appeals' processes , 192 the maximum possible
elapsed time under the statute (170 days) is not enforced. 193 The HAC
has unnecessarily lengthened the process beyond the statutory limita-
tions by not closing its hearings until it actually renders a deci-
sion. This prevents the requirement that a decision be rendered with-
in thirty days of the close of hearings from being activated. The HAC
has delayed its decisions months, and even over a year in a few in-
stances. 194 The Melrose case ruling has for all practical purposes
sanctioned the laggardness of the HAC. To maintain the goodwill of
the HAC, a developer would not want to pressure for a timely decision
and would be inclined to agree to any delay, even though the costs in
time and money might ultimately cause him to abandon the project. Part
of the difficulty has been the legislature's failure to fund and staff
the HAC adequately. 195 Appropriation of funds for clerical staff would
go a long way towards elimination of this problem.
Another criticism states that the suburbs have skillfully used
"dilatory tactics" to slow down the process even further. 196 Counsel
for boards of appeals have taken advantage of the de novo procedures
of the HAC to offer evidence on "every conceivable issue. "197 Often
the evidence is redundant or only remotely related to the central is-
sues. Counsel will also ask for separate hearings on every issue in-
volved or every site proposed by the developer, or claim the need for
excessive continuances which must be granted under due process re-
quirements.!^ if a town is willing to fight a housing proposal, the
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entire appeals' process can take as long as three years. 199 Conse-
quently, only the most "financially secure" developers can economic-
ally endure such a protracted legal battle. 200 Since few developers
of low-cost housing are financially secure enough to absorb the costs
of litigation and the inflated construction costs of a multi-year
wait.-u-L towns such as Billerica, Northbridge, Rockland, 202 wilbra-
ham203 and many others2 04 have been able to stall developers into
abandonment of projects. There seems little that can be done to
alleviate this problem, since due process rightly requires that pro-
cedural safeguards be preserved for localities.
Procedural inadequacies of the law itself are said also to con-
tribute to extended delays. The comprehensiveness of the permit sys-
tem has been negated to a great extent by the state Environmental
Policy Act, 205 the Inland and Coastal Wetlands Acts, 206 and the His-
toric District Acts. 207 The Environmental Policy Act requires project
developers to file an environmental impact report with the Secretary
of the Department of Environmental Affairs. Comment periods and re-
quirements for hearings on the environmental impact report can extend
the approval period for a project another 105 days. 208
If an area designated as a wetland is involved in a proposed
project, then the developer must apply to the local conservation com-
mission for a wetlands permit under the Wetlands Act. The Massachu-
setts Department of Natural Resources must also give its approval. 209
If a historic district is affected by a proposal, then review
by the local historical commission is also required. 210
All of these steps are not part of the comprehensive permit pro-
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cess. Each must be acquired subsequent to obtaining the comprehen-
sive permit. If opponents of a subsidized housing project fail to
prevent it via the comprehensive permit process, they can still cir-
cumvent Chapter 774 by claiming environmental concerns. Even if
environmental approval is eventually gained, the entire approval pro-
cess is unnecessarily lengthened by leaving these other permits out
of the comprehensive permit system. The simple solution to this pro-
blem would be to make all permits a part of the comprehensive permit.
A last set of criticisms of Chapter 774 maintains that munici-
palities' planning prerogatives are not adequately protected by the
planning criteria of the consistency with local needs standard. Is-
suance of a comprehensive permit for multi-family housing on any un-
planned for site can drastically alter or even negate the best thought
out long-range master plan of development of a community. In effect,
the law makes planning and growth management practically impossible.2H
The narrow definition of planning factors which are consistent with
local needs should be expanded to include more local concerns and
legitimate planning objectives such as traffic considerations, "the
proximity of the housing to essential services, "212 and the value of
the proposed sites for other uses than public housing. 213 Planning
considerations should not only be expanded but should also be given
more weight when they are balanced against the regional need for hou-
sing. If a town objects to the use of a specific site for low-cost
housing, for whatever reasons, it should be allowed to designate an
alternative site. 214 The power of boards of appeals and the HAC to
override local planning and zoning should be limited to only those
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cases in which "a clear case of discrimination" is apparent or pro-
ven. 215 However, if such provisions were enacted, they would weaken
an already less than perfect system.
To summarize, Chapter 774 has been criticized from a variety of
viewpoints for a variety of weaknesses. Some critics assert that the
law does not go far enough in attacking exclusionary zoning. Others
maintain that the administrative procedures required to build subsidized
housing are unnecessarily time consuming and costly. Still others con-
tend that the law should be curtailed because it disrupts community ef-
forts at planned and orderly growth. The majority of these criticisms
are well founded. If segregated central city-suburban living patterns
are primarily attributable to zoning, a stiff er anti-snob zoning law
would be necessary to combat that exclusion. Bills have been introduced
into the legislature to rectify the defects of Chapter 774, but it has
been unwilling to adopt these solutions . The judiciary has not been as
activist as that in such states as Pennsylvania and New Jersey but has
limited itself to interpreting state zoning statutes.
Unless more definitive and convincing proof is forthcoming con-
cerning the harmful effects of restrictive zoning on race relations and
the housing crisis in Massachusetts and elsewhere, it is extremely un-
likely that a more effective solution will be forthcoming from the
Massachusetts legislature or the courts in the immediate future. The
following chapters undertake a systematic, statistical analysis of the
relationship of zoning to racially and economically segregated living
patterns in the Springfield SMSA in a search for more persuasive proof
of the exclusionary zoning hypothesis.
CHAPTER V
RESEARCH DESIGN
Hypothesis
The general hypothesis to be investigated can be stated in sev-
eral fashions. First, if suburbs in the Springf ield-Holyoke-Chicopee,
Massachusetts-Connecticut Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)
have exclusionary land use policies (and by implication the central ci-
ties do not), 1 then the percentages of minorities and the poor will be
markedly smaller and the quality of living conditions will be substan-
tially better in the suburbs than in the central cities. Stated in a
slightly different and more testable fashion, the hypothesis is that
land use policy as embodied in zoning documents explains differences
(variance around the mean) in the minority composition, class status
and quality of living conditions of suburban and central city resi-
dents in the Springfield SMSA. Stated more technically, a multiple
regression equation, or factors, or canonical variates which describe
exclusionary zoning can be derived from zoning variables which pre-
dict(s) a large portion of the variance in specific variables, or fac-
tors, or canonical variates which describe the urban ecology, that is,
the racial, socioeconomic and/or housing pattern that exists in the
Springfield SMSA.
The Data Base: The Springfield Metropolitan Area
The Springfield SMSA was chosen for study because it is not
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atypical of the old metropolitan areas of the Northeast. 2 Its popula-
tion is a pastiche of the descendants of the waves of immigrants of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Irish, Poles, Italians,
Russian Jews, French Canadians, and the modern migrants of the twenti-
eth century, southern Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Its twentieth century
development pattern has been the common New England one - settlement in
the existing Victorian and pre-war development of 'the inner city, fol-
lowed by the outward migration of the upwardly mobile from the frayed
center to the post-war, new construction of the suburbs, all of which
is superimposed on the scattered, colonial greens of the first settlers
which are preserved to the present.
The central area is a portrait of any American city, well-worn,
densely populated, multi-racial, with sparse, shiny new projects as
testimonials to federal renewal and redevelopment efforts. The residen-
tial subdivisions, industrial parks, and shopping malls of outlying
areas complete the typical metropolitan landscape.
Governmentally , the Springfield SMSA follows the New England
tradition. All land is placed in town or city jurisdictions which are
the fundamental governing units. 3 Although county divisions nominally
exist, counties perform no primary, general-purpose governmental func-
tions.
The City of Springfield itself governs only five percent of the
total land area of the metropolis. ^ The remaining land is fragmented
into twenty-four city and town governmental jurisdictions, each with
its own executive and legislative structure, its own zoning ordinance,
plan of development (or lack of such), subdivision requirements,
155
building codes, and so on. The fragmentation of local governments and
the planning function is typical of metropol itan areas in the United
States at large. The near-exclusive governance by municipalities of
the total metropolitan area is typical of the Northeast and atypical
of the rest of the country. The similarities and differences of the
Springfield SMSA with metropolis at large make it ideal for a case
study. What is learned about it can be compared and contrasted to
other metropolitan areas, although in a general, and not statistical,
way.
Tests of Significance
Since the Springfield SMSA was not chosen at random as repre-
sentative of all United States metropolitan areas or even Massachu-
setts ones, tests of significance will be generally disregarded in the
data analysis. 5 Relationships which are explicated will be accepted
as statistically valid only for the specific data used. No attempt
will be made to apply them to other metropolitan areas other than in
a non-empirical manner. Certainly, the review of the literature shows
ample precedent for using the standard case study method in the exclu-
sionary zoning and urban ecology context.
Definitions of Central Cities and Suburbs
The census classifies Holyoke and Chicopee as central cities
along with Springfield, although Holyoke and Chicopee locationally lie
in the first ring suburbs. The census definition will be used here.
The first ring of suburbs includes those jurisdictions which
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have borders contiguous to the City of Springfield as the core city.
Holyoke and Chicopee are excluded from the first ring because of their
central city classification by the census. Hampden is included as a
first ring suburb although it has no contiguous borders with Spring-
field, because it is locationally sandwiched between Wilbraham and
East Longmeadow and logically completes the first ring. The first
ring of suburbs then includes the census tracts in Agawam, East Long-
meadow, Hampden, Longmeadow, Ludlow, West Springfield and Wilbraham.
The second ring of suburbs is defined as those jurisdictions with bor-
ders contiguous to the first ring (or Holyoke or Chicopee which are
locationally in the first ring). These include the west suburbs of
Easthampton, Southampton, Southwick and Westfield, the north suburbs
of Granby, Hadley, Northampton and South Hadley, and the east suburbs
of Belchertown, Monson and Palmer.
The towns of Hatfield, Warren and Somers, Connecticut, although
defined as a part of the Springfield SMSA, have been eliminated from
the analysis. Hatfield lies beyond the second ring of suburbs. Warren
is located in WorChester County, outside the Hampden-Hampshire area.
Somers is outside Massachusetts and operates under differing legal con-
straints. Data will be coded by census tracts in order to provide ade-
quate data points. The area of study will include eighty-three census
tracts, forty-nine of which are central city tracts (thirty-three in
Springfield, eight in Chicopee, eight in Holyoke) and thirty-four of
which are suburban tracts (nine in the first ring and twenty-five in
the second ring). 6 Map 1 displays the area of research.
Map 1. Subgrouping of municipalities
the Springf ield-Holyoke-Chicopee SMSA.
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Level of Measurement
All variables included in the study, both dependent and inde-
pendent, will be interval level variables so that factor analyses, mul-
tiple regressions and canonical correlations can be performed on the
data.
Operationalization of Independent Variables :
Describing Exclusionary Zoning
The eleven variables which will be used to describe zoning in-
clude those which operationalize the six basic categories of exclu-
sionary devices enumerated by Williams and Norman, 7 those indicated by
the Massachusetts Legislative Research Council as having exclusionary
effect, 8 and subsidized housing figures provided by the Areawide Hou-
sing Opportunity Plan ,
9
Large lot zoning will be operationalized as the average zoned
minimum lot size in square feet required for single-family residential
uses. The minimum lot size of each single-family residential district
or use will be summed and averaged to calculate this variable.
Frontage requirements will be operationalized as the average
zoned lot width in linear feet required for single-family residential
uses. The frontage requirements in each category of single-family
zoning of a municipality will be summed and averaged.
The exclusion of multiple dwellings will be operationalized by
three variables. The percent acreage zoned for multi-family housing
is the number of acres zoned for two-family or more living units, di-
vided by the total land acreage of a census tract. Census tract acreage
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and acreage zoned for multi-family housing will be taken by polar
planimeter from the "Location of Subsidized Housing (AKOP) Map" and
zoning maps of each municipality. Maps will be divided into census
tracts to facilitate coding.
The percent multi-family housing units will be the actually
developed number of two-family or more living units, divided by the
total number of housing units in a census tract, as given by the 1970
census. This variable accounts for those units which would not show
up in zoning ordinances such as existing non-conforming uses and those
apartments or planned unit developments which have been allowed by var-
iances, special exceptions or floating zones.
The total, zoned (developed or undeveloped) number of multi-
family units is the acreage zoned for multi-family housing multiplied
by the living units per acre restrictions for each subcategory of
multi-family housing. For example, ten acres zoned for duplexes on
quarter acre lots would theoretically result in eighty living units,
while ten acres zoned for four, ten-story high rises with forty apart-
ments each would result in one hundred and sixty living units. This
variable measures the policy of the municipality in permitting apart-
ments regardless of market forces or developer decisions to build or
not to build. In most cases, actually developed figures are far lower
than zoned figures, indicating that liberal zoning does not necessarily
result in large numbers of apartments.
Since the Legislative Research Council included height and set-
back restrictions in multi-family housing districts in Massachusetts
localities, along with minimum lot size and frontage requirements in
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single-family districts, as having exclusionary effects, 10 these vari-
ables will also be included. Average height restrictions in multi-
family districts will be the sum of linear feet height limitations in
each multi-family zoning category divided by the number of categories.
Low numbers are more exclusionary than high numbers.
Average setback requirements will be the sum of linear feet
setback requirements in each multi-family category divided by the
number of categories. High numbers of setback are more exclusionary
than low numbers.
Restrictions on the number of apartment bedrooms will be opera-
tionalized as a dummy variable. If a municipality has no bedroom re-
strictions, it will be coded as zero on this variable. If it has bed-
room restrictions of any sort, it will be coded as one.
The prohibition of mobile homes will also be coded as a dummy
variable. A zero will here indicate no mobile homes or that mobile
homes are prohibited, while a one will indicate that mobile homes are
permitted. Note the reverse direction on the exclusionary-inclusionary
continuum of the coding of bedroom restrictions and prohibition of
mobile homes.
Two variables concerning subsidized housing will operationalize
a municipality 1 s policy towards public housing. The total number of
public housing units will include both elderly and family, low- and
moderate- income housing units in a census tract. Unrestricted sub-
sidized housing, that is, family housing, will be subsidized housing
less restricted elderly units. Some Massachusetts virtually all-white
suburbs ,H under the mandate of Chapter 774 to provide small percent-
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ages of new housing per year as subsidized housing, are accused of
avoiding opening up their housing stock to minorities and the general
population of poor from the inner city by prohibiting family housing
while permitting a limited number of elderly housing units to be con-
structed and then giving preference for residence in these to the el-
derly already residing in their municipality. Removing such units
from the subsidized housing total attempts to account systematically
for this circumvention of the anti-snob zoning legislation, since the
analysis of statewide and Springfield SMSA, family and elderly subsi-
dized housing data provided no conclusive confirmation of this accu-
sation.
Since the locations of multi-family public housing projects and
subsidized single-family subdivisions are provided by the AHOP, totals
for towns and cities can be readily disaggregated by census tracts.
However, the precise locations of scattered site, single-family houses
in localities are not provided. Consequently, as a proxy for pinpoint-
ing the census tract location of scattered site housing for those muni-
cipalities with multiple census tracts, the ratio of the 1970 popula-
tion density of each census tract will be used to disaggregate the to-
tal for each town. Such a mathematical distribution may create slight
bias in the results.
Although minimum building size requirements are suggested by the
literature as having exclusionary effects, they will not be used in this
analysis. The Massachusetts State Zoning Enabling Act prevents locali-
ties from zoning for more than 768 square feet of floor space, a mini-
mum required for health and safety, in single-family residential zones.
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The law does not specify any maximum allowable square footage require-
ments for multi-family housing. 12 However, most municipalities keep
their multi-family minimum floor area requirements within the single-
family limitations. Only one municipality (Westfield) requires floor
areas in its multi-family housing in excess of the single-family re-
striction. This variable would therefore be meaningless within the
context of a Massachusetts SMSA.
The zoning variables will be taken from regional planning docu-
ments, zoning ordinances and maps, and the 1970 and 1980 Census of
Housing and Population of the twenty-one governmental jurisdictions.
Those documents adopted or housing decisions taken prior to January 1,
1979 will be used. For example, if a zoning ordinance was adopted in
prior years and remains unchanged to this date, it will be considered
to be in effect on January 1, 1979. If amendments were added to an
earlier zoning ordinance, they will also be considered to be in effect
on January 1, 1979. As the federal government placed more anti-dis-
crimination conditions on its aid to localities, and as the State of
Massachusetts became more restrictive in its legislation concerning ex-
clusion of low cost housing, and developers began to use the Chapter 774
provisions, one would expect exclusionary suburbs to react with provi-
sions which attempt either to accommodate or to circumvent these regu-
lations and statutes. The cutoff date does not mean that prior zoning
decisions will be excluded. On the contrary, longitudinal aspects are
considered since most Springfield SMSA municipalities adopted zoning in
the 1950s and early 1960s, and the latest adoption of zoning in the area
was in 1973. The cutoff date means only that zoning decisions made af-
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ter a certain point in time will be excluded in order to allow suffi-
cient lead time for zoning to have had its hypothesized effect on the
urban ecology as described by the 1980 census. The shortest lead time
of any zoning amendment will be at least one- and one-half years. 13
All documents to be used are public records subject to public
viewing and are available for purchase or scrutiny in the town offices
or public library of each municipality. The zoning ordinances will be
scanned to find the numerical values of the average minimum lot size,
average zoned lot width, prohibition of mobile homes, restrictions on
the numbers of bedrooms, average apartment height and average apartment
setback. The percent acreage zoned for multi-family housing will be
taken from the zoning maps as described above. The total zoned number
of multi-family housing units will be calculated from the multi-family
acreages derived from the zoning maps and the living units per acre
restrictions taken from the zoning ordinances. The percent multi-
family housing units will be taken from the Census of Population and
Housing
.
Beginning analysis of the zoning data will use descriptive sta-
tistics to describe census tracts subgrouped by municipality so that
general zoning characteristics can be displayed. Subsequently, all in-
dependent variables will be converted to common logarithms for normali-
zation. Whichever (original variables or logarithms) display the more
normal distribution on histograms will be used as the values for each
variable in further analysis. A correlation matrix of the zoning vari-
ables will be constructed to identify collinearity and unrelated vari-
ables .
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The zoning variables will then be factored in order to see if
one or more exclusionary zoning factors can be derived. The factor
analysis will use as input the matrix of the correlations between the
independent variables. The principal components method of factoring
with iterations (PA 2) will be used. Factor scores for each census
tract and each rotated factor that is derived will be calculated. This
analysis should indicate whether various zoning devices systematically
constitute a restrictive zoning policy, and if they do so, what muni-
cipalities have the highest and lowest scores on the factors, that is,
are the most and least exclusionary.
Operationalization of Dependent Variables ;
Describing the Urban Ecology
Twelve dependent variables will be used to describe the urban
ecology of the Springfield SMSA. These include, first, a measure of
the minority composition of the population, that is, the number of
Blacks, plus the number of Asians and Pacific Islanders, plus the num-
ber of persons of Spanish origin, divided by the total population in
a census tract.
Second, the measures of socioeconomic status will be the same
six variables used by Berry and Horton in their census tract analy-
sis.-^ These include the median school years completed of persons
twenty-five years and over as given by the census, as a measure of edu-
cation. As measures of occupation, the percent white collar workers
and percent unemployed will be used. The percent white collar workers
is the number of professional, technical and kindred workers, plus the
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number of managers and administrators, except farm, plus the number
of sales workers, plus the number of clerical and kindred workers,
divided by the total number of employed workers sixteen years old and
over. The percent unemployed workers is the numbers of unemployed
males plus females sixteen years old and over in the civilian labor
force divided by the numbers of males plus females sixteen years old
and over in the civilian labor force.
As measures of income, poverty and wealth, three variables will
be used. The median annual family income is that figure as given by
the census. The percent poor families is the percent of all families
with income below the poverty level as given by the census. The per-
cent well-off families is the number of families and unrelated indi-
viduals with income of $15,000-24,999, plus those with income of
$25,000-49,999, plus those with income of $50,000 or more, divided by
all families.
The measures of the quality of living conditions will include
the three used by Berry and Horton. The percent housing built after
1970 (as a measure of new housing) is the number of housing units in
a municipality in 1980 minus the number of housing units in a munici-
pality in 1970, divided by all housing units in a municipality in 1980.
The percent substandard housing is all units lacking some or all plumb-
ing facilities, divided by all year-round housing units. 15 The popula-
tion per household, that is, the average household size, is the 1980
population in a municipality divided by the number of housing units in
the municipality in 1980.
In addition, the percent units overcrowded and the median single-
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family value will also be included." The percent units overcrowded
is the number of units with 1.01 to 1.50 persons per room, P lus the
number of units with 1.51 or more persons per room, divided by all
occupied housing units. The median single-family value is the median
value of single-family houses as given by the census.
Three of the urban ecology variables, the percentage nonwhite,
the average household size, and the percentage of housing built between
1970 and 1980 will be taken from the 1980 Census, since these figures
were released early. 17 The remaining nine variables will be taken from
the 1970 Census^ as a proxy for the 198Q data which havg n<jt bgen
released as of this writing. The minority figures for the Springfield
SMSA for 1980 indicate that very little change in central city and
suburban residency of minorities has taken place between 1970 and
1980. 19 Since the change in the distribution of minority population
is small, changes in the distribution of other dependent variables are
hypothesized to be small also. Since minorities remain largely concen-
trated in the central cities, the distributions of the poor and wealthy,
the well- and poorly educated, the well-employed and the unemployed,
and the quality of living conditions will remain relatively the same
by locality in 1980 as they were in 1970. The 1980 dependent variables
are expected to be highly correlated with 1970 variables. For example,
although the median value of single-family houses probably has risen
substantially, the rises should be approximately the same proportion-
ately for all municipalities. Similarly, although the percentages of
unemployed may have changed since 1970, the unemployed probably still
live in 1980 where they did in 1970, and so on for the other 1970 de-
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pendent variables. Use of the 1970 data will probably produce little
distortion in the final analysis.
In a beginning analysis of the dependent data, descriptive sta-
tistics for all variables by census tracts will be calculated. The
data will be regrouped into municipalities so that the distribution of
the jurisdictions on the variables can be displayed, and each munici-
pality's ecological characteristics can be discussed separately. A
correlation matrix of the ecology variables will be calculated in order
to get a preliminary sense of their interrelationship.
The factorial methodology used by Berry and Horton and repli-
cated by Erickson and Miller20 wm be used t0 anaiy2e the ecology
variables. Just as was done with the zoning variables, principal com-
ponents with iterations and varimax rotation will be used. Factor
scores will also be calculated for each census tract and factor that
is derived.
The factor analysis should give a fairly detailed account of the
metropolitan development pattern of the Springfield SMSA. In general,
it is expected that the Berry and Horton, and Erickson and Miller fac-
tors can be replicated for Springfield. Specifically, the hypotheses
are that socioeconomic status, race and resources, and quality of liv-
ing conditions factors (or factors similar to these) can be derived,
and that the central cities in comparison to the first ring suburbs
will have higher percentages of nonwhites, lower socioeconomic status,
and poorer quality of living conditions. It is expected that the se-
cond ring suburbs will lie generally in between the first ring and the
central cities on all or most of the factors, just as Berry and Horton
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found in the Chicago area. 2 * If segregation is found in the Spring-
field SMSA, it is hoped that some definitive data on whether it is
primarily racial or socioeconomic can be found to further elucidate
this controversy of the political science and sociological literatures.
Research Methodology
Using the conceptual framework of Branfman, et al., 22 and fol-
lowing the recommendation of Paul Warwick that "considerable experi-
mentation with different techniques is advisable in order to discover
the one that causes the least distortion of the data," 23 the methods
suggested by Warwick for the type of research problem presented here
will be used. 2 ^ Multiple regression and canonical correlation will be
used sequentially in order to see if zoning variables are substantially
related to the urban ecology.
In the first stage of regression analysis, a series of step-
wise multiple regressions will be run using the independent zoning
variables and each factor derived from the analysis of the ecology
variables. In a second stage, standard regressions will be calculated
with those variables which have been identified in the first stage as
being important predictors. A last stage of regression will further
narrow the independent variables to only those that are sufficiently
powerful in the second stage. The regression analyses may provide less
than a satisfactory solution, however, since an explanation is sought
for racial, socioeconomic and living conditions variables as a whole.
If sufficiently data-limiting, exclusionary factors have been
derived from the zoning factoring, these can additionally be correlated
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with or regressed on the dependent factor(s). However, this method
has at least three difficulties. First, the exclusionary zoning vari-
ables may not yield satisfactory exclusionary zoning factors. Second,
if more than one urban ecology factor surfaces, this method has the
limitation of not permitting all dependent factors to be treated simul-
taneously. Third, factoring the independent and dependent variables
separately may not yield independent factors which best account for
the set of dependent factors, since separate factoring seeks "to maxi-
mize explained variance"25 within each set and not between them.
Since canonical correlation is designed to overcome these diffi-
culties of regression and factoring, it will be used in a last step.
It derives canonical variates, that is, the best "linear combination"26
of each set (dependent and independent) of variables which maximizes
the interrelationships, canonical coefficients, between each set.
The relative importance of each independent variable on the zoning
side, and its relationship to the most important attributes of the
ecology, that is, whether the metropolitan development pattern is seg-
regated by race and resources, socioeconomic status or quality of
living conditions, can be explicated. The census tracts can then be
grouped by central city or suburban location to see if suburbs are more
exclusionary and segregated than central cities.
Finally, the suburbs and central cities will be individually
ranked by the various statistical methods of analysis on the exclu-
sionary- inclusionary continuum. The two suburbs with the highest and
lowest exclusionary scores will be qualitatively analyzed according to
the standards of Arlington Heights 27 and compared to each other in <
171
effort to explicate further what public policies and political, socio-
economic and developmental characteristics precisely describe exclu-
sionary zoning and the urban ecology. One would expect that such first
ring suburbs as Wilbraham and Longmeadow which are generally considered
to be high class enclaves , would have the highest exclusionary-segrega-
tion scores. The central cities would be expected to lie on the re-
verse end of the scale, that is, to be nonexclusionary and to contain
large percentages of low-cost, multi-family housing, minorities and
the poor. Although such suburbs as Northampton and West Springfield
would be expected to be in the exclusionary range, the hypothesis is
that they would be the least exclusionary of the suburbs. Northampton
is a suburb with large numbers of resident college students and multi-
family housing, while West Springfield is a highly developed suburb
containing large urbanized areas. The tales of the two most contrast-
ing suburban towns should highlight the findings of the statistical
analvsis
.
CHAPTER VI
ZONING IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF THE SPRINGFIELD SMSA
Introduction
This chapter examines the independent side of the exclusionary
zoning hypothesis. Those aspects of zoning which are alleged by the
zoning literature to effectuate racial and economic exclusion in met-
ropolitan areas are coded and analyzed for the twenty-one municipali-
ties and eighty-three census tracts of the Springfield SMSA. The twen-
ty-one municipalities and the census tracts which they contain are sub-
grouped by census bureau designation into central cities and suburbs.
Working direct ionally outwards, the suburbs are subgrouped into first
and second rings by their location in relation to the central cities.
Because of the large numbers of second ring suburbs, they are further
subdivided by their relative directional location into west, north
and east suburbs in order to simplify the analysis.
The subsidiary hypotheses examined here maintain that the cen-
tral cities have the most liberal zoning of the three classes of mu-
nicipalities. Additionally, the first ring suburbs, as the historical
repositories of high socioeconomic status populations and the upwardly
mobile, are expected to have used zoning to promote and protect a high
quality of life. Because they are locationally contiguous to the cen-
tral cities, one expects that they feel some compunction to protect
themselves from possible influxes of urban poor and minorities. Con-
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sequetitly, the zoning of the first ring suburbs is hypothesized to
be the most exclusionary in relation to the other jurisdictions. Last,
the zoning of the second ring suburbs is anticipated to be neither as
exclusionary as that of the first ring nor as inclusionary as that of
the central cities. Because the second ring suburbs are not as close
to the central cities as the first ring, the threat of mass migration
of the urban poor and minorities to the second ring is less pronounced.
Consequently, they are expected not to place as restrictive conditions
on the development of their land as do the first ring. Conversely, be-
cause they do not have to accommodate large numbers of poor and minori-
ties, they do not need to zone for excessive amounts of low cost hou-
sing, and are expected to have more restrictive zoning than the central
cities.
To test these hypotheses, the scores of each town on each zoning
variable will first be examined in the context of the town's census and
locational classification. Each town of each subclassif ication (cen-
tral city, first and second ring suburbs) will be compared to each
other town in its own subgroup in order to discover which are the most
and least exclusionary in each subgroup. A continuum of exclusion-
inclusion will be established for each variable based on common sense
standards and standards established by the literature concerning what
levels of control are restrictive and not restrictive. Each subclassi-
fication of municipalities will then be compared to the continuum to
explicate whether their zoning is exclusionary or inclusionary by these
standards. Last, the three broad categories will be compared to each
other to test whether the hypothesized, exclusionary-inclusionary order
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of first ring suburb-second ring suburb-central city is supported by
the evidence.
In a second phase of the analysis, the zoning variables will be
factored to see if exclusionary factors can be derived for the metro-
politan area. If such factors surface, then factor scores for all cen-
sus tracts will be calculated to explicate which tracts most consis-
tently evidence exclusionary zoning and which municipalities most sys-
tematically apply a restrictive zoning policy.
Central Cities
The three central cities of the SMSA, Springfield, Holyoke,
and Chicopee, are expected to have relatively liberal zoning according
to the hypothesis that exclusionary zoning is primarily a suburban and
not an urban policy.
Early residents of the central cities settled along both banks
of the Connecticut River. Today, the remnants of the housing and in-
dustry of more than a century of waves of immigrants in the areas along
the river form the impoverished inner core of the three cities. Their
zoning reflects these physical characteristics. The bulk of the small
lots, multi-family zoning, and public housing of the cities is located
within a mile or two of the river. Lesser amounts of these zoning types
are interspersed with larger lot single-family zoning and commercial
and industrial uses in their remaining sectors.
Overall standards of inclusion for the central cities establish
that the average minimum lot size in single-family zones should be less
than one-quarter acre (10,890 square feet).^- Based on the quarter acre
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standard, average frontage should be 104 feet or less, since a 104
foot square lot or less yields a minimum lot size of a quarter acre or
less. One would expect to find that by conservative standards of in-
clusion, at least five percent of a jurisdiction's acreage is zoned for
multi-family housing, that more than ten percent of its housing stock
is in multi-family housing and that more than a thousand units of multi-
family housing are provided by zoning. The inclusionary standard which
the central cities should meet would hold that no bedroom restrictions
are placed on apartments, that apartment buildings of more than two and
one-half stories (35 feet) are permitted, and that setback restrictions
for apartments are minimal, less than fifty feet, a maximum which could
conceivably be required for safety from fire and traffic hazards. The
central cities would be expected to permit mobile homes, to have the
highest concentrations of subsidized housing, and to have more family
than elderly units. Subsidized housing units should total at least
five hundred in a municipality (one hundred to two hundred in a census
tract when a municipality has more than one census tract), and at least
half or more of these (250) should be unrestricted, family housing (fif-
ty to one hundred in a census tract)
.
The following separate analyses of the zoning ordinances of the
three central cities illustrate, that with some few exceptions, each
city's zoning does conform to the expected inclusionary pattern.
Springfield
.
Springfield is the core city of the SMSA. It is com-
prised of 20,288 acres of land area which is divided into thirty-three
census tracts. In 1980 it had a population of 152,319, a 7.1% decline
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from its 1970 population of 163, 905. 2
Springfield's zoning ordinance was completely rewritten in 1971.
The ordinance in effect on January 1, 1979 contains amendments added to
January 19, 1978. No amendments were added in the remainder of 1978
or in all of 1979. Amendments added in 1980 deal with flood plain zon-
ing, commercial and industrial uses, the definition of "lot" and other
such aspects which are irrelevant to exclusionary zoning. 3 The zoning
map accompanying the ordinance is undated.^
The ordinance itself is as complex a document as one would ex-
pect to find in a highly urbanized central city. It contains six re-
sidential zones, two of which are single-family, two of which are
mixed single and multi-family, and two of which are exclusively multi-
family. It also has various commercial, business and industrial zones.
The Residence A and A-l districts are limited to single-family
uses. The Residence B zone is a mixed residential zone "intended to
accommodate single-family detached, semi-detached, and two-family
dwellings of medium densities. . . ."5 The bulk of Springfield's resi-
dential areas are zoned Residence B, as are parks, playgrounds, ceme-
taries and some public buildings. ^ For the purpose of tabulating multi-
family acreage, these areas have been eliminated. Realistically, they
could not be developed as two-family housing. In order to tabulate the
percentage of Residence B acreage that is developed in two-family uses,
1970 single-family and two-family housing units figures have been used
to calculate the percentage of housing which is two-family in each cen-
sus tract. The Residence B acreage in each tract was then reduced by
each percentage. For instance, Census Tract (C.T.) 8001 has 309.5
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TABLE 5
REDUCTION OF RESIDENCE B ACREAGE BY 1970 PERCENTAGES OF TWO-FAMILYLIVING UNITS FOR SPRINGFIELD CENSUS TRACTS WITH RESIDENCE 3 ZONING
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C.T.
8001
8002
8003
8004
8005
8006
8007
8008
8009
8010
8011.01
8011.02
8012
8013
8014
8015.01
8015.02
8015.03
8016.01
8016.02
8016.03
8016.04
8016.05
8017
8018
8019
8020
8021
8022
8023
8024
8025
8026
Total
1970 1970 Total
S-F L.U* 2-F L.U.*
%
2-F
Res B
Acres
1147
2070
1257
958
487
61
116
88
611
932
1288
891
980
752**
627
501
351
81
677
192
411
2098
1614
871
475
233
1010
549
259
286
249
560
611
151
81
71
1064
914
752
416
727
473
1171
172
1149
2018
2545
1490
1968
1036
320
402
337
43.2
18.7
15.6
51.3
53.0
80.9
71.1
309.5
464.4
463.4
354.8
171.6
15.4
1.8
73.9 123.9
1171
1543
1439
972
1051
47.8
39.6
10.5
8.3
6.8
108.2
219.9
17.2
61.8
281.6
0** 752** 41. 3*** 193.0
1691
1415
1103
497
1404
665
1582
2270
2763
62.9
64.6
68.2
83.7
51.8
71.1
74.0
7.6
41.6
328.7
187.5
104.8
4.2
143.8
88.1
202.3
82.3
270.8
17438 12244 29682 41.3 4199.0
Res B Acres
Coded M-F
133.7
86.8
72.3
182.0
90.9
12.5
1.3
91.6
51.7
87.1
1.8
5.1
19.1
79.7
206.8
121.1
71.5
3.5
74.5
62.6
149.7
6.3
112.7
1724.3
SOURCE: Building Zone Map of the City of Springfield (ca. 1980).
*These and subsequent housing figures for all localities are ta-
ken from U.S., Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of
Population and Housing, Census Tracts, Spfld.-Holyoke-Chicopee SMSA
.
**Excluded from total.
***Since there was no two-family housing in this tract in 1970,
it is assumed that Residence B zoning was added between 1970-80. The
percentage used here is the average for the rest of the tracts. This is
a more accurate representation of Res B acreage than a zero.
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zoned Residence B
,
while it had 1,147 single-family and 871 two-family
units in 1970. The percentage of two-family housing is 43.2%. Thus
only 43.2% of land zoned Residence B in this tract, 133.7 acres, has
been included as multi-family. Table 5 shows the calculation of acres
coded Residence B for those Springfield tracts with Residence B zoning.
The Residence B zone permits single-family detached houses on
6,000 square feet of land area with a minimum lot width of sixty feet.
7
These figures have been included in the calculation of single-family
minimum lot size and frontage. Similarly, the 5,000 square foot mini-
mum lot size and fifty foot frontage permitted for single-family de-
tached dwellings in Residence C zones are also included in the tabula-
tion of average minimum lot size and frontage, 8 as are the requirements
for lots and frontages in mobile home parks? Table 6 shows the calcu-
lation of average minimum lot size and average frontage for single-
family residential uses in Springfield.
TABLE 6
DETACHED* SINGLE-FAMILY MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND
FRONTAGE REQUIREMENTS' IN SPRINGFIELD
Zone or MLS in Frontage
Use Sq. Ft. in L. Ft.
Res A-l 10,000 100
Res A 7,500 75
Res B 6,000 60
Res C 5,000 45
Mb. Homes 5,000 • 45
Average 6,700 65
*The variables for semi-detached and attached single-family
housing have not been included because in effect these types of hou-
sing are duplexes or row houses, that is multi-family housing.
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The Residence C zone is a mixed use district "intended to
accommodate the full range of housing types, including
. . , multiple-
dwellings at the higher densities appropriate in the established neigh-
borhoods of the inner city. "10 For all practical purposes, the Resi-
dence C zone is apartment zoning.
Residence C-l and C-2 are entirely apartment zoning. Residence
C-l permits "two-family dwelling projects, or
. . . garden apartment
projects or" a mixture of the two. 1 ! The areas so zoned are middle-
class, clustered complexes of two-family buildings and condominiums.
Residence C-2 is the high rise apartment category which permits "build-
ings for three or more families." 12 The acreages zoned for these var-
ious types of apartments in the thirty-three census tracts of Spring-
field are given in Table 7,
The largest portion of such acreage, 61.7%, is in the Residence
B category. Most census tracts have some Residence C zoning. Only six
tracts have some Residence C-l, garden apartment, zoning. Four of these
tracts, 8021, 8025, 8026 and 8016.05, form the southernmost border of
Springfield. The two tracts, 8016.02 and 8016.03, are located in the
central eastern section. All of these tracts are largely single-family
residential areas and include such neighborhoods as Forest Park and
Sixteen Acres. Garden apartments are obviously considered by Spring-
field officials to be compatible with single-family neighborhoods.
Only four tracts contain Residence C-2, high rise apartment, zoning.
Of these, tracts 8007-8009 comprise Springfield's North End, the His-
panic area. The two CBD tracts, 8010 and 8011.01, contain no multi-
family zoning as would be expected. The two single-family residential
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TABLE 7
ACREAGE ZONED FOR MULTI-FAMILY USES IN SPRINGFIELD CENSUS TRACTS
L . 1 . Tract Acres Acres Acres Acres Total PC
Acre- Coded Zoned Zoned Zoned M-F MFAM
age Res B Res C Res
C-1
Res
C-2
Acres AC
8001 133 .
7
58 .0 — 191.7 18.4
8002<j yj \j Q C Q00,0 AO c28 .
5
— 115.3 4.6
800?U VJV _J £7 AbZ<+ 12 .3 9 .
3
— 81.6 13.0
8004 All loZ . (J 3 .1 185.1 38.8
8005 *MJ1 on oyu . y C A6,9 97.8 24.4
800ft i n/,iy^ 1Z . _> C A A59 . — 71.8 37.0
8007\j \j i 7QA 7 71 . J 7 /. Q A14o . 0 i a er13.5 162 .8 57.3
8008 7 A 7Z4 / /. 7 0 / A4.0 46.3 18.7
8009 juy Q 7 £y i . u zy . d A ^2.6 123.8 40.1
8010 yy 0.0 0.0
8011 01 1 <^7i_> z 0.0 0.0
t-> \J X JL « V £t lub 17 711. / 11.7 11.0
801 2 71 A A a a 40.0 18 .
7
801 3 /• a ^ S7 7Ji./ 1 c o1 J . z 66.9 16.
5
8014 9 e;7 97 7O / . 1 7 7 AZ / . U A O t i O allo . 9 1 A A13.9
801 5 01 oy / 1 Q1.0 J . o 7 .
6
1.1
801 S 07 3Zb c 73.1 0 Q QJO . O 43.9 O A8 .
3
901 S 0?OU J • Uj 77 c1 1 J 7 Q 719 . 1 T A 119.1 A C2.3
9oi ft m 11 / J Q Ay . o A A9 .
0
A Q0.O
sm ft 09 £Q1Ool 7 A Czo . 0 CO 76z . Z OZ . 0 1 A A12 .
2
sm ft ao ayyo 7 Q 7/y
.
/ 3 7 COZ . 0 1 £ 7 "3Ibz . J 1 c /.lb . 4
901 ft oaOUI" . lit izoy A A A A
901 ft 0"^ 1U1^ o y • j by . j A 9b . o
8017 402 206.8 206.8 51.4
8018 295 121.1 11.8 - - 132.9 45.0
8019 400" \J \J 71 5 101 0-i- J -J- « v / 172.5 43 1
8020 210 3.5 49.2 52^7 25.1
8021 1184 74.5 46.1 2.9 123.5 10.4
8022 146 62.6 9.4 72.0 49.3
8023 304 149.7 14.1 163.8 53.9
8024 671 0.0 0.0
8025 868 6.3 6.6 12.9 1.5
8026 792 112.7 3.9 33.1 149.7 18.9
Total 20288 1724.3 788.6 256.7 24.9 2794.5 . 13.8
SOURCE: Building Zone Map of City of Springfield (ca. 1980).
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tracts, 8024 and 8016.04, also contain no apartment zoning.
In order to derive the multi-family living units provided by
zoning, it was first necessary to calculate living units per acre lim-
itations in the multi-family zones, since a variety of restrictions are
placed in each apartment category according to the type of housing or
number of bedrooms. Table 8 displays these calculations.
TABLE 8
LIVING UNITS PER ACRE LIMITATIONS IN SPRINGFIELD MULTI-FAMILY ZONES
Zone Type of MLS per
Housing Unit in
Sq. Ft.
2-F 4,000
S-F attached 2,500
S-F semi-
detached 3,000
2-F 3,000
M-F, 1 BR 1,400
M-F, 2 BR 2,000
M-F, elder Iv 1,000
Average 2,150
Per 3 BR unit 4,200
Per 2 BR unit 3,300
Per efficiency 1,500
Average 3,000
Formula Units (or
Average Units)
per Acre
Res B
Res C
43,560
4,000
10,9
43,560
_2J 150_
20.3
Res C-l
43,560
_3j000_
14.5
100.0Res C-2
SOURCE: "Summary Table of Zoning Ordinance Standards," Zoning
Ordinance, Springfield, Massachusetts (1971, amended to 1978), unnum-
bered appendix page.
The units or average units per acre permitted in the various
multi-family categories were then multiplied by the acreage in each
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TABLE 9
MULTI-FAMILY LIVING UNITS PROVIDED BY ZONING
IN SPRINGFIELD CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. Res B Res C Res C-l ^CO \j— local
Acreage Acreage Acreage
Times Times Times T imes
10.9 20.3 14.5 100
8001
8002
8003
1457
946
788
1177
579
189
2634
1525
0 7 7
8004 1984 63 o n/, 7
8005 991 140
8006 136 1204 1 34D
8007 14 3004 1350JL mj mm* \J 4 J Do
8008 _ 859 4 n0
8009 998 601 260
8010 _
_ n
8011.01 _
n
8011.02 _ 238 238
8012 812 _ 812
8013 563 308 871
8014 949 548 _ 480 1977
8015.01 20 118 138
8015.02 56 788 _ 844
8015.03 208 mm 208
8016.01 — mm mmm) 183 183
8016.02 — 418 902 1320
8016.03 869 _ 1198 2067
8016.04 _ _ mm _ 0
8016.05 — — 1005 1005
8017 2254 - - - 2254
8018 1320 240 1560
8019 779 2050 m 2829
8020 38 999 1037
8021 812 936 42 1790
8022 682 191 873
8023 1631 286 1917
8024 0
8025 69 96 165
8026 1228 79 480 1787
Total 18792 15827 3723 2673 41015
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category in order to calculate the zoned multi-family living unit:
Table 9 shows these figures for Springfield census tracts. Census
tract 8007 in the North End contains the most zoned multi-family
living units. The two CBD tracts and tracts 8016.04 and 8024 con-
tain no zoned multi-family living units.
The height and setback restrictions in apartment zones are
displayed in Table 10.
TABLE 10
APARTMENT MAXIMUM HEIGHT AND MINIMUM SETBACK RESTRICTIONS
IN SPRINGFIELD MULTI-FAMILY ZONES
Zone Height in Feet Setback in Feet
Res B 35 15
Res C 35 10
Res C-l 28 40
Res C-2 150 25
Average 62 22.5
SOURCE: "Summary Table of Zoning Ordinance Standards," Zoning
Ordinance, Springfield, Massachusetts (1971, amended to 1978), unnum-
bered appendix pages.
The Springfield ordinance contains no bedroom restrictions in
any of its multi-family categories. Mobile homes are also permitted
as individual residences on single lots but only "where personal hard-
ship can be demonstrated." Mobile home parks are permitted by special
permit in Residence C and Business A districts. 13
At the end of 1978, Springfield contained 599 scattered site
housing units, 14 the census tract distribution of which is calculated
in Table 11. It had a total of 7,763 subsidized housing units, 5,835
of which were unrestricted family housing. Three-quarters of all un
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C.T.
TABLE 11
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN SPRINGFIELD CENSUS TRACTS
Acre- 1970
age Pop.
Dpn — uen- c „ „ <bcat- Fam- UNR Eld. NO
s i ty terred ily PUB Pub. PUB
t\dl. 10 o ite
units
TT J .Units HO Ho. HO
Q 70 9 o 0 39 0 39
7? 8 QJi JU 9 QJO 0 38 32 70
7 1 8 9 na7 . UO 9 CJO 0 36 0 36
?0 4 8 SO 9 AJ4 i o cIJD 170 22 192
20 2 8 A 9 9/.J4 O £ "7367 401 104 505
90 ?
—
- —
8 A 9O . 4 Z 9 /,J4 0 34 0 34
20 0 8 9 9 9 9J J J00 333 0 333
15 9U« 7 ft ft*}D,Oj 9 7Z / 0 27 102 129
1 5 S ft AftO . 4 0 9 £Z 0 152 178 0 178
14 9XH • y ft 91 9 5 0 25 0 25
14 7 ft 1 3 9 ^ZD 1Z 37 412 449
14 6 ft 1 1 9 ^ Zol 286 32 318
19 1 5 A AJ . 4 0 9 1ZZ 47 69 0 69
IT Q A Q A4 , ^ 0 9 nZU lo4 204 617 821
n 4lit 1* A 7 54 . / D 1 oiy Ql COlD o3A 152 986
Q Q A 1 94 . x J 1 / 0 17 0 17
.7 • 1 9 10J a / y ID i riId / 172 0 172
8 4 9 1 A ZOO 214 80 294
7 9 9 9QJ • Zy 1 91
J
9 /. QZ4o 261 40 301
7 9/ • y 9 9 QJ . zy 1 91 lJO 149 0 149
7 7 9 91
-3 . Zl 1 9XJ 0 13 171 184
ft 8 9 8 9Z , O J 11 tooD JO b4y n 649
ft 7 9 79z • / y 11 9/,J4 4D 0 / c45
6.6 2.75 11 o 11 o 11
6.1 2.54 10 0 10 116 126
4.2 1.75 7 93 100 0 100
3.8 1.58 6 0 6 0 6
3.6 1.50 6 0 6 48 54
3.5 1.46 6 551 557 0 557
2.7 1.13 5 435 440 0 440
2.7 _* 255 255 0 255
2.4 1.00 4 215 219 0 219
1.1 _* 0 0 0 0
599 5236 5835 1923 7763
8023
8022
8017
8018
8019
8006
8020
8011.02
8012
8004
8008
8013
8026
8009
8007
8005
8025
8014
8001
8015.02
8003
8016.02
8015.01
8024
8021
8016.01
8015.03
8002
8016.05
8016.03
8011.01
8016.04
8010
Total
Aver-
age
304
146
402
295
400
194
210
106
214
477
247
405
792
309
284
401
868
857
1041
526
624
681
697
671
1184
1173
775
2481
1014
990
152
1269
99
7140
3334
8757
6006
8091
3912
4201
1684
3307
7110
3633
5942
10374
3681
3244
3958
7857
7172
8258
4156
4815
4616
4679
4401
7186
4890
2926
8817
3502
2667
411
3066
112
20288 163905
8.1 4 . 00***
*CBD, not figured.
**CBD, none allocated.
***Constant, 599 divided by sum of the column.
186
thus were family units, and only one-fourth were restricted to elderly
occupancy. The total subsidized housing units and unrestricted units
in Springfield census tracts are also shown in Table 11.
The heaviest concentrations of subsidized units are in the North
End (C.T.s 8007-8009), the Old Hill neighborhood (C.T.s 8019 and 8020),
and those middle class residential tracts with C-l, garden apartment,
zoning (C.T.s 8016.02, 8016.03 and 8016.05). This indicates that al-
though subsidies are available for multi-family housing for minorities
and the poor, government financing agencies are not adverse to provid-
ing assistance to developers or residents of middle income apartments.
Several census tracts have no subsidized multi-family or elderly
projects. These include tracts 8004-8006, 8015.03, 8017, 8023 and 8024.
Some knowledgeable persons contend that even the core city is not im-
mune from the tactics of exclusion. In commenting on a decision by the
Springfield Housing Authority to locate additional subsidized units in
the Old Hill neighborhood, an Hispanic area in C.T.s 8019 and 8020, a
minority leader stated,
[t]his once again points to the fact [that] the city pro-
tects other neighborhoods from accommodating low-income
housing and continues to disenfranchise low-income resi-
dents by stacking them all in the poorest neighborhoods in
the city. 15
That much of the subsidized housing in Springfield is located
in inner city census tracts would seem to support that contention.
Nonetheless, even though public housing projects are concentrated in
minority areas, Springfield does not concentrate its low cost housing
through zoning. It does zone for at least some type of multiple dwell-
ings in all but two census tracts (excluding the two CBD tracts).
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TABLE 12
ZONING OF SPRINGFIELD CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. AVP t\ v tv ZND AVR AVR BDRM PRO NO UNR
MT s r r\i * i
AC
Hr AN
riU
MFAM HGT STBK RES MOB
HO
PUB
HO
PUB
HO
8001 67nn OJ ISA JO . 4 o ^ n / 62 .0 22.5 0 1 301 261
8002 6700 65U J A 6 9 7 A IjZj 62 .
0
22.5 0 1 54 68003 6700U / UU 65O J i ^ nX j . u 1 R T10 , X y / / 62 . 22 .
5
0 1 184 13
8004 6700(J / UU 65U J ?r rJQ tO 5R A / 62 . 22.5 0 1 25 25
8005 6700 65 9 A L A 9 50 J . J 11 Jl o2 . 22 . 0 1 17 17
8006 6700 65U -J 17 n Q A 5JO. J i *5 /, n1j4u oZ . 0 22 . 0 1 34 34
8007 6700U / vj w 65O J 57 ?J / . J R7 A /, "5 C Q4 J bo oz . 0 22 . 0 1 986 834
8008 6700 65O J 1 R 7 q 5y j . j lj. jy o2 . 22 . 0 1 449 37
8009 6700u / uu 65O J An i A 9 9 lo jy 62 . 22 . 0 1 821 204
8010 6700\j / vj yj 65 n nu • u i nn nxwu . u U OZ . U 22 . 0 1 0 0
8011.01 6700U / U U 65O J 0 0u . u Q 5 9y j . j U bz . 0 22 . 0 1 255 255
8011 02 6700 65 Q£ 77U . / iJO OZ . U 22 . 0 1 129 27
8012 6700 65 1 R 7xo . / QR R70 . 0 olZ bZ . U 22 • 5 0 1 178 178
8013 6700U / U \J 6*1 16 5ID, J Q7 A O / 1 bZ . U 22 . o 0 1 318 286
801
4
67oo 6 5 1 7 Q ^7 1J / • X 1 077iy / / bl . 0 22 . 0 1 294 214
8015 01 6700U / UU 65Q J 1 1X • X 9A ^zt • J 1 TO1 JO bZ . (J 0 o c11 . J 0 1 45 45
8015 02 6700u / uu 65 R TO.J 7 ^ A/ J . D PA AOH 4* at nbZ . (J 0 o c11
. J (J 1 149 149
8015 03 6700U / WU 65 9 5A . j 7 ft ZUO AO nbZ . U 0 o ^2Z . j AU 1 6 6
8016 01 6700 65O J n ru . o 1 R
1
10 ,3 ao nbZ . U o o2Z . j Au 1 1 AA100 100
8016 02 6700 65O J 19 9 IT AX J • 1 990IjZU AO obZ . U 0 02 Z . j Au 1 b4y 64y
8016 03 6700u / UU 65 1 6 AX O . H n nu • u 90A7 ao nbZ . u 0 0 ^zz . J Au 11 /. /. A / /. A
8016 04 6700u / uu 65j o n n nu . u U ao noz . u 0 0 ^Z Z • j Au 1 0 1 Qziy O 1 Qziy
8016 05 6700U / UU 65O J 6 Ro « o 9T Q i nn ^1UU J ao noz • u 90 ^Z Z . J AU 1 ^7j j / t; k 7j j /
8017 6700 65 51.4 71.9 2254 62.0 22.5 0 1 36 36
8018 6700 65 45.0 78.4 1560 62.0 22.5 0 1 192 170
8019 6700 65 43.1 90.2 2829 62.0 22.5 0 1 505 401
8020 6700 65 25.1 95.6 1037 62.0 22.5 0 1 333 333
8021 6700 65 10.4 75.9 1790 62.0 22.5 0 1 126 10
8022 6700 65 49.3 84.0 873 62.0 22.5 0 1 70 38
8023 6700 65 53.9 83.2 1917 62.0 22.5 0 1 39 39
8024 6700 65 0.0 0.8 0 62.0 22.5 0 1 11 11
8025 6700 65 1.5 12.8 165 62.0 22.5 0 1 172 172
8026 6700 65 18.9 52.4 1787 62.0 22.5 0 1 69 69
Total 41015 7763 5835
Aver-
age 6700 65 13.8* 41.8* 62.0 22.5 0 1
*These figures are the percentages resulting from dividing the
total multi-family acres by tract acreage and the total number of multi-
family housing units by total housing units. Totaling the column per-
centages and dividing by the number of census tracts results in higher
figures. See Table 13.
188
Housing Authority decisions concerning where to locate public housing,
seem to be related more to any existing exclusionary purpose than is
zoning policy per se. Public housing could as well be located in out-
lying tracts as in the inner city.
Table 12 summarizes the zoning variables for Springfield census
tracts. Table 13 provides descriptive statistics for each variable.
TABLE 13
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ZONING VARIABLES IN SPRINGFIELD
AVR AVR PC PC ZND AVR AVR BDRM PRO NO UNR
MLS FRNT MFAM MFAM MFAM HGT STBK RES MOB PUB PUB
AC HO HO HO HO
Mean 6700 65 20.0 57.9 1243 62.0 22.5 0.0* 100* 235 177
Med ian 6700 65 16.4 63.5 1131 62.0 22.5 172 100
Mode 6700 65 0.0 0.0 0 62.0 22.5 0 6
Sum 221100 2145 659.1 1191.0 41015 2046 742.5 - 7763 5835
Range 0 0 57.3 100.0 4368 0 0 986 834
Variance 0 0 328.5 1271.6 978045 0 0 - 60004 42193
Std.Err. 0 0 3.155 6.208 172 0 0 - 42.64 35.74
Std.Dev. 0 0 18.1 35.7 989 0 0 245 205
Kurtosis 0 0 -.763 -1.386 1.589 0 0 - 2.002 2.517
Skewness 0 0 .714 -.430 .920 0 0 - 1.495 1.622
Holyoke . The designation by the census of the City of Holyoke as a
central city is somewhat misleading, since its developmental charac-
teristics are highly variegated. While its central eastern section
along the Connecticut River is highly urbanized, the major portion of
its land area is suburban, rural, and sparsely populated. Its northern
panhandle, with Mount Tom as the central feature, is mountainous and
unsuitable for large-scale development.
Holyoke contains 13,376 acres divided into eight census tracts.
Tracts 8114-8118, the urbanized section, are areally small but highly
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populated. Tract 8120 contains both urban and rural sections. Tracts
8119 and 8121 are areally large, rural and thinly populated.
Like the other central cities of the SMSA, Holyoke lost popula-
tion in the 1970 decade. The 1980 figure of 44,678 residents repre-
sents a 10.8% decline from the 1970 figure of 50,112. The population
decline removes Holyoke from official designation as a city, since it
now has less than 50,000 residents.
The zoning regulations of Holyoke are appended to the Holyoke
Code and are not a separate ordinance. The regulations in effect on
January 1, 1979 were a 1972 revision of the original code adopted in
1960,16 With amendments to December 19, 1978. 17 The date of the ori-
ginal code indicates that much of the multi-family zoning in the urban-
ized area was superimposed upon already existing multi-family uses.
Two amendments added in 1979 deal with flood plain zoning and
home occupations and are irrelevant to this research. The zoning map
was adopted September 23, 1971 and contains rezonings to November 26,
1980.18 As far as can be ascertained, no rezones affecting this study
were added to the 1980 map after the cutoff date.
Three single-family residential districts are provided. The RA
category permits mixed agricultural and single-family residential uses
on minimum lots of 20,000 square feet with 100 feet of frontage. Mo-
bile homes in mobile home parks are permitted in RA zones by special
permit on lots of 3,000 square feet with no specific frontage require-
ments. R-l and R-1A, single-family residential zones, require minimum
lots of 11,250 and 9,500 square feet, and minimum frontages of 90 and
75 feet, respectively. " Average minimum lot size is thus 10,938
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square feet, while average frontage is 88 feet.
Holyoke's multi-family zoning is excessively cumulative, that
is, higher and lower uses are permitted in lower and higher use dis-
tricts as a matter of right. For example, multi-family dwellings are
authorized in three multi-family zones, RM-20, RM-AO and R^-60, but
also in the mixed use zone, RO, multi-family residence and professional
offices, and in four business zones, BL, limited business, BC, down-
town business, BG, general business, and BH, highway (automobile-
oriented) business. 20 Likewise, farming is permitted in all three
multi-family districts. In order to calculate the acreage zoned for
multi-family uses and the maximum multi-family living units provided
by zoning, land areas zoned RO have been included in the totals for
each census tract, but the acreage has been reduced by half. The as-
sumption is that this type of mixed use zone would be developed in
relatively equal proportions of the two primary uses. The acreages of
the four business zones have not been included in the multi-family
variables. Buildings in these zones are limited to two stories. x A
site review indicates that, in the central business district, build-
ings are primarily developed in business uses on the first floor with
apartments in some buildings overhead. Business zones in outlying
areas are almost exclusively developed in business uses. Excluding
these areas from the multi-family variables does not underestimate
multi-family zoning to any great extent. However, including them
would inflate multi-family totals substantially.
In addition to these multi-family zones, a two-family residen-
tial zone, R-2, is provided. 22 Acreage in the R-2 classification
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Holyoke is treated differently from the Residence B areas in Spring-
field and Chicopee. All R-2 acreage is included as multi-family and
has not been reduced by the percentage of two-family housing in cen-
sus tracts, although single-family residences are also permitted. The
wording of the Holyoke Code and the relatively small acreages zoned for
this use indicate that the R-2 zone is primarily two-family and not a
mixed use zone as are Springfield's and Chicopee' s Residence B classi-
fications, even though single-family residences are permitted in it. A
site review also indicates that housing is almost entirely duplex. It
is felt that bias resulting from this treatment is minimal. The acre-
age zoned for various multi-family categories in Holyoke census tracts
is given in Table 14.
TABLE 14
ACREAGE ZONED FOR MULTI-FAMILY USES IN HOLYOKE CENSUS TRACTS
CT. Acres Acres Acres Acres Acres Total Tract PC
Zoned Zoned Zoned Zoned Zoned Acreage MFAM
R-2 RM-20 RM-40 RM-60 RO/2 AC
8114 77.0 77.0 231 33.4
8115 38.9 38.9 211 18.4
8116 35.8 32.5 8.4 76.7 221 34.7
8117 9.4 52.6 10.8 5.3 78.1 235 33.2
8118 30.0 124.4 6.3 160.7 193 83.2
8119 21.7 88.5 110.2 4157 2.7
8120 304.2 141.6 16.0 11.8 473.6 1518 31.2
8121 246.7 58.0 104.8 11.0 420.5 6610 6.4
Total 550.9 260.7 317.3 264.0 42.8 1435.7 13376 10.7*
SOURCE: Official Zoning Map, Holyoke Massachusetts (1971 as
amended through 1980)
.
*This figure is the percentage resulting from dividing the total
multi-family acres by total acreage. Totaling the column percentages
and dividing by the number of census tracts results in a higher figure.
See Table 19, p. 196.
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The largest portion of multi-family acreage in Holyoke, 38.4%,
is R-2. All census tracts have at least some multi-family acreage. C.
T. 8118 has 83.2% of its area zoned in multi-family uses. This is one
of the most densely zoned census tracts in the entire SMSA. At the
other extreme, only 2.7% of C.T. 8119, and 6.4% of C.T. 8121, the two
large rural-suburban tracts, are zoned for multi-family uses.
In order to derive the numbers of multi-family living units pro-
vided by zoning, it was first necessary to calculate the living units
limitations of the various multi-family districts. These are displayed
in Table 15.
TABLE 15
LIVING UNITS PER ACRE LIMITATIONS IN HOLYOKE MULTI-FAMILY ZONES
Zone Minimum Sq.Ft. L.U. per Acre
Land per L.U. (43560/n)
R-2 3,000 14.5*
RM-20 2,200 20.0*
RM-40 1,100 40.0*
RM-60 750 60.0*
RO 750 60.0*
SOURCE: Holyoke Code
,
Appendix A, pp. 1101, 1129.
*These figures are given in the Code
, p. 1101, and are slightly
higher than calculated densities.
The living units per acre for each category of zoning were then
multiplied by the number of acres zoned in that category in order to
derive the multi-family living units provided by zoning. Table 16 shows
these figures.
By providing for the very dense 20, 40 and 60 living units per
acre districts, Holyoke zones for a total of 44,302 possible multi-
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TABLE 16
MULTI-FAMILY LIVING UNITS PROVIDED BY ZONING IN HOLYOKE CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. R-2
Acreage
times
14.5
RM-20
Acreage
times
20
RM-40
Acreage
times
40
RM-60
Acreage
times
60
RO (coded)
Acreage
times
60
Total
8114
8115
8116
8117
8118
8119
8120
8121
4411
3577
188
600
434
2832
1160
1432
2104
4976
3540
640
4620
2334
1950
648
6288
504
318
378
708
660
4620
2334
3886
3258
5954
3974
8591
11685
Total 7988 5214 12692 15840 2568 44302
family living units, approximately 3,000 more than provided even by
Springfield. All census tracts have substantial numbers of zoned
multi-family living units.
Even though the two large rural-suburban tracts of Holyoke,
8119 and 8121, have small percentages of their areas zoned for multi-
family uses, still they provide large numbers of multi-family units by
permitting very dense development in those areas so zoned. Alterna-
tively, it is possible to hypothesize that permitting dense develop-
ment in relatively small areas concentrates less expensive housing and
less affluent residents, while it preserves vast areas for sparser, more
expensive and exclusive housing and well-to-do residents. While the
PCMFAMAC variable indicates that there may be some intracity exclusion
in zoning policy, Z0NMFAM gives a picture of liberal zoning, especially
when Holyoke is compared to suburban jurisdictions.
Progressing to the multi-family variables, average height and
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setback restrictions in multi-family zones are 59 feet and 20 fe
respectively. Table 17 gives the height and setbacks for the fi
multi-family zones. 23
TABLE 17
APARTMENT MAXIMUM HEIGHT AND MINIMUM SETBACK
RESTRICTIONS IN HOLYOKE MULTI-FAMILY ZONES
Zone Stories Height in Ft. Setback in Ft.
R-2 2.5 35 20
RM-20 3 40 20
RM-40 3 40 20
RM-60 7 90 29*
RO 7 90 40*
Average 4.5 59 25.8
*In the RM-60 zone, setback is 20 feet plus 3 feet for every
story over 4, or [20+(3 times 3)]. In the RO zone, setback is 20
feet plus 5 feet for every story over 3, or [20+(4 times 5)].
None of the multi-family zones contains any bedroom restrictions.
Holyoke's zoning permits mobile home parks in RA zones by special per-
mit. 24
Holyoke provided a total of 2,600 subsidized housing units in
1978, 1,682 of which are unrestricted multi-family units, 190 of which
are scattered site units, and 728 of which are restricted, elderly
units. Table 18 deplays the calculation of the distribution of scat-
terred site housing among census tracts, the numbers of unrestricted
and restricted units, and the total number of subsidized housing units
in each census tract. Seventy-two percent of the total are family
units, while twenty-eight percent are restricted to the elderly. One
tract, 8120, has no subsidized housing projects. All other tracts have
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substantial amounts of multi-family projects.
TABLE 18
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN HOLYOKE CENSUS TRACTS
CT. Acre- 1970 Den- Den- Scat- Fam- UNR Eld. NO
age Pop. sity sity terred ily PUB Pub. PUB
o ice TT— ' a_ _Units HO Ho. HO
units
Oil/8114 231 4666 20.2 18.36 32 98 130 100 230
8115 211 4184 19.8 18.00 31 196 227 0 227
8116 221 6747 30.5 27.73 48 219 ^67 7 U JUJ
8117 235 3471 14.8 13.45 24 261 285 321 606
8118 193 5042 26.1 23.72 41 0 41 134 175
8119 4157 4515 1.1 1.00 2 0 2 0 2
8120 1518 8312 5.5 5.00 9 391 400 77 477
8121 6610 13175 2.0 1.82 3 517 520 0 520
Total 13376 50112 190 1682 1872 728 2600
Aver-
age 3.7 1.74*
*Constant
,
190 divided by sum of the column
.
Table 19 summarizes Holyoke's scores on the zoning variables
and provides the relevant descriptive statistics.
TABLE 19
ZONING OF HOLYOKE BY CENSUS TRACTS AND DESCRIPTIVE
STATISTICS OF ZONING VARIABLES IN HOLYOKE
CT. AVR AVR PC PC ZND AVR AVR BDRM PRO NO UNR
MLS FRNT MFAM MFAM MFAM HGT STBK RES MOB PUB PUB
AC HO HO HO HO
8114 10938 88 33.4 96.4 4620 59.0 25.8 0 1 230 130
8115 10938 88 18.4 97.5 2334 59.0 25.8 0 1 227 227
8116 10938 88 34.7 93.4 3886 59.0 25.8 0 1
'
363 267
8117 10938 88 33.2 94.7 3258 59.0 25.8 0 1 606 285
8118 10938 88 83.3 82.8 5954 59.0 25.8 0 1 175 41
8119 10938 88 2.7 27.7 3974 59.0 25.8 0 1 2 2
8120 10938 88 31.2 64.6 8591 59.0 25.8 0 1 477 400
8121 10938 88 6.4 41.0 11685 59.0 25.8 0 1 520 520
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TABLE 19—Continued
AVR AVR PC PC ZND AVR AVR RDRM PRO. Tryrr)
MLS FRNT MFAM MFAM MFAM HGT DTTT3 rUB
AC HO unnu rlU
Mean 10938 88 30.4 74.7 5538 59.0 25.8 o* l on*
Median 10938 88 31.3 83.4 4018 59.0 25.8 232 236
Mode 10938 88 2.7 27.7 2334 59.0 25.8 2 2
Sum 87504 704 243.3 598.1 44302 472.0 206.4 2600 1872
Range 0 0 80.6 69.8 9351 0 0 604 518
Variance 0 0 617.4 750.4 9823059 0 0 40999 30711
Std.Err
.
0 0 8.785 9.685 1108.1 0 0 71.59 61.96
Std.Dev. 0 0 24.85 27.39 3134.2 0 0 202 175
Kurtosis 0 0 2.966 -.647 1.003 0 0 -.865
-.509
Skewness 0 0 1.381 -.991 1.281 0 0 .131 .260
*Percentage of ones.
Chicopee
.
Chicopee, the last of the three central cities of the SMSA,
is located directly north of the City of Springfield. Just as Holy-
oke's classification as a central city is misleading, so is that of
Chicopee. Chicopee could just as easily be designated as a working
class suburb as a central city. Its population is largely ethnic with
substantial groups of Poles and Italians. However, its central city
designation is accounted for by its highly urbanized and densely set-
tled southwestern sector.
Chicopee is comprised of nine census tracts and 15,168 acres,
although the acreage in C.T. 8105, Westover Air force Base, is elimi-
nated. Chicopee's population in 1980 was 55,112, a decline of 17.3%
from its 1970 population of 66,676. This percentage is the largest
loss of the central cities.
The zoning ordinance current on January 1, 1979 was adopted in
1978. No changes were made in the ordinance up to the beginning of
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1981.- The accompanying zoning map was drafted in 1977 and revised
August 31, 1978.26 No areal changes have been made since that date.
One exclusively single-family residential zone, Residence A,
one mixed single-family and two-family residential zone, Residence B,
one cumulative apartment zone, Residence C, and a mobile home residen-
tial zone, Residence D, are provided.
Minimum lot size in Residence A zones is 10,000 square feet.
Minimum frontage is 100 feet. Single-family minimum lot size in Resi-
dence B is 7,500 square feet with minimum frontage of 75 feet. Mobile
homes are permitted in Residence D zones on lots of 6,223 square feet
with no specific frontages. 27 Average minimum lot size is thus 7,908
square feet. Average frontage is 88 feet.
Chicopee' s Residence B zone is similar to its counterpart in
Springfield's ordinance. It provides for both single-family and two-
family residences. Consequently, the coding of Residence B acreage
has been treated similarly, that is, the actual number of acres zoned
Residence B in a census tract has been reduced by the percentage of
two-family housing (sf/sf+2f) in the tract in 1970. Again, this may
bias the results. Table 20 shows the reduction of Residence B acreage
for Chicopee census tracts.
The percentage of acreage zoned multi-family includes the re-
duced Residence B acreage and all acres zoned Residence C. Table 21
displays these calculations for Chicopee census tracts.
C.T. 8111, which forms the central western border of Chicopee,
contains the greatest percentage of multi-family zoning. C.T. 8109,
directly to its south, has the second greatest portion. These tracts
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TABLE 20
REDUCTION OF RESIDENCE B ACREAGE BY 1970 PERCENTAGES OF TWO-FAMILYHOUSING UNITS FOR CHICOPEE CENSUS TRACTS WITH RESIDENCE B ZONING
CT.
8105
8106
8107
8108
8109
8110
8111
8112
8113
Total
1970
S-F
L.U.
1970
2-F
L.U.
Total %
2-F
Res B
Acres
Res B
Acres
Coded
M-F
1095 288 1383 20.8 69.8 14.5
1180 475 1655 28.7 99.6 28.6
454 481 935 51.4 39.0 20.0
958 672 1630 41.2 37.4 15.4
1076 333 1409 23.6 312.7 73.8
1241 641 1882 34.1 300.2 102.4
1289 370 1659 22.3 16.0 3.6
2216 281 2497 11.3 45.8 5.2
9509 3541 13050 27.1 920.5 263.5
*SOURCE: Zoning Locus Map, City of Chicopee (1977, amended
through 1978). ' —
TABLE 21
ACREAGE ZONED FOR MULTI-FAMILY USES IN CHICOPEE CENSUS TRACTS
CT. Acres Acres Total Tract PC
Coded Zoned M-F Acreage MFAM
Res B Res C Acres AC
8105
8106 14.5 21.8 36.3 3845 0.9
8107 28.6 6.2 34.8 805 4.3
8108 20.0 13.7 33.7 587 5.7
8109 15.4 64.4 79.8 829 9.6
8110 74.8 15.3 89.1 1540 5.8
8111 102.4 69.2 171.6 1219 14.1
8112 3.6 20.0 23.6 1122 2.1
8113 5.2 21.2 26.4 2144 1.2
Total 263.5 231.8 495.3 12896 3.8*
"This figure is the percentage resulting from dividing multi-
family acres by total acres. The computer figures a higher percentage,
See Table 24.
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contain the early, dense settlements of the city and are zoned accor-
dingly. The Westover Air Force Base tract, 8105, contains no multi-
family zoning. The large tract to its south, 8106, has less than one
percent of its area zoned for multi-family uses. Chicopee thus has a
large variation from tract to tract in its multi-family zoning policy
with only an average of 3.3% (compared to 13.8% in Springfield and 10.7
in Holyoke) of its area zoned for multi-family uses. That Chicopee
maintains the suburban character of a great portion of its land area
by zoning for a minimum of multi-family uses illustrates the working
class psychology of preserving the hard-won gains in quality of life
from minority intrusion.
The multi-family living units provided by zoning in the Resi-
dence B areas are calculated as follows. A minimum lot size of 10,000
square feet is required for a two-family building, 28 so t^at 4^355
buildings or 8.7 units can be built per acre (43,560 times 2/10,000).
The Residence B acreage coded is then multiplied by 8»7. In Residence
C areas, every multi-family building must have "a minimum lot area of
seven thousand five hundred
. . . square feet for the first dwelling,
two thousand five hundred
. . . square feet for the second unit and
two thousand
. . . square feet for each additional unit. "29 Under
this formula, 18.78 living units can be built per multi-family acre
[((43, 560-(7, 500+2, 500) /2,000)+2]. Residence C acreage is then multi-
plied by 18.78 to find Residence C living units provided by zoning.
Finally, Residence B and Residence C totals are added. Table 22 shows
the calculation of zoned multi-family living units provided in census
tracts.
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TABLE 22
MULTI-FAMILY LIVING UNITS PROVIDED BY ZONING IN CHICOPEE CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. Res B (coded)
Acreage times 8.7
Res C Acreage
times 18.78
Total
8105
8106
8107
8108
8109
8110
8111
8112
8113
Total
126
249
174
134
642
891
31
45
2292
409
116
257
1209
287
1300
376
498
4352
535
365
431
1343
929
2191
407
443
6644
C.T. 8111 has the largest number of zoned units, while C.T.
8019 has the second largest number. All tracts provide for at least
several hundred units.
Two-family uses in the Residence B zone are limited to 40 feet
in height and are required to have a setback of 100 feet. The Residence
C apartment zone permits buildings of four stories or 60 feet which must
be set back 25 feet. 30 The average height of multi-family buildings Is
thus 50 feet. Average setback is 62.5 feet.
No bedroom limitations are placed on buildings in any of the
multi-family zones. Mobile homes are permitted in a mobile home dis-
trict. 31
Chicopee had a total of 1,618 subsidized housing units in 1978.
Of these, 824 were restricted to elderly use. There were 442 family
apartments and 352 scattered site single-family units. Table 23 cal-
culates the distribution of scattered site units to census tracts and
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displays the numbers of the various types of subsidized housing units
in census tracts.
TABLE 23
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN CHICOPEE CENSUS TRACTS
C T ApTP—
age
i Q7n
Pop.
flanden-
sity
Den-
sity
Ratio
Scat-
t erred
Site
Units
Fam-
ily
Units
UNR
PUB
HO
Eld.
Pub.
Ho.
NO
PUB
HO
8105
8106 3845 5921 1.5 1.00 11 0 11 0 11
8107 805 6889 8.6 5.73 61 0 61 224 285
8108 587 4087 7.0 4.67 49 146 195 92 287
8109 829 7932 9.6 6.40 68 0 68 150 218
8110 1540 5929 3.9 2.60 28 0 28 40 68
8111 1219 10209 8.4 5.60 59 226 285 222 507
8112 1122 6704 6.0 4.00 42 0 42 0 42
8113 2144 10271 4.8 3.20 24 70 104 96 200
Total
Aver-
age
15168 66676
.
4.4 10.60*
352 442 794 824 1618
*Constant, 352 divided by sum of the column.
Subsidized housing units are concentrated in the tier of cen-
sus tracts which form Chicopee's southern and western borders. There
are slightly more elderly units than unrestricted units. Only three
tracts, 8108, 8111 and 8113, contain family apartments.
The location of subsidized family projects, like PCMFAMAC, in-
dicates a restrictive policy within the city. Such housing is permit-
ted only in the older areas of the city. The central and eastern tracts
are preserved for single-family residential uses.
Table 24 summarizes the zoning variables and descriptive statis-
tics of Chicopee.
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TABLE 24
ZONING OF CHICOPEE BY CENSUS TRACTS AND DESCRIPTIVE
STATISTICS OF ZONING VARIABLES IN CHICOPEE
C.T. AVR AVR PC PC ZND AVR AVR BDRM PRO NO UNR
MLS FRNT MFAM MFAM MFAM HGT STBK RES MOB PUB PUB
AC HO HO HO HO
8105 - - - - - - - — _ _
8106 7908 88 0.9 39.8 535 50.0 62.5 0 1 10 10
8107 7908 88 4.3 49.5 365 50.0 62.5 0 1 282 58
8108 7908 88 5.7 70.6 431 50.0 62.5 0 1 285 193
8109 7908 88 9.6 64.9 1343 50.0 62.5 0 1 214 64
8110 7908 88 5.8 39.2 929 50.0 62.5 0 1 66 26
8111 7908 88 14.1 63.8 2191 50.0 62.5 0 1 504 282
8112 7908 88 2.1 35.6 407 50.0 62.5 0 1 40 40
8113 7908 88 1.2 30.4 443 50.0 62.5 0 1 198 102
Mean 7908 88 5.4 49.2 831 50.0 62.5 0* 100* 202 92
Median 7908 88 4.4 40.1 449 50.0 62.6 201 65
Mode 7908 88 0.9 30.4 365 50.0 62.5 11 11
Sum 63264 704 43.7 393.8 6644 400.0 500.0 1618 794
Range 0 0 13.2 40.2 1826 0 0 496 274
Variance 0 0 20.5 234.9 416634 0 0 26776 8896
Std.Err. 0 0 1.6 5.4 228.2 0 0 57.9 33.3
Std.Dev. 0 0 4.5 15.3 645.5 0 0 163.7 94.3
Kurtosis 0 0 .686 -1.842 2.270 0 0 .382 1.055
Skewness 0 0 1.032 .300 1.650 0 0 .693 1.354
^Percentage of ones.
Conclusions . The expectation that central city zoning would be nonre-
strictive is fairly closely borne out by the zoning of Springfield,
Holyoke and Chicopee. The relative scores of the three central cities
on the zoning variables are visually depicted in Figure 1. Table 25
summarizes the descriptive data for the central city subfile.
All of Springfield's scores fall in the definitely. inclusion-
ary range. In fact, most of Springfield's scores determine the outside
parameters on the inclusionary side of the exclusionary- inclusionary
continuum.
Fig. 1. Comparative ranking of the central
cities on the exclusionary-inclusionary continuum
according to their zoning variable scores. il
204
<
O
H
J
a
x
w
c
a
o
c
c
o
c
o
00
o
-I
•
*3 CO
<X) CU
I—
i
•
CO XI CU
u CO to
— •H £
CO
iH CO S-i
tT3 >
CJ >%
CO
j-> CO CO
0 o 3
c O
CJ •n
a) CO CO
3
cO
—
r—
1
o CJ
•H X
c CO CJ
cO 3 c
I—
1
o
!>i CJ c
t—* X
C cu CJ
o —
u
CI) o
> c
•H CO •H
•U iH
CO CO T3
> CU
-j CO
W CU CO
3 — CU
rH c -
iH •H a
iH E
i—
1
0
CU CO a
'- c
CO o CO
•H •H
CO 4-1
CU 1-1 cu
0 tH
CO C CO
cj 0 CJ
CO en
a *
205
TABLE 25
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ZONING VARIABLES
IN THE CENTRAL CITY SUBFILE
City Totals or Averages
City AVR
MLS
AVR
FRNT
PC
MFAM
HO
PC
MFAM
HO
ZND
MFAM
AVR
HGT
AVR BDRMPRO NO
STBKRES MOB PUB
HO HO
UNR
PUB
HO
Spring-
field
6700 65 20.0 57.9 41015 62.0 22.5 0 1 7763 5835
Holyoke
Chicopee
10938
7908
88
88
30.4
5.4
74.7
49.2
44302
6644
59.0
50.0
25.8 0
62.5 0
1 2600
1 1618
1872
794
Descriptive Statistics by Census Tracts
Mean 7589 73 19.3 59.2 1877 59.6 29.6 0* 100* 245 170
Median 6992 71 13.9 63.8 1320 61.3 23.3 - - 192 101
Mode 6700 65 0.0 0.0 0 62.0 22.5 - - 11 6
Sum 371868 3553 946.1 2902.9 91961 29.8 1449 - - 11981 8501
Range 4238 23 83.3 100.0 11685 12.0 40.0 - - 986 834
Variance 2429606 119 364.8 1049.5 4837810 19.4 217.5 - - 51323 35415
Std.Err. 222.7 1.6 2.7 4.6 314.2 .629 2.107 - - 32.4 26.9
Std.Dev. 1559 11 19.1 32.4 2200 4.4 14.7 - - 227 188
Kurtosis .910- 1.479 1.210 -1.150 8.725 1.063 1.542 - - 1.490 2.457
Skewness 1.592 .763 1.256 .405 2.649
-L652 1.853 - - 1.245 1.540
^Percentage of ones.
Holyoke' s average minimum lot size of 10,938 square feet is
slightly more than one-quarter acre. All the rest of Holyoke' s scores
are in the inclusionary range.
Chicopee departs from the nonexclusionary side of the contin-
uum on one variable. It requires more apartment setback than is needed
for safety. Its percentage of multi-family acreage is slightly higher
than the five percent point. Chicopee's scores on six variables, PC-
MFAMAC
,
ZNDMFAM, AVRHGT, AVRSTBK, NOPUBHO and UNRPUBHO, are signifi-
cantly more towards the exclusionary side of the scale than Spring-
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field's or Holyoke's scores. Although Chicopee's overall zoning poli-
cy is inclusionary, its policy of zoning small areas for dense multi-
family development is questionable, since the policy concentrates less
expensive housing and leaves large areas relatively free of that kind
of development. The placement of Chicopee's zoning scores relative to
Springfield and Holyoke again indicates its status as a working class
suburb rather than a central city with liberal policies towards minor-
ities and the very poor.
The averages of all variables for the central cities as a group
are well within the inclusionary range. Minimum lot size is less than
one-quarter acre. Frontage is approximately thirty feet less than the
inclusionary-exclusionary turning point. The percent acreage zoned for
multi-family uses is well above ten percent, and on the average, the
central cities had more than half of their housing stock in multi-family
uses. The cities had an average of more than 30,000 zoned multi-family
units. Average apartment height permitted is approximately four stor-
ies. Average setback required for apartments is about thirty feet.
None of the cities have bedroom restrictions, and all permit mobile
homes on small lots. The cities had an average of almost 4,000 subsi-
dized housing units. Approximately 58% of these were unrestricted
family housing. Less than half (42%) of subsidized housing units were
restricted to elderly occupancy.
It seems safe to conclude that zoning in the central cities is
nonexc lus ionary
,
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First Ring Suburbs
Seven suburbs which border Springfield, that is, Agawam, East
Longmeadow, Hampden, Longmeadow, Ludlow, West Springfield and Wilbra-
ham, comprise the first ring of suburbs of the SMSA. The zoning of
these jurisdictions is hypothesized to be the most exclusionary of the
metropolitan area, since they lie directly in the path of the popula-
tion and developmental pressure which overflows from the central ci-
ties. Consequently, average minimum lot size in single-family zones
is expected to be large, that is, generally in the half acre (21,780
square feet) or more range. One hundred and five feet of frontage or
more is anticipated. One would expect to fine that small percentages,
under five percent, of total acreage are zoned for multi-family uses,
that substantially less than ten percent of housing stock is multi-
family, that considerably less than one thousand apartment buildings
are provided by zoning, that apartment buildings are limited to two
and one-half stories (35 feet), that apartments are required to be set
back great distances from the street (more than 50 feet) , and that
bedroom restrictions are placed on apartments. It is anticipated that
mobile homes are prohibited, that relatively few subsidized units (under
500) have been built, and that more than half of these are restricted to
elderly occupancy. These general hypotheses are in great part con-
firmed by the following analysis of the first ring suburbs.
.
However,
the exceptions are more numerous than anticipated. Some towns are not
as exclusionary as anticipated. Some variables have less exclusionary
scores than expected.
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Agawam. The town of Agawam is a community of 15,232 acres and one
census tract, 8132. It is located in the western and southern tier
of the first ring suburbs. The State of Connecticut is to its south.
West Springfield is to its north. Southwick and Westfield form its
western boundaries.
The western suburbs of Springfield have absorbed the major pop-
ulation growth of the SMSA during the 1970 decade. Agawam has been in-
cluded in this growth. Its 1980 population was 26,271, an increase
of 21% over its population of 21,717 in 1970. Its housing units grew
from 7,083 in 1970 to 9,637 in 1980, a 36.1% increase. However, Agawam
remains a semi-rural community with a large portion of its area devoted
to agricultural pursuits. Its major settlements are located in its
northeastern quadrant.
Zoning in Agawam was adopted in 1957. The by-laws current on
January 1, 1979 were last amended on September 8, 1978. 32 No changes
in zoned land areas had been made since 1975, the date of the current
zoning map. 33 The infrequent modification of zoned land areas in Aga-
wam is typical of the Springfield suburbs. Even those which have ex-
perienced" fairly strong population pressures have not as yet attemp-
ted to provide more areas for inexpensive or multi-family housing to
accommodate increasing numbers of low and moderate income families.
However, changes may be forthcoming in the first of these two areas, at
least in Agawam. During a recent period of excessive rainfall, the
Town Council President of Agawam "called for a moratorium on residential
building . . . especially bigger housing developments, ..." because of
runoff flooding, sewage-filled cellars and inadequate roads. Durd
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the moratorium, stricter zoning provisions and a phased growth ser-
vice plan would be drawn up. The Council President cited "the lack
of tough zoning and local control once a zone is changed" as major
causes of Agawam's developmental problems. 35 Certainly in this in-
stance of proposed tightening of controls, planning needs are of pri-
mary concern. Any restrictive zoning provisions which result cannot
reasonably be attributed to exclusionary motivations.
Agawam's current zoning provides two single-family residential
zones and three types of multi-family districts. The single-family
districts, A-l and A-2, require minimum lot sizes of 17,000 and 15,000
square feet, and frontages of 125 and 110 feet, respectively. The
average minimum lot size therefore is 16,000 square feet, while the
average frontage is 117.5 feet. The A-2 district permits conversion
of single-family residences existing at the time of the adoption of
the ordinance to two-family dwellings, if authorized by variance by
the Board of Appeals. 3f>
The three types of multi-family districts include Residence A-3,
which authorizes apartment houses or garden apartments of five units
or more; 37 Residence A-4, which permits "Elderly Housing Development";38
and Residence B, which authorizes dwellings of two to four housekeeping
units. 3 ^ Buildings in the A-3 and A-4 districts are limited to two
stories or 28 feet, while the B district allows heights of 35 feet,*40
that is, large, newly-built apartment buildings must have less height
than existing, old houses which have been converted to multi-family use.
The average height requirement is thus 30 feet. Setback in the A-3 and
A-4 districts is 40 feet. In the B district, it is 30 feet/41 Again,
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large apartment buildings are more strictly regulated than those with
smaller numbers of units. The average setback requirement is 37 feet.
The total acreage zoned for all types of multi-family housing is
315 acres, or 2.1% of the total land area. The largest amount of this,
219 acres, is in the B classification. Eighty-eight acres are zoned
A-3. Only 8.4 acres are zoned A-4, for elderly use. The Pheasant Hill
subsidized, family and elderly housing project which was built on 35
acres, was authorized by a Chapter 774 comprehensive permit. Its zon-
ing remains agricultural because, according to toxm officials, it does
not conform to any of the specifications of the apartment districts.
Since Chapter 774 "supercedes all zoning," there would be no reason to
alter the existing zoning classification for the land. 4 2
The total number of zoned multi-family units in Agawam has been
calculated as follows. The A-3 district limits living units to 8 per
acre. 43 Eighty- eight acres with 8 units would provide 704 living
units. The A-4 district permits 16 living units per acre44 so that 8.4
acres provides 134.4 living units.
The B district has two varying restrictions concerning numbers
of living units which can be built per acre. Two-family dwellings re-
quire a minimum lot size of 12,000 square feet, so that 7.26 units per
acre are permitted [(43,560/12,000) times 2], Four-family dwellings
require a minimum lot size of one acre, so that 4 units are allowed
per acre. 4 ^ Inexplicably, the ordinance has no codified restrictions
for three-family dwellings. The average number of living units per
acre authorized in B zones is thus 5.6, that is, [ (7 . 26+4) /2 ] . Since
there are 219 acres zoned Residence B, the B districts authorize 1226.4
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living units (219 times 5.6). The total number of zoned multi-family
units in Agawam is 2065 (704+134
.4+1226.4)
.
None of the multi-family zones places any restrictions on the
number of bedrooms in apartments.
Mobile homes and trailers as residences are not authorized any-
where in the by-laws. "House trailers" may be kept on residential pro-
perty in the A-2 and B districts, but these cannot "be used for living
quarters," nor can space "be rented or leased for trailers.
"
4 6 Trail-
ers can obviously be kept for traveling purposes only. A fair assess-
ment of the wording indicates that mobile homes as residences are pro-
hibited.
Agawam is one of the few towns that places minimum floor area
restrictions on apartments. However, its restrictions are within the
768 square foot maximum set by the Massachusetts State Zoning Enabling
Act. 47
Agawam provided a total of 424 subsidized housing units in 1978.
Of that number, 312 were restricted elderly units, while 112 were unre-
stricted family units.
East Longmeadow
. East Longmeadow is located in the southern tier of
the first ring suburbs, with Longmeadow to its west, Springfield to its
north and west, Hampden to its east, and Connecticut to its south. It
is comprised of 8,320 acres and one census tract, 8134. In 1980 its
population was 12,905, a 1.0% decrease from its 1970 population of
13,029. East Longmeadow is experiencing population decline and no
growth pressures.
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Zoning was first adopted in East Longmeadow in 1952.^8 The
revision in effect as of January 1, 1979 was adopted in 1978. Amend-
ments subsequent to January 1, 1979 are not relevant to residential
variables. The zoning map accompanying the by-laws is current to
1979.49
The by-laws provide for four single-family residential dis-
tricts and one elderly residential district. No multi-family or unre-
stricted apartment zoning in its own right is authorized. Table 26
displays the minimum lot size and frontage requirements of the four
single-family residential zones. The average minimum lot size is 22,500
square feet, while the average frontage is 122.5 feet.
TABLE 26
SINGLE-FAMILY MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND FRONTAGE
REQUIREMENTS IN EAST LONGMEADOW
Zone MLS in Sq.Ft. Frontage in L. Ft.
AA
A
B
C
40,000
25,000
15,000
10,000
175
140
100
75
Average 22,500 122.5
SOURCE: The Zoning By Law of the Town of East Longmeadow, Mas s.
(1978), p. Z-4-i:
The by-law provides that elderly multiple-unit housing can be
constructed by "a duly constituted Housing Authority" in any residen-
tial district. 5° Most of the elderly units in East Longmeadow have
been built under this provision on land zoned single-family. Those
areas which are actually developed in elderly housing in single-family
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districts, although not literally zoned multi-family, have been included
as multi-family zoning as a compromise between excluding them entirely
and including all single-family zoning as multi-family. Including all
single-family residential acreage as multi-family would unduly inflate
this variable since private developers cannot build elderly housing as
a matter or right in single-family zones, and no specific areas are
zoned for this use. Not accounting for projects actually developed un-
der the provision would give the impression that East Longmeadow's zon-
ing is more restrictive than it actually is. This compromise seems to
be as fair as possible a treatment between two unacceptable extremes.
Twenty-one and three/tenths single-family acres which are devel-
oped as elderly housing and which provide 172 elderly units have been
included as acreage zoned multi-family, and multiple housing units pro-
vided by zoning, respectively.
The by-laws also zone for an elderly residential district in
its own right. One area of 28.8 acres is zoned in this category. Al-
though the regulations for the use provide that 25 units per acre can
be built, no more than 200 units on any one site can be constructed, so
that the maximum multi-family units provided in this area is 200. 51
Total acreage zoned multi-family is 50.1, 0.6% of total land area.
Total zoned multi-family units is 372.
The maximum height permitted in the elderly district is 35 feet.
Setback is 50 feet. 52 Although no bedroom restrictions are enumerated,
since East Longmeadow's zoning only allows elderly housing which must be
built in conformance with relevant Massachusetts law, 53 in effect, bed-
rooms are limited to two in any authorized housing. Bedroom restric
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tions are considered to be in effect.
East Longmeadow contains a total of 279 subsidized housing units,
197 of which are elderly, 75 of which are multi-family unrestricted,
and 7 of which are scattered site family housing. Ironically, the 75
units of multi-family housing were constructed under Chapter 774 provi-
sions which overrode East Longmeadow' s prohibition of such construction,
in the one district zoned for elderly residential use.
Mobile homes and trailers as residences are prohibited by zon-
ing. 54
Hampden
.
Hampden lies in the southeast corner of the first ring of
suburbs, with Connecticut forming its southern border, with East Long-
meadow to its west, Wilbraham to its north, and Monson to its east. It
is a sparsely settled town, with great portions which are mountainous
and unsuitable for large scale development. Its total land area is
12,608 acres. Census tract 8135 is coterminous. In 1980 its popula-
tion was 4,745, a 3.8% increase over its 1970 population of 4,572.
Since Hampden has experienced very little population growth pres-
sure, zoning x^as adopted comparatively late, in 1973. Hampden has not
modified its zoning very frequently. Amendments were added in 1974,
1976 and 1978.^5 7^e 1978 version of the by-laws was in effect January
1, 1979. The zoning map is current to 1978 with no changes after that
date. 56
Two single-family residential zones are furnished. The R-4 dis-
trict requires a minimum lot size of 40,000 square feet, almost one acre,
while the R-6 district requires a minimum of 60,000 square feet, more
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than one and one-third acres. The average minimum lot size is 50,000
square feet. The R-4 district requires a minimum frontage of 170 feet,
while the R-6 district requires 200 feet. Average frontage is 185
feet. 57
In a provision which treats elderly housing similarly to East
Longmeadow's treatment, the by-laws provide that "housing projects for
elderly persons" can be built in the R-4 single-family zone when con-
structed by the Hampden Housing Authority. 53 However, only one pro-
ject of 56 units on 14.6 acres has been built under this provision. 59
In order to account for this provision, only the elderly project and
its land area, and not all areas zoned R-4, single-family, are inclu-
ded as multi-family zoning. Although this treatment is not a literal
reading of the zoning by-laws, it adequately quantifies the by-laws'
substantive purpose.
Hampden's zoning does supply a multi-family dwelling district
which permits, as a matter of right, construction of garden apart-
ments. 60 One small area of 14.3 acres is zoned for this use. 61 No
apartments were built in this zone as of January 1, 1979. Total zoned
multi-family acreage thus is 28.9 acres, 0.2% of Hampden's land area.
Zoning provides for 111 multi-family living units, 56 in the
elderly area and 55 in the garden apartment zone. In the garden apart-
ment zone, the by-laws require a minimum lot area of 100,000 square
feet, or 2.3 acres, for the first three units. In addition, minimum
lot area "shall be increased by ten . . . percent [10,000 square feet]
for each dwelling unit over three, . . ."^ 2 so that, for each acre over
2.3 in a site, 4.356 units can be constructed (43,560/10,000). Since
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there are 14.3 acres zoned multi-unit, the first 2.3 acres provide
three units, and the additional 12.0 acres provide 52.3 units (12.0
times 4.356").
All buildings in Hampden are limited to two and one-half stories
(35 feet) 63 so that the average height restriction in multi-family dis-
tricts is also 35 feet. Setback for elderly housing is 60 feet, for
garden apartments 100 feet, so that average setback is 30 feet. 64 No
bedroom restrictions are made in the elderly or apartment zones. Mobile
homes are prohibited as residences . 65
In 1978, two scattered site, subsidized family units were avail-
able, so that the total number of subsidized housing units is 58. The
total number of unrestricted units is two.
Longmeadow
.
The town of Longmeadow, located directly south of Spring-
field, is generally considered to be one of the most expensive and ex-
clusive suburbs in the metropolitan area. The town is almost entirely
a residential community. It has no industrial zoning and no industry.
Approximately one quarter of its gross area is zoned for agriculture. 66
Only around 0.4% of its land area (28 acres) is zoned for and developed
in commercial uses. 6 ?
Longmeadow is comprised of 5,824 acres and one census tract,
8133. Its 1980 population was 16,301, an increase of 4.3% over its
1970 population of 15,630.
Zoning in Longmeadow was adopted in 1963 6 ^ and substantially
revised in 1977. 6 ^ At that time provisions for an elderly residential
district were also adopted.^ These provisions represent Longmeadow'
s
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only multiple housing zoning. No revisions have been made in the by-
laws since 1977. The map accompanying the by-laws is dated January,
1979. 7 1
The by-laws provide four types of single-family residential dis-
tricts. The most restrictive district, A-2, requires a minimum lot size
of 30,000 square feet and a minimum frontage of 150 feet. Residence A-l
requires 18,750 square feet for a lot with a frontage of 125 feet. Res-
idence A requires lots of 15,000 square feet with a frontage of 100
feet. Residence B requires a minimum lot size of 8,050 square feet and
a frontage of 70 feet. 72 The average minimum lot size is 17,950 square
feet, less than half an acre, while the average frontage is 111.3 feet.
The elderly housing district adopted in 1977 applies only to a
specific parcel of 7.73 acres which is less than 0.1% of the total land
area. 7 3 By restricting apartment zoning to elderly housing only, and
by not applying the zoning category to other than one parcel, the town
discourages any further apartment development.
The zoning by-laws permit ten living units per acre in the elder-
ly district, 74 so that seventy-seven (10 times 7.73) multi-family living
units have been provided by zoning. Sixty, one-bedroom units and eight,
two-bedroom units were authorized, 75 so that the by-laws do, de facto,
include bedroom restrictions. The height restrictions in all residen-
tial districts is 35 feet. 76 The setback in the elderly residential
district is 40 feet. 77
Although 68 subsidized elderly housing units were built in 1979-
80 in the elderly residential district, as of January 1. 1979, the town
had no subsidized housing of any kind.
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The by-laws do not expressly prohibit the use of mobile homes
as primary uses. However, only "detached, permanent, single-family
dwelling(s)" 78 are permitted in residential zones. In addition,
"... the parking, storing, or maintaining of any type of trailers,
excepted within a totally enclosed garage"79 is specifically forbidden.
In effect, the by-laws prohibit mobile homes.
Ludlow. The town of Ludlow is located with Chicopee to its west, Spring-
field and Wilbraham to its south, Belchertown to its northeast, and
Granby to its north. Ludlow contains 17,472 acres and one census tract,
8104. In 1980, its population was 18,150, an increase of 3.2% from its
1970 population of 17,580.
Zoning in Ludlow was first adopted in 1955. The by-laws in
effect on January 1, 1979 were amended through 1977. No amendments
were added in 1978. Amendments added in 1979 and 1980 do not affect
the relevant variables. 80 Ludlow's zoning map is revised to April,
Q -1
1978. 01 One zone change in late 1978 of a specific area from single-
family to multi-family has been included in this study.
Ludlow's residential zoning provides two single-family dis-
tricts. Residence A specifies a minimum lot size of 15,000 square
feet and frontage of 90 feet. Residence A-l requires a minimum lot
size of 40,000 square feet and a frontage of 140 feet. 82
The Residence B zone, however, is a multi-residential use dis-
trict. Single-family houses require a minimum lot size of 7,500 square
feet and 75 feet of frontage. 8 ^ Average minimum lot size thus is 20,833
square feet, while average frontage is 101.7 feet.
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All types of multi-family housing are also authorized in Resi-
dence B districts, but with varying restrictions. Two-family struc-
tures require a minimum lot size of 10,000 square feet so that 8.7
living units are permitted per acre (43,560 times 2/10,000). Three
and four family structures require 21,780 square feet of land, so that
six living units per acre are permitted if three-family buildings are
built (43,560 times 3/21,750) and eight living units per acre are per-
mitted if four-family buildings are constructed. Structures with more
than four units are limited to ten units per acre. 84 The average liv_
ing unit restrictions on multi-family housing in the Residence B zone
is 8.175 living units per acre [ (8 . 7+6+8+10) /4 ] . Approximately 319
acres, 1.8% of the total acreage, are zoned Residence B. All Resi-
dence B acres are included as multi-family since the wording of the by-
laws indicates that this classification is primarily multi-family.
Single-family uses are only incidentally permitted in order to avoid
non-conforming use status for existing houses.
Ludlow's by-laws contain no other apartment or elderly zones.
No bedroom restrictions are placed on multi-family housing. The set-
back for all multi-family structures is 50 feet, while the height re-
striction is 35 feet. 85
In addition to these districts, the Ludlow by-laws have an In-
dustrial 3 district which permits trailer camps (mobile home parks). 86
No specific minimum lot sizes or frontages are given for this use. No
land is zoned Industrial 3. Two trailer parks do exist in agricultural
zones as non-conforming uses, that is, they were established before the
Industrial B provision was adopted. 8? If a developer wishes to esta-
220
blish additional trailer courts, he/she would have to petition for a
rezoning to the Industrial B category. Mobile homes are permitted,
although with tight restrictions.
Ludlow contained a total of 172 subsidized housing units in
1978, 92 of which were elderly units, and 80 of which were unrestric-
ted family housing.
West Springfield
.
The town of West Springfield is situated directly
southwest of the Springf ield-Holyoke-Chicopee central city complex.
Agawam is to its south, while Westfield lies due west. West Spring-
field is comprised of 10,816 acres and three census tracts, 8122-8124.
Its population was 27,042, a 5.0% loss from its 1970 population of
28,461.
Zoning in West Springfield was originally adopted in 1953. The
by-laws and map in effect on January 1, 1979 included the original by-
laws and amendments adopted to July, 1978. 88 The by-laws used for this
analysis are dated July, 1980. However, they contain a "Summary of
On
Changes y which lists amendments by page that were added after the ba-
sic revision of 1978. The information pertinent to this study was a
part of the 1978 document. Amendments added in 1979 and 1980 pertain
to fire districts, heliports, signs, and the like.*^ None of the basic
residential uses or land zoned for them was altered after 1978.
If the number of residential zoning districts alone is appraised,
the zoning of West Springfield appears to be one of the most nonexclu-
sionary of the suburbs. The by-laws contain three single-family resi-
dential districts, A, A-l, A-2; a two-family district, B; a mull
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family residential district, C; and two mixed use districts, B-l and
BA-1, which permit apartment construction along with business uses. 91
The average minimum lot size and frontage for single-family uses
are not quite as liberal as the overall apartment policy. The calcula-
tion of these variables is displayed in Table 27.
TABLE 27
SINGLE-FAMILY MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND FRONTAGE
REQUIREMENTS IN WEST SPRINGFIELD
Zone MLS in Sq. Ft. Frontage in L. Ft,
A
A-l
A-
2
Mobile Homes
Average
30,000
20,000
15,000
7,500
150
125
100
75
18,125 113
SOURCE: Zoning^ By-Law
Massachusetts (1980), p. 35.
of the Town of West Springfield
,
In order to calculate the acreages zoned for multi-family uses,
the acreages contained in the two mixed-use zones, B-l and BA-1, have
been treated in a fashion similar to the treatment of the RO acreage
in Holyoke.92 Since these zones mostly contain business buildings with
apartments in the second story, only half the acreage has been included.
Business and multi-family uses are assumed to be equally divided. Slight
bias in the findings may result. Table 28 displays the multi—family ac-
reage in the various classifications of multi-family zones in the three
census tracts of West Springfield.
For a suburb, West Springfield has a surprisingly high percentage,
7.3, of its total area zoned in multi-family uses, although the greatest
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8122
8123
8124
Total
360.4 65.0
29.3 102.5
159.4
51.4
549.1 167.5 51.4 25.1
1 Total Tract
Acreage
PCMFAMAC
1 438.5 2841 15.4
0 195.2 1198 16.3
159.4 6777 2.4
793.1 10816 7.3
portion of this acreage, 69.2%, is in the two-family rather than mul-
tiple family classification. One tract, 8124, which areally comprises
63% of the town, contains only two-family zoning and no zoning for mul-
tiple units. Apartment zoning per se is concentrated in the two census
tracts of the urbanized portion of the town which borders the Connecti-
cut River.
The maximum number of multi-family living units permitted in
each of the multi-family zones is calculated as follows. The RB, two-
family zone, requires a minimum lot size of 10,000 square feet, so that
8.712 living units per acre are permitted (43,560 times 2/10,000). The
RC and B-l zones authorize a maximum density of thirty living units per
acre. The BA-1 zone permits a maximum of fifty-five units per acre. 93
Table 29 multiplies the acreages in each multi-family zoning category
by the appropriate living unit restriction.
The high densities permitted in the three multiple family zones
alter the proportions of the various classifications for the living
units variable. The RC classification contains the greatest percentage
of living units, while the RB classification contains the greatest per-
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TABLE 29
MULTI-FAxMILY LIVING UNITS PROVIDED BY ZONING
IN WEST SPRINGFIELD CENSUS TRACTS
C T K-Ti Acreage
times 8.712
RC Acreage
times 30
B-l Coded
Acreage
times 30
BA-1 Coded
Acreage
times 55
Total
8122
8123
8124
3140
255
1389
1950
3075 1542
718
660
5808
5532
1389
Total 4784 5025 1542 1378 12729
centage of multi-family acreage. The liberality of the thirty unit
per acre density is manifested by these figures. The western census
tract, 8124, has relatively few zoned multi-family living units. This
again indicates that low-cost housing is concentrated in the mid-town
section.
The four multi-family zones contain differing height restrictions.
The RB zone limits buildings to two and one-half stories or 40 feet.
The RC and B-l zones permit four-story buildings of 60 feet. The BA-1
zone permits six-story buildings of 75 feet. The average height re-
striction is 58.8 feet. Setback in the RB zone is 30 feet, in the other
three zones, 25 feet. Average setback is 32.5 feetl^
None of the multi-family districts contains any bedroom limita-
tions on apartments.
West Springfield permits mobile homes as residences and mobile
home parks in three of its four business districts (BA, B and B-l). 95
The minimum restrictions in all of these districts are 7,500 square feet
and 75 feet, respectively . 96 These figures have been included in the
calculation of the single-family variables.
Although West Springfield's zoning provides ample areas for
construction of multi-family housing, actual numbers of subsidized
units fall far behind the town's need. At the end of 1978, West
Springfield had 537 subsidized housing units, 315 of which were unre-
stricted family housing. Yet it had more than three times as many
households requiring housing assistance. West Springfield's subsidized
housing situation indicates that other factors than zoning such as eco-
nomic considerations, the availability of governmental subsidies, and
developer decisions to build or not to build influence the availability
of adequate amounts of low-cost housing. If a jurisdiction does not
zone for multi-family housing, little will result. If a jurisdiction
does so zone, as does West Springfield, the resulting multi-family hou-
sing may not be affordable to low or moderate income households.
Of the subsidized housing total, 130 were scattered site houses,
185 were multi-family units, and 222 were restricted, elderly units.
West Springfield, in the typical suburban pattern, provides more elder-
ly multiple units than family units. Table 30 shows the calculation of
the distribution of scattered site houses and the types of subsidized
housing in West Springfield census tracts.
Wilbraham
. Like Longmeadow, Wilbraham is a suburban community with a
reputation for exclusivity. Like Longmeadow, the majority of. its devel-
opment is in single-family residential uses, although Wilbraham does
provide some industrial zoning (which Longmeadow does not) along the
Chicopee River in its northern sector.
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TABLE 30
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN WEST SPRINGFIELD CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. Acre- 1970 Den- Den- Scat- Fam- UNR Eld. NO
age Pop. sity sity terred ily PUB Pub. PUB
bite units HO Ho. HO
Units
8122 2841 7556 2.7 1.3 35 95 130 74 204
8123 1198 6404 5.3 2.5 68 0 68 0 68
8124 • 6777 14501 2.1 1.0 27 90 117 148 265
Total 10816 28461 130 185 315 222 537
Aver-
age 2.6 2.7*
^Constant, 130 divided by sum of the column.
Wilbraham is located directly east of Springfield, with Hampden
to its south, Palmer and Monson to its east, and Ludlow to its north.
It is comprised of 14,220 acres of land area and one census tract, 8136,
Its 1980 populat ion was 12,053, an increase of 0.6% over its 1970 pop-
ulation of 11,984.
Zoning in Wilbraham was adopted in 1931. 97 The by-laws current
on January 1, 1979 included amendments up to June 19, 1978. No amend-
ments were added between June, 1978 and January 1, 1979. Amendments
adopted after January 1, 1979, those dealing with flood plain zoning,
retail sales of automobiles, and conditions for granting special per-
mits are irrelevant here.^ The zoning map is dated January, 1974.99
However, it is current to 1979 according to town officials.
Single-family residential zoning in Wilbraham is divided into
five categories, R-15, R-26, R-34, R-40 and R-60. 100 Table 31 shows
the minimum lot sizes and frontage requirements of each category.
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TABLE 31
SINGLE-FAMILY MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND FRONTAGE REQUIREMENTS IN WILBRAHAM
Zone
R-15
R-26
R-34
R-40
R-60
Average
MLS in Sq. Ft. Frontage in L, Ft,
15000 100
26000
34000
130
170
40000 200
60000 200
35000 i 6 o
SOURCE: Building Zone Map, Town of Wilbraham, Mass
. (1974).
The average minimum lot size is approximately four-fifths of an
acre, while the average frontage requirement is 160 feet. Both these
averages put Wilbraham' s single-family zoning well into the exclusion-
ary range.
Wilbraham is one of the few communities which zones for lot sizes
of more than one acre. The R-60 zone requires 1.38 acres for a house.
Most significantly, approximately one-third of its land area is zoned
in this category. However, the large R-60 land area in the eastern por-
tion of the town contains Mount Wilbraham and is generally rocky and
hilly. Planning considerations such as the natural characteristics of
the land and soil, lack of municipal infrastructure, and the need to
prevent pollution of ground water could justify these excessively large
lot sizes in this area.
Wilbraham 's by-laws contain one category of multi-family zoning,
RMD, a multiple dwelling district. Only one small area, 6.05 acres,
less than 0.1% of the total land area, is zoned for this use. 101 That
parcel contains forty elderly housing units. Wilbraham has only five.
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scattered site subsidized family units and no multi-family projects
which are unrestricted. It had a total of 45 subsidized housing units
in 1978.
When the elderly housing project was built in 1969, the zoning
by-laws required a minimum lot size of three acres in the RMD district
with a maximum number of dwelling units per acre of eight, so that the
zoned number of multi-family living units is 48.102 However, in 1975,
the three-acre minimum was raised to ten acres, so that in the future,
if any areas are rezoned RMD, larger parcels will be required. 103 Such
a stiffening of apartment requirements is an indication of exclusionary
motivation.
The maximum number of bedrooms permitted in the RMD zone is two.
In addition, at least half of all dwelling units must be limited to one
bedroom, so that bedrooms in apartments are restricted. 10^ These are
the strictest bedroom limitations of any jurisdiction.
Buildings in the RMD district are limited to two stories or 28
feet in height. They are required to be set back 50 feet from streets
on parcels "with not less than 500 feet of frontage," and set back 80
feet "on all other parcels"10 ^ so that average setback is 65 feet.
The by-laws require minimum floor areas in multi-family units,
but these are within the maximums set by state law. 106
Wilbraham does not authorize mobile homes in any district. How-
ever, they are not expressly prohibited, except as accessory buildings
for nonpaying guests. 10? Since only one-family houses are permitted res-
108idential structures, it is apparent that mobile homes are forbidden.
The 1970 census confirms this conjecture by listing the number of
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homes as one.
.
Exclusion and inclusion in the first ring
. An analysis of the zoning
variables in the first ring suburbs confirms that many of the towns
have exclusionary ratings on many of the variables. However, there
are several exceptions. Figure 2 visually displays the comparative
relationships of the first ring suburbs on the zoning variables. Table
32 gives the specific scores of each suburb for each variable as well
as descriptive statistics.
The scores of the suburbs on AVRMLS range between a high of
50,000 square feet in Hampden, to a low of 16,000 square feet in Aga-
wam. All towns have averages in the exclusionary range, that is, more
than a quarter acre (10,390 square feet). All towns except Ludlow re-
quire a minimum frontage in single-family zones of more than 104 feet.
All towns except West Springfield have less than five percent of their
total area zoned for multi-family uses. Three towns, Agawam, West
Springfield, and Ludlow had more than ten percent of their housing units
developed in multi-family uses in 1970. Agawam had a total of 4,769
multi-family units, although it zoned for only 2,065 such units, indi-
cating that more than half of the multi-family housing in Agawam either
holds non-conforming use status or has been built by special or compre-
hensive permits. Although Ludlow's multi-family acreage as a percentage
of its land area is small, 1.8%, it had a total of 1,211 multi-family
units in 1970 (23.3% of its housing stock) and zoned for more than twice
that many (2,608) as of 1979. West Springfield had 44.3% (4,276 units)
of its housing stock in multi-family units in 1970 and zoned for 9,477
Fig. 2. Comparative ranking of the firs<-
ring suburbs on the exclusionary-inclusionarv continuum according to their zoning variable scores
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such units. Ludlow and West Springfield maintain liberal apartment
zoning policies, while Agawam's zoning for less apartments than exist
indicates that restrictive zoning came too late to prevent development
that the town would rather do without. Agawam probably will follow a
similar pattern with its single-family zoning.
The four remaining towns, Hampden, Wilbraham, Longmeadow and
East Longmeadow, provided for 200 or less multi-family units with their
zoning. They had equally small percentages of acreage zoned for multi-
family housing (less than one percent in all cases), and equally small
percentages of their housing stock actually developed in multi-family
units (less than six percent in all cases)
.
All towns except West Springfield limit the size of apartment
buildings to two and one-half stories (35 feet) or less. The towns as
a whole are not as restrictive in their apartment setback requirements
as in their bulk restrictions. West Springfield, Agawam and Longmeadow
require less than fifty feet of setback. East Longmeadow and Ludlow re-
quire fifty feet, placing them on the borderline between restrictive and
nonrestrictive on this variable. Two towns, Hampden and Wilbraham, have
excessive average setback requirements, eighty and sixty-five feet, re-
spectively.
Only three jurisdictions, Longmeadow, East Longmeadow and Wilbra-
ham, place bedroom restrictions on their apartments. This indicates
that the attempt to keep out poor families with large numbers of chil-
dren by limiting the numbers of bedrooms in apartments is not as widely
a used exclusionary device in the Springfield area as it is elsewhere
in the nation.
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Five jurisdictions prohibit mobile homes as residences. Only
West Springfield and Ludlow permit them.
No towns fare very well on the subsidized housing variables.
The highest total provided by any town is 537 units in West Springfield.
Longmeadow had none as of 1978, while Wilbraham and Hampden had less
than sixty. Only West Springfield had more family units (315) than el-
derly units (222). Elderly units exceed family units in all other
jurisdictions
.
When the towns are considered individually across all variables,
West Springfield is consistently the least exclusionary in its zoning
policy. Only its single-family residential zoning can be considered
restrictive. On all the other variables, it has the least restrictive
scores. Generally, its multi-family housing policy can be character-
ized as inclusionary
.
Hampden, on the other hand, seems to be the most exclusionary .^9
Its scores lie on the excessive end of the exclusionary scale for most
variables, although in specific instances, for example, PCMFAMHO, ZND-
MFAM, AVRHGT, and NOPUBHO, Longmeadow and/or Wilbraham have more re-
strictive provisions. Only in failing to place bedroom restrictions
on apartments does Hampden maintain a nonexclusionary standard.
Wilbraham also has excessively restrictive scores. In variable
after variable its provisions lie in the exclusionary range. Its single-
family lot sizes and frontages are excessive. It prohibits mobile homes
and restricts the number of bedrooms in apartments. It zones less than
one percent of its area for multi-family use and provides only forty-
eight zoned multi-family units. It provides only forty-five subsidized
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housing units, only five of which are family units, and these are scat-
tered site houses. It has no family public housing projects. Apart-
ments are limited to two stories, only twenty-eight feet, and are re-
quired to be set back sixty-five feet from the street. On the basis
of these statistics alone, Wilbraham's reputation for exclusion is sub-
stantiated. Generally, its overall apartment policy is at least as re-
strictive as Hampden's. Only on the two single-family variables and
AVRSTBK does it score less than Hampden.
Surprisingly, Longmeadow is not as restrictive as expected. Al-
though its single-family variables are in the exclusionary range, they
are exceeded in restrictiveness by at least four other jurisdictions.
Zoning for large lots and wide frontages is not the major way that Long-
meadow maintains its exclusive character and reputation. Excluding sub-
sidized and multi-family housing through zoning, as well as mobile homes,
industry and large commercial uses, seems to be far more important. 110
In the one area that is zoned for elderly housing, the setback restriction
is quite liberal, although the bedroom restrictions and height limita-
tions are not. Longmeadow' s land use policy seems to be far more sophis-
ticated than blatant in its use of restrictive zoning devices. Rather
than using all or most available devices across the board as do Wilbra-
ham and Hampden, Longmeadow judiciously selects some, for example, zon-
ing out mobile homes, zoning almost no acreage for multi-family uses and
keeping out subsidized family housing, and relaxes the restrictions in
the rest. The selective use of restrictive devices leaves the impres-
sion that Longmeadow' s zoning is less restrictive than that of sur-
rounding towns.
The three towns, East Longmeadow, Ludlow and Agawam, have
neither excessively restrictive nor liberal zoning policies. A possi-
ble explanation is that since they have large areas of undeveloped land,
and in the case of East Longmeadow and Ludlow at least, little popula-
tion growth pressure, they do not feel the need to make their zoning ex-
cessively restrictive.
In sum, the hypothesis that the first ring suburbs maintain ex-
clusionary zoning policies is generally confirmed.
Second Ring Suburbs
Those jurisdictions which are located adjacent to the first ring
suburbs comprise the second ring. Many of these municipalities are
rural in character, have little industry, and have small populations in
large areas. One would expect to find that their zoning is relatively
uncomplicated and unsophisticated. The hypothesis is that their zoning
is not as restrictive as that of the first ring suburbs, since these
suburbs are buffered by the first ring from influxes of central city
minorities and poor. Their outlying location and remoteness from jobs,
industry and commerce make them unattractive to the urban poor. Further,
their rural economies and generally poorer residents could not support
the expensive housing which results from excessively restrictive zoning
and which is affordable to wealthier first ring residents.
Additionally, their zoning is expected to be not as liberal as
that of the central cities since outlying suburbs do not have to deal
with the problems of housing large minority and urban poor populations.
For the most part, the scores of the second ring suburbs on the zoning
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variables are expected to lie in between those of the central cities
and the first ring suburbs.
Nine towns and two cities comprise the second ring suburbs. For
the convenience of analysis, they have been divided according to their
location into the west suburbs, the north suburbs, and the east suburbs.
The west suburbs. The towns of Easthampton, Southampton and Southwick,
and the city of Westfield, are located to the west of the first ring
suburbs and the central cities. Easthampton is the northernmost of
these. It is triangularly shaped with Northampton to its north, South-
ampton to its southwest, and Holyoke to its southeast.
Southampton is located southwest of Easthampton, with Holyoke to
its east and Westfield to its south. The outlying towns of Westhampton,
Huntington and Montgomery complete its other borders.
Southwick is the southernmost of the west suburbs. Westfield
forms its northern border. Agawam and Holyoke are to its north, while
Montgomery and Russell are situated to its west.
Westfield is located south of Southampton and north of Southwick.
Holyoke, West Springfield and Agawam form its eastern borders. Mont-
gomery, Russell and Granville are to its west. Westfield is the economic
center of the west suburbs. It is the most populous, urbanized and de-
veloped of these jurisdictions.
Easthampton
.
Easthampton is a town of approximately 8,512 acres.
It is divided into two census tracts, 8223 and 8224. In 1980 its popu-
lation was 15,580, an increase of 19.7% from its population of 13,012
in 1970.
Zoning in Easthampton was adopted in 1951 and underwent
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a major
revision in 1972. 111 Amendments were added in 1974, 1975 and 1976
which made minor changes in the wording of some provisions . "-2 In May
of 1979, gross floor area requirements for single- and multi-family
housing were dropped, and temporary mobile homes as residences for one
year were permitted when permanent residences have been "destroyed by
fire or other natural holocaust." 113 These were, however, added after
the cutoff date of January 1, 1979. The by-laws in effect on January
1, 1979 were the basic revision of 1972 and subsequent amendments. The
map in effect was adopted in 1972 and revised in 1973. 114 No changes
in land districts have been made since that date. 11 ^
The by-laws provide for four residential districts. The R-5,
Urban Residential, district provides for mixed uses. One-familv de-
tached dwellings and multi-family dwellings are permitted in it as a
matter of right. 116 The R-10 district is designated as Suburban Resi-
dential, a single-family district. However, multi-family housing is
permitted in R-10 areas by special permit. 117 The descriptions of the
R-15 zone, Suburban Residential, contain a contradiction. The use reg-
ulations show that multi-family dwellings are not permitted even by
special permit, yet the area regulations prescribe conditions for multi-
family development. 11 ^ Since visual inspection discloses many apartment
projects in R-15 districts, it is safe to assume that the use regula-
tions represent an error, and that in fact multi-family housing is per-
mitted by special permit in R-15 areas. These areas will be treated
accordingly. The R-35, Rural Residential, district limits new construc-
tion exclusively to single-family construction. Conversions of existing
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single-family houses to two- to four-family dwellings are permitted
by special permit in the R-5, R-10, and R-15 zones. 119
The minimum lot sizes in the four single-family zones range from
5,000 square feet to 35,000 square feet. Frontage requirements range
from fifty to 120 feet. Table 33 shows the calculation of the average
minimum lot size and average frontage.
TABLE 33
S INGLE-FAMILY MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND FRONTAGE
REQUIREMENTS IN EASTHAMPT0N
Zone MLS in Sq. Ft. Frontage in L. Ft.
R- 5 5000 50
R-10 10000 100
R-15 15000 100
R-35 35000 120
Average 16250 92.5
In order to calculate the acreage zoned for multi-family uses
in the R-5, mixed use zone, the acreage zoned R-5 In C.T. 8224 was
reduced to 46.8%, the percentage of that tract's housing which was
multi-family in 1970. C.T. 8223 has no R-5 zoning.
In order to account for conversions of single-family homes into
apartment houses in the R-5, R-10, and R-15 areas, and apartments built
by special permit in the R-10 and R-15 zones, declining percentages of
each area have been included as multi-family. The R-5 zones are in the
midtown area and are most densely developed. The R-10 zones border the
CBD and are less densely developed, while the R-15 zones are mainly sub-
urban in character. Easthampton' s development and zoning follow a clas-
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sic concentric pattern, decreasing in density as distance from the CBD
increases. Consequently, one would expect conversions to follow a sim-
ilar pattern. A visual inspection of Easthampton generally confirms
this expectation. In the R-5 zones in C.T. 8224, besides the original
46.8% of the acreage zoned multi-family by right, an additional 46.8%
of the remaining 43.8 acres has been included as multi-family in order
to account for conversions. A site inspection indicates that these
areas' contain large turn-of-the-century houses which are mostly con-
verted to apartments, although some smaller houses remain single-family
residences
.
In the R-10 zones, the acreage is included at the percentage of
housing that was multi-family in each census tract in 1970, that is,
52.5% in C.T. 8223 and 46.8% in C.T. 8224. These districts are mixed
areas of single-family houses, converted houses, and apartments lying
on the fringe of the CBD. The proportion of single-family and multi-
family is estimated by visual inspection to be about the same as the
overall proportion in the census tract.
The acreage in the R-15 zone on the fringe of the central area
of the town has been included at half of the percentage of multi-family
housing in each tract, that is, 26.25% in C.T. 8223 and 23.4% in C.T.
8224. These more outlying districts have some apartment projects and
conversions, but the majority of their housing is single-family. No
conversions have been accounted for in four suburban R-15 zones, the
three areas in the north around Olive Street, Clapp Street and Florence
Road, and the suburban area along Strong, Division and Phelps Streets.
These areas contain isolated single-family houses and post-war single-
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family subdivisions.
Although some bias may result from these interpretations, the
actual development of these areas and the large percentage of East-
hampton's housing which was multi-family in 1970 (49.4%) seem to jus-
tify including additional acreages as zoned for multi-family use.
Leaving them out would interpret Easthampton' s zoning as far more ex-
clusionary than visual inspection and housing counts indicate that it
is. The calculation of the percent acreage zoned multi-family is dis-
played in Table 34.
TABLE 34
ACREAGE ZONED FOR MULTI-FAMILY USES IN EASTHAMPTON CENSUS TRACTS
CT. Acres
Zoned
R-5
Acres
Zoned
R-10
Acres
Zoned
R-15
Total Tract
Acre-
age
PC
MFAM
AC
8223 343 times
.525 - 180.1
329.7 times
.2625 86.5 266.6 2333 11.4
8224 82.3 times
.468 =
(82. 3-38. 5)
times .468 =
38.5
2C.5
252.7 times
.468 = 118.3
575.4 times
.234 134.6 311.9 6179 5.0
Total 59.0 298.4 221.1 578.5 8512 6.8
In order to calculate the zoned multi-family units, the units per
acre permitted in multi-family zones must first be derived. Table 35
does this calculation.
The acreage zoned in each category was than multiplied by the
appropriate maximum unit density. Table 36 derives the zoned multi-
family living units for Easthampton census tracts.
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TABLE 35
CALCULATION OF MULTI-FAMILY LIVING UNITS PER ACRE
LIMITATIONS IN EASTHAMPTON RESIDENTIAL ZONES
K-
j
R-10 R-15
MLS in
Sq. Ft.
5000 + 2500 for
each unit more
than one
10000 + 5000 for
each unit more
than one
15000 + 5000 for
each unit more
than one
Formula 43560 - 5000 43560 - 10000 43560 - 15000
2500
+ 1
5000 + 1 5000 + 1
Units per
Acre 16.424 7.712 6.712
SOURCE: Appendix E, Town of Easthampton Bv-Law and Map (1972)
.
TABLE 36
MULTI-FAMILY LIVING UNITS PROVIDED BY ZONING
IN EASTHAMPTON CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. R-5 Acreage R-10 Acreage R-15 Acreage Total
times 16.424 times 7.712 times 6.712
8223 1389 581 1970
8224 969 912 903 2784
Total 969 2301 1484 4754
The heights of multi-family buildings are limited to two and one-
half stories or 35 feet in the R-10 and R-15 zones, while six-story
buildings of 90 feet are permitted in the R-5 zone. 120 AVRHGT is thus
53.4 feet. Setback is 50 feet in the R-5 zone and 120 feet in the R-10
and R-15 zones, 121 so that average setback is 96.7 feet. None of the
apartment zones contains any bedroom restrictions.
Although mobile homes are not explicitly excluded anywhere in the
by-laws, the wording indicates that they are forbidden. A "building" is
defined as a "portable or fixed" structure, while a "dwelling" is
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defined as a "permanent structure. 1,123 Residential uses are confined
to dwellings or permanent structures. This would exclude buildings or
mobile homes. 1 *-'1 In addition, mobile homes or trailers are not listed
as principal uses in any district. 125 Accessory uses permit the "stor-
age of a trailer," but it cannot "be used for dwelling or sleeping pur-
poses."126 The May, 1979 amendments did permit temporary use of trail-
ers as residences for up to one year. However, the amendments did not
permit trailers as permanent residences. The fact that no mobile homes
were listed for Easthampton in the 1970 census confirms that mobile
homes are prohibited.
Easthampton had a total of 370 subsidized housing units is 1978,
53 scattered site units, 197 multi-family units, and 120 restricted,
elderly units. Table 37 shows the distribution of subsidized housing
by type and census tract.
TABLE 37
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN EASTHAMPTON CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. Acre- 1970 Den- Den- Scat- Fam- UNR Eld. NO
age Pop. sity sity terred ily PUB Pub. PUB
Ratio Site Units HO Ho. HO
Units
8223 2333 5683 2.4 2 35 0 35 120 155
8224 617P 7329 1.2 1 18 197 215 0 215
Total 8512 13012 53 197 250 120 370
Aver-
age 1.5 17.7*
^Constant, 53 divided by sum of the column.
Table 38 summarizes the scores of Easthampton' s census tracts for
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the zoning variables.
TABLE 38
ZONING OF EASTHAMPTON BY CENSUS TRACTS
CT. AVR AVR PC PC ZND AVR AVR BDRM PRO NO UNR
MLS FRNT MFAM MFAM MFAM HGT STBK RES MOB PUB PUB
AC HO HO HO HO
8223 16250 93 11.4 52.5 1970 53.4 96.7 0 0 155 35
8224 16250 93 5.0 46.8 2784 53.4 96.7 0 0 215 215
Total 16250 93 6.8 49.4 4754 53.4 96.7 0 o 370 250
Southampton Southampton is a typically rural New England town
It is comprised of one census tract, 8225, and 18,432 acres
.
In 1980
its population was 4,137, an increase of 34.8% from its 1970 population
of 3,069. In spite of this high growth rate, the town remains sparsely
populated with an average density of 0.2 persons per acre.
Zoning in Southampton was originally adopted in 1956 and remained
essentially the same, although eight amendments were added between 1963
and 1973, up until February 13, 1979, when the original by-laws were
completely rewritten. 127 Zoning categories were reclassified and land
areas were redesignated according to the newer classifications at this
time. The 1979 document generally tightened developmental restrictions
because, according to town officials, poor soil drainage and lack of a
municipal sewer system were combining to create a threat of ground
water pollution. ^28 Although the newer by-laws miss the January 1,
1979 cutoff by about six weeks, they seem to represent a fairer assess-
ment of current zoning than the 1956 by-laws. Where appropriate, var-
iables from the newer version will be used in an attempt to capture
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quantitatively the tightening up of zoning policy. The February 13,
1979 date is sufficiently close to the cutoff to allow for little dis-
tortion in the overall results.
The old by-laws provided three single-family residential dis-
tricts, the R-20, Central Residence, the R-30, Open Residence, and the
R-40, Rural Residence, zones. The minimum lot size and frontage require-
ments in these zones are presented in Table 39.
TABLE 39
1956-79 SINGLE-FAMILY MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND
FRONTAGE REQUIREMENTS IN SOUTHAMPTON
Zone MLS in Sq. Ft. Frontage in L. Ft.
R-20 20000 120
R-30 30000 130
R-40 40000 140
Average 30000 130
SOURCE: Zoning By-Laws of the Town of Southampton, Mass . (1973),
p. 5.
The by-laws allowed two-family dwellings in any residential zone
by authorization of the Board of Appeals on lots of 25,000 square feet
if "connected to a Town water main," or on lots of 40,000 square feet
if only wells were available. Apartments could be similarly authorized
on lots of 30,000 square feet with "an additional 4,500 square feet"
required for each unit "beyond three." Apartments were required to
i 129
be connected to the town water supply.
The 1979 by-laws also contain three single-family residential
districts, but their designations and restrictions are completely re-
vamped. R-V, Residential Village, R-N, Residential Neighborhood,
and
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R-R, Residential Rural, classifications were created. 130 Generally,
10,000 square feet were added to the minimum lot size in each dis-
trict, and ten feet were added to the frontage requirements. Single-
family cluster development on smaller lots with less frontage was also
established. 131 Since the cluster provisions have a liberalizing ef-
fect on the restrictive single-family requirements, they are included
in the calculation of average minimum lot size and average frontage.
Table 40 shows these calculations for the 1979 by-laws. The 1979 fig-
ures have been used in the data analysis.
TABLE 40
1979 SINGLE-FAMILY MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND
FRONTAGE REQUIREMENTS IN SOUTHAMPTON
Zone MLS in Sq. Ft. Fronta^;e in L. Ft.
R-V, Standard 30000 130
Cluster 20000 120
R-N, Standard 40000 140
Cluster 30000 130
R-R, Standard 60000 175
Cluster 40000 140
Average 36667 139
SOURCE: Zoning Bv-Laws of the Town of Southampton (1979), pp.
6-2, 11-2.
Neither of Southampton's by-laws furnished any apartment zoning.
No land is zoned for multi-family housing. However, the newer by-laws
do allow two-family dwellings in the R-N and R-V zones by special per-
mit. Multi-family and elderly housing are authorized by special permit
only in the R-V and C-V, Commercial Village, zones. 132 In order to ac-
count for the special permit procedures of both the old and new by-laws.
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only the land actually developed in multi-family uses will be included
as multi-family. Applying the 1970 census percentages of types of hou-
sing to actual acreages yields inaccurately high figures. The town has
approximately 25 two-family buildings. 133 Using the requirement of
25,000 square feet per building, approximately 14.3 acres are zoned for
this use. Using the 40,000 square feet requirement gives a figure of
23.0 acres. An average of the two gives 18.7 acres zoned for two-family
uses
.
Eighty-three apartment units have been built under Board of
Appeals approval in three projects along Route 10. 134 Using the old
by-laws' criterion of 30,000 square feet for the first three units and
4,500 square feet for each additional unit, 9.7 acres are zoned for
apartments. In addition, approximately five houses have been conver-
ted to three-family residences
.
13 ^ These yield another 3.4 acres of
multi-family zoning. Total zoned multi-family acreage is 31.8 acres
(18.7+9.7+3.4), or 0.2% of total tract acreage.
Zoned multi-family units were calculated by adding the actual
numbers of multi-family units built, that is, fifty two-family units,
eighty-three apartment units in projects, and fifteen converted units.
The total is 148 units.
In 1978, Southampton had a total of 26 subsidized housing units,
including 24 unrestricted apartments and two scattered site units. The
town has no public housing projects for the elderly, although the Hou-
sing Authority has a proposal for elderly housing under advisement
.
13 6
All units of subsidized housing are unrestricted.
The old bv-laws contained no specific height and setback restric-
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tions for multi-family housing. Consequently, the figures from the
new by-laws will be used for these variables. When multi-family hou-
sing is constructed by special permit, it is restricted to a height of
two and one-half stories or 35 feet. Two-family housing in the R-N
district is also limited to 35 feet. Two-family houses in the R-V
district can be 45 feet in height. 137 AVRHGT thus is 38.3 feet.
Setback required for multi-family housing is 30 feet. It is 125
feet for two-family housing in the R-V district and 150 feet in the R-N
district. 138 AVRSTBK thus is 101.7 feet. 13 ^
No bedroom restrictions are placed on multi-family housing in
either addition of the by-laws.
Mobile homes are prohibited as permanent residences in the newer
by-laws. They may, however, be used as residences for up to sixty days
in any calendar year by special permit, and, as accessory uses, can be
stored permanently in residential and commercial districts, if unoccu-
pied. 1^0 The older by-laws permitted mobile homes as residences if
allowed by the Board of Appeals and authorized by the Board of Health.
Renewal of the permit each year was required. 1 ^ 1 Mobile homes are re-
corded as prohibited in accordance with the newer by-laws.
Southwick . Southwick is comprised of 19,776 acres and one cen-
sus tract, 8131. In 1980 its population was 7,382 persons, an increase
of 16.6% from its 1970 population of 6,330.
Zoning was first adopted in Southwick in 1950. The by-laws in
effect on January 1, 1979 were the amendments of the original by-laws
adopted September 26, 1978.^ Substantial amendments were also added
248
on April 22, 1980.1*3 The only 198o a i terat ion which is relevant to
this study is the reduction of frontage requirements in the R-20-A,
apartment zone, from 100 to 75 feet. 144 The map accompanying the 1980
by-laws is dated March 29, 1977 and amended September 26, 1978.145 No
area changes have been made since 1978.
The by-laws contain two mixed use (single-family and two-family)
residential zones. The R-20 zone requires a minimum lot size of 40,000
square feet and a frontage of 150 feet. The figures for the R-40 zone
are 60,000 square feet and 200 feet, respectively
.
i4 6 Southwick's
smallest minimum lot size is just under one acre. Southwick, along
with Hampden, has the dubious honor of having the largest AVRMLS in
the SMSA. Average frontage is 175 feet, the second largest in the
metropolitan area. The designations as R-20 and R-40 indicate that
earlier lot sizes were 20,000 and 40,000 square feet in these zones,
and that the 1978 ordinance increased these to the higher requirements
.
Both the R-20 and R-40 zones permit two-family residences as a
matter of right, but under more restrictive conditions. R-20 two-
faraily houses require lots of 60,000 square feet, while R-40 two-
family houses require lots of 90,000 square feet. Both zones require
250 feet of frontage for two-family houses. 14 ^
7
In order to code the two-family acreage, the total acreage zoned
R-20 and R-40 has been reduced by the percentage of housing, in South-
wick that was two-family in 1970.
The by-laws establish one apartment zone, the R-20-A district.
554.6 acres are zoned for this use. Table 41 gives the calculation of
two-family acreage, the total and percent multi-family acreage.
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TABLE 41
CALCULATION OF ACREAGE ZONED ^OR MULTI-FAMILY USES IN SOUTHWICK
% Housing 2-F in 1970 Calculation of Acreage Zoned Multi-Family
S-F L.U. 1,702
2-F L.U. 871
Total 2,018
% 2-F 5.5
R-20 Acreage 1688.2
R-20 Acres
Coded M-F 92.9
R-40 Acreage 11943.0
R-40 Acres
Coded M-F 656.9
R-20-A Acreage 554.6
Total M-F Acres 1034.4
Tract Acreage 19776.0
FCMFAMAC 6
.
6
The number of multi-family housing units provided by zoning is
calculated as follows. In the R-20 zone, a 60,000 square foot lot is
required for one, two-family unit, so that 1.452 units can be built per
acre (43,560 times 2/60,000). In the R-40 zone, a 90,000 square foot
lot is required for one, two-family unit, so that .968 of a unit is
possible per acre (43,560 times 2/90,000). In the R-20-A zone, six
units per acre are permitted. 1 ^ 8 The units per acre are then multi-
plied by the acreage zoned for each use. Table 42 shows these calcula-
tions and the total zoned multi-family units.
TABLE 42
MULTI-FAMILY LIVING UNITS PROVIDED BY ZONING IN SOUTHWICK
C.T. R-20 Coded R-40 Coded R-20-A Total
Acreage times Acreage times Acreage
1.452 .968 times 6
8131 135 636 3328 4099
The maximum height permitted in all residential zones is 35 feet
or two and one-half stories. The frontage requirement in all districts
permitting two or more units per building is 100 feet. 1^ This was re-
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duced to 75 feet in all districts in 1980.
Bedroom restrictions are placed on multi-family units. No more
than three bedrooms per unit are permitted, and three-bedroom apartments
can comprise not more than five percent of any multi-family project. 150
Mobile homes are permitted as isolated permanent residences in
any district but by authorization of the Boards of Appeals and Health
only. They must conform to the lot size and frontage requirements of
the district in which they are located. Mobile home parks of more than
one trailer are not permitted. 151 Mobile homes are coded as permitted.
Southwick had a total of 61 subsidized housing units in 1978.
Forty-nine were restricted elderly units, and twelve were scattered site
family houses.
Westf ield
. The city of Westfield is the most urbanized of the
western suburbs. Its land area of 29,834 acres is divided into five
census tracts, 8125-8129. In 1980 it had a population of 36,465 per-
sons, an increase of 16.0% from its 1970 population of 31,433.
Zoning in Westfield was adopted originally in the early 1950s.
Amendments were added to the original ordinance until 1977. The ordi-
nance used for this study is dated March, 1979. 15 ^ However, this date
refers to the revision of the zoning of. land areas. No textual amend-
ments were added at that time or in all of 1978.153 ^he Westfield
document furnishes the dates of adoption of each specific provision
following each provision. This methodology of identification furnishes
valuable historical information concerning the evolution of the docu-
ment .
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The zoning map used for this study is dated January, 1980.154
The map was revised in January, 1980 with the March, 1979 changes of
zoned areas. In March, 1979, two adjacent areas in the Prospect Hill
region of C.T. 8128, one zoned Residence 3, two-family, the other zoned
Residence C, multi-family, were downzoned to Residence A, single-family.
A developer had recently built a complex of duplexes as a matter of
right. The town fathers were dissatisfied with this development and,
in order to prevent any further multiple housing from being constructed
in the area, rezoned both the districts to Residence A, single-family 155
For the purposes of coding multi-family acreage, the areas changed to
Residence A in 1979 have been changed back to the multi-family desig-
nations which they had on January 1, 1979. These modifications were
taken from an earlier zoning map held in the records of the Westfield
building department.
Westfield' s zoning is excessively cumulative, that is, higher
level residential uses are permitted in lower level residential use
zones. Four residential zones are established. The Residence A dis-
trict permits single-family residences and conversion of single-family
houses to duplexes under certain conditions. 156 The Residence B dis-
trict permits single-family residences, construction of two-family
diallings of up to four apartments, and construction of garden apart-
ments by special permit. 157 Realistically, this zone is a two-family
zone since city officials are parsimonious in issuing permits for more
intensive uses. 15 ^ In the Residence C district, all Residence B uses
are permitted. In addition, construction of multi-family buildings with
up to ten units are permitted by right. Apartments of more than ten
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units are permitted by special permit. 150 For most purposes, this can
be considered to be Westfield's apartment zone. 160 In the Residence
C-l, Professional Building and Apartment District, no construction of
single-family houses is permitted. Apartment buildings may be con-
structed as a matter of right, except that buildings with more than
ten units require special permits. Conversion of existing buildings
to six or less apartments is also permitted under certain conditions 161
The ordinance also provides an agricultural district which permits
single-family residential uses on one acre lots.
I
62 That the majority
of Westfield's land area is zoned agricultural indicates that the agri-
cultural zoning is meant to serve as a residential holding zone which
prevents large scale, small lot subdivisions. As a result, the mini-
mum lot size and frontages of the agricultural zone are included in
the calculation of the single-family variables.
The single-family minimum lot sizes and frontage requirements of
the four districts which permit single-family houses and the averages
for these variables are listed in Table 43.
TABLE 43
SINGLE-FAMILY MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND FRONTAGE
REQUIREMENTS IN WESTFIELD
Zone MLS in Sq. Ft. Frontage in L. Ft.
Agricultural 43560 150
Res A 21780 125
Res B 7500 75
Res C 7500 75
Average 20085 106
SOURCE: Zoning Ordinance, Westfield, Massachusetts (1979), p. 51.
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Because Westfield's multi-family residential zoning is so ex-
cessively cumulative, it presents one of the most difficult of coding
problems. In order to calculate the land zoned for multi-family ac-
reage in the various districts that permit multi-family uses, the fol-
lowing procedures have been devised. Land area which is zoned Resi-
dence A is coded at half the percentage of housing in each census tract
that was two-family in 1970 in order to account for conversions to two-
family units by special permit. Land area which is zoned Residence B
is coded according to the percentage of housing in each census tract
that was two-family in 1970. In order to account for conversions and
garden apartments built by special permit, an additional half of the
percentage of multi-family housing in the census tract is included.
Land areas zoned Residence C are coded according to the percentage of
housing in each census tract that was two-family and multi-family in
1970. The Residence C-l acreage which provides for professional
buildings and apartments is similar to Holyoke's RO, residential-
office, areas and is treated similarly. The two land areas which are
zoned Residence C-l in C.T. 8127 and C.T. 8129, respectively, are re-
duced to half under the assumption that business and apartment uses
are about equally divided in the CBD area and the one area near West-
field State College zoned Residence C-l. Table 44 shows the calculation
of Residence B, C-l, and C multi-family acreages by census tracts.
The living units per acre permitted in the various zones where
multi-family uses are allowed were derived as follows. In the Residence
A zone, a single-family house can be converted to a duplex provided
that it is located on a lot of at least 21,780 square feet. Thus,
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TABLE 44
CALCULATION OF ACREAGE ZONED FOR MULTI-FAMILY
USES IN WESTFIELD CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. 1970 1970 1970 Total % 2-F Res A Res A
S-F 2-F M-F 2 Acres Acres
L.U. L.U. L.U. Coded M-F
8125 1107 145 129 1381 5.8 1129.2 65.6
8126 1158 110 90 1358 4.4 1010.9 44.5
8127 1046 1385 997 3428 28.5 166.1 47.3
8128 1061 144 234 1439 6.0 376.7 22.6
8129 1870 159 113 2142 3.9 1273.4 49.7
Total 6242 1943 1563 9748 11.9 3956.3 229.6
C.T. % 2-F % M-F Total Res B Res B X 2-F Res C Res C
2 Acres Acres + M-F Acres Acres
Coded M-F Coded M-F
8125 11.6 5.2 16.8 88.3 14.8 19.8 36.5 7.2
8126 8.7 3.6 12.3 94.6 11.6 14.7 13.5 2.0
8127 57.0 24.4 81.4 261.5 212.9 69.5 76.9 53.4
8128 12.0 9.0 21.0 190.1 39.9 26.3 43.3 11.4
8129 7.8 2.8 10.6 59.0 6.3 12.7 2.3 0.3
Total 23.7 10.0 33.7 693.5 285.5 36.0 172.5 74.3
C.T. Res C-1
Acres
Res C-1
Acres
2
Total M-F
Acreage
Tract
Acreage
PCMFAMAC
8125 0 0 87.5 7491 1.2
8126 0 0 58.1 3982 1.5
8127 48.9 24.4 338.0 912 37.1
8128 0 0 73.9 9830 0.8
8129 6.2 3.1 59.4 7609 0.8
Total 55.1 27.5 616.9 29834 2.1
four living units per acre are permitted (43,560/21,780 times 2).
In Residence B zones, two-family houses require a minimum lot
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:an
size of 12,000 square feet so that 7.26 two-family units per acre c,
be built (43,560/12,000 times 2). Conversions of single-family houses
to up to four families require a minimum lot size of 12,000 square feet
for two-families and an additional 2,000 square feet for each family ex-
ceeding two. 163 a maximum of 10.89 units per acre can thus be conver-
ted to apartments [(43,560/(12,000+2,000+2,000)) times 4]. Garden
apartments in Residence B zones can be constructed at a maximum of six
units per acre. 16^ The average units per acre permitted in Residence
B zones thus is 8.05 [ (7 . 26+10. 89+6) /3 ] . The Residence C units per
acre limitations are the same as those in Residence B districts. 165
In Residence C-l zones, the multi-family housing units 'per acre
limitations are the same as those in Residence 3 areas, that is, 10.89.
Conversions of existing buildings to six apartments require a minimum
lot size of 5,000 square feet plus 1,000 square feet for each unit, 166
so that 23.76 units per acre are permitted [(43,560 times 6)/5,000 +
(6 times 1000)]. Average units per acre in Residence C-l zones is
17.325 [(10. 89+23. 76/2].
In order to calculate the living units provided by zoning in
multi-family zones, the living units per acre or average units per acre
is multiplied by the acreages zoned in each category. Table 45 shows
these calculations.
Apartment buildings in the three districts (B, C, C-l) which
permit apartments are limited to two stories or thirty feet. 16 '7 Two-
family houses in the B and C districts are limited to thirty-five
1 68
feet, so that the AVRHGT in multi-family districts is thirty-two
feet.
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TABLE 45
MULTI-FAMILY LIVING UNITS PROVIDED BY ZONING
IN WESTFIELD CENSUS TRACTS
G.T. Res A Coded Res B Coded Res C Coded Res C-l Coded Total
Acreage times Acreage times Acreage times Acreage times
8.05 8.05 17.325
8125 262 119 58 0 439
8126 178 93 16 0 287
8127 189 1714 430 423 2756
8128 90 321 92 0 503
8129 199 51 2 54 306
Total 918 2298 598 477 4291
All buildings in the Residence B, C and C-l districts are re-
quired to beset back thirty feet. No bedroom restrictions are placed
on apartments in any zone. However, a minimum floor area of 750 square
feet per apartment plus an additional 150 square feet for each bedroom
over one is required. 169 These restrictions are in excess of the maxi-
mum permitted in single-family residential zones by state law. West-
field, unlike most jurisdictions, does not attempt to keep its multi-
family restrictions within the state law's single-family maximum per-
missible floor area requirements.
Mobile homes are permitted as residences but only in trailer
parks and not on single lots, except for less than a year on a lot on
which a destroyed house is being rebuilt. No specific lot size or
frontages are given for mobile homes. 1^0
Uestfield in 1978 had a total of 851 subsidized housing units,
417 family apartments, 160 scattered site houses and 274 restricted,
elderly apartments. Table 46 shows the calculation of the distribution
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of scattered site houses among census tracts and the figures for the
other subsidized housing variables.
TABLE 46
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN WESTFIELD CENSUS TRACTS
CT. Acre- 1970 Den- Den- Scat- Fam- UNR Eld,
age Pop. sity sity terred ily pub pu b,
Ratio Site Units HO Ho.
Units
NO
PUB
HO
8125
8126
8127
8128
8129
7491
3982
912
9830
7609
4866
4744
9400
4523
7900
0.6
1.2
10.3
0.5
1.0
1.2
2.4
20.6
1.0
2.0
7
14
121
6
12
250
0
105
62
0
257
14
226
68
12
0
52
222
0
0
257
66
448
68
12
Total
Average
29824 31433 160
l.i 5.;
417 577 274 851
*Constant, 160 divided by sum of the column.
Westfield's overall zoning policy does not appear to be excess-
ively exclusionary. However, at least three factors indicate an offi-
cial attitude of intracity exclusion. The percentages of multi-family
acreages show that only one census tract, 8127, which contains the CBD,
has a substantial portion of its acreage zoned for multi-family uses.
The other four census tracts all have 1.5 percent or less of their areas
zoned multi-family. In addition, the zoning of the majority of the
acreage of the four outlying census tracts as agricultural with the re-
quirement of one-acre lots for single-family houses indicates a desire
to keep the majority of Westfield's land area in exclusive residential
uses. The agricultural designation of what in reality is exclusive
residential zoning suggests an obfuscation. Finally, the most poignant
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evidence of internal exclusionary motivation in Westfield's zoning is
the 1979 downzoning of the Prospect Hill area from Residence 3 and C
to Residence A when a developer built duplexes in the area, and all
indications were that more multi-family housing would follow. All this
evidence points to a public policy of limiting low-cost and multi-family
housing to the midtown area and preserving the rest of the city for
exclusive single-family residential uses.
Commentary on zoning in the west suburbs
. Population growth in
the Springfield SMSA during the 1970 decade has been concentrated in
the west suburbs. The four suburbs together gained 9,720 persons, an
increase on the average of 18.1% over their 1970 population figures.
The zoning policies of at least two of these suburbs indicate that local
officials are aware of the hazards that rapid, large-scale development
can bring. Southampton, particularly, tightened its regulations in its
1979 revision of the zoning by-laws by adding 10,000 square feet to its
minimum lot sizes and ten feet to its frontages in all districts.
Westfield's downzoning of one area from multi-family to single-family
was a piecemeal attempt to tighten restrictions. In addition, West-
field's overall zoning is internally restrictive, largely limiting low-
cost and multi-family development to the fringes of the CBD. Southwick
is the only west suburb which conforms to the second ring suburban
model of fairly unrestrictive and uncomplicated zoning. It first adop-
ted multi-family zoning in 1977 and zoned one area of more than five
hundred acres for this use. It thus provides for ample development of
multi-family housing in the future but concentrates it in one area.
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Easthampton is an atypical second ring suburb with developmental and
zoning characteristics more similar to a central city than any type of
suburb. Approximately half of its housing in 1970 was multi-family.
No major revision of its zoning by-laws has been undertaken since 1972,
nor have any more restrictive provisions been added in response to a
1970 's population growth rate of 19.7%.
All of the west suburbs are typical of the second ring model in
that they contain large areas which are rural and undeveloped. Their
population concentrations are centered in their C3D areas and fringes.
Thus all of them are likely to continue to feel the developmental push
during the 1980s. Southampton has taken the lead in responding to
growth pressures in its zoning. Southwick and Westfield are likely to
follow the lead in the not too distant future. One would expect to see
them tighten their zoning restrictions. Easthampton, with no evidence
of exclusionary zoning in its past, is unlikely to tighten its zoning
in the future unless it should reach a tipping point at which it would
decide that enough low-cost and multi-family housing is enough.
The north suburbs
. The city of Northampton and the towns of Granby,
Hadley and South Hadley comprise the north suburbs.
Granby is located to the east of South Hadley. Chicopee and
Ludlow form its southern borders. Belcher town is to its east, and
Amherst is to its north.
Hadley is directly north of South Hadley. Northampton and Hat-
field are to its west. Easthampton and Holyoke border Hadley on its
southwest. Sunderland is to its north, while Amherst is to its east.
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Northampton is the major urban and population center of the
north suburbs. It is located north of Easthampton and west of Hadley.
The outlying towns of Westhampton, Williamsburg and Hatfield complete
its borders.
South Hadley is bordered by the central cities of Holyoke and
Chicopee to its west and south. Granby is to its east, while Hadley
is to its north.
The north suburbs have two significant developmental character-
istics. They house many of the students of the "Five Colleges" which
are located in the northern suburban area. One would expect to find
some differences in their zoning and demographic characteristics be-
cause of their relationship to the colleges.
Much of the land area in the north suburbs is flat and fertile,
at least by New England standards, and is used for agricultural pur-
poses, especially truck gardening. Zoning in the north would be ex-
pected to account for and support these agricultural uses.
Granby
.
Granby is comprised of 17,856 acres and one census tract,
8209. In 1980 it had a population of 5,380 which represents a loss of
1.7% from its 1970 population of 5,473.
The zoning by-laws^"' ^ that were current in Granby on January 1,
1979 were adopted in 1974 and amended in 1976. ^2 ^0 amendments or land
area changes were added between 1976 and 1979. The 1976 date of the
zoning map reflects this stability
.
^'^ Tb.e by-laws, however, were
amended by the town meeting on November 6, 1980, at which time a Muni-
cipal Zone, MZ, was added to allow for the construction of a dog pound
261
on a specific site. The municipal zone will also allow "facilities
for the elderly," although what kind of facilities these will be is not
defined. 17
- In any event, the 1980 amendments do not deal with single-
family or multi-family variables.
That Granby 's zoning is relatively stagnant with amendments com-
ing only every few years, is typical of the semi-rural, second ring sub-
urb which is experiencing no developmental push. The substance of Gran-
by's zoning also fits the second ring prototype. The by-laws contain
one single-family residential district, RS, and one multi-family resi-
dential district, RM. Granby has only one business and one industrial
zone.
The RS, Residential District, requires a minimum lot size of
40,000 square feet and a frontage of 150 feet for single-family hou-
ses. 175 Besides single-family uses, conversion of single-family houses
"existing at the time of enactment of this by-law" into two-family hou-
ses is permitted. 176 In 1970, there were 106 two-family units, or 53
two-family houses in Granby. Using the 40,000 square foot minimum as
a measure of acreage, approximately 48.7 acres are zoned for two-family
uses. One parcel of 41.8 acres is zoned for RM, multi-family. Multiple
dwellings are also permitted in the GB, General Business, district.
Fifty-six elderly housing units on 6.7 acres are actually developed in
the GB zone. Total acreage zoned multi-family is 97.2, or 0.5% of
tract acreage.
The zoned multi-family living units is computed as follows.
Since converted two-family houses in the RS district require a 40,000
square foot lot, 2.178 duplexes can be built per acre (43,560 times
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40,000). The RS total of 48.7 multi-family acres yields 106 multi-
family units. The RM district requires a minimum lot size of 50,000
square feet for the first two units, ? lus ten percent (500 square feet)
for each unit over two. 177 Thus 1#7A24 units can be^ ^ ^
acre, 7.6816 units on the second acre, and 8.712 units on each addi-
tional acre. Since all 418 acres zoned RM are in one parcel, this
yields a total of 356 zoned RM units [ 1 . 7424+7
. 6816+(8 . 712 times 39.8)].
In the GB zone there are 56 units. The total zoned multi-family units
is thus 518 (106+356+56).
The height limitation in both residential zones is 35 feet, in
the GB district, 40 feet, so that the average height is 36.7 feet.
Setback in all districts is 40 feet. No bedroom restrictions are placed
on apartments, and mobile homes are prohibited
.
1 78
In 1978, Granby had a total of 60 subsidized housing units, 56
of which were restricted to elderly occupancy, and four of which were
scattered site houses.
Hadley
.
Hadley is comprised of one census tract, 8214, and
14,848 acres. In 1980, its population was 4,135, an increase of 10.0%
from its 1970 population of 3,750. Hadley is largely a farming com-
munity although it contains intensive commercial development along
Route 9, a major east-west highway which bisects its midsection.
Zoning in Hadley was originally adopted in 1961. Significant
amendments were adopted in 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978 according to the
dates on various sections of the by-laws. 179 xhe by-laws and map in
effect on January 1, 1979 were adopted on October 5, 1978, and Sep-
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tember 26, 1978, respectively, and approved by the state's attorney
general December 11, 1973. 180
The Hadley by-laws provide for two, single-family residential
classifications, the Residential and Agricultural-Residential dis-
tricts. Minimum lot sizes and frontages are 22,500 square feet and 150
feet, respectively, in both districts. 181 No multi-family zoning of any
type is provided. Only the conversion of one-family houses into two-
family houses which were in existence in 1961 at the time of adoption
of the by-laws is permitted in both districts. 182 In 1970, Hadley had
159 two-family units, or approximately 80 duplexes. Using the minimum
lot size of 22,500 square feet per house, 41.3 acres, or 0.3% of the
total land area, have been allowed to be developed into two-family uses.
Interestingly, Hadley had 116 apartment units in 1970 although zoning
nowhere provides for these.
Zoned multi-family living units is 159. Since Hadley provides
for no multi-family apartments other than conversion to duplexes, the
average height and setback restrictions for multi-family housing will
be coded as the most restrictive provisions of any suburbs, that is,
28 feet of height in Wilbrahm, and 99.9 feet of setback in Southamp-
ton. The assumption is that providing no apartment zoning is as least
as restrictive as the provisions of the most restrictive suburb. If
Hadley were to be pressured by higher governmental authorities into
adopting some multi-family zoning, it would likely copy the most re-
strictive nearby suburbs, since these restrictions have the legitimacy
of being extant in the legal books. Also, suburbs do in fact imitate
the zoning provisions of surrounding towns when they revise or amend
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their by-laws.
Bedroom restrictions will be coded as being in existence, since
permitting no apartments Implies permitting no bedrooms in them.
Trailers or mobile homes as residences are permitted in Hadley
business districts. This provision was adopted in 1978, showing a
somewhat more liberalizing attitude by zoning officials. Lot sizes
and frontages are the same for mobile homes as those of the residential
district. 183
In 1978 Hadley had a total of 40 subsidized housing units, all
of which were restricted to elderly occupancy.
Northampton
.
The city of Northampton has 21,952 acres which are
divided into seven census tracts, 8216-8222. However, census tracts
8218 and 8221 are eliminated from the analysis because they are com-
prised of the U.S. Veteran's Hospital and Northampton State Mental Hos-
pital, respectively. Local land use regulations are superceded by
federal and state prerogatives in these tracts.
In 1980 Northampton had 29,286 residents. This figure represents
a 1.3% loss from its 1970 population of 29,664.
While zoning in Northampton was originally adopted in 1959, the
zoning ordinance current on January 1, 1979 was adopted in 1975, revised
in 1977, and amended in 1978 and 1979. 18<* The map which accompanies the
ordinance is dated July, 1978.185 nq changes to land areas were added
between that date and January 1, 1979.
The Northampton ordinance contains five residential districts.
The RR, Rural Residence, SR, Suburban Residence, and UR-A, Urban Resi-
265
dence A, districts are limited to single-family uses. The UR-B, Urban
Residence B, zone permits one-family dwellings by right, and town
houses, and two- and three-family houses by special permit. The UR-C,
Urban Residence C, district permits one-, two-, and three-family dwel-
lings, multi-family dwellings of three stories or less, and town hou-
ses and lodging houses as a matter of right. Multi-family dwellings of
more than three stories are permitted by special permit. The UR-C zone
is for all practical purposes an apartment zone. Three-family and
multi-family dwellings of three or less stories, town houses and lodg-
ing houses are also permitted by special permit. lfi 6 The ordinance also
permits single- and multi-family cluster developments in R-R, S-R, and
UR-A zones, and planned unit developments in all residential districts,
business, and one industrial district by special permit. 187
The minimum lot size requirements and frontages of the three ex-
clusively single-family zones and the UR-B zone, as well as the smaller
cluster requirements are given in Table 47. No single-family minimum
lot size or frontage requirement is given for the UR-C zone, again indi
eating that it is exclusively for multi-family use.
Acreages zones UR-C are coded entirely multi-family. Acreages
zoned UR-B are coded according to the percentage of housing in 1970 in
each census tract which was developed in multi-family uses. Table 48
shows these computations.
Since Northampton's lot size restrictions in the UR-B and UR-C
zones vary for each type of multi-family housing, there are a variety
of living units per acre restrictions. Table 49 shows the calculations
of living units per acre for the various classifications of multi-
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TABLE 47
SINGLE-FAMILY MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND FRONTAGE REQUIREMENTS IN NORTHAMPTON
Zone
R-R Standard
Cluster
S-R Standard
Cluster
UR-A Standard
Cluster
UR-B Standard
Average
MLS in Sq. Ft.
40000
10000
30000
10000
20000
5000
10000
17857
Frontage in L. Ft,
175
85
125
80
100
75
75
102
6-2.
SOURCE: City of Northampton Zoning Ordinance (1977 amended), p.
TABLE 48
CALCULATION OF ACREAGE ZONED FOR MULTI-FAMILY
USES IN NORTHAMPTON CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. 1970 1970 Total % UR-B UR-B Acres UR-C
S-F 2-F+ 2-F+ Acres Coded M-F Acres
L.U. M-F M-F
8216 1432 782 2214 35.3 894.4 315.7 4.6
8217 732 274 1006 27.2 221.8 60.3 0.0
8218
8219 1207 2771 3978 69.7 387.9 270.4 224.0
8220 36 203 239 84.9 17.0 14.4 136.4
8221
8222 1145 293 1438 20.4 116.2 23.7 28.9
Total 4552 4323 8875 48.7 1637.3 684.5 393.9
C.T. Total M-F Acres Tract Acreage PCMFAMAC
8216 320.3 4264 7.5
8217 60.3 7365 0.8
8219 494.4 998 49.5
8220 150.8 172 87.7
8222 52.6 8323 0.6
Total 1078.4 21122 5.1
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family housing, and the averages for the UR-B and UR-C zones
.
TABLE 49
LIVING UNITS PER ACRE LIMITATIONS IN NORTHAMPTON'S MULTI-FAMILY ZONES
UR-B
Type of Housing MLS in Sq. Ft. Formula Units per Acre
2-F
3-F
Townhouses
10000 plus 1000 43560
•times 2
times 3
per unit (10000+2000)
10000 plus 1000 43560
per unit (10000+3000)
20000 plus 5000 (43560-20000) First
per unit 5000 Acre
43560 Each Addi-
5000 tional Acre
Average
7.26
10.05
4.712
8.712
7.6835
UR-C
2-F 10000 plus
per unit
1000
(10000+2000) 1 lineS 2 7.26
3-F 10000 plus
per unit
1000
(10000+3000) t imes 3 10.05
M-F High Rise,
4 or more
10000 plus
per unit
2500 (43560-10000)First
2500 Acre 13.424
stories
43560 Each Addi-
2500 tional Acre 17.424
Other M-F 10000 plus 3000 (43560-10000) First
11.19per unit 3000 Acre
43560 Each Addi-
14.523000 tional Acre
Townhouses 20000 plus 4500 (43560-20000)
5.2
9.68
per unit 4500
43560 Each Addi-
4500 tional Acre
Average 11.0935
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The multi-family living units provided by zoning in each census
tract are calculated by multiplying the living units per acre by the
number of acres zoned in each multi-family category. Table 50 shows
these figures for Northampton's census tracts.
TABLE 50
MULTI-FAMILY LIVING UNITS PROVIDED BY ZONING
IN NORTHAMPTON CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. UR-B Coded
Acreage times
7.6835
UR-C Coded
Acreage times
11.0935
Total
8216 2426 51 2477
8217 463 0 463
8219 2078 2485 4563
8220 111 1513 1624
8222 182 321 503
Total 5260 4370 9630
The various types of multi-family housing in the UR-B and UR-C
zones also contain differing height and setback restrictions. These
restrictions and the averages are given in Table 51.
TABLE 51
APARTMENT MAXIMUM HEIGHT AND MINIMUM SETBACK RESTRICTIONS
IN NORTHAMPTON MULTI-FAMILY ZONES
Zone Type of Housing Height Setback
UR-B 2—F, 3-F, Lodging Houses 35 • 20
Townhouse 40 30
UR-C 2-F, 3-F, M-F, Lodging
Houses, Townhouses 40 20
M-F High Rises 80 20
Average 48.8 22.5
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Northampton's multi-family districts contain no bedroom restric-
tions
.
Although the ordinance defines mobile homes and excludes them
from regulations applicable to "one-family dwellings," 188 whether
mobile homes are permitted or prohibited is not indicated in the ordi-
nance. However, in 1970, Northampton had ten mobile homes, so that it
seems safe to assume that they are permitted, but under strict regu-
lations
.
In 1978, Northampton had a total of 1,211 subsidized housing
units. 140 were scattered site units, 681 were unrestricted family
units, and 390 were restricted to elderly occupancy. Table 52 shows
the calculation of the distribution of scattered site houses to census
tracts and the totals by type in each census tract.
TABLE 52
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN NORTHAMPTON CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. Acre- 1970 Den- Den- Scat- Fam- UNR Eld. NO
age Pop. sity sity terred ily PUB Pub. PUB
Ratio Site Units HO Ho. HO
Units
8216 4264 6641 1.6 4.0 8 290 298 72 370
8217 7365 3230 0.4 1.0 2 271 273 0 273
8219 998 9964 10.0 25.0 51 0 51 318 369
8220 172 2578 15.0 37.5 76 0 76 0 76
8222 8323 4531 0.5 1.25 3 120 123 0 123
Total 21122 26944 140 681 821 . 390 1211
Average 1.3 2.04*
*Constant, 140 divided by sum of the column.
South Hadley . South Hadley is comprised of 11,264 acres of land
and four census tracts, 8210-8213. Tracts 8210 and 8211 contain the
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major settlements and residential and commercial areas. Tract 8212
is geographically small, with Mount Holyoke College as its major de-
velopmental feature. Tract 8213 is the largest areal tract. Mostly
rural in character, it also contains the town's industrial garden dis-
trict. In 1980 the population of South Hadley was 16,399, a decline
of 3.7% from the 1970 figure of 17,033.
The zoning by-laws were adopted in 1946. 189 The variables for
this analysis were taken from the by-laws as amended through May 19,
1979. This version substantially revised the wording of the earlier
zoning by-laws. However, the substance of none of the relevant pro-
visions was altered, so that the same provisions were in effect as of
January 1, 1979. No multi-family land areas were added between Jan-
uary 1 and May 19, 1979. 190 The zoning map is dated April, 1975
.
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No areal changes were made after that date.
The zoning by-laws provide for two types of single-f amilv resi-
dential districts (A-l and A-2) , an agricultural district, and two
types of multi-family districts (B and C) . The Residence B district
permits two- and three-family dwellings, lodging houses and dormitories
as a matter of right. The Residence C district is the apartment dis-
trict. Three-family and multi-family dwellings are permitted as a mat-
ter of right. ^- 9 ^ Although multi-family dwellings were allowed by spe-
cial permit in the Residence A-l, A-2 and 3 zones, and the Business A
and B zones as of May 19, 1979, these provisions were not in effect as
of January 1, 1979. Consequently, no attempt is made to account for
land zoned or developed under these provisions.
The single-family residential districts are not particularly
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restrictive in their minimum lot size and frontage requirements. Resi-
dence A-l requires a minimum lot area of 22,500 square feet and a mini-
mum frontage of 125 feet. Residence A-2 requires a minimum lot area
of 12,500 square feet and a minimum lot frontage of 100 feet. The agri-
cultural zone is in effect, if not in name, a single-family residential
zone. It provides for single-family residences on 30,000 square feet
minimum lots with 150 minimum frontage. 193 The average minimum lot
size in single-family residential districts thus is 21,667 square feet.
The average frontage is 125 feet.
The acreages zoned Residence 3 and C in South Hadley census
tracts are displayed in Table 53. The average percentages of multi-
family acreages in each tract are also calculated.
TABLE 53
ACREAGE ZONED FOR MULTI-FAMILY USES IN SOUTH HADLEY CENSUS TRACTS
C.T Acres Zoned Acres Zoned Total Tract PCMEAftAC
Res B Res C Acreage
8210 0.0 14.9 14.9 2148 0.1*
8211 181.8 10.0 191.8 1578 11.5
8212 5.6 0.0 5.6 667 0.1*
8213 0.0 20.0 20.0 6871 0.1*
Total 187.4 44.9 232.3 11264 2.1*
^Acreages which are less than 0.05% are coded as 0.1.
In order to calculate the multi-family living units provided by
zoning, the living units per acre in the Residence B and C zones were
calculated as follows. Residence B zones require a minimum of 3,000
square feet of land area for each family unit with an additional 300
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square feet for each bedroom in a living unit. 194 Thus u%2 one-bed-
room units, 12.1 two-bedroom units, and 11.2 three-bedroom units can
be built per acre (43560/3300, 43560/3600, 43560/3900). Average living
units per acre in the Residence B zone is 12.2.
In the Residence C zone, a minimum lot size of 87,120 square
feel (two acres) is required. The 3,000 plus 300 square feet of land
area per unit formula is also applied, 195 so that the living unit re-
strictions are the same as in the 3 zone. Table 54 shows the calcula-
tion of multi-family living units provided by zoning in South Hadley
census tracts.
TABLE 54
MULTI-FAMILY LIVING UNITS PROVIDED BY ZONING
IN SOUTH HADLEY CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. Res B Acreage
times 12.2
Res C Acreage
times 12.2
Total
8210 0 181 181
8211 2212 122 2334
8212 68 0 68
8213 0 243 243
Total 2280 546 2826
The maximum height in the Residence 3 zone is 45 feet, in the
Residence C zone, 35 feet. The average height restriction in multi-
family districts thus is 40 feet. Setback in the B zone is 15 feet,
in the C zone, 30 feet. 196 The average setback is 22.5 feet.
Neither of the multi-family districts contains any restrictions
on numbers of bedrooms. Mobile homes as residences are forbidden from
every type of district although they may be kept for recreational pur-
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197poses . 7 '
South Hadley had 151 subsidized housing units in 1973, 136 of
which were elderly restricted, and 15 of which were scattered site hou-
sing. The town had no subsidized multi-family apartments. Table 55
shows the calculation of the distribution of scatterd site housing and
other subsidized units in South Hadley census tracts.
TABLE 55
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN SOUTH HADLEY CENSUS TRACTS
CT. Acre- 1970 Den- Den- Scat- Fam- UNR Eld. NO
age Pop. sity sity terred ily PUB Pub. PUB
Ratio Site Units HO Ho. HO
8210 2148 4322 2.0 5.00 3 0 3 40 43
8211 1578 7727 4.9 12.25 7 0 7 96 7
8212 667 2030 3.0 7.50 4 0 4 0 4
8213 6871 2954 0.4 1.00 1 0 1 0 1
Total 11264 17033 15 0 15 136 151
Average 1.5 .58*
*Constant, 15 divided by sum of the column.
South Hadley is considered by many to be an exclusionary suburb,
For example, in a suit filed against a member of the planning board by
the developer of a multi-unit project recently approved by the Housing
Appeals Committee, it is alleged that
[w]hile there are substantial minority populations in the
surrounding areas, the town of South Hadley is an almost
exclusively white community. Town officials and residents
have perpetuated this disparity through continual opposition
to any housing proposal seen as having racially integrated
[sic] potential. 198
Further, the town contains "no undeveloped location . . . where, under
the zoning By-Law, a multi-family housing development may be constructed
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as a matter of right
. .
."199 In Qther wordSj ^ Residence B and Q
areas are fully developed. There is no undeveloped land zoned for
multi-family housing, and comprehensive permits for such housing are
consistently denied locally.
This negative view of South Hadley is somewhat offset by steps
it has taken during the past several years to compensate for its lack
of low-cost housing. A major revision included in the 1979 amendments
to the by-laws was the addition of the special permit process to open
up more areas for the construction of apartment complexes. 200 The
special permit process was adopted in response to circumstances sur-
rounding a 1977 proposal for a substantial number of primarily elderly,
housing units. The local zoning board of appeals granted a variance
for the project which was subsequently overturned in court as the re-
sult of a suit by an abuttor to the project. The controversy surround-
ing this case brought the need for some adequate procedures to permit
multi-family housing to the attention of local officials. Rather than
zone more areas for multi-family housing, they chose the special per-
mit procedure as a means to assure tight control over subsequent devel-
opment. 20 ^- Multi-family housing is permitted by special permit in both
single-family residential zones, in the two- and three-family zones, and
in two business districts. 202
The special permit process was intended to liberalize the town's
zoning. Prior to its adoption, multi-family developers avoided South
Kadley because they knew that a rezone to Residence C, the multi-family
classification, would be difficult, it not impossible, given local
public opposition to apartment construction. Following the adoption,
275
the 1977 multi-family proposal which spawned the special permit amend-
ment was granted construction permission under the procedure, and at
least two other multi-family projects have been approved, although the
numbers of units proposed in both have been reduced. No projects pro-
posed have been denied, and local officials are favorably inclined to-
ward several projects which are in the offing. 203
Although the percent acreage zoned for multi-family housing in
South Hadley is small (2.1%), the percent of the total living units
which are multi-family is substantial. Multi-family units should con-
tinue to grow under the special permit procedure.
Commentary on zoning in the north suburbs
. The four north sub-
urbs remain essentially farming areas and bedroom communities for the
colleges and university of the area. Only one of the four north sub-
urbs, Hadley, experienced any population growth during the 1970 decade.
The other three localities, Granby, South Hadley, and Northampton, lost
population. Most of Hadley' s population growth is probably university
related and does not represent any mass population movement in its di-
rection. That Hadley provides no apartment zoning but channels growth
onto single-family lots of more than a half acre indicates that it does
not want to become another Northampton with large amounts of multi-
family student housing.
Granby and South Hadley are typically suburban in their develop-
ment patterns. Granby, like Hadley, is largely a farming community with
simple zoning uncomplicated by the need to accommodate large numbers of
people. South Hadley follows the first ring suburban prototype more
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than that of the second ring. It has a reputation for exclusionary land
use policy hut is making efforts to polish its somewhat tarnished image.
Northampton is more an urban community in its own right than a
suburb. It provides ample multi-family zoning, more than one thousand
acres, although this is only five percent of its total area. Approxi-
mately half of its housing is some type of multi-family units. The ma-
jority of Northampton's multi-family housing is concentrated in the two
midtown census tracts, 8219 and 822C. However, unlike Westfield which
seems to have made a conscious effort to keep multi-family zoning cen-
tralized, Northampton's zoning appears to be more the result of loca-
tional need and growth. Multi-family areas do exist in all census
tracts except the Veterans' Hospital area. They are more diffused than
are Westfield's areas.
Unlike the west suburbs, the north suburbs have made no attempt
to tighten their zoning restrictions. Nor have they made any signifi-
cant efforts through zoning to preserve their agricultural lands. North-
ampton and Granby zone their agricultural lands for residential uses
with minimum lot sizes of 40,000 square feet. Hadley and South Hadley
have agricultural classifications but permit single-family uses on
minimum lot sizes of 22,500 and 30,000 square feet, respectively. These
restrictions would not prevent subdivision of their prime agricultural
lands
.
At least two provisions designed to open up these suburbs to
some extent were adopted in the late 1970s. Hadley permitted mobile
homes, and ^outh Hadley adopted the speical permit procedure for apart-
ments. It seems unlikely that the poor and minorities or the general
population will show inclinations to migrate to these communities as a
result of such minor relaxations of zoning. Consequently, the north
suburbs are unlikely candidates for more restrictive zoning policies
in the immediate future unless they should feel that their agricul-
tural base is threatened by large scale commerial and residential
development
.
The east suburbs
.
The second ring of suburbs is completed by the east-
ern towns of Belchertown, Monson and Palmer.
Belchertown is the northernmost of the east suburbs. Palmer is
to its south. Amherst, Granby and Ludlow are to its west. Pelham is
to its north, while Ware and New Salem are to its east.
Monson is the southernmost of the east suburbs. Palmer forms
its northern border. Brimfield and Wales are to its east. Connecti-
cut is to its south, and Hampden and Wilbraham are to its west.
Palmer is the most populous and urbanized of the east suburbs.
Locationally sandwiched between Belchertown and Ware on the north, and
Monson on the south, it has mutual borders with Wilbraham, Warren and
Brimfield.
The east suburbs are largely rural in character, but unlike the
rural north suburbs, they are not farming communities. Land is more
mountainous, rocky and unsuited for farming, although it is not totally
unsuitable for residential uses.
Belchertown . Belchertown is areally the largest of all the local-
ities in the Springfield SMSA. It is comprised of 33,792 acres and part
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of C.T. 8202. Belchertown is one of the few second ring suburbs to
have experienced substantial population growth during the 1970s, rising
from 5,936 residents in 1970 to 8,339 residents in 1980, a growth rate
of 40.5%.
Belchertown first adopted zoning in 1957. The town maintains an
excellent historical record of the development of its zoning in a folder
which holds every amendment as originally passed with dates. 204 Further>
the current by-laws record the date of adoption of each provision. 205
Basic apartment zoning was added to the by-laws in 1975. The
last amendments added prior to the January 1, 1979 cutoff are dated
June 12^1978. 206 Amendments added in 1979 and 1980 do not affect rele-
vant variables. The zoning map accompanying the by-laws is undated. 207
The by-laws contain one single-family residential district, Gen-
eral Residential, a Multi-Family Residential district, an Agricultural
district which permits single-family residential uses, and a Mobile Home
Park Residential district. 208 The minimum iot s izes and frontages in
the General Residential, Agricultural and Mobile Home Park districts are
used to compute the AVRMLS and AVRFRNT. Table 56 shows these figures.
TABLE 56
SINGLE-FAMILY MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND FRONTAGE
REQUIREMENTS IN BELCHERTOWN
C.T. MLS in Sq. Ft. Frontage in L. Ft.
General Residential
with Public Sewers 20000 120
without Public Sewers 40000 140
Agricultural 40000 140
Mobile Home Park 6600 30
Average 26650 108
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The General Residential District permits the conversion of single
family houses into apartments if they were in existence at the time of
the adoption of the by-laws, as well as the construction of two-family
dwellings. 209 Since Belchertown has experienced much growth during the
1970s and total housing units have jumped by ninety percent, accounting
for these provisions by taking the percent of housing that was two- and
multi-family in 1970 seems more accurate as an estimate of multi-family
acreage in the General Residential District than does multiplying the
number of multi-family units in 1970 by the AVRMLS. Approximately
2223.8 acres zoned General Residential times 19.1% yields a figure of
424.7 General Residential multi-family acres. The other procedure, in
which 290 two- and multi-family units in 1970 is multiplied by the aver-
age minimum lot size of 30,000 square feet in the General Residential
district yields 199.7 multi-family acres, a much lower figure. The
424.7 acre figure is used here.
The Multi-Family Residential District does not permit apartments
as a matter of right but only when a special permit is obtained. 210 A
total of 98.4 acres are zoned in this category. Total zoned multi-
family acreage is thus 523.1 acres, or 1.5% of tract acreage.
The units per acre permitted in the General Residential district
for two-family houses is 2.904 [(43560 times 2)/30000], For conversions
of single-family houses to three, four and five units the respective
figures are 4.356, 5.808 and 7.26, [(43560 times 3)/30000, (43560 times
4)/30000, (43560 times 5)/30000], Average units per acre is 5.082 which
yields a zoned multi-family living units per acre of 2158.
In the Multi-Family district, construction is limited to s
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units per acre, 211 which yields a tQtal q£ 59q ^.^ ^
Total zoned multi-family living units is 2,748.
Multi-family dwellings are limited in height to two and one-
half stories or 35 feet. Required setback is 50 feet in the multi-
family district and 40 feet for two-family houses or apartment con-
versions in the General Residential district. 212 AVRSTBK is 45 feet.
No bedroom restrictions are placed on apartments, and mobile
homes are permitted.
Belchertown contained a total of 144 subsidized housing units in
1978. Of these, 48 were restricted to elderly occupancy. Eighty were
family units, and eight were scattered site units. Total unrestricted
units were 96.
Monson. Monson is an areally large jurisdiction which is com-
prised of 28,736 acres and one census tract, 8137. Its population in
1980 was 7,315 persons, a decline of 0.5% from its 1970 population of
7,355 persons.
"Monson originally adopted zoning in 1970, relatively late com-
pared to other second ring suburbs. The by-laws in effect on January
1, 1979 were the originals with amendments added to 1979. Those
amendments added after the cutoff date deal with stables, non-con-
forming uses, and the definition of animals. 214 They do not relate to
exclusionary zoning. Copies of the Monson zoning map were unavailable
during the time of this research. Consequently, multi-family acreages
have been estimated mathematically as indicated below.
Monson' s by-laws provide for two single-family residential dis-
281
tricts, the RV, Village Residential District, and the RR, Rural Resi-
dential District. In addition, trailers are permitted on smaller lots
with smaller frontages. Table 57 shows the minimum lot sizes and
frontages required.
TABLE 57
SINGLE-FAMILY MINIMUM LOT SIZE AND FRONTAGE REQUIREMENTS IN MONSON
Zone or Use MLS in Sq. Ft. Frontage in L. Et.
RV
RR
Trailers
Average
20000
40000
5000
125
200
50
21667 125
SOURCE
:
pp. 13-14.
Monson Zoning By-Laws, Monson, Massachusetts (1979)
,
Conversion of existing single-family houses into four apartments
or less is permitted by special permit in both the RV and RR zones.
Since the actual acreages zoned can only be roughly estimated, given the
absence of a zoning map, and since Monson has experienced no growth
during the 1970s, these provisions are accounted for by multiplying the
number of 2-4 units existent in 1970 times the average minimum lot size
of the single-family districts. Using this method, an estimated 226.9
acres have been adapted to apartment use under the conversion provi-
sion [(329 times 30000/43560].
The by-laws also establish a Multiple-Dwelling District. However,
no land has been zoned for this use as a matter of right, xo although
one elderly housing project on approximately 13 acres has been construc-
ted. The dearth of such projects probably results from the very restric-
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tive conditions placed upon gaining town approval. A developer must
first seek a reclassification of a specific parcel to the multiple-
dwelling classification. Then a public hearing must be held on the
request for the rezone. The Board of Health must certify that the land
is suitable "for the safe disposal of sewage, and that an adequate pot-
able water supply will be provided." 217 The rezone must then be ap-
proved by the town meeting. Subsequently, a special permit for the
specific site proposal must be issued by the Board of Appeals. 218 The
number of hurdles to be cleared in itself is sufficient to dissuade the
most determined developer. The low probability of clearing them, es-
pecially the town meeting hurdle, is perhaps the final deterrent to
multi-family development. Monson's multi-family procedure is precisely
the type that the comprehensive permit procedure of Chapter 774 is de-
signed to overcome.
The estimated total zoned multi-family land area is 239.9 acres,
or 0.8% of tract acreage. The total zoned multi-family units are cal-
culated by adding the 1970 census total and the 52 elderly housing units
constructed in 1972. This gives a figure of 443.
The height restriction for multiple dwellings is "two stories and
an attic,
"
21 9 an estimated 35 feet. No height restrictions are given
for the single-family districts so that no height restrictions for
single-family houses converted to apartments can be given. AVRHGT thus
is 35 feet.
Setbacks required in the RV and RR districts are 40 and 50 feet,
respectively. In former RV districts, multiple dwellings are required
to be setback 40 feet. In former RR districts, the figure is 100 feet,
22
AVRSTBK thus is 57.5 feet.
The by-laws contain bedroom restrictions on apartments. No more
than two bedrooms per unit are permitted, and fifty percent of all
dwelling units in any project must be limited to one bedroom. 221 Min-
imum floor areas are also required in both the single-family and multi-
family districts. However, these do not exceed 768 square feet. 22 2
Mobile homes are permitted in mobile home parks. 223
Monson had a total of 57 subsidized housing units in 1978, 52
of which were restricted to elderly occupancy and seven of which were
scattered site houses. There were no subsidized family apartments.
Palmer. The town of Palmer is the most populous and urbanized
of the east suburbs, although it lost population during the 1970s, going
from 11,630 residents in 1970 to 11,389 residents in 1980, a 2.5% de-
crease. Palmer is made up of three census tracts, 8101, 8102, and 8103,
and 20,352 acres.
Palmer was late to adopt zoning. Its first by-laws were effec-
tive in 1972. The by-laws adopted at that time were current on Janu-
ary 1, 1979.224
Palmer's zoning is peculiar in that it contains no zoning dis-
tricts assigned to land areas. The by-laws provide for specific uses
with the ordinary types of restrictions. However, where these uses will
locate is regulated by the planning board and building inspector, and
not by zones for uses. 225 Excessive discretion is thus left in the
hands of public officials. Zoning districts with mapped locations have
been annually proposed at the town meeting since the original by-laws
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were adopted. However, until 1981, they have been continually voted
down. 226
Single-family residential uses, including trailers, require
minimum lots of 20,000 square feet with public sewers and water avail-
able, and 30,000 square feet without public services. AVRMLS thus is
25,000 square feet. The corresponding frontages are 100 and 150 feet,
so that the AVRFRNT is 125 feet. 227
Since no acreages are zoned for any specific uses, it is not
possible to use actual multi-family acreage figures derived from maps
to calculate the PCMFAMAC. Consequently, as an estimate of multi-
family acreage, the minimum lot size required for each kind of multi-
family dwelling, multiplied by the number of such units in existence
in 1970, plus the subsidized multi-family housing units built after
1970, have been used for each census tract. Table 58 provides these
calculations and the PCMFAMAC.
The number of multi-family units in 1970 plus the subsidized
units built after 1970 have been used as the total zoned multi-family
living units provided by zoning for each census tract.
All multi-family uses are limited to a height of 35 feet, so
that AVRHGT is 25 feet. Setback requirements for two-family, three-
and four-family, and five or more family buildings are 50, 75 and 100
feet, respectively, so that AVRSTBK is 75 feet.228
No bedroom restrictions are placed on apartments, and mobile
homes are permitted.
Palmer provided a total of 254 subsidized housing units in 1978.
Of these, 48 were elderly units, 140 were multi-family apartments, and
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TABLE 58
CALCULATION OF ACREAGE ZONED FOR MULTI-FAMILY
USES IN PALMER CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. 8101
Use MLS 1970 Units +
SUBHO Built
after 1970
No. of
Houses
in 1970
No. of
Acres
Zoned
Tract
Acreage
PC
MFAM
AC
2-F
3-
,
4-F
5+ F
30000
60000
20000
unit
361
194
per 205
181
55
124.7
75.8
84.1
Total 760 294.6 117 33 2.5
C.T. 8102
2-F
3-
, 4-F
5+ F
30000
60000
20000 per
unit
226
110
164*
113
31
77.8
42.7
75.3
Total 500 195.8 5235 3.7
C.T. 8103
2-F
3-
, 4-F
5+F
30000
60000
20000 per
- unit
283
186
82**
142
53
97.8
73.0
37.6
Total 551 208.4 3384 6.2
Grand
Total 1811 698.8 20352 3.4
*22 units in 1970 plus 140 subsidized family units built in 1973.
**34 units in 1970 plus 48 subsidized elderly units built in 1970.
66 were scattered site units. The distribution of scattered site units
among census tracts and the numbers of restricted and unrestricted units
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are given in Table 59.
TABLE 59
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN PALMER CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. Acre-
age
1970
Pop.
Den-
sity
Den-
sity
Ratio
Scat-
terred
Site
Units
Fam-
ily
Units
UNR
PUB
HO
Eld.
Pub.
Ho.
NO
PUB
HO
8101
8102
8103
11733
5235
3384
5485
2520
367 5
0.5
0.5
1.1
1.0
1.0
2.2
16
16
24
0
140
0
16
156
34
0
0
48
16
156
82
Total
Average
20352 11680
0.6 15. 7 *
66 140 206 48 254
Commentarv on zoning in the east suburbs
,
Land use regulation
in each of the east suburbs has few similarities. The three towns have
followed different philosophies in their zoning policies.
Population growth during the 1970s in the east suburbs has been
concentrated in Belchertown, yet Belchertown has not reacted to this
growth with excessively restrictive zoning provisions. Belchertown 1 s
zoning most accurately fits the second ring prototype. Perhaps its
size provides an explanation. Since it is areally so large, its current
residents do not feel the need to protect their living space. Belcher-
town has more than enough room and developable land to accommodate large
numbers of new residents without suffering any detriment to its quality
of life. Its single-family land use controls are sufficiently restric-
tive to manage growth and to prevent any overdevelopment in concentrated
areas. Belchertown's requirement of special permits for development in
the apartment zones acts as an extra control on multi-family housing.
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The town can legally turn down or require modifications in proposals
which do not meet discretionary standards.
The unique zoning by-laws of Palmer follow the Bernard Siegan
and rural conservative models. The failure to adopt zoning districts
and the leaving of approval of development in the hands of public offi-
cials on a case by case basis indicates a reluctance to accept system-
atic governmental regulation over developmental decisions. Palmer res-
idents either implicitly or explicitly accept the thesis that market
forces are a sufficient check on unacceptable mixing of land uses.
Given that Palmer has experienced no recent developmental pressure, its
no-district system seems adequate for its current needs. The excessive
discretionary power placed in administrative officials also suggests the
possibility or even liklihood that Palmer is susceptible to the notor-
ious irregularities often associated with zoning. The system seems ripe
for bribes and payoffs from unscrupulous developers.
Monson has the most restrictive zoning of the east suburbs. Mon-
son 's zoning is more like the first ring suburban model than the second
ring. Although its by-laws provide for apartment zoning, no land has
been zoned for this use. The all-but-impossible conditions placed on
gaining a rezoning to the multi-family use and eventual approval for
construction indicate deliberate efforts to prevent low-cost, multiple
housing. The one- and two-bedroom apartment limitations suggest that
even if apartments could be cleared for construction, families with
children could not occupy them. Monson's single-family variables are
not excessively restrictive but are sufficient to prevent low-cost hou-
ses. For all practical purposes, Monson officially limits itself to
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middle class, single-family residents.
The zoning by-laws of all three suburbs have one similarity which
is a saving nonexclusionary provision. Each permits mobile homes as
residences and moible home parks. Belchertown and Monson substantially
reduce the minimum lot size and frontages required for trailers from
the requirements for single-family houses, while Palmer maintains its
requirements at the least restrictive single-family levels. These mo-
bile home provisions seem to represent concessions to the necessity of
housing the rural poor.
The dates of adoption of zoning in the east suburbs appear to
have had some influence on the historical development of these towns.
Belchertown adopted zoning in 1957, during the post-war era when most
SMSA localities were first applying developmental controls to land.
Belchertown' s zoning was not and is not now excessively restrictive.
Consequently, net population increase during the 1970s has been possible
in Belchertown.
Both Palmer and Monson did not adopt zoning until the 1970s, but
these towns have followed very different developmental paths. Palmer
grew in population prior to 1970. The absence of zoning may have pro-
vided a precondition for that growth. The adoption of zoning and the
excessive discretionary power of administrative officials could indi-
cate that the surface appearance of unrestrictive zoning masks a 1970s'
policy of restricting further development through denial of planning
board approval or building permits.
Monson did not experience much population growth during the post-
war boom years in spite of its lack of zoning. In 1970 it adopted a
289
restrictive zoning policy, indicating that at that point it intended to
preserve its rural character. The lack of population growth during the
1970s may be related to its tight land use controls. If developers were
to seek to construct low-cost housing in Monson, they would have a dif-
ficult time in doing so. Monson has adequately put a stop to any fu-
ture large-scale immigration.
Exclusion and inclus ion in the second ring
. The most striking feature
of zoning in the second ring suburbs is its inconsistency within the
variables taken separately, but more particularly within each munici-
pality across variables.
Analysis of each variable manifests three exceptions to this
general statement. All municipalities have average minimum lot sizes
which are restrictive. However, the minimums of eight jurisdictions
are clustered in the 16,000-27,000 square feet (one-third to three-
fifths acre) range. Three towns, Southwick, Granby and Southampton,
have excessively large minimums which cluster around the one-acre or
more mark (36,667-50,000 square feet).
The PCMFAMAC also shows some consistency. Eight jurisdictions
have less than five percent of their areas zoned for multi—familv uses.
Of these, four towns, r.ranby, Hadley, Monson and Southampton, have less
than one percent so zoned. Northampton, Easthampton and Southwick have
five percent or more of their areas zoned for multi-family uses and are
in the nonexclusionary range on this variable.
The numbers of public housing units are also consistently in the
exclusionary range for all towns except Uestfield and Northampton, which
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have more than five hundred units. The other ten jurisdictions have
370 or less public housing units.
The remaining eight variables show little consistency in their
scores. The AVRFRNTs of Northampton and Easthampton are less than 104
feet, the exclusionary- inclusionary dividing mark. The scores of the
rest of the municipalities range between 106-175 feet, all in the ex-
clusionary range.
The 1970 scores of the towns of PCMFAMHO are clustered into two
groups. Easthampton (49.4%), Northampton (48.7%), Westfield (47.9%),
Palmer (41.3%), and South Hadley (32.1%) had from around one-third to
one-half of their housing stock in multi-family uses. These are unex-
pectedly high figures, well within the nonexclusionary range. The
scores of the remaining six jurisdictions range between 7.9 and 22.2%.
Only one town of this cluster, Southampton, has a score of less than
ten percent, within the exclusionary range. Unlike the second ring
suburbs, there were no towns with five percent or less of their housing
stock in multi-family uses.
PCMFAMHO seems to be related to population size in the second
ring suburbs. The five jurisdictions with high percentages of multi-
family housing also had populations of more than 11,000 in 1970. The
six jurisdictions in the low score cluster all had populations of 7,300
or less in 1970.
The scores of the towns on zoned multi-family living units are
similarly clustered into two groups, with two towns, Southwick and
Belchertown, shifting to the higher cluster. The clusters themselves,
however, are more firmly lodged on the exclusionary and nonexclusic:
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sides of the scale than are the PCMFAMHO clusters. The scores of the
seven towns in the high score cluster range from 1,811 to 9,839 zoned
units, decidedly above the 1,000 exclusionary-inclusionary turning
point. Four towns, Southampton (148), Hadley (159), Monson (443) and
Granby (518), make up the low score, exclusionary cluster. All have
substantially less than 1,000 zoned multi-family living units.
The two variables, PCMFAMHO and ZNDMFAM, seem to be fairly
closely related.
The scores of the AVRHGT variable indicate that the. majority
of the second ring suburbs limit their multi-family housing to two, or
two and one-half stories. Only South Hadley (40.0), Northampton (48.8)
and Easthampton (53.4) permit taller multi-family buildings on the ave-
rage. Zoning in most second ring suburbs prevents high rise apart-
ments.
The scores of the AVRSTBK variable show wide variation. Four
towns (three of which are west suburbs), Southwick (99.9), Southampton
C99.9), Hadley (99.9), and Easthampton (96.7), require on the average
more than 95 feet of setback for apartments. No first ring suburbs
come even close to these excessive setback requirements. The highest
first ring setback is less than 80 feet. Five jurisdictions require
less than fifty feet of setback for apartments and score within the
nonexclusionary range on this variable. South Hadley and Northampton
are the most liberal. Both require an average of only 22.5 feet.
It is surprising to find that three jurisdictions, Monson, Had-
ley, and Southwick, place bedroom restrictions on their apartments.
One would expect this more sophisticated device of exclusion to be
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limited to the first ring. Instead, an equal amount of jurisdictions
in both suburban subgroups use bedroom restrictions.
Only four jurisdictions prohibit mobile homes. Again, two of
these, Easthampton and Southampton, are west suburbs, while two, Granby
and South Hadley, are north suburbs. Generally, the policy of the
second ring suburbs is far more liberal in permitting mobile homes than
that of the first ring. Seven jurisdictions of the second ring permit
them, while only two of the first ring do so.
The numbers of UNRPUBHO units show wide variation, although five
towns, Hadley (0), Granby (4), Monson (5), Southwick (12), and South
Hadley (15), form a cluster in the very low range. Two jurisdictions,
Westfield and Northampton, have more than two hundred and fifty family
units and are considered to be nonexclusionary on this variable.
Tables 60 and 61 show the scores on the zoning variables for the
second ring census tracts, and the second ring municipalities, respec-
tively.
In turning to an analysis of the jurisdictions themselves across
variables, it is apparent that no jurisdiction can be classified as com-
pletely exclusionary or inclusionary
.
However, Southampton seems the
most exclusionary of the second ring suburbs. 229 it scores in the ex-
clusionary range on all variables except one. It places no bedroom re-
strictions on apartments. Its single-family variable scores are restric-
tive, although exceeded by those of both Granby and Southwick. It has
one of the lowest percentages of acreage zoned multi-family, the small-
est percentage of multi-family housing stock in 1970, and the smallest
number of zoned multi-family units of all second ring suburbs. It limits
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TABLE 60
ZONING OF THE SECOND RING SUBURBS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 0- ZONINGVARIABLES IN THE SECOND RING SUBURBAN SUBFILE BY CENSUS TRACTS
Munici-
pality
CT AVR AVR PC PC
MLS FRNT MFAM MFAM
AC HO
ZND AVR AVR BDRM PRO NO UNR
MFAM HGT STBK RES MOB PUB PUB
HO HO HO
Belcher-
town
Easthamp-
ton
Granby
Hadley
Monson
North-
ampton
Palmer
South-
ampton
South
Hadley
South-
wick
West-
field
8202
8223
8224
8209
8214
8137
8216
8217
8219
8220
8222
8101
8102
8103
26650
16250
16250
40000
22500
21667
17857
17857
17857
17857
17857
25000
25000
25000
108 1.5
93 11.4
93 5.0
150
150
125
102
102
0.5
0.3
0.5
7.5
0.8
102 49.5
102 87.7
102 0.6
125 2.5
125 3.7
125 6.2
19.1
52.5
46.8
12.4
22.2
20.2
35.3
27.2
69.7
84.9
20.4
40.3
43.4
41.5
2748
1970
2784
518
159
443
2477
463
4563
1624
503
760
500
551
35.0
53.4
53.4
36.7
28.0
35.0
48.8
48.8
48.8
48.8
48.8
35.0
35.0
35.0
8225 36667
8210 21667
8211 21667
8212 21667
8213 21667
8131
8125
8126
8127
8128
8129
50000
20085
20085
20085
20085
20085
139 0.2 7.9
125 0.1 21.4
125 11.5 40.8
125 0.1 63.2
125 0.1 19.4
175 6.6 11.3
106 1.2 19.8
106 1.5 14.7
106 37.1 69.5
106 0.8 26.3
106 0.8 12.7
148 38.3
181 40.0
2334 40.0
68 40.0
243 40.0
4099 35.0
439 30.0
287 30.0
2756 30.0
503 30.0
306 30.0
45.0
96.7
96.7
40.0
99.9
57.5
22.5
22.5
22.5
22.5
22.5
75.0
75.0
75.0
99.9
22.5
22.5
22.5
22.5
99.0
30.0
30.0
30.0
30.0
30.0
0 1 144 96
0 0 155 35
0 0 215 215
u u 60 4
1 1 40 0
1 1 57 5
0 1 370 298
0 1 273 273
0 1 369 51
0 1 76 76
0 1 123 123
0 1 16 16
0 1 156 156
0 1 82 34
0 0 26 26
0 0 43 3
0 0 103 7
0 0 4 4
0 0 1 1
1 1 61 12
0 1 257 257
0 1 66 14
0 1 448 226
0 1 68 68
0 1 12 12
12* 68 * 129 80
76 34
1 4
3225 2012
448 298
15665 9598
25.0 19.6
125.1 98.0
1.265 1.164
.731 -.979
Mean
Median
Mode
Sum
Range
Variance
Std.Err.
Std.Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
23254
21334
17857
581362
33750
6264 (+8)
1583
7915
118
108
125
2948
82
9.5
1.5 26.3
.8 7.9
238 842.9
87.6 77
395 404.5 442.5
4 4.0 4.2
20 20.1 21.0
2.251 1.175 3.075 .930
5.211 1.441 9.864 .021
33.7 1257 39.4 48.5
504 36.7 30.6
503 35,0 22.5
31427 983.8 121.3
4495 25.4 77.4
** 56.8
264 1.5
1322 7.5
1.188 .613
943
6.1
30.7
.775
.368 -.903 -1.137 — -
"Percentage of ones. **1747669
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TABLE 61
ZONING OF THE SECOND RING SUBURBS BY MUNICIPALITIES
Munici-
pality
AVR
MLS
AVR
FRNT
PC
MFAM
\r
PC
MFAM
HU
ZND
MFAM
AVR
HGT
AVR
STBK
BDRM
RES
PRO
MOB
HO
NO
PUB
HO
UNR
PUB
HO
Belcher-
town
Easthamp-
7 6650 1 ORX \J vj l c.x . .7 1 Q 1 0 7/, oZ 1 4o 35.0 45.0 0 1 144 96
ton
Granby
Hadley
Monson
North-
16250
40000
22500
21667
150
1 SO
125
f\ ft
0.5
0 1U.J
0.5
AO /.
12.4
9 9 9
20.2
/. 7 5/H / j4
518
ICQ
443
53.4
36.7
zo
. 0
35.0
96.7
40.0
99 .
9
57.5
0
0
1
1
o
0
i
l
370
60
40
57
250
4
0
5
ampton
Palmer
South-
17857
25000
102
125
5.1
3.4
48.7
41.3
9630
1811
48.8
35.0
22 .
5
75.0
0
0
l
l
1211
254
821
206
ulll u LUL1
South
JOiju/ u . z 7 Q/
. 9 I/O 38 .
3
99.9 0 0 26 26
Hadley
South-
21667 125 2.1 32.1 2826 40.0 22.5 0 0 151 15
wick
West-
50000 175 6.6 11.3 4099 35.0 99.9 1 1 61 12
field 20085 106 2.1 47.9 4291 32.0 30.0 0 1 851 577
Mean 27122 127 2.6 28.4 2857 37.9 62.6 27.3* 63.6* 293 183
^'Percentage of ones.
multi-family housing to slightly more than two and one-half stories on
the average, prohibits mobile homes, has few subsidized family housing
units, and few subsidized housing units of all types.
The towns of Granby and Southwick seem to be the next most ex-
clusionary. They have the highest scores on the single-family variables.
Both have low numbers of public housing and unrestricted public housing.
Granby has a small percentage of acreage zoned for multi-family use,
few zoned multi-family units, limits apartments to two and one-half sto-
ries, and prohibits mobile homes. Yet it also had more than ten per-
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cent of its housing stock in multi-family uses in 1970, requires a non-
exclusionary level of setback for apartments, and maintains no bedroom
restrictions. Southwick limits apartments to two and one-half stories,
requires excessive apartment setback, and places bedroom restrictions on
apartments. Yet it also has more than five percent of its land area
zoned for multi-family uses, had more than ten percent of its housing
stock in multi-family uses in 1970, zones for sufficient amounts of
multi-family units and permits mobile homes.
Easthampton, Northampton and Westfield seem to be the least ex-
clusionary.
Easthampton has the lowest scores on the single-family variables
of the second ring suburbs, although its AVRMLS is still above one-
quarter acre. It has the highest percentage of acreage zoned for multi-
family uses, the highest percentage of its housing stock in multi-
family uses in 1970, the second highest number of zoned multi-family
living units and the highest permissible average height for apartments,
and places no restrictions on apartment bedrooms. However, it has less
than five hundred subsidized housing units. Its unrestricted housing
unit total (250) is at the inclusionary-exclusionary turning point. It
requires excessively high average setback for apartments and does pro-
hibit mobile homes.
Northampton has the second lowest single-family minimum lot size
and frontage requirements of the second ring suburbs. It has the third
highest percentage of acreage zoned multi-family, and the second highest
percentage of housing in multi-family use in 1970. It has the highest
number of zoned multi-family units of the second ring, more than double
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Easthampton's total. On the average it permits apartments of more than
three stories. Only Easthampton's average is higher. Its apartment
setback is tied with South Hadley »s as the most liberal. It places no
bedroom restrictions and permits mobile homes. It has the highest tot-
als of subsidized housing and unrestricted subsidized housing.
Westfield's single-family variable scores are the third least
restrictive of the second ring suburbs, as are its percentage of housing
in multi-family use in 1970, zoned multi-family living units, and ave-
rage apartment setback. Westfield places no bedroom restrictions on
apartments and permits mobile homes. It has the highest numbers of
total public housing units and unrestricted units of the second ring.
However, its percent of multi-family acreage is only 2.1, well in the
exclusionary range, and its average height permitted for apartments is
the second most restrictive, less than two and one-half stories.
The remaining five second ring suburbs, the three east suburbs
of Belchertwon, Monson and Palmer, and the two north suburbs of Hadley
and South Hadley, fall generally in the middle of the groups of most and
least restrictive, although there are many exceptions on specific vari-
ables. For instance, Hadley has the second fewest zoned multi-family
living units, the most restrictive average apartment height, and has
no family subsidized housing units. Monson has only 0.5% of its ac-
reage zoned for multi-family uses, places excessively tight bedroom
restrictions on apartments, and has only five subsidized family housing
units. None of the scores of Palmer and Belchertown on any variables
falls outside the middle range. Surprisingly, South Hadley, in spite
of its exclusionary reputation, does not come close to being the most
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exclusionary of the second ring suburbs. Only its prohibition of mobile
homes and its subsidized housing variables fall outside of the middle
range and on the exclusionary side. It has considerably less than five
hundred total units and two hundred and fifty family units. On the in-
clusionary side of the scale, its average apartment setback is tied
with Northampton's as the least exclusionary.
Comparison o f Zoning in the Central Cities, First Ring, and
Second Ring Suburbs of the Springfield SMSA
The town averages for the zoning variables of the three classi-
fications of municipalities confirm the general hypothesis. The central
cities* averages for all variables are well to the inclusionary side of
the zoning continuum. Both the first and second ring suburbs have ave-
rage scores on all variables which are more exclusionary than those of
the central cities. Table 62 and Figure 3 give the variable averages
for the three classifications of municipalities and graphically dis-
play these averages on the exclusionary-inclusionary continuum, respec-
tively.
The subsidiary hypotheses of this chapter are not as starkly
supported by the evidence. The average scores of both classes of sub-
urbs are not as restrictive as expected. Scores for one or both clas-
ses of suburbs are on the inclusionary side of the continuum for PCMFAM-
HO, ZNDMFAxM, BDRMRES, and PROMOBHO,
That both classes of suburbs have scores on the inclusionary side
of PCMFAMHO and ZNDMFAM may indicate that the turning points on the con-
tinuum are too conservative for these variables. Perhaps a municipal-
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TABLE 62
CENTRAL CITY, FIRST RING SUBURBAN AND SECOND RING
SUBURBAN MUNICIPAL MEANS OF ZONING VARIABLES
Subgroup AVR
MLS
AVR
FRNT
PC
MFAM
AC
PC
MFAM
HO
MFAM
AT7D
HGT
AVR
STBK
BDRM
RES
PRO
MOB
HO
NO
PUB
HO
TJNR
PUB
HO
Central
Cities
First Ring
8515 80 18.6 60.6 30654 57.0 36.9 0* 100* 3994 2834
Suburbs
Second Ring
25765 130 1.7 16.4 2540 36.7 50.6 33.3* 44.4* 216 85
Suburbs 27122 127 2.6 28.4 2857 37.9 62.6 27.3* 63.6* 293 183
*Percentage of ones.
ity should be expected to have at least thirty percent rather than just
ten percent of its housing stock in multi-family uses to be considered
inclusionary
.
Similarly, perhaps more than three thousand zoned multi-
family units rather than just one thousand should be expected for a lo-
cality to earn an inclusionary rating on ZNDMFAM.
That the first ring suburbs are approximately at the turning
point, fifty feet, for AVRSTBK may indicate that fifty feet is too
liberal an interpretation of apartment setback. Perhaps less than fifty
feet should be required for an inclusionary rating on this variable.
That both first and second ring suburbs have averages in the in-
clusionary range for bedroom restrictions may indicate the unpopularity
of this type of exclusionary device in the Springfield SMSA, or it may
indicate that suburban planners in the area are simply not as familiar
with this fairly complicated exclusionary mechanism as are officials
in other parts of the country.
The second ring suburbs have more restrictive scores than the
29?
Fig. 3. Comparative ranking of the central
city, first and second ring suburban subfile
average
scores on the exclusionary-inclusionary continuum.-
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central cities on all variables. However, the hypothesis that they are
generally less restrictive than the first ring suburbs, has two notable
exceptions. On the average, the second ring suburbs require slightly
larger minimum lot sizes for single-family houses and require greater
setback for apartments than do the first ring. The requirements for
larger single-family lot sizes and greater apartment setbacks can per-
haps be explained by their generally more rural character, less devel-
oped and less populous characteristics. The second ring suburbs have
fewer people to accommodate and more land in which to disperse them. It
is not unreasonable for them to require larger house lots and to screen
apartments from tbe road by greater setbacks, since land is generally
not a scarce commodity in these communities. Unexplained, however, is
why single-family frontage, the other variable which deals with this
characteristic of spaciousness, does not conform to the deviant pattern.
AVRFRNT is less restrictive in the second ring suburbs than in the first
ring.
That more second ring suburbs permit mobile homes than prohibit
them seems to be a concession to rural poverty. The outlying towns
must provide some kind of inexpensive housing for their poor residents.
These towns generally prefer mobile homes to apartments. Scattered site
mobile homes and mobile home parks do not hold the same attraction for
the urban poor that permanent, subsidized multi-family housing projects
hold. Mobile home residents are generally elderly retired persons or
young households who are upwardly mobile in the housing market. Mobile
homes most often require a purchasing decision and at least some minimal
line of credit. They are rarely rented by owners on a mass scale. Per-
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manent low-cost, multi-family housing, on the other hand, is for the
most part rental housing maintained or subsidized at least partially by
some governmental agency. Apartment buildings would be far more likely
to attract minorities and the urban poor to these outlying jurisdictions
than would mobile home parks or individual mobile homes. Permission of
mobile homes combined with low percentages or acreages zoned for multi-
family uses and low amounts of subsidized housing is a plausible, and
the existent, policy in second ring suburbs.
Few first ring suburbs permit mobile homes. They feel no social
necessity to provide low-cost housing of any type for the poor. The
first ring suburbs most consistently combine restrictive single-family
requirements, restrictive apartment zoning, and restrictive subsidized
housing policies into an overall exclusionary zoning policy. The only
exceptions are the percent housing in multi-family uses, the number of
multi-family units provided by zoning, and the use of bedroom restric-
tions. The explanations provided above for these exceptions lessen the
mitigative quality of these exceptions.
The SMSA as a Whole
As a summary of the zoning variables by census tracts without
regard to location, descriptive statistics in Table 63 were calculated.
The Springfield SMSA on the average does not have excessively re-
strictive zoning when census tracts are used as the data points. The
large number of census tracts in the central cities (forty-nine) com-
pared to the smaller number of suburban tracts (thirty-four) weights the
majority of scores to the inclusionary side of the continuum. Neverthe-
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less, the average minimum lot size is still considerably more than one-
quarter acre, although the median is approximately at the quarter acre
turning point. The averages and percentages of all other variables are
within the nonexclusionary range.
The median scores for average minimum lot size, average frontage,
average height and average setback are less restrictive than their
means. The reverse is true for the other variables.
The ranges of all variables indicate a wide variation in the
scores among census tracts. The variances and standard deviations also
show that municipalities have great differences in the numbers they
assign to various zoning devices.
The fairly large standard errors for the variables indicate that
caution should be maintained in using Springfield SMSA zoning averages
as representative of those of other metropolitan areas.
The sum of zoned multi-family units shows more than one hundred
thousand such units in the SMSA. The sum of total public housing com-
pared to the sura of family public housing shows that two-thirds of pub-
lic housing is unrestricted and one-third is elderly, an acceptably non-
exclusionary ratio. Only six of eighty-three census tracts (7.2%) have
bedroom restrictions. Seventy of eighty-three census tracts (84.3%)
permit mobile homes.
As a whole, the Springfield SMSA does not appear to be excess-
ively exclusionary. However, its scores would have to be compared to
other similar metropolitan areas in order to draw any definitive con-
clusions .
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Preliminary Steps
In order to proceed with further analysis of the zoning varia-
bles, a first preliminary step of examining the distribution of the
variable scores was necessary. All variables except the dummy vari-
ables, BDRMRES and PR0M0BH0, were converted to base- ten logarithms.
Histograms were constructed and compared for the scores of the varia-
bles and their logarithms by standard deviation units from the mean.
Those logarithms which are more normally distributed than their corres-
ponding variable scores are used in subsequent analyses. These include
LOGMLS, LOGFRNT, LOGMFAC, LOGSTBK, LOGZMF , L0GPUBH0 and LOGUNRPH. PC-
MFAMHO, AVRHGT, BDRMRES and PR0M0BH0 have been retained. Skewness and
kurtosis for the variables and logarithms were also calculated. Appen-
dix A contains the histograms and relevant statistics.
In a second preliminary step, simple bivariate correlations among
all pairs of the zoning logarithms and retained variables were calcula-
ted in order to get some sense of how various zoning devices work to-
gether. Table 64 presents these Pearson correlations.
Single-family minimum lot size and single-family frontage re-
quirements are highly correlated (R = .9593). This suggests that in
areas in which large lots are required, long frontages are also requir-
ed. Similarly, where lot size requirements are small, so are frontage
requirements. LOGFRNT and LOGMLS can realistically be considered to be
measuring the same dimension of zoning, that is, large lot requirements.
One variable can be substituted for the other without any data distor-
tion.
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TABLE 64
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE ZONING VARIABLES AND LOGARITHMS
t nr1LUG LOG LOG PC LOG
FRNT MFAC MFAM
HO
ZMF
LOGFRNT .9583
LOGMFAC
-.4991
-.5299
PCMFAMHO -.4338
-.4220
.6903
LOGZMF .0285 .0228
.6223 .2781
AVRHGT -.8494
-.8662
.5873 .4868 .0980
LOGSTBK .5348 .6315 -.3400
-.3154
-.0123
BDRMRES .3885 .4382 -.3568
-.3251
-.1414
PROMOBHO
-.5331
-.5366
.5257 .3226 .1643
LOGNOPH
-.1791
-.1895
.5056 .2494 .4278
LOGUNRPH -.3486
-.3891 .535Q .3110 .3624
AVR LOG BDRM PRO LOG
HGT STBK RES MOB NO
HO PH
LOGSTBK -.5979
BDRMRES -.4486 .3965
PROMOBHO .4662 -.3026 -.2637
LOGNOPH .2135 -.0659
-.1921 .2752
LOGUNRPH .3794 -.2122 -.3649 .4176 .8341
The average height permitted for apartments is highly, and nega-
tively correlated with the two single-family variabels (R with LOGMLS »
-.8494, R with LOGFRNT = -.8662). If jurisdictions are liberal in per-
mitting small lots and frontages, they also permit mid- and high-rise
apartments. If they require large lots and frontages, then they re-
strict apartments to two, or two and one-half stories.
The numbers of public housing units and the numbers of unrestric-
ted public housing units are also highly correlated (R = .8341). Juris-
dictions with large numbers of public housing units also have large num-
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-1C
bers of unrestricted, family units. Those with low totals of publ:
housing units necessarily also have few family units.
The numbers of zoned multi-family units have little relation-
ship to most of the other zoning variables, particularly to minimum lot
size (R = .0285), minimum frontage (R =
.0228), and apartment setback
(R = -.0123). However, the number of zoned multi-family units is mod-
erately related to the percentage of acreage zoned for multi-family use
(R = .6223). That the correlation is in the middle range and not high-
er confirms that living unit restrictions modify the percentages of
acreages zoned for multi-family use. Jurisdictions can zone relatively
large percentages of acreages for multi-family use but prevent the con-
struction of large numbers of apartments through living unit restric-
tions. Alternatively, they can zone relatively small percentages of
acreage for apartments and concentrate large numbers in these areas
by having liberal living unit restrictions.
The correlations of the remaining pairs of zoning variables are
in the low to moderate range.
Exclusionary and Inclusionary Zoning Factors
The factor analysis (varimax rotation) of the zoning variables
derived four identifiable zoning factors. The first factor has an eigen-
value of 5.16845 and explains 47.0% of the total variance in the zoning
variables. The second factor has an eigenvalue of 1.99008 and explains
18.1% of the variance. Factors Three and Four have eigenvalues of
.96842 and .80297, and explain 8.8% and 7.3% of the variance, respec-
tively. Total eigenvalue is eleven. The percentage of the variance
308
explained by the four factors as a group is 81.2% of the total variance
in the zoning variables.
Factors Five through Eleven were unidentifiable. All variables
loaded less than
.4 on all seven of these factors. Communality figures
show that the four factors taken together have high or moderate explana-
tory power in relation to the majority of the zoning variables. The
communality correlations with only the two dummy variables fall below
forty percent. Communality was not appreciably raised by retaining all
factors. Consequently, only the first four factors have been retained
as independent variables. Table 65 ranks and compares the communality
figures of the first four factors and the eleven factors taken together
TABLE 65
COMPARISON OF COMMUNALITY FOR FOUR AND ELEVEN ZONING FACTORS
Variable Four Factor Communality Eleven Factor Communality
LOGMFAC 100.748 102.126
LOGFRNT 97.973 100.087
LOGMLS 95.982 98.052
LOGUNRPH 89.120 92.719
LOGNOPH 81.048 85.942
AVRHGT 80.709 84.208
LOGZMF 53.865 66.873
LOGSTBK 51.700. 54.681
PCMFAMHO 46.201 62.894
PR0M0BH0 37.344 47.975
BDRMRES 35.492 38.997
Since the two dummy variables, BDRMRES and PR0M0BH0, .have rela-
tively low communality figures, they will also be retained as separate
independent variables.
The first factor is highly associated with large single-family
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minimum lot sizes, long frontages, and small apartment heights, and
moderately associated with large apartment setback, small percentages
of multi-family acreage and the prohibition of mobile homes. Correla-
tions with the remaining five variables are less than .A. Since this
factor is associated with restrictive levels of six of the zoning de-
vices which are commonly considered to be used as mechanisms for exclu-
sion, it is named the "General Exclusionary Zoning Factor."
The second and third factors identify inclusionary characteris-
tics of land use policy. Factor Two is highly associated with large
numbers of public housing units and family public housing units, while
Factor Three is highly associated with high percentages of multi-family
acreage, and moderately associated with high percentages of multi-family
housing and numbers of zoned multi-family units. Factor Two is named
the "Public Housing Factor" since it is associated with the availability
of state and federally subsidized public housing, the construction of
which has been permitted or approved by the state Housing Appeals Com-
mittee or local officials and residents. Factor Three is identified
more with direct, local multi-family zoning policy, since it is associa-
ted with those aspects of inclusion of multi-family housing over which
local governments have exclusive control. It is named the "Local In-
clusion of Apartments Factor."
Factor Four is moderately associated with low apartment height,
large apartment setback, and bedroom restrictions on apartments. Since
it is related to areal and bulk restrictions which are placed on multi-
family housing, it is named the "Encumbered Apartments Factor." Table
66 gives the bivariate correlations of the four factors with the rele-
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vant zoning variables.
TABLE 66
THE ZONING FACTORS
The General Exclusionary Zoning
Factor
The Public Housing Factor
Variable Bivariate
Correlation
Variable Bivariate
Correlation
LOGMLS
.94802
LOGFRNT
.91081
AVRHGT
-.75484
PROMOBHO
-.49673
LOGSTBK
.44818
LOGUNRPH
.87022
LOGNOPH
.85283
The Local Inclusion of Apartments
Factor
The Encumbered Apartments
Factor
Variable Bivariate
Correlation
Variable Bivariate
Correlation
LOGMFAC .85915
LOGZMF
.66132
PCMFAMHO .52427
LOGSTBK .55735
BDRMRES .47962
AVRHGT -.42698
The factor scores for the census tracts on the four factors con-
firm to some extent the exclusionary nature of suburban zoning and the
inclusionary nature of zoning in the central cities. While the dichoto-
mization of central city and suburb is apparent in the General Exclu-
sionary Zoning Factor scores, there is less division by location evi-
denced in the factor scores of the other three factors. A complete
list of factor scores is contained in Appendix B.
All Springfield and Chicopee census tracts have negative scores
on the General Exclusionary Zoning Factor. Unexpectedly, all Holyoke
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census tracts except C.T. 8119 have positive scores. However, the range
of scores is low, from .029603 to .183277. Holyoke's relatively large
minimum lot size compared to those of the other central cities (10,938
square feet compared to 6,700 square feet in Springfield and 7,908
square feet in Chicopee)
,
and the relative importance of minimum lot
size in this factor account for Holyoke's positive scores.
By contrast, all suburban census tracts have positive General
Exclusionary Zoning Factor scores. Hampden, Granby and Southwick have
scores greater than two. Southampton and Wilbraham also have high
scores. Surprisingly, Longmeadow has the lowest score of any suburb.
Easthampton, Monson and Agawam also have low scores. Map 2 displays
the relative positions of census tracts on this factor.
Six of the ten census tracts with the lowest Public Housing
factor scores are in the central cities (five in Springfield and one
in Holyoke)
,
indicating that these central cities maintain an intra-
city policy of exclusion towards public housing. Census tracts with
low scores have small totals of public housing, and much of it is re-
stricted to elderly occupancy. The remaining four lowest scores are in
suburban census tracts. Two census tracts in South Hadley, Hadley and
Longmeadow have the lowest Public Housing factor scores.
Census tracts with the highest Public Housing factor scores in-
clude three census tracts in Springfield (C.T.s 8007, 8016.05 and
8016.02), two in Holyoke (C.T.s 8120 and 8121), and one in Chicopee
(C.T. 8111). One census tract in Westfield and Northampton, and Aga-
wam and East Longmeadow, complete the areas with the highest Public
Housing factor scores. These tracts have high absolute numbers of both
312
Map 2. Status of Springfield SMSA census
tracts on The General Exclusionary Zoning Factor.
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kinds of public housing and a high ratio of family public housing to
total public housing. Map 3 shows the relative positions of census
tracts on the Public Housing Factor.
Census tracts with the highest and lowest factor scores on the
Local Inclusion of Apartments Factor are also mixed by suburban and cen-
tral city location. Three census tracts in Springfield (C.T.s 8011.01,
8016.01 and 8025) have low scores. The remaining tracts with low
scores are suburban. They include two tracts each in South Hadley
(C.T.s 8210 and 8212) and Northampton (C.T.s 8222 and 8217), and Long-
meadow, Southampton, and Wilbraham. Those suburbs with reputations of
exclusionary zoning, South Hadley, Longmeadow, Southampton, and Wilbra-
ham, earn their reputations by exclusion of multi-family housing.
Apartments are also excluded by zoning in selected areas of Springfield
and Northampton.
Those census tracts with high Inclusion of Apartments factor
scores include three in Springfield (C.T.s. 8004, 8023 and 8017), and
one in Holyoke (C.T. 8118), as representatives of liberal zoning in the
central cities. In addition, two census tracts in Northampton and one
census tract each in the suburbs of West Springfield, Southwick, West-
field and South Hadley have high Inclusion of Apartments scores.
The zoning of multi-family housing in Springfield and Northampton
is polarized. Some areas of each municipality lie at the extreme ends
of the Inclusion of Apartments factor. Neither the suburbs nor the cen-
tral cities can be characterized as exclusionary nor inclusionary on
this factor. A mix of zoning apartments in or out exists among the cen-
tral cities and suburbs. Map 4 shows the areas of high and low inclusion
315
Map 3. Status of Springfield SKSA census
tracts on "The Public Housing Factor."
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Map 4. Status of Springfield SMSA census
tracts on "The Local Inclusion of Apartments
Factor."
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and exclusion of apartments.
The Encumbered Apartments Factor also shows a mix of restric-
tiveness and liberality, although more suburban census tracts than
tral city tracts have high scores, and more central city tracts have low
scores than suburban tracts. Hadley, Monson, Southwick, Wilbraham, East
Longmeadow and Agawam place the most exclusionary restrictions on apart-
ments according to their high Encumbered Apartments scores. Four cen-
sus tracts in Chicopee also have high scores on this factor.
On the reverse side of the factor, six census tracts in Spring-
field have the least encumbered apartments, as do two census tracts in
Northampton, and one census tract in South Hadley and Belchertown. All
census tracts with negative Encumbered Apartment scores have scores of
less than
-1, indicating that the lack of restrictions on apartments is
not as liberal as the lack of other exclusionary factor devices. Map
5 shows census tracts with high and low, positive and negative Encum-
bered Apartments scores.
In order to pinpoint the most exclusionary suburban and central
city census tracts, those tracts with highly exclusionary ratings on one
or more of the factors have been ranked according to the number and
strength of such ratings, subgrouped by suburban and central city loca-
tion. Table 67 contains these rankings.
Census tract 8212 in South Hadley, which contains Mount Holyoke
College is the most exclusionary census tract, and South Hadley has the
most exclusionary policy of the suburbs. C.T. 8212 has highly exclu-
sionary scores on three of the four factors. On the fourth factor, En-
cumbered Apartments, it has a slightly inclusionary score. Since public
320
Map 5. Status of Springfield SMSA census
tracts on "The Encumbered Apartments Factor."
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TABLE 67
FACTOR SCORES OF HIGHLY EXCLUSIONARY CENSUS
TRACTS IN THE SPRINGFIELD SMSA
Suburban Census Tracts
Rank Munici- C.T. General Public Local Encumbered
paiity Exclusionary Housing Inclusion Apartments
Zoning Factor of Apts. Factor
Factor Factor
1. S.Hadley 8212 1.183796
-1.389159
-1.592308 (-.884869)*
1.595973
2. Wilbraham 8136 1.453193 -
-1.281381
3. Longmeadow 8133
-2.124581
-1.473454 1.013267
4. S .Hadley 8213 1 077767
— i.
. Z / ±0_)D 1 1 C Conn-1 . 155099
5. Hadley
'
8214
-1.125391 2.878052
6. Southwick 8131 2 .043911 (1.564619)* 1 . 666843
7
.
Southampton 8225 1.809510
-1.311200
8 S .Hadley 8210 1.174620
-1.716238 _
9. Hampden 8135 2.420069
10. Granby 8209 2.074756
_
11. S .Hadley 8211 1.123950 (2.032274)* —
12 Belchertown 8202 1.265049
-
13 Palmer 8102 1.198936
-
14 Monson 8137 1.689978
15 E.Long. 8134 1.402668
16. Agawam 8132 1.251139
Central City Census Tracts
1. Springfield 8010
-2.853982 (.-. yzoiiz ) *
2. Holyoke 8119
-2.258622
3. Springfield 8015.03 -
-1.609329
4. tt 8005
-1.244115
5. ii 8024
-1.229424
6. ii 8002
-1.045835
7. ii 8011. 01 -
-2.000006 (-.904347)*
8. IT 8016. 01 -
-1.915333
9. II 8025
-1.476758
10. Chicopee 8110 1.485005
11. ii 8107 1.440623
12. ii 8111 (1.030201) 1.416962
13. it 8109 1.390307
*Parentheses denote a highly inclusionary score.
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housing and multi-family housing are virtually nonexistent in this
tract, it is not inconsistent for nonexistent housing to be unencum-
bered. There is no need to set restrictions on nonexistent multi-family
housing since multi-family housing cannot be built.
All four census tracts in South Hadley rank as highly exclusion-
ary. C.T. 8211, the mid-town tract, is the least exclusionary of these.
Although zoning is generally restrictive in this tract as indicated by
the high score on the General Exclusionary Zoning Factor, the high pos-
itive score on Inclusion of Apartments indicates that multi-family hou-
sing is permitted in this tract.
Wilbraham and Longmeadow are also highly exclusionary. Wilbra-
ham has highly exclusionary scores on three of the four factors. Its
Public Housing factor score is also exclusionary, although it is in the
low range. Similarly, Longmeadow has highly exclusionary scores on
three of four factors. Only its general zoning score is in the low
exclusionary range. Longmeadow has gained its reputation for discrim-
inatory motivation in zoning by excluding multi-family and subsidized
housing, and by placing restrictive conditions on the multi-family and
subsidized housing that it does allow, rather than by restrictive zoning
in general.
Hadley has high scores on two of four factors, as do Southwick,
Southampton, and C.T. 8210 in South Hadley. Hadley's General Zoning
and Local Inclusion of Apartments scores are in the low exclusionary
range, while its Public Housing and Encumbered Apartments factor scores
are highly exclusionary. Southwick has highly restrictive General
Zoning and Encumbered Apartments scores. It also has a high positive
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score on the Inclusion of Apartments factor which indicates that it
zones for apartments but encumbers them with excessive restrictions.
Southampton's general zoning and zoning for apartments are highly
exclusionary.
Hampden and Granby have highly exclusionary scores on the
General Zoning factor only. Hampden has low exclusionary scores on
the Public Housing and Local Inclusion of Apartments factors, and a
low inclusionary score on the Encumbered Apartments factor.
Other jurisdictions with one highly exclusionary factor score
include the suburbs of Belchertown, Palmer C.T. 8102, Monson, East
Longmeadow and Agawam.
Of the central city census tracts which have highly exclusionary
factor scores, none has more than one such score. None have highly ex-
clusionary General Zoning. The plurality of high factor scores are on
the Public Housing Factor. Eight census tracts in Springfield, one in
Holyoke, and four in Chicopee have ranking scores on one factor. The
central cities are selectively exclusionary. None uses exclusionary
devices in large areas or as consistently as do the suburbs of South
Hadley, Wilbraham and Longmeadow.
To summarize the conclusions of this chapter, the central cities
have liberal zoning, both absolutely and relative to the suburbs. The
first ring suburbs are generally the most exclusionary, although the
second ring suburbs exceed the first ring in restrictiveness in some
instances. These conclusions are supported by descriptive statistics,
and to a lesser extent by factor scores.
Additionally, the various types of zoning devices are big!,
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interrelated, since factors can be derived which combine various aspects
of exclusion or inclusion. The strongest factor, General Exclusionary
Zoning, describes restrictive regulation of single- and multi-family
land and building developmental characteristics imposed by local govern-
ments. The Public Housing Factor describes local attitudes towards
state and federally subsidized public housing. The Local Inclusion of
Apartments ^actor describes the permission of multi-family housing. The
Encumbered Apartments ^actor describes areal and bulk restrictions
placed on multi-family housing.
All census tracts with high factor scores on more than one factor
are located in the suburbs. South Hadley, Wilbraham and Longmeadow are
the most exclusionary according to their factor scores. All suburbs
have positive General Exclusionary Zoning scores. However, random sub-
urban census tracts have inclusionary scores on one or more of the
multi-family factors. Not all suburbs are entirely exclusionary. Some
central city census tracts have some highly exclusionary factor scores
interspersed with generally inclusionary factor scores. This indicates
that exclusion is not entirely suburban in character. However, the ma-
jority of central city factor scores are inclusionary, especially on the
General Zoning Factor.
Although suburban zoning in the SMSA can be described as exclu-
sionary on its face, it remains to be seen if the differences in the
zoning provisions of the central cities and suburbs recounted here are
related to differences in the urban ecologies of the central cities and
suburbs. The next chapter will describe the distribution of minority
and poor populations, and living conditions in central city and suburb.
CHAPTER VII
THE URBAN ECOLOGY OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF THE SPRINGFIELD SMSA
Introduction
Analyzing the urban ecology of the Springfield SMSA involves
describing the locational distribution of minority populations, the
socioeconomic status (SES - education, occupation, income) of central
city and suburban residents, and the quality of living conditions in
the central cities and suburbs. The general hypothesis under exami-
nation maintains that substantially more minorities reside in the cen-
tral cities than the suburbs, that the socioeconomic status of central
city residents is lower than that of suburbanites, and that housing and
living conditions in the central cities are of poorer quality than
those in the suburbs.
Specifically, the percentage of minorities is expected to be
greater in the central cities than in the suburbs. The median education,
the percent of white collar workers, and the median family income are ex-
pected to be lowest in the central cities. The percent of unemployed
workers and percent of poor families are anticipated to be highest. The
percent of well-off families is expected to be lowest. The average house-
hold size should be the highest, as should be the percents of substandard
housing and crowded units. The percent of new housing and the median val-
ue of single-family housing should be the lowest in the central cities.
In the first ring suburbs the percentage of minorities should be
the lowest. The median education, the percent of white collar workers
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and the median family income should be highest. The first ring suburbs
should have the fewest unemployed and the fewest poor families. The
percent of well-off families should be the highest. Housing and living
conditions should be of the best quality, with average household size
the lowest, the percent of new housing and the median value of single-
family homes the highest, and the percent of substandard housing and
percent of crowded units the lowest in the SMSA.
The second ring suburbs are hypothesized to fall in between the
central cities and the first ring suburbs on most or all variables.
The method of analysis of the metropolitan ecology is similar
to that used with the zoning variables. The three central cities will
be analyzed separately and compared to each other, as will the individ-
ual first and second ring suburbs, in order to expose which are the
most and least segregated by race, class and living conditions in each
subgroup. However, since the urban ecology is less complicated than
zoning, the second ring suburbs will not be subgrouped by location for
simplification. The means for each subclassif ication of municipality
on each variable will be compared in order to establish the relative
location of the highest, middle and lowest minority percentages, socio-
economic status and quality of living conditions.
Additionally, an attempt will be made to derive urban ecology
factors for the Springfield SMSA. A Socioeconomic Status Factor simi-
lar to that derived by Berry and Horton for Chicago^ should combine the
education, occupation and income, and some quality of living conditions
variables. Median education, median family income, the percent of
white collar workers, the percent of well-off families and percent of
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new housing should load high on this factor. Additionally, the per-
cent of families with incomes below the poverty level, the percent of
substandard housing and the percent of unemployed workers should have
negative loadings. A second factor similar to the Race and Resources
Factor found by Berry and Horton should also surface. 2 Race and Re-
sources should be associated with high percentages of minorities, poor
families, substandard housing and unemployed workers. It should have
high negative loadings on the percent of well-off families and median
family income. A third factor with high positive correlations with
percent of new housing and median single-family value, and high nega-
tive correlations with average household size, percent of substandard
housing and percent of crowded units should constitute a Quality of
Living Conditions factor.
Census tracts with high positive factor scores for the Socio-
economic Status Factor (high levels of education, occupation, income
and living quality) and for the Quality of Living Conditions (good qual-
ity housing and living conditions) should be located primarily in the
first ring of suburbs. Those with low negative factor scores (low
levels of SES and Quality of Living Conditions) should be situated pri-
marily in the central cities. The converse whould hold for the Race
and Resources Factor. Census tracts with high positive factor scores
(high percentages of minorities with few resources) should be primari-
ly central city tracts, while those with high negative scores (few mi-
norities and many resources) should be principally first ring suburban
tracts.
If racial and economic segregation between central city and
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suburb is found to exist in the Springfield SMSA, the strength of the
loadings of the minority and income variables on the various factors
should give some indication as to whether segregation is primarily
racial or economic.
Central Cities
The central cities are expected to have the highest percentages
of minorities, to have low socioeconomic status, and to have relatively
poor quality of living conditions.
Minorities and the poor are expected to live primarily in the
central cities. Housing quality is anticipated to be low, and living
units should be relatively crowded. The image of the inner city which
portrays minorities living in pockets of poverty and deteriorated slums
is expected to be confirmed statistically.
Springfield
.
The core city of the metropolitan area contains the high-
est numbers and percentages of minorities of any jurisdiction. More
than 39,000 Springfield residents are Black or Hispanic. Minorities
comprise 27.4% of the city's population.
The percentages of minorities range from 1.6% in C.T. 8025 to
88.1% in C.T. 8018. The median percentage is 18.7, somewhat less than
the mean, indicating that minorities are concentrated in some areas.
Minorities comprise more than half of the population in seven census
tracts, while fourteen census tracts contain less than ten percent
minorities. These figures suggest intracity racial segregation in
Springfield. Table 68 shows the calculation of the percentages of
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TABLE 68
1980 MINORITY POPULATION IN SPRINGFIELD CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. Pop. Black Asian St Persons of Total
Pacific Spanish Minority
Islander* Origin**
P.C.
Non-
White
8001
8002***
8003
8004
8005
8006
8007
8008
8009
8010
8011.01
8011.02
8012
8013
8014***
8015.01
8015.02
8015.03
8016.01
8016.02
8016.03
8016.04
8016.05
8017
8018
8019
8020
8021
8022
8023
8024
8025
8026***
Total
7522
7575
4357
6417
3505
3017
4136
2101
3946
123
1107
1656
2413
5214
6448
4000
3225
2859
4759
5460
4177
4644
4441
7875
4911
6937
3697
6133
3122
6094
3971
7109
9368
417
101
47
45
92
61
672
127
340
13
150
163
393
3483
4133
707
767
211
976
387
525
250
320
4530
3644
1842
403
74
48
100
71
82
45
20
24
3
11
11
7
3
0
14
0
7
9
17
27
11
13
2
10
21
32
45
32
16
27
4
34
5
14
19
9
5
6
59
253
84
84
71
572
2104
2593
1400
1369
3
50
381
318
455
297
114
117
60
123
49
46
48
49
200
677
1118
645
89
107
161
27
28
112
690
209
134
127
675
2172
3268
1527
1723
16
207
553
728
3965
4441
834
886
281
1120
468
616
330
385
4757
4325
2994
1053
177
174
270
103
116
216
9.2
2.8
3.1
2.0
19.3
72.0
79.0
72.7
43.7
13.0
18.7
33.4
30.2
76.0
68.9
20.9
27.5
9.8
23.5
8.6
14.7
7.1
8.7
60.4
88.1
43.2
28.5
2.9
5.6
4.4
2.6
1.6
2.3
152319 25219 517 13804 39540 26.0
*Included because S.E. Asian immigrants are the new minorities.
** Persons of Spanish origin may be Black or White. Those Blacks who
identified themselves as of Spanish origin may thus be doubly counted.
***The 1980 Census divided these tracts into two. The 1980 tracts
have been recombined into their 1970 designations for comparability to
the zoning data.
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minorities in Springfield census tracts.
Persons 25 and over in Springfield census tracts have a median
education of less than a high school diploma. The mean for census
tracts is 11.4 years of education. The population of four census
tracts, 8006-8 and 8011.02, has a median education of less than 10
years. The lowest median education is 8.2 years in C.T. 8008, while
the highest median is 12.6 years in C.T.s 8016. 0* and 8105.
The percentage of white collar workers averages 46.8%, with a
minimum of 15.1% in C.T. 8007 and a maximum of 69.3% in C.T. 8024. The
average percentage of unemployed workers is 4.9%. The highest rates of
unemployment are 14.1% in C.T. 8008 and 11.9% in C.T. 8018. Two C.T.s,
8010 and 8011.01, had no unemployed workers. However, they had only
32 and 249 residents, respectively , in the civilian labor force.
The three income variables also show wide variation. Median
family income ranges from a low of $5,119 in C.T. 8008 to a high of
$13,549 in C.T. 8016.04. The average median family income in Spring-
field census tracts is $9,247. Three census tracts, 8007, 8008, and
8018 have a median income of less than $6,000.
The average percentage of families with incomes below the pover-
ty level is 10.8. C.T. 8010. the CBD tract, with only 17 families, has
no poor families. Twelve census tracts have less than 5% poor families,
while five census tracts, 8007-9, 8011.01, and 8018 have more than 20%
poor families.
The average percentage of families with income above $15,000 is
16.1. C.T. 8010 has no such families. Eleven tracts have more than
20% well-off families. The highest percentage is 38.1 in C.T. 8016.04.
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The average household size in Springfield is 2.60 persons. The
average percentage of housing built from 1970 to 1980 is 4.0. The
median value of single-family houses in all tracts is $14,126. Three
census tracts, 8008, 8011.02, and 8018, have housing valued at a median
of less than $10,000. The tracts with the highest valued housing are
8016.04 and 8016.05. The percentages of substandard housing range from
0.2 in C.T.s 8016.01, 8016.02, and 8016.04, to 77.5% in C.T. 8010.
These units are hotel or boarding house rooms which share bathrooms or
kitchens. The mean percentage of substandard units is 5.3%, while the
median is 1.6%, indicating that most census tracts have few substandard
units. Thirty tracts contain less than 8.0% substandard units. C.T.
8011.01 contains 20.6% substandard units, while C.T. 8012 contains 15.4%,
The mean percentage of overcrowded units is 6.5%. The percentages of
overcrowded units range from 1.6 in C.T. 8011.01 to 21.1 in C.T. 8007.
Thirty-one census tracts have 10% or less overcrowded units. C.T. 8008
contains 18.8% such units and shares the extreme end of the scale with
C.T. 8007.
The summary of the urban ecology variables in Springfield census
tracts is given in Table 69. Table 70 provides descriptive statistics
of the Springfield ecology variables.
Census tracts 8006, 8007, and 8008 in Springfield's North End
(an Hispanic area) and census tracts 8013, 8014, and 8018, Winchester
Square (a black area), which are the two major minority areas in the
SKSA, have low socioeconomic status and poor housing and living con-
ditions. In the three North End tracts, the average percentage of
minorities is 74.6. The median education is 8.7 compared to the mean
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TABLE 69
THE URBAN ECOLOGY OF SPRINGFIELD CENSUS TRACTS
MED PC
EDUC WCC
WK
9.1
2.8
3.1
2.0
19.3
72.0
79.0
72.7
43.7
13.0
18.7
33.4
30.2
76.0
68.9
20.9
27,5
9.8
23.5
8.6
14.7
7.1
8.7
60.4
88.1
43.2
28.5
2.9
5.6
4.4
2.6
1.6
2.3
10.5
12.0
11.5
11.7
12.1
9.3
8.7
8.2
10.1
11.1
12.4
9.7
11.0
12.0
11.6
12.0
12.0
11.6
12.4
12.5
12.4
12.6
12.4
12.0
10.3
11.6
10.1
12.4
12.1
12.0
12.5
12.5
12.3
36.9
49.6
45.7
43.2
59.3
25.8
15.1
22.1
31.2
46.9
54.6
23.7
48.9
35.1
35.9
49.3
50.3
50.2
55.8
56.2
54.8
66.0
63.7
42.5
28.6
52.9
41.6
65.9
49.4
47.3
69.3
66.6
60.8
PC MED PC PC AV PC MED PC PC
UN FINC PR WEL HOU NEW SF SUB CRWD
EMP FAM OFF SIZ HO VAL HO
4.0 9521 11.6 16.2 9 AnOU 4.0 14200 2.4 7.9
4.2 10010 3.8 16.2 9
•
Anou 4.0 14100 0.7 6.0
3.9 11212 4.4 19.0 9 Anou 4.0 13900 0.3 6.1
4.6 9706 4.7 15.0 9 An 4.0 13400 0.8 6.3
3.3 11073 2.1 25.1 9i.
.
Anou 4.0 18700 7.8 5.1
7.8 7778 15.2 7.5 9 Anou 4.0 13300 7.5 7.6
9.0 5867 23.2 5.7 9i-
.
Ano u 4.0 10000 1.4 21.1
14.1 5119 36.7 7.2 9 Ano u 4.0 9500 6.2 18.8
5.4 7196 21.7 9.3 9
- .
An 4.0 13400 2.5 5.7
0.0 9247* 0.0 0.0 9 An 4.0 14126*77.5 2.9
0.0 6200 32.8 25.9 9~ • An 4.0 14126*20.6 1.6
6.0 7633 12.5 5.3 9
— •
60 4.0 9800 3.5 5.1
6.5 6359 16.9 5.5 9 • 60 4.0 10900 15.4 3.2
6.1 7320 15.3 8.5 9 60 4.0 10600 2.3 5.7
5.9 8107 17.3 11.2 9 • 60 4.0 12500 1.0 9.0
4.4 9992 3.8 12.3 2. 60 4.0 12900 1.4 5.7
4.2 9396 10.6 10.4 2. 60 4.0 13500 1.1 9.5
2.5 9592 4.1 20.2 2
.
*— • 60 4.0 13700 1.5 6.0
2.1 11912 3.6 27.3 2. 60 4.0 17200 0.2 8.6
2.3 12266 1.4 31.5 2. 60 4.0 17100 0.2 8.2
4.8 11515 1.6 23.3 2. 60 4.0 17900 0.4 7.7
2.0 13549 0.7 38.1 9*- • 60 4.0 20100 0.2 5.8
2.4 11096 3.8 23.6 2. 60 4.0 19500 0.3 5.8
5.5 8819 11.4 11.1 2. 60 4.0 13300 1.9 6.1
11.9 5759 27.0 6.5 9<— • 60 4.0 8900 2.2 7.6
5.9 7128 18.9 12.1 2. 60 4.0 10600 4.4 4.8
5.4 7326 14.6 5.3 2. 60 4.0 11100 1.0 4.4
4.6 10622 5.5 22.9 2. 60 4.0 18900 1.8 2.1
4.4 9144 10.9 12.8 2. 60 4.0 14500 3.2 4.8
5.5 9377 8.6 14.8 2. 60 4.0 13600 2.4 4.8
2.8 12882 4.1 32.8 2. 60 4.0 17900 0.5 3.0
2.7 11944 2.4 29.4 2. 60 4.0 17200 0.5 5.0
3.9 10480 4.7 20.2 2. 60 4.0 15700 1.6 4.1
*The mean for Springfield is used here because this figure is
missing in the Census data.
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of 11. A for Springfield. The percentage of white collar workers is
21.0 compared to a Springfield average of 46.8. The average percentage
of unemployed is 10.3 compared to A. 8 for Springfield. The average in-
come is $6,255 compared to $9,2A7 city-wide. The average percentage of
poor families is 25.0 while the Springfield average is 10.8. Spring-
field had an average of 16.1% families making more than $15,000 in
1970, while the North End had 6.8%. The median single family value in
the North End is $10,933. In Springfield it is $14,126. The percen-
tage of substandard units is essentially the same as the city mean,
5.0 compared to 5.3. The percentage of crowded units, 15.8, in the
North End is much larger than the 6.5% figure for Springfield. Simi-
larly, the three Winchester Square tracts, 8013, 801A, and 8018, which
average 77.6% minorities have lower socioeconomic status and quality
of living conditions scores on most variables, although the gaps be-
tween the Springfield means and the Winchester Square means are not as
great. Blacks seem to fare slightly better than Hispanics in their
education, occupation, income, and living quality levels.
Almost all census tracts which have both higher percentages of
poor than the Springfield mean and lower median family income than the
Springfield mean also have higher percentages of minorities than the
Springfield mean. Besides the three North End and three Winchester
Square tracts, these include census tracts 8009, 8011.02, 8012, 8019,
and 8020, all of which border the two areas with the highest concentra-
tions of minorities. The central business district tract, C.T. 8011.01,
has a high percentage of poor (32.8%) and the lowest median family in-
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come of Springfield ($6,200), but fewer minorities (18.7%) than the
Springfield mean (27.4%). It also has a high median educational le-
vel (12.4 years) and a large percentage of well-off persons (25.9%).
C.T. 8011.01 is anomalous. As a central business district tract, it
has few resident (1,107) and few housing units (363). Those who do re-
side in C.T. 8011.01 are sharply divided into rich and poor.
Looking at the reverse side of race and poverty, C.T. 8016.04,
in the southeast corner of Springfield, seems to have the highest socio-
economic status and living quality, although it does not have the small-
est percentage of minorities, as would be expected. It ranks tenth
from the lowest on PCNONWHI with 7.1% minorities. It has the highest
median education (12.6), the third highest percentage of white collar
workers (66.0), the third smallest percentage of unemployed (2.0), the
highest median family income ($13,549), the second smallest percentage
of poor families (0.7), the highest percentage of well-off families
(38.1), the highest median single family value ($20,100), and the low-
est percentage of substandard housing (0.2). Its percentage of over-
crowded units (5.8) is tied with two other tracts for the. eighth lowest.
The second highest status tract seems to be C.T. 8024 in the For-
est Park area. It has high scores on the SES and quality of living con-
ditions variables, and only 2.6% minorities. Five other census tracts
also have small percentages of minorities (less than 10%) combined with
high median education (12.3 years or more), high median family income
(greater than $10,000), high percentages of well-off families (greater
than 20%), median single-family housing value of more than $1,000 above
the Springfield mean, and percentages of substandard housing of 1.8% or
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less (3.5 percentage points or more below the mean of 5.3). These
include C.T.s 8016.02, 8016.05, 8021, 8025, and 8026.
However, not all census tracts with high socioeconomic status
and high quality of living conditions have few minorities. The high-
est class tract in town, 8016.04, has 330 minorities. Three other high
class census tracts, 8005, 8016.01, and 8016.03 also have substantial
minorities, although the percentages of minorities are lower than the
Springfield mean (27.4) in each tract. The relevant variables for these
tracts are depicted in Table 71.
TABLE 71
SPRINGFIELD CENSUS TRACTS WITH HIGH PERCENTAGES OF
MINORITIES, AND HIGH SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND
QUALITY OF LIVING CONDITIONS
C.T PC MED MED PC MED PC
NON EDUC FINC WEL SF SUB
WHI OFF VAL HOU
8005 19.3 12.1 11073 25.1 18700 7.8*
8016.01 23.5 12.4 11912 27.3 17200 0.2
8016.03 14.7 12.4 11515 23.3 17900 0.4
*C.T. 8005 has more substandard housing
than the mean but has high level scores on
the other pertinent variables.
The figures for these tracts could indicate that some minori-
ties have attained high class status and high quality of living condi-
tions. Although large areas of Springfield are segregated by race and
class, some minorities have apparently made some progress in some few
areas. At least three tracts have populations that are integrated by
race and which have high class status. However, whether they are inte-
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grated in a "salt and pepper" pattern or in segregated areas within
the census tracts is not ascertainable from this grain of measurement.
Block data would have to be examined.
Additionally, two tracts, 8015.01 and 8015.02, have substantial
amounts of minorities (20.9% and 27.5%) and have scores around the means
on the other variables. These tracts are racially integrated and mid-
dle class by Springfield standards.
The remainder of the census tracts in Springfield, 8001-8004,
8015.03, 8017, 8022, and 8023, generally have few minorities (less than
10%) and middle class status and housing and living conditions.
Map 6 graphically portrays Springfield's black and brown inner
city, its white high class areas, and the racially integrated areas
with high and middle class status.
In sum, there is some evidence of intracity racial-economic
segregation in Springfield. Eleven census tracts contain high concen-
trations of minorities. These tracts are also poor in economic, educa-
tional and housing resources. Seven census tracts with high levels of
economic, educational and housing resources have few minorities. Three
high class tracts have substantial minorities. Two tracts have sub-
stantial minorities and middle class status. The remaining areas of
Springfield are middle class and white. There are no areas which are
predominantly white and socioeconomically poor in Springfield.
Holyoke . Like Springfield, Holyoke has high concentrations of minority
populations, although Holyoke's mean, 23.8%, is somewhat less than
Springfield's. Minorities in Holyoke are concentrated in the four mid-
Map 6. Location of Springfield census
tracts with and without racial, socioeconomic
status and quality of living conditions segre-
gation.
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town tracts, 8114-8117. The minority percentages in these tracts
range between 23.6 and 59.7 percent. The four remaining tracts, 8118-
8121, have from 2.1 to 7.0% minorities. Table 72 shows the calcula-
tion of minority populations in Holyoke.
TABLE 72
1980 MINORITY POPULATION IN HOLYOKE CENSUS TRACTS
C.T. Pop. Black As ian & Persons of Total P.C
Pacific Spanish Minority Non-
Islander Origin White
8114 2782 147 2 1266 1415 50.9
8115 3395 149 0 1879 2028 59.7
8116 5144 204 21 1879 2104 40.9
8117 2184 101 2 412 515 23.6
8118 4361 29 36 61 126 2.9
8119 4678 39 21 39 99 2.1
8120 8469 235 23 335 593 7.0
8121 13665 141 18 294 453 3.3
Total 44678 1045 123 6165 7333 16.4
The majority of the SES and living conditions variables display
a similar dichotomization. The median education levels of the four
inner city tracts range from 8.7 to 9.7 years. In the four other
tracts, the range is from 12.1 to 12.7 years. The mean education le-
vel for Holyoke is 10.7 years.
While the average percentage of white collar workers is 40.1
in Holyoke, the percentages in the inner city tracts range from 18.0
to 29.3. In the four other tracts the scores range from 44.5 to 72.0.
Similarly, Holyoke's average percentage of unemployed workers is 5.7.
In the inner city tracts the rates range from 5.6 to 9.6%. In the
other tracts, the range is from 2.8 to 4.5%.
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The income variables are also clustered. The average median
family income is $8,890. The range of the inner city tracts is from
$5,662-37,695. In the other tracts it is from $9,375-$13,866. In
the inner city tracts the percentages of poor families range from 17.1
to 25.3. The range in the other tracts is from 2.9 to 6.3. The mean
is 12.7%. The inner city tracts have low percentages of well-off fami-
lies (4.8 to 8.8%). The other tracts have from 17.1 to 44.7% well-
off families. The Holyoke mean is 16.3%.
The median single-family value of housing in the inner city
tracts ranges from $7,800 to $12,760. In the outlying tracts the range
is from $14,600 to $27,600. The average median single-family value in
Holyoke is $15,163.
The percentages of substandard housing are not so extremely
polarized. Two of the inner city tracts, 8116 and 8117, have high
percentages (12.2 and 21.0, respectively). C.T.s 8114 and 8115 have
low percentages (3.2 and 3.7) which are in the range of the other tracts
(1.5 to 4.8). The average percentage is 6.7.
The percentages of crowded units also are not strictly dichoto-
mized. C.T.s 8114 and 8115 have high percentages, 15.4 and 10.2, re-
spectively. The percentages of C.T.s 8116 and 8117 (6.7 and 6.1)
are within the range of the other census tracts (3.1 to 7.1). The mean
percentage for Holyoke is 7.3.
The average household size in Holyoke is 2.48.
Holyoke had a net loss of housing during the 1970' s decade, going
from 18,458 units in 1970 to 18,021 units in 1980. Although, undoubt-
edly, some new housing units were built during the seventies, figures
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now available do not separate these units. Since the loss of units
outweighed the new units, the percentage of new housing is necessari-
ly coded as zero.
Table 73 gives the scores of Holyoke T s census tracts on the ecol-
ogy variables and provides descriptive statistics for the ecology vari-
ables
.
It is starkly apparent from Holyoke's statistics that the city
is highly segregated internally by race, socioeconomic status and qual-
ity of living conditions. The mean percentage of minorities in the in-
ner city census tracts is 43.8, compared to 3.8 in the outlying tracts.
The population of the inner city tracts has a low educational level
(9.1 years), compared to an average 12.2 years in outlying tracts.
Only 24.5% of inner city workers are white collar, while 55.7% of the
outer city workers are white collar. An average of 7.4% of the workers
in the inner city are unemployed, while only 4.0% in the rest of Holy-
oke are unemployed. The median income of inner city families is $6,805;
of outer city families, $10,975. The central city has an average of
20.5% poor families and 7.2% well-off families. The rest of Holyoke
has 5.1% poor families and 25.5% well-off families. The median value
of single-family housing in the inner city is $10,675, compared to
$19,650 in the other four tracts. The inner city has averages of 10.0%
substandard units and 9.6% crowded units. The outer city has 3.3% sub-
standard units and 5.1% crowded units.
The census tracts with the highest percentages of minorities
also have low class status and poor quality of living conditions. C.T.
8119 consistently has the best quality scores on the socioeconomic and
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living conditions variables, except for percent unemployed on which
it ranks second lowest. C.T. 8119 also has the smallest percentage
of minorities of any tract in Holyoke.
Unlike Springfield, Holyoke has no census tracts with sub-
stantial proportions of minorities and high socioeconomic status and
housing quality indicators. None of the tracts with substantial mi-
norities have scores on any of the other variables on the high status
or quality side of the Holyoke means, except for C.T.s 8116 and 8117
on the one variable, PCCRWD, and C.T.S 8114 and 8115 on PCSUBHO.
Clearly, racial and class status in Holyoke vary together by location.
Internally, Holyoke is a highly segregated community.
Chicopee
.
Of the three central cities, Chicopee has the smallest per-
centage of minorities - only 2.1%. No census tract has more than three
hundred minority persons. Table 74 shows the calculation of the mi-
nority percentages in Chicopee census tracts.
Chicopee' s socioeconomic status and quality of living conditions
variables lack the extreme scores of the other central cities. For
the most part, the scores indicate that Chicopee residents are middle
to lower-middle class without extremes of poverty and wealth, and
without palatial or slum living conditions.
The average median educational level in Chicopee is 10.8 years.
Six census tracts, 8107-8112, have an educational level of less than
11.0 years. Only C.T. 8113 has a high school (12.0) median education-
al level.
The same six census tracts also have less than 40.0% of their
346
TABLE 74
1980 MINORITY POPULATION IN CHICOPEE CENSUS TRACTS
C.T Pop. Black Asian &
Pacific
Islander
Persons of
Spanish
Origin
Total
Minority
P.C.
Non-
White
8105
8106*
8107
53 1 HQolUo
8109
8110
8111*
8112
8113*
6186
6473
3765
6393
5542
9565
6224
9875
31
16
15
28
1
27
53
160
75
13
30
10
16
17
15
36
16
40
62
120
75
142
43
99
122
71
107
158
92
186
111
295
2.0
1.1
2.8
2.5
1.7
1.9
1.8
3.0
Total 54023 331 212 597 1142 2.1
The 1980 Census divided these tracts into two. The 1980 tracts
have been recombined into their 1970 designation for comparability to
the zoning data.
labor force in white collar jobs. C.T.s 8106 and 8113 have somewhat
higher percentages of white collar workers. The mean percentage is
37.7. The percentages of unemployed vary little. The range of points
is 3.2. The mean level of unemployment is 4.6%.
The range of the median family income in all census tracts is
less than $2,000. The scores cluster around the mean of $10,056.
The percentages of families with income below the poverty level
in all tracts are small, less than seven percent. The mean percentage
is 5.4. The percentages of well-off families have slightly greater
variation, ranging from 9.7% in C.T. 8111 to 20.5% in C.T. 8108. The
mean percentage is 16.2. Relatively few families in Chicopee are fi-
nancially well-off.
The average household size in Chicopee is 2.61, while the per-
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centage of new housing is 3.4. Relatively little building took place
in Chicopee during the seventies. The median value of single-family
houses is $17,425. All scores are within $1,500 of the mean single-
family value. The highest percentage of substandard housing in Chico-
pee is 4.2. The average percentage is 1.8. Four census tracts have
less than 1.0% substandard housing.
The percentages of crowded units in all tracts range from 3.0
to 9.8. The average percentage is 7.5.
No census tract in Chicopee has consistently high or low scores
on all or most of the socioeconomic and living conditions variables.
Living conditions in C.T. 8108 may be slightly better than in Chico-
pee generally since the median single-family value is the highest and
the percent of crowded units is the lowest. C.T. 8108 also has the
highest percentage of well-off families and the highest median family
income in Chicopee. However, the median educational level of C.T.
8108 residents is the lowest in Chicopee, and its percentage of white
collar workers is on the low side of the mean. Its percentage of un-
employed is third from the highest, and its percentage of substandard
housing is the second highest. C.T. 8108 seems to be an area in which
working class persons with little education have, to some extent, made
it economically.
The poorest tract in Chicopee seems to be C.T, 8111. . It has
the second lowest educational level, the lowest percentage of white
collar workers, the lowest median family income, the highest percen-
tage of poor families, the lowest percentage of well-off families, the
lowest value of single-family houses, and the highest percentage of
348
crowded units. It has little substandard housing, however. C.T.
8111 is the lowest in socioeconomic status and poorest in living con-
ditions, yet it is not very poor by absolute Chicopee standards. Vari-
able scores fall within the shadow of the mean in most instances. Like
the rest of the tracts in Chicopee, C.T. 8111 has few minorities.
Those who are relatively poor socioeconomically
,
educationally and in
living quality in Chicopee, are white.
Table 75 gives the scores of Chicopee census tracts on the urban
ecology variables and descriptive statistics for the variables.
Conclusions
. Intracity segregation by race and class, and to some ex-
tent by quality of living conditions, exists in the central cities of
the Springfield SMSA. In both Springfield and Holyoke, pockets of
Black poverty exist. Both cities have areas with relatively high per-
centages of poor and minorities, and relatively poor living conditions.
These are contrasted to areas with relatively wealthy majoritarian popu
lations living in comparative comfort. Springfield is not as racially
and socio-economically segregated as is Holyoke. It has some census
tracts integrated by race and SES.
Chicopee is largely White, has no extremes of wealth or poverty,
and is largely composed of middle-class living conditions. While Chi-
copee is segregated by race, it is not segregated by class or living
conditions.
The overall averages for the central cities are not as extreme
as anticipated, since the extremes of high percentages of minorities,
poverty and poor living conditions in some census tracts are balanced
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off by their opposites in other census tracts. The averages for the
central city subfile leave the impression of somewhat high percentages
of minorities, but middle to lower middle class status and living con-
ditions. In considering the SES variables individually, all three ci-
ties have a median education level of less than a high school diploma.
All have less than half of their labor force in white collar occupations.
Unemployment levels in the central cities cluster around 5.0%, while the
median family income clusters around $9,000. The percentages of poor
families average 10.2%, while the percentages of well-off families aver-
age 16.2%. By general standards, these are not excessive figures.
The population of Holyoke seems to have the lowest socioeconomic
status in the central cities. It has the lowest class status on three
of the five SES variables.
The quality of living conditions variables show little consis-
tency. The average household size in the central cities is 2.58 per-
sons. This small household size indicates that central city populations
probably contain many elderly, two and one person households. The per-
centages of housing built during the 1970s average 3.2. No central
city has a very large percentage of new housing. The median value of
single-family housing is a low, $14,834. The average percentage of
substandard housing is small, 4.9. The average percentage of crowded
units is 6.8.
Looking at the cities across the quality of living conditions
variables, no city can be said to have the best or worst conditions.
The three cities vary in having the highest or lowest quality scores.
Table 76 compares the means of the central cities on the ecology
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variables, gives the averages for the central cities by census tracts,
and provides other descriptive statistics.
First Ring Suburbs
According to the segregation hypothesis, few minorities should
reside in the first ring suburbs. These jurisdictions should have
relatively high socioeconomic status and the best quality of living
conditions of the SMSA. The statistics for the most part confirm this
hypothesis
.
Less than 5.0% of the populations of all the first ring suburbs
are minorities. The highest percentage of minorities is 4.3 in C.T.
8123 in West Springfield. The highest number of minorities is 520 in
Ludlow. Only slightly more than 2,000 minorities live in the first
ring suburbs compared to a general population of more than 100,000. Of
these, the greatest number are Hispanics. Only 727 Blacks live in the
first ring suburbs. Table 77 shows the minority population figures
in the first ring suburbs.
The median education in the first ring suburbs is slightly more
than a high school education (12.4 years). The highest median is 13.8
years in Longmeadow, while the lowest is 11.2 in C.T. 8123 in West
Springfield. Median education has a range of only 2.6 years. The ma-
jority of first ring suburbanites are well educated.
The percentages of white collar workers range from a low of 40.7
in Ludlow to a high of 81.3 in Longmeadow. The average of these sub-
urbs is 57.5%.
The percentage of unemployed workers is lowest in Longmeadow,
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TABLE 77
1980 MINORITY POPULATION IN THE CENSUS TRACTS OF THE FIRST RING
C.T. Pop. Black Asian & Persons Total P.C.
Pacific of Minority Non-
Islander Spanish White
Origin
Agawam
E. Longmeadow
Hampden
Longmeadow
Lu d_l ow
_
W.Springfield
8132
8134*
8135
8133
.
8lQiL*.
8122
'
8123
8124
Town
8136*
26271
12905
4745
16301
18150
7610
5166
14266
27°12
12053"
152
34
9
96
132
89
99
11
199_
105
58
16
5
155
_41
55
34
27
116
51
183
33
21
108
.341
49
88
64
201
' 64'
393
106
35
359
12£L
193
221
102
I1!
220
1.5
0.8
0.7
2.2
2.5
4.3
0.7
L9
1.8"Wilbraham
Total 117467 727 448 951 2149 1.8
*The 1980 census divided these tracts into two. Tracts have
been recombined into their 1970 designation for comparability to the
zoning data.
1.8%, and highest in C.T. 8123 in West Springfield, 6.4%. The average
The median family income in the first ring averages $12,189,
with a high of $19,123 in Longmeadow and a low of $8,166 in C.T. 8123
in West Springfield. Both these are extreme scores. The rest of the
figures cluster in the $10,000-$13 ,000 range.
The percentages of poor families are small, with the highest per
centage (6.6%) in C.T. 8123 in West Springfield. Longmeadow has the
lowest figure, 1.0%. The average for these suburbs is 3.8%.
The percentages of well-off families vary substantially, with
Longmeadow having 64.0% and West Springfield C.T. 8123 having 9.6%.
The rest of the percentages cluster in the 20-40% range.
is 3.5%
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The average household size is smallest in West Springfield
(2.48) and largest in Hampden (3.16). The average for these suburbs
is 2.82.
The percentage of new housing averages 14.8%, with a high in
Agawam of 26.5% and a low in West Springfield of 11.5%. Except for
Agawam, the scores cluster around the mean of 14.8%.
The median value of single-family housing averages $20,333 for
the first ring suburbs. The high is $30,800 in Longmeadov, with the
low being $11,900 in C.T. 8123 in West Springfield.
The percentage of substandard housing is generally small, 1.2%.
Longmeadow's percentage is lowest, 0.3, while C.T. 8l23 f s percentage,
2.3, is highest. Even the highest percentage is not very high.
The percentage of crowded units is highest in Hampden, 7.8, and
lowest in Longmeadow, 1.2. The average is 5.3%.
Turning to an analysis of the towns themselves, Longmeadow con-
sistently has the highest socioeconomic status and quality of living
conditions in the first ring, although it does not have the smallest
percentage of minorities. Longmeadow's median education, percentage
of white collar workers, median family income, percentage of well-off
families, median single-family value are the highest of all first ring
suburbs, while its percentage of unemployed, percentage of poor fami-
lies, percentage of substandard housing and percentage of crowded units
are the lowest. In most instances, Longmeadow's scores far outdistance
those of the second highest census tract or jurisdiction. Only its
average household size and percentage of new housing fall in the middle
range. Its families average slightly more than one child, indicating
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that it is middle American in family composition. Its percentage of
new housing is on the low side, which is a reflection of its largely
built up character more than of low quality housing.
Wilbraham seems to have the second highest socioeconomic status
and living quality.
C.T. 8123 in West Springfield consistently has the lowest socio-
economic status and living conditions quality. It also has the highest
percentage of minorities of any first ring suburban census tract, A. 3,
although that percentage is in itself not very high. Ludlow on most
variables is the second lowest in status and living conditions.
Table 78 gives the scores of the first ring suburbs and descrip-
tive statistics of the ecology variables in the first ring.
The first ring suburbs generally display homogeneous demographic
and housing quality characteristics. The first ring suburbs match the
stereotype of the American suburb. They contain, with few exceptions,
white populations of high income, occupational and educational levels,
residing in solid, standard, spacious, suburban housing.
Second Ring Suburbs
If the general hypothesis holds for the second ring suburbs,
then their variable scores should fall in between those of the central
cities and the first ring on all or most variables.
Like the first ring suburbs, the outlying suburbs have rela-
tively few minorities. The highest percentages of minorities are in
C.T.s 8220 in Northampton (9.3%), C.T. 8212 in South Hadley (7.5%) and
C.T.s 8127 (7.4%) and 8125 (6.0%) in Westfield. The remainder of the
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TABLE 79
1980 MINORITY POPULATION IN THE CENSUS
TRACTS OF THE SECOND RING SUBURBS
Municipality C.T. Pop. Black Asian & Persons Total P.C.
Pacific of Minority Non-
Islander Spanish White
.
—
1
Origin
Belchertown 8202.01* 8339 47 27 41 115 1.4
Easthampton 8223 5335 6 3 29 38 0.7
8224 10245 18 19 51 88 0.9
Granby 8209 5380 16 12 26 54 1.0
Hadley 8214 4125 18 11 25 54 1.3
Monson 8137 7315 33 15 20 68 0.9
Northampton 8216** 7885 76 31 242 349 4.4
8217 3194 12 2 8 22 0.7
8218 - - - -
—
_
8219** 9383 61 58 123 242 2.6
8220 2513Cm -S X -J 107±.\J / 76 Z J.5 Q T
8221
8222 5624 34 13 1 7QX / y J . 1
Palmer 8101 5038 21 13 18 73 1.4
8102 2772 6 2 6 14 0.5
8103 3579 7 3 8 18 0.5
Southampton 8225 4137 0 1 15 16 0.4
S.Hadley 8210 4180 16 10 8 34 0.8
8211 7054 15 38 23 76 1.1
8212 2349 61 67 48 176 7.5
8213 2816 10 24 14 48 1.7
Southwick 8131 7382 43 12 55 110 1.5
Westf ield 8125 6681 142 50 212 404 6.0
8126 6431 29 52 38 119 1.9
8127** 8638 25 23 591 639 7.4
8128 5816 13 33 144 190 3.3
8129 8899 68 27 41 136 1.5
Total 145110 884 622 1968 3474
Average 5804 35 25 79 139 2.4
*Pelham has become tract 8020.02, while Belchertown, part of C.T.
8020 in 1970, is now C.T. 8020.01.
**The 1980 Census divided these tracts into two. The 1980 tracts
have been recombined into their 1970 designations for comparability to
the zoning data.
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census tracts have less than five percent minorities. Nine of twenty-
five second ring tracts have one percent or fewer minorities. The
average percentage of minorities is 2.4. Table 79 shows the minority
populations in the second ring census tracts.
When municipalities are considered without regard to census
tracts, Westfield and Northampton have the highest percentages of mi-
norities, 4.1 and 3.6, respectively. The remainder of the second ring
suburbs have 2.0 percent or less minorities. Table 80 gives the mi-
nority populations by towns.
TABLE 80
1980 MINORITY POPULATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES
OF THE SECOND RING SUBURBS
Town Pop. Black Asian & Persons of Total p r
Pacific Spanish Minority Non-
Islander Origin White
Belchertown 8339 47 27 41 115 1.4
Easthampton 15580 24 22 80 126 0.8
Granby 5380 16 12 26 54 1.0
Hadley 4125 18 11 25 54 1.3
Monson 7315 33 15 20 68 0.9
Northampton 28599 290 180 . 555 1025 3.6
Palmer 11389 34 18 32 84 0.7
Southampton 4137 0 1 15 16 0.4
S. Hadley 16399 102 139 . 93 334 2.0
Southwick 7382 43 12 55 110 1.5
Westfield 36465 277 185 1026 1488 4.1
Total 145110 884 622 1968 3474
Average 13192 80 57 179 316 2.4
The average educational level of second ring suburbs is 12.3
years. Two census tracts
,
C.T. 8220 in Northampton and C.T . 8212 in
South Hadley, which contain Smith and Mount Holyoke Colleges, respec
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tively, have median educational levels of more than 16 years. The
lowest educational median is 10.3 years in C.T. 8223 in Easthampton.
The average percentages of unemployed are generally low, al-
though three census tracts, C.T. 8103 in Palmer, C.T. 8212 in South
Hadley, and C.T. 8127 in Westfield, have more than 5.0% unemployed.
The lowest percentage is 1.4 in Southampton. The average is 3.4%
Median family income in the second ring averages $10,867. C.T.
8102 in Palmer has the lowest median, $8,966, while C.T. 8220 in North-
ampton has the highest, $13,250.
The percentages of poor families range from a low of zero in
C.T. 8220 in Northampton to a high of 19.6 in C.T. 8212 in South Hadley.
C.T. 8212' s score is more than twice as large as the second highest
percentage, 8.8, in Belchertown. The average percentage of poor in
the second ring is 5.5.
The average percentage of well-off families is 22.0, with a low
of 11.9% in C.T. 8127 in Westfield and a high of 40.0% in C.T. 8213 in
South Hadley.
The average household size varies from a low of 2.53 in Palmer
to a high of 3.07 in Granby and Monson. The mean household size in
the second ring is 2.80.
The percentages of new housing range from a low of 8.2% in South
Hadley to a high of 47.3% in Belchertown. The average for the munici-
palities is 19.4%.
The range of the median value of single-family housing varies
from a low of $14,700 in Belchertown to a high of $29,400 in C.T. 8212
in South Hadley. The average value is $19,100.
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The average percentage of substandard housing is 3.5, with a low
of 0.9% in C.T. 8210 in South Hadley and a high of 15.5% in C.T. 8220
in Northampton. The high percentage in C.T. 8220 is probably accounted
for by the large numbers of college dormitories which lack individual
bathroom and kitchen facilities.
The average percentage of crowded units is 6.1. The lowest per-
centage is 1.4 in C.T. 8220 in Northampton, while the highest percent-
age is 10.6 in Granby.
The average percentage of white collar workers in the second
ring is 46.7. The scores vary from a low of 27.7% in C.T. 8102 in Pal-
mer to a high of 75.0% in C.T. 8212 in South Hadley, a range of 47.3
points
.
Table 81 provides the census tract scores and statistics which
describe the ecology variables in the second ring suburbs.
Turning to an analysis of the municipalities themselves, South
Hadley seems to have the best quality urban ecology, but not consistent-
ly so. Its median educational level, percentage of white collar work-
ers, median family income, and median single-family value are the high-
est of the second ring municipalities. However, its percentage of un-
employed is in the middle range for the second ring, and its percentage
of poor families is the third highest. It also has a small percentage
of new housing, a high average household size and a middling percent-
age of crowded units.
No municipality has consistently low quality urban ecology
scores. Neither socioeconomic status nor living quality variables
vary together in the majority of second ring suburbs. The scores of
361
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ond ring suburbs by municipalities are provided in Table 82.
TABLE 82
THE URBAN ECOLOGY OF THE SECOND RING SUBURBS BY MUNICIPALITIES
Municipality PC MED PC PC MED PC PC AV PC MED PC PC
NON EDUC WCOL UN FINC PR WEL H0U NEW SF SUB CRWD
WHI WK EMP FAM OFF STZ TTOlL\J VAT
Belchertown 1.4 12.2 40.7 2.8 9029 8.8 16.3 2.78 47.3 14700 5.6 8.8
Easthampton 0.8 11.2 39.7 3.3 10581 5.0 18.7 2.62 25.4 17700 1.8 5.2
Granby 1.0 12.3 47.7 4.0 10448 6.6 20.2 3.07 15.1 18000 1.7 10.6
Hadley 1.3 12.3 43.6 2.5 11514 8.5 25.6 2.66 20.2 22700 3.4 3.4
Monson 0.9 11.1 45.6 4.3 10005 5.2 21.0 3.07 18.2 15700 5.2 5.7
Northampton 3.6 13.1 52.0 3.2 10934 3.6 25.0 2.75 16.1 21420 6.1 4.2
Palmer 0.7 11.2 34.4 3.7 9837 5.6 16.8 2.53 12.4 16200 3.0 6.2
Southampton 0.4 11.6 35.6 1.4 10693 4.9 18.8 3.01 33.6 18400 3.7 7.6
S. Hadley 2.8 13.3 57.0 3.5 11392 8,4 26.7 3.01 8.2 22475 2.4 6.0
Southwicfc 1.5 12.2 38.3 3.2 10761 3.2 18.7 2.83 25.9 16300 3.0 9.3
Westf ield 4.1 12.2 49.2 3.8 10763 4.2 21.9 2.80 24.6 18140 2.3 6.4
Average 1.7 12.1 44.0 3.2 10542 5.8 20.9 2.83 22.5 18340 3.5 6.7
Comparison of the Urban Ecology of the Central Cities, First
Ring and Second Ring Suburbs of the Springfield SMSA
Analysis of the average scores for the three subclasses of ci-
ties confirms that the SMSA is segregated by race, class and quality of
living conditions. Minorities live primarily in the central cities,
particularly Springfield and Holyoke. Additionally, the socioeconomic
status of central city residents is the lowest in the area as is the
quality of living conditions.
The first ring suburbs have the fewest minorities, the highest
socioeconomic status and the best quality of living conditions, while
the second ring suburbs fall in between the central cities and the
first ring on all but one variable (PCNEWHO) . Table 83 provides the
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ges for the three subclasses of municipaliti
TABLE 83
CENTRAL CITY, FIRST RING SUBURBAN AND SECOND RING SUBURBAN
CENSUS TRACT MEANS OF THE URBAN ECOLOGY VARIABLES
Class of PC MED PC PC MED PC PC AV PC MED PC PC
City NON EDUC WCOL UN FINC PR WEL HOU NEW SF SUB CRWD
WHI WK EMP FAM OFF SIZ HO VAL HO
Central
Cities 22.7 11.2 44.2 4.9 9293 10.2 16.2 2.58 3.2 14834 4.9 6.8
First Ring
Suburbs 1.9 12.4 57.5 3.5 12189 3.8 29.0 2.82 14.8 20333 1.2 5.3
Second Ring
Suburbs 2.5 12.3 46.7 3.4 10687 5.5 22.0 2.80 19.4 19100 3.5 6.1
The central cities contain a far greater percentage of minori-
ties than do the two classes of suburbs. While 22.7% of central city
residents are minorities, only 1.9% of first ring residents and 2.5%
of second ring residents are minorities.
The median educational level of central city residents is more
than a year less than that of either class of suburb. The median edu-
cational level of first ring residents is only one-tenth of a percent-
age point greater than that of second ring residents. Suburbanites
generally are far better educated than central city residents.
The percentage of white collar workers in the central cities is
the lowest in the area. The percentage in the second ring is only
slightly higher than that of the central cities. The percentage in the
first ring is substantially greater than it is in either the central
cities or the second ring. While suburbanites generally are better
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educated than central city residents, this does not transfer into
occupational levels. Second ring suburbanites with almost equal educa-
tional attainment to first ring suburbanites do not achieve higher
class occupations in as great proportions. White collar jobs are not
as readily available for second ring residents as they are for first
ring residents.
The unemployment rate in the central cities exceeds the rates
in both classes of suburbs by approximately a point and a half. The
rates in both classes of suburbs are separated by only one-tenth of a
percentage point. Although second ring suburbanites cannot find as high
class work as first ring residents, they do find work of some sort in
equal proportions to first ring residents.
The median family income of central city residents is approxi-
mately $1,400 less than that of second ring residents, and approxi-
mately $2,900 less than that of first ring suburbanites. Even though
second ring suburbs have only slightly larger percentages of white col-
lar workers than central cities, their residents earn more in their blue-
collar jobs than do central city residents. First ring residents quite
naturally make substantially better average income at the substantially
greater rate of employment in white collar jobs.
The greatest percentages of poor reside in the central cities.
The suburbs have far smaller percentages of poor, although the second
ring suburbs have almost two percent more poor families than do the
first ring.
The percentage of well-off families is smallest in the central
cities, greatest in the first ring suburbs, and in between in the
366
second ring suburbs. The percentage in the second ring exceeds that
in the central cities by 5.8 percentage points, while the percentage
in the first ring exceeds that in the second ring by 7.0 percentage
points. The gap between the first and second ring is slightly larger
than that between the second ring and the central cities.
The average household size variable does not vary in the direc-
tion expected. A high average household size seems to be more asso-
ciated with suburbanite families than with poor quality of living con-
ditions. If family life is valued in American society, then a higher
average household size in the suburbs indicates more intact traditional
families and a better quality of life, while a low average household
size in the central cities indicates more isolated elderly, non-tra-
ditional families, single-parents and the like, and a lower quality of
life according to traditional American values. Given this interpreta-
tion, both classes of suburbs have substantially greater average
household sizes and quality of life on this variable than do the cen-
tral cities. The slightly higher average household size in the first
ring than in the second ring indicates slightly more children per fami-
ly in the first ring than in the second ring. Most surprising of all
is that all classes of cities average less than three persons per house-
hold (2.68 for the SMSA). In 1970 the comparable figure was 3.13. The
national trend toward the breakup of the traditional family is apparent
in these Springfield SMSA figures.
The percentage of new housing in the central cities is small,
3.2, indicating the older nature of urban housing and the more com-
pletely developed status of central cities. Building took place at
367
substantially greater rates in the suburbs than in the central cities,
and at greater rates in the second ring than in the first ring. These
figures could indicate that the trends to move out from the cities to
the suburbs, and to move out greater and greater distances, which are
generally thought to have abated nationally, continue, at least in this
SMSA. The figures could also be functions of the greater space avail-
able for building in the outlying suburbs. However, since ample space
for development still exists in all first ring suburbs except Long-
meadow, this second interpretation is less viable than the first.
The average median value of single-family houses in the central
cities is several thousand dollars lower than that of both classes of
suburbs. The average median value of houses in the first ring is
slightly more than that of second ring houses.
The central cities have the largest percentage of substandard
and crowded units. The second ring suburbs have slightly less scores
on both variables, while the first ring suburbs have substantially
lower percentages on both variables than either of the other two clas-
ses of municipalities.
In sum, the urban ecology of the Springfield SMSA displays the
classic pattern identified in the urban ecology literature. The socio-
economic-racial-spatial distribution of the Springfield metropolitan
population is one of a poor, disproportionately black, low status inner
core living in relatively poor quality conditions, surrounded by an
essentially white, wealthy, high class suburban population living in
physical comfort.
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The SMSA as a Whole
In order to generalize the description of the SMSA, descrip-
tive statistics for the variables were calculated without reference to
the subfile structure. Table 84 provides these data.
The SMSA contains an average of 14.3% minorities x^hich approxi-
mates the percentage of minorities nationwide. However, the median of
3.0% indicates that minorities are residentially maldistributed through-
out the metropolitan area with large percentages in some census tracts.
The median educational level is slightly less than a high school
education. Less than half of the labor force is employed in white col-
lar jobs, and the unemployment rate is 4.3%. The median family income
is $10,043. Less than ten percent of families are poor, and less than
twenty percent are well-off. On the average, the socioeconomic status
of the metropolitan population is middle to lower-middle class.
The living conditions variables also indicate average status.
The population per household is less than three persons. Housing built
during the seventies is less than ten percent of the total housing
stock. The average median value of single-family housing is $16,704.
Less than five percent of housing is substandard. Approximately six
and one-half percent of housing contains more than one person per room.
The general statistics support the hypothesis that the Spring-
field SMSA is representative of the American metropolis at large. Its
average figures portray the typical United States metropolis.
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Correlation Matrix
The Pearson correlations of the ecology variables provide pre-
liminary information concerning the relationships of individual ecology
variables to each other. Table 85 provides these bivariate correlations.
The percentage of minorities is fairly strongly and positively
correlated with the percentage of poor families and the percentage of
unemployed, and negatively with median family income. These relation-
ships suggest that minorities are poorer financially and in employment
resources than are majorities.
Median education is fairly strongly correlated with the percen-
tage of white collar workers, median family income, the percentage of
well-off families, and the median value of single-family houses. The
indicators of education, income and occupation suggest that the tradi-
tional concept of socioeconomic status is a factor in the Springfield
SMSA. Additionally, high levels of education, income and occupation
are also associated with high-valued housing. Expensive housing may
constitute an additional element of high socioeconomic status.
The three income variables themselves display a degree of multi-
collinearity
. Median family income and the percentages of well-off
families are highly correlated (R = .8907). Median family income and
the percentages of poor families have a -.7831 correlation, while the
percentages of poor families and well-off families have a -.5023 corre-
lation. Since median family income and the percentages of well-off
families are so strongly related, and since in terms of analysis they
are similar, the percentages of well-off families will not be analyzed
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in the series of regressions. Median family income and the percent-
ages of poor families will be retained as dependent variables. Median
family income measures the relative wealth or poverty of all families
in a census tract, and as such, it is the best income measure. The
percentage of poor families is retained since the -.7831 correlation
between MEDFINC and PCPRFAM is not quite strong enough for the vari-
ables to be treated as identical, and since it is important theoreti-
cally to look at the poor as a distinct group.
The Urban Ecology Factors
The factor analysis of the urban ecology variables derived three
major and identifiable factors. None of the remaining nine factors had
more than one variable with a loading of greater than .4. Nor did fac-
tors Four through Twelve add appreciably to the explanation of the ur-
ban ecology, even though the comraunality correlation using twelve fac-
tors was substantially better for the one variable, PCSUBHO, which had
low communality with the first three factors. The communality figures
for three and twelve factors are given in Table 86.
The socioeconomic status and minority variables, for the most
part, have the highest communality. The quality of living conditions
variables, except for MEDSFVAL, have communality of 50% or less. The
low communality of these variables indicates that socioeconomic charac-
teristics are more predominant facets of the urban ecology than are
living conditions. The communality correlations of the ecology vari-
ables .with the ecology factors are, unfortunately, not as great as are
those of the zoning variables with the zoning factors.
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TABLE 86
COMPARISON OF COMMUNALITY FOR THREE AND TWELVE URBAN ECOLOGY
Variable Three Factor Twelve Factor
Communal ity Communal ity
PCWCOLWK 89. 647
-305
PCWELOFF 87. 312 97. 921
MEDFINC 86. 813 100. 642
MEDSFVAL 75. 616 37. 059
PCUNEMP 74. 644 77. 742
PCNONWHI 73. 391 77. 736
MEDEDUC 69. 353 88. 025
PCPRFAM 66. 545 90. 746
PCCRWD 50. 785 56. 487
AVHOUSIZ 44. 793 58. 468
PCNEWHO 43. 921 57. 069
PCSUBHO 14. 038 45. 757
In spite of the limitations of the three factors, an initial
decision was made to examine only these first three. The first two
of these factors are essentially the same as those derived in previous
ecology research. The third factor is a composite of four of the five
living conditions variables and two income variables. Seeking expla-
nations for the remaining factors, which themselves have little mean-
ing, would be pointless.
Factors One through Three together explain 74.4% of the total
eigenvalue. Factor One has an eigenvalue of 6.27158 and explains 52.3%
of the total variation. Factor Two has an eigenvalue of 1.44853 and
explains 12.1% of the variation. Factor Three has an eigenvalue of
1.20427 and explains 10.0% of the variation.
Factor One is identified as "The High Socioeconomic Status
Factor" (SES) and is very similar to Berry and Horton's "Socioeconomic
Status Factor" derived for Chicago.-^ Four of the variables which load
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highly on this factor, median education, median family income, percent
white collar workers, and percent well-off families, also had high
loadings in Berry and Horton's analysis. Two variables, percent poor
families and percent unemployed workers, which have moderate negative
loadings, were similarly associated with Berry and Horton's Socioeco-
nomic Status Factor. In addition, MEDSFVAL has a high positive loading,
and PCCRWD has a moderate, negative loading on the Springfield Socio-
economic Status Factor. These variables were not important in the Chi-
cago SES Factor. Instead, the percentage of new housing had a high
positive association, and the percentage of substandard housing had a
high negative association with the Chicago factor. Both these rela-
tionships are lacking in the Springfield SES factor. These differences
do not seem particularly significant.
The High Socioeconomic Status Factor identifies areas with resi-
dents who have high educational levels, who work in white collar jobs,
who make a high annual income, who live in high valued, uncrowded hou-
sing, and who suffer little unemployment. In addition, these areas
have relatively few poor, and many well-off households.
The second factor is similar to Berry and Horton's "Race and
Resources Factor," although again slight differences in specific vari-
ables exist. ^ Race and Resources is associated with the minority vari-
able and some socioeconomic status and living conditions variables.
Variables with high positive loadings on both the Springfield and Chi-
cago Race and Resources Factors include the percentage of minorities,
the percentage of poor families, and the percentage of unemployed. In
addition, median family income has a high negative loading on both
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cities' factors. While the percentage of well-off families and per-
centage of substandard housing also had positive and negative asso-
ciations, respectively, with the Chicago Race and Resources Factor,
these are missing in the Springfield Factor. Alternatively, the per-
centage of new housing has a moderate negative association, and the
percentage of crowded units has a slight positive association with the
Springfield Factor which were missing from the Chicago Factor. The
two cities' factors both identify minorities lacking resources , although
the resources they lack are slightly different.
The Springfield Race and Resources Factor identifies areas with
large percentages of minorities and poor, who have high unemployment
rates and low annual incomes, and who live mostly in old housing, some
of which is crowded.
The comparative strength of Springfield's first two factors is
also similar to the order of Berry and Horton's factors. That Socio-
economic Status explains more variance in both analyses is an indica-
tion that socioeconomic segregation is more predominant than racial
segregation, although minorities who are largely of low income status
are also clustered together, at least in Chicago and Springfield.
The third factor is identified as "The Family Living Factor."
Two of the quality of living conditions variables, average household
size and percentage of new housing, have moderately high loadings on
this factor. In addition, two income variables and one living condi-
tions variable, median family income, percent well-off families and
median single-family value, have positive loadings in the .3 - .4 range,
while a fourth living conditions variable, percent substandard housing,
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has a negative loading in this range. Although this factor is weak,
it can be identified as the "Family Living Factor." It is moderate-
ly associated with larger households (presumably traditional families)
who live in new housing, and slightly associated with families with
higher than average income, some of whom are well off, who live in
high valued housing, little of which is substandard. Table 87 shows
the correlations of the relevant variables with the three urban ecol-
ogy "factors.
TABLE 87
THE URBAN ECOLOGY FACTORS
The High Socioeconomic The Race and Resources
Status Factor Factor
Variable Bivariate Variable Bivariate
Correlation Correlation
PCWCOLWK .92301
PCWELOFF .82385 PCNONWHI .76746
MEDEDUC .74694 PCUNEMP .72513
MEDSFVAL .74504 PCPRFAM .69602
MEDFINC .73504 PCCRWD .33238
PCPRFAM -.41709 PCNEWHO -.46039
PCUNEMP -.46641 MEDFINC -.46211
PCCRWD -.56250
The Family Living Factor
Variable Bivariate
Correlation
AVHOUSIZ .56910
PCNEWHO .47529
PCWELOFF .39182
MEDFINC .33807
MEDSFVAL .33461
PCSUBH0 -.35867
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The factor scores for the SMSA census tracts pinpoint areas
of high and low socioeconomic status, of minorities with few resources
and Whites with many resources, and of large and small percentages of
family living.
High SES tracts are not segregated by central city and suburban
location, although there is a locational socioeconomic pattern. Six
tracts in Springfield and one in Holyoke have factor scores of more
than one. Six tracts in the suburbs also have high Socioeconomic Sta-
tus. These include Longmeadow, Wilbraham, C.T. 812A in West Spring-
field, C.T. 8220 in Northampton, and C.T.s 8212 and 8213 in South Had-
ley. Longmeadow has a SES score of greater than three, while the Holy-
oke and Northampton census tract scores are greater than two. The
other high scores are in the one-two range. The suburbs have relative-
ly more high or moderately high SES tracts (47.1% of thirty-four
tracts) than have the central cities (32.7% of forty-nine tracts).
On the other side of the SES factor, three census tracts in
Springfield (C.T.s 8007, 8008 and 8011.02) and two in Holyoke (C.T.s
8114 and 8115), and two suburban tracts, Southampton and C.T. 8102 in
Palmer, have very low SES (less than a negative one factor score).
Census tracts with low or moderately low SES are slightly more concen-
trated in the central cities than in the suburbs. Thirty-three of
forty-nine central city census tracts, 67.3%, have low SES, while
eighteen of thirty-four suburban tracts, 52.9%, have low SES.
Map 7 displays the areas of very high, high middle, low middle
and very low socioeconomic status in the Springfield SMSA. Factor
scores for census tracts on all factors are given in Appendix C.
Map 7. Status of Springfield SMSA census
tracts on "The High Socioeconomic Status Factor"
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The Socioeconomic Status map indicates that high status popu-
lations are dispersed in the metropolitan area in a lopsided horse-
shoe pattern which is mostly composed of first ring suburbs, but also
the southeastern parts of Springfield, the northwestern parts of Holy-
oke and South Hadley, all of Hadley, and parts of Northampton and West-
field. The high SES horseshoe confirms, in part, that the first ring
suburbs have the highest socioeconomic status, although parts of the
central cities and second ring suburbs also have high class populations.
The inner city parts of Springfield and Holyoke, all of Chicopee, and
the majority of the second ring suburbs have low socioeconomic status
populations.
The Race and Resources factor scores pinpoint the areas with
many minorities with few resources and many Whites with many resources.
All census tracts with very high (greater than one) Race and Resources
scores are in the central cities. These include C.T.s 8006, 8007, 8008,
8013, 8014, 8018, and 8019 in Springfield, and C.T.s 8114, 8115, 8116
and 8119 in Holyoke. All of these tracts, except C.T. 8119 in Holyoke,
have high percentages of minorities. Although C.T. 8119 has only 2.9%
minorities, these minorities lack resources. The 97.1% of the popula-
tion which is white in C.T. 8119 has high socioeconomic status as in-
dicated by the 2.592040 factor score of the tract on the SES Factor,
The few minorities who live in this tract are highly segregated from
the white population by class and resources.
The Race and Resources score of C.T. 8119 is a small bit of
evidence in support of Erickson and Miller's findings in their nation-
wide factor analysis, that is, that black suburbanites do not escape
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poverty by moving outward from the inner city.
5
All but six of the suburban tracts have negative Race and Re-
sources scores. Five census tracts, C.T. 8223 in Easthampton, South-
ampton, Southwick, Belchertown and C.T. 8101 in Palmer, have very low
(less than negative one) scores. Only one central city tract, the CBD
tract 8010 in Springfield, has a very low negative score.
The factor scores for Race and Resources confirm to some extent
that white suburbanites have greater resources than do central city
minorities. Racial and resource segregation vary together by location.
Blacks and Hispanics in the central cities have few resources. Those
who live in the suburbs may also have few resources. Map 8 arrays the
census tracts according to their Race and Resources scores.
The Family Living Factor displays the greatest dichotomization
by location of the three factors. All but nine of forty-nine central
city census tracts have low (negative) Family Living factor scores.
Ten of the forty-nine central city tracts have very low (less than neg-
ative one) factor scores.
Only five of thirty-four suburban tracts have low (negative)
factor scores. Only one census tract, C.T. 8122 in West Springfield,
has a very low (less than negative one) factor score.
Census tracts with high (positive) factor scores are mainly sub-
urban, and the majority of suburban census tracts have positive scores.
Nine of thirty-four suburban tracts have very high (greater than one)
positive scores. The highest Family Living score is in Longmeadow,
which has a factor score greater than two.
Eleven central city census tracts do have positive factor scores.
Map 8. Status of Springfield SMSA
census tracts on "The Race and Resources
Factor".
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Two of these, C.T.s 8007 and 8008 in Springfield's North End have
very high (greater than one) Family Living scores. These scores sug-
gest that the percentage of new housing variable has more than one
dimension. The percentage of new housing is high in suburban tracts
in which much single-family housing has been built in the seventies
and in central city tracts in which much urban redevelopment has been
undertaken and much subsidized, multi-family housing has been built
during this period. Thus, both Longmeadow and Springfield's North
End have high loadings on this factor. The high positive scores in
C.T.s 8007 and 8008 (which tracts have very low socioeconomic status
and few resources) also suggest that the variables with slight loadings
on this factor (PCWELOFF, MEDFINC , MEDSFVAL and PCSUBHO) would have
significantly higher loadings if these two tracts were eliminated.
In the same manner, census tracts with very low scores on this
factor are largely central city tracts in which little new housing,
either single-family or public multi-family, has been built in the
seventies, and in which households are small, non-traditional families.
However, the central city fringe tracts such as C.T. 8120 in Holyoke,
C.T. 8122 in West Springfield, and C.Ts 8016.05 and 8021 in Springfield
can also have very low scores because they are areas which are commer-
cial in nature, or which contain little undeveloped land, or which con-
tain a natural feature such as Forest Park. These tracts logically
could not have had much new housing construction in the seventies. Map
9 shows the location of Springfield SMSA census tracts with very and
moderately low and high factor scores on the Family Living Factor.
The Family Living Factor will not be retained as a dependent
Map 9. Status of Springfield SMSA
census tracts on "The Family Living Factor"
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variable for several reasons. First, the factor is a relatively
weak composite with no variables loading highly on it. Second, the
analysis of factor scores for the census tracts seems to indicate that
the relationships among the variables which the factor combines are
more non-linear than linear. Particularly, the percentage of new hou-
sing does not seem to vary linearly with the average household size
and other variables. Third, the composition of the factor itself is
not as hypothesized. Rather than summarizing quality of living condi-
tions, the factor seems to focus on the characteristics of families
themselves. To suggest that these characteristics can be explained
by zoning would be fatuous and unrelated to the theory of exclusion-
ary zoning. There is no suggestion of such a relationship in the ex-
clusionary zoning literature.
The two factors, High Socioeconomic Status and Race and Resour-
ces, adequately summarize the characteristics of the urban ecology
which are said by the exclusionary zoning literature to be influenced
by local land use policy. In essence, these factors describe economic
and racial segregation. A better description of segregation could not
have been anticipated.
Conclusions
The analysis of the urban ecology of the Springfield SMSA sug-
gests the following conclusions. Descriptive statistics indicate that
segregation by race and socioeconomic class, and by central city and
suburban location, exists in the Springfield SMSA. The central cities
generally have greater percentages of minorities and lower socioecono-
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mic status than do the suburbs. However, such segregation is less
than total and complete. Some central city tracts have high percen-
tages of minorities and high or middle socioeconomic status. Some
suburban tracts have low socioeconomic status. All suburban tracts
are segregated by race. All have few minorities. The central cities
are also segregated internally. Some central city census tracts have
few minorities and high socioeconomic status.
Derivation of factors shows that socioeconomic indicators vary
together, as do race and resources. High socioeconomic status census
tracts form a horseshoe-shaped land area, the bulk of which is made up
of first ring suburbs. The majority of low status areas are in the
central cities and second ring suburbs.
Areas which contain minorities with few resources are concen-
trated in the central cities. Areas with large families and new hou-
sing are concentrated in the suburbs, but this is irrelevant to exclu-
sionary zoning.
Zoning in the Springfield SMSA has been demonstrated to be exclu-
sionary on its face, that is, it is more restrictive in the suburbs than
in the central cities. Similarly, the urban ecology has been shown to
be locationally segregated by socioeconomic status and race, although
not to as great a degree as zoning is exclusionary. Whether the loca-
tional differences in zoning are related to the locational differences
in the minority composition and the socioeconomic status of the metro-
politan population remains to be explicated. Does the restrictive zon-
ing of the suburbs have an exclusionary effect and result in the segre-
gated urban ecology? The next chapter will address this question.
CHAPTER VIII
THE RELATIONSHIP OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING AND THE URBAN ECOLOGY
Restatement of Hypothesis and Research Methodolo
The central hypothesis under investigation in this research main-
tains that metropolitan racial and economic segregation is a function of
differences in the zoning of central cities and suburbs. At this point,
zoning and land use policy have been shown to vary by location in the
Springfield SMSA. The suburbs are generally more restrictive in their
land use regulations than are the central cities. Similarly, the urban
ecology has been shown to be segregated by race and socioeconomic status.
To discover whether differences in central city and suburban zoning are
statistically related to differences in the urban ecology, multiple re-
gression and canonical correlation, with the zoning variables and fac-
tors as predictors of the urban ecology variables and factors, will be
used
.
The search for the link between zoning and the principle facets
of the urban ecology begins with the calculation of a correlation matrix
of the zoning and urban ecology variables. The matrix is used 'as input
for the regression analysis. In the first stage of regression analysis,
two stepwise multiple regressions using the zoning variables or their
logarithms as predictors of the two major ecology factors are calcu-
lated. A second series of regressions of the first stage uses the zon-
ing factors and the two zoning dummy variables as predictors of the
urban ecology factors. A third series of the first stage uses the zoning
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variables and logarithms as predictors of individual ecology variables,
namely, the minority and income variables which operationalize the con-
cepts of race and economic resources. Second and third stages of regres-
sion analysis concentrate on those independent variables which were
found in the first stage to be important facets of exclusion.
Following the analysis by multiple regression, canonical cor-
relation analysis is applied to the zoning variables as predictors of
the ecology variables. Whether the correlations between any or all of
the several orthogonal linear combinations of the ecology variables fol-
low the expected pattern of restrictive zoning and segregation will be
examined
.
Correlation Matrix
Table 88 presents the correlation matrix of the zoning variables
with the urban ecology variables. Several important simple relation-
ships are apparent.
The correlation matrix indicates that the percentage of multi-
family housing is an important zoning variable. It has the strongest
correlation of all the zoning variables with the percentage of minor-
ities, and has correlations in the + .6 to .8 range with the three in-
come variables. Where there are high percentages of multi-family hou-
sing, there will also be many minorities and poor, few wealthy, and
median family income will be low.
The two single-family variables, LOGMLS and LOGFRNT, have strong
correlations with two quality of living conditions variables, AVHOUSIZ
and PCNEWHO. Where zoning requires large lots, families will also be
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TABLE 88
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE ZONING VARIABLES AND
LOGARITHMS WITH THE URBAN ECOLOGY VARIABLES
Variable PC
NON
WHI
MED
EDUC
PC
WCOL
WK
PC
UN
EMP
MED
FINC
PC
PR
FAM
LOGMLS
LOGFRNT
LOGMFAC
PCMFAMHO
LOGZMF
AVRHGT
LOGSTBK
BDRMRES
PROMOBHO
LOGNOPH
LOGUNRPH
,4436
,4824
4598
5775
,1671
4668
3992
1637
2487
2583
3263
,3180
,2725
,3962
,4454
,2348
,2839
,0763
,1601
,2833
,3543
,2792
0839
3995
4624
3365
0923
1942
2013
2482
3840
3024
2917
2723
,5136
5400
4406
,2988
,1980
,2073
,2382
,3159
,2614
,3484
,3671
,5670
,7457
,2804
,3966
,2076
,3637
,3769
,4547
,4315
3014
3135
3518
6500
0969
,3277
2717
,1519
,1480
,3220
,2992
Variable PC
WEL
OFF
AV
HOU
SIZ
PC
NEW
HO
MED
SF
VAL
PC
SUB
HO
PC
CRWD
LOGMLS
LOGFRNT
LOGMFAC
PCMFAMHO
LOGZMF
AVRHGT
LOGSTBK
BDRMRES
PROMOBHO
LOGNOPH
LOGUNRPH
,3151
3195
5487
,6529
,3163
3411
,0842
,3801
,3588
3806
,3415
,6505
,6154
,6408
4848
,2623
,7050
2398
4520
6987
3264
4994
,7349
,6218
,3749
,4163
,0007
,7282
,4595
,2528
,3440
,0614
,1450
,4260
,4643
,4768
,4659
,2146
,4522
,2118
,2967
,4025
,4152
,4017
,1033
,1240
,0199
,3880
,3548
,1353
,1343
,0547
,1110
,2429
,1579
,0525
,0485
,1372
,0626
,2850
,0589
,0341
,1573
,0836
,3046
,2374
larger. Apparently, large lots permit large homes so that relatively
large families can live in them. More houses were built between 1970
and 1980 in jurisdictions with large lot zoning than in areas where small
lots are permitted. This correlation is probably a function of develop-
mental characteristics. Census tracts zoned for small lots are predomi-
nantly urban areas which are mostly developed. Suburban areas with
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large lot zoning generally have much undeveloped land on which houses
can be built. Logically, construction in the seventies was primarily
in undeveloped suburbs with large lot zoning. One might also surmise
that little inexpensive housing was built during the seventies, since
most of the building took place in large lot (and house) areas.
The average height permitted for apartments is also strongly,
and negatively correlated with AVHOUSIZ and PCNEWHO. In jurisdictions
which limit the height of apartments to two or two and one-half stories,
households tend to be large, and much residential construction took
place in the seventies. These correlations again suggest the suburban
scene, with townhouses and garden apartments interspersed with large
households (which live in large houses on large lots) and in which most
of the housing built during the seventies was located. Alternatively,
in census tracts which permit tall apartments, households are small, and
little construction took place in the last decade. Here, the urban pan-
orama comes to mind, that is, already developed areas with high-rise
apartments and smaller, non-traditional households.
The percentage of acreage zoned for multi-family use and the pro-
hibition of mobile homes have fairly strong, negative correlations with
average household size. Census tracts with large percentages of multi-
family acreage have small households. This suggests that, contrary to
the accusations of fiscal zoning and of anti-apartment advocates, apart-
ments do not result in large numbers of children occupants. Households
are smaller where there is ample multi-family acreage zoned. Similarly,
where mobile homes are permitted, household sizes are smaller. Where
they are prohibited, households are larger, presumably traditional
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families living in traditional suburban houses.
None of the remaining zoning and ecology variables have strong
correlations. The signs of most relationships are as expected, that
is, the more restrictive the zoning, the higher the socioeconomic sta-
tus and the better the quality of living conditions.
Multiple Regression
The first regression, between the zoning variables or logarithms
as predictors of the ecology factor, High Socioeconomic Status (SES)
,
uncovers a moderate association between zoning and socioeconomic status,
Table 89 provides the relevant statistics.
TABLE 89
THE RELATIONSHIP OF ZONING VARIABLES AND LOGARITHMS
TO SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS
Order of Variable Simple Beta* Multiple Adjusted R2
Entrance R R R2
1 PCMFAMRO -.40502 -.53368 .40502 .15372 .16404
2 LOGSTBK -.19966 -.50181 .53203 .26513 .28306
3 LOGNOPH -.38397 -.54198 .60471 .34159 .36568
4 BDRMRES .21550 .22801 .63000 .36597 .39690
5 LOGUNRPH -.27855 .38229 .64032 .37170 .41001
6 PR0M0BH0 -.21149 -.19877 .65259 .38055 .42588
7 AVRHGT -.04081 .16606 '.65773 .37965 .43260
8 LOGFRNT .04785 .91195 .66238 .37088 .43875
9 LOGMLS .04752 -.65214 .67729 .39199 .45872
10 LOGZMF -.31349 -.21778 .68136 .38984 .46425
11 LOGMFAC -.34925 .29930 .69191 .39799 .47874
^Controlling for all other variables.
Examination of the bivariate correlations (simple Rs) between the
individual zoning variables and SES shows that no variable taken separ-
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ately has more than a moderate relationship to SES, and most have only
slight relationships. The percentage of multi-family housing, the num-
ber of public housing units, and the acreage zoned for multi-family uses
are moderately, negatively related to socioeconomic status, that is, the
the more multi-family housing, the more subsidized housing, and the more
acreage zoned for multi-family use in a census tract, the lower will be
the SES of the population. However, the strength of these relation-
ships is not great. Surprisingly, the two single-family variables,
minimum lot size and average frontage required for single-family lots,
have almost no simple relationships to socioeconomic status. Large lot
zoning per se is not a predictor of a high socioeconomic population.
Examination of the betas uncovers an apparent peculiar inter-
action between the two single-family variables, LOGFRNT and LOGMLS.
LOGFRNT has a positive beta weight of .91195, while LOGMLS has a nega-
tive beta of -.65214. The very strong positive beta of single-family
frontage with SES, and the moderately strong negative beta of minimum
lot size would seem to indicate that, other zoning variables being equal,
wide frontage requirements are the primary means used to insure that
high status households occupy single-family homes, and that large mini-
mum lots are associated with low socioeconomic status households, when
other zoning variables are held constant.
However, several facts contradict this apparent interaction and
support the conclusion that the strong betas for LOGFRNT and LOGMLS do
not represent a real, opposing interaction between lot size and front-
age. First, that large minimum lots are associated with low socio-
economic status populations is antithetical to accepted zoning theory.
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The reverse is generally true and should hold in this instance. Fur-
ther, the high simple correlation between LOGFRNT and LOGMLS (R =
.9593)
indicates chat, practically speaking, LOGMLS and LOGFRNT are the same
variable, that is, they measure the same dimension of zoning. In gen-
eral, if there is a high simple correlation between independent varia-
bles, as there is in this specific case, then partial coefficients be-
come unreliable as indicators of the relative importance of each vari-
able. 1 As each variable is entered sequentially into the regression
equation, the second variable cancels out or contradicts the first.
This results in the outlandish betas. Finally, when either LOGFRNT or
LOGMLS is removed from the SES equation, the beta for the remaining
variables drops almost to zero. This provides supportive, and conclu-
sive, evidence that both variables have little explanatory power in
their own rights, and that any theory of contradictory interaction be-
tween LOGFRNT and LOGMLS should be abandoned.
Variables which contribute the most to the explanation include
PCMFAMHO, LOGSTBK, LOGNOPH and BDRMRES. Small percentages of multi-
family housing are the best predictors of high SES populations, predic-
ting 16.4% of the variance in SES. That the four important variables
are all aspects of multi-family zoning indicates that overall multi-
family policy is the best predictor of the SES of census tract residents.
The second regression seeks a prediction of the Race and Resources
Factor from the zoning variables or their logarithms. This regression
uncovers only a modest association between the zoning of municipalities
and Race and Resources. Table 90 shows the relevant statistics for the
Race and Resources equation.
396
TABLE 90
THE RELATIONSHIP OF ZONING VARIABLES AND LOGARITHMS
TO RACE AND RESOURCES
Order of
Entrance
Variable Simple R Beta* Multiple
R
Adjusted
R2
R2
1
2
" 3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
PCMFAMHO
.49722
.38946
.49722
_L0GSTBK
-.47991
-.34728
.60262
BDRMRES
-.15328
.20444
.61594
AVRHGT
.48961
.13753
.63426
LOGNOPH
.22914 .08835
.64464
LOGZMF
.19563 .19347
.64777
LOGMFAC
.42061
-.22210
.65668
LOGMLS
-.45774
-.28433
.66288
PROMOBHO
.23997
-.05402
.66388
LOGUNRPH
.28444
.05467 .66419
LOGFRNT
-.45983
.11302 .66464
.23793
•2AZ23
".35581
.37164
.37761
.37379
.37814
.37881
.37179
.36353
.35525
.24723
•I6!1!
'.37938
.40229
.41556
.41961
.43123
.43941
.44074
.44114
.44174
Controlling for all other variabl es
.
The simple Rs for the individual variables and Race and Resour-
ces indicate that some zoning variables are more strongly correlated
with the Race and Resources of census tract residents than they are with
residents' SES, but again, these correlations are only moderately
strong. PCMFAMHO, AVRHGT, LOGSTBK, LOGFRNT and LOGMLS have bivariate
correlations in the + .4 - .5 range. As the percentages of multi-family
housing and multi-family acreage, and the average height of apartments
increase, so too do the percentages of minorities with few resources.
As the single-family minimum lot size and frontage, and the setback for
apartments decrease, the percentages of minorities with few resources
increase.
Comparison of the bivariate correlations and the betas shows no
dramatic changes. The correlations of none of the variables with Race
and Resources increase when the influence of other variables is removed.
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However, the directions of the relationships of several variables
change. While the simple correlation of LOGFRNT with Race and Resour-
ces indicates that the smaller the frontage requirement in a census
tract, the greater the percentage of minorities with few resources, as
would be expected, controlling for the other variables changes the di-
rection of the relationship. This is undoubtedly due to the collin-
earity of LOGFRNT and LOGMLS
.
In a similar fashion, the greater the percentage of zoned multi-
family acreage, the greater the percentage of minorities with few re-
sources, but when the other variables are controlled, the relationship
is unexpectedly negative. These beta reversals, along with the low
order of inclusion of LOGMFAC and LOGFRNT and the weakness of the betas,
show that LOGMFAC and LOGFRNT are not good predictors of Race and Re-
sources
.
The order of inclusion of the variables in the equation shows
that the percentage of multi-family housing is the best predictor of
Race and Resources, predicting 24.7% of the variance by itself. Apart-
ment setback increases explained variance by 11.6 percentage points.
Thus the equation accepted in the first stage as valid includes only
the first two variables. They predict 36.8% of the variance in Race
and Resources. Zoning is only a moderately strong predictor of the
Race and Resources of census tract residents, and slightly less of a
predictor of Race and Resources than of SES.
The residual scores show four census tracts, C.T.s 8007, 8008,
8010 and 8018, all in Springfield, as outliers. The regression equa-
tion was unable to predict accurately the high Race and Resources scores
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of the three census tracts which contain Urge percentages of poor and
minorities (C.T.s 8007, 8008 and 8018) and the high negative score of
the anomalous CBD tract, 8010.
The second pair of regressions uses the zoning factors and the
two zoning dummies as predictors of the urban ecology factors. Use of
the zoning factors in the independent position provides even less of an
explanation than did the use of individual zoning variables. The re-
gression of the zoning factors with SES manifests only a slight rela-
tionship between the two. Table 91 presents the relevant statistics.
TABLE 91
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ZONING FACTORS AND
DUMMY VARIABLES TO SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS
Order of
Entrance
Variable Simple Beta* Multiple Adjusted
R R R2
PUBHOU
-.28728
-.21846
.28728 .07120 .08253
_INCLAPT
-.25322
-.17149 .37865 .12196 .14338
BDRMRES "
.21550 .23928 .40006 .12815
"
.16005
ENCUAPT -.01539
-.15967 .41807 .13246 .17478
PR0M0BH0 -.21149
-.11916 .42311 .12571 .17902
GENEXC .01091 -.08950 .42945 .12004 .18443
^Controlling for all other variables.
The simple bivariate correlations (simple Rs) show that no
individual zoning factor or dummy variable has more than a slight re-
lationship to SES, although the directions of the relationships are as
anticipated. The betas are not appreciably different from the Rs.
The Public Housing Factor was entered first into the equation,
indicating that it is the most strongly related to SES, although it
predicts only 8.3% of variance in SES. The Inclusion of Apartments
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Factor adds another 5-6% of explanatory power. The four remaining
factors each contribute little to the explanation. Surprisingly,
General Exclusionary Zoning makes no real contribution to the explana-
tion. There is almost no linear relationship between General Exclu-
sionary Zoning and the SES of census tract residents. This lack of re-
lationship is undoubtedly due to the offsetting influences of minimum
lot size and single-family frontage in relation to SES, since these
variables are the major components of the General Exclusionary Zoning
Factor.
The equation with only The Public Housing and Inclusion of Apart-
ments Factors included, and with 14.3% of the variance predicted, is
accepted as statistically the best. Comparison of this figure to the
figure for the regression of the zoning variables with SES (14.3% pre-
dicted variance versus 39.7% predicted variance) indicates that factor-
ing of the independent variables has caused much of their predictive
power to be lost.
The regression equation of the zoning factors and the two dummy
variables with the Race and Resources Factor is a better predictor of
Race and Resources (29.5% predicted variance) than of SES (14.3% pre-
dicted variance), but again, it is less of a predictor of SES (29.5%
predicted variance) than are the individual zoning variables (39.7%
predicted variance). Table 92 provides the relevant statistics.
The simple Rs indicate that no individual factor or dummy var-
iable has more than a slight relationship to SES, although the signs
of the slight relationships are as expected.
The betas of the four zoning factors increase slightly when I
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TABLE 92
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ZONING FACTORS AND DUMMY
VARIABLES TO RACE AND RESOURCES
v L UCI \J L
Entrance
variable Simple
R
Beta* Multiple
R
Adjusted
R2
R2
1
2
3
4
5
6
GENEXC
-.39775
ENCUAPT
-.31256
INCLUAPT .19464
3DRMRES
-.15328
" PUBHOU
.13690
PROMOBHO .23997
-.42963
-.42822
.27824
.28199
.17632
-.07271
.39775
.46684
.51154
.54298
.56487
.56776
.14781
.19839
.23363
.25866
.27486
.26885
.15820
.21794
.26167
.29482
.31907
.32235
Controlling for all other variables.
other factors are controlled. The signs of the two dummies change, al-
though neither the simple nor the partial correlations of either dummy
are very strong.
General Exclusionary Zoning has the greatest relationship to
Race and Resources. The Encumbered Apartments Factor, The Local Inclu-
sion of Apartments Factor, and bedroom restrictions all contribute sub-
stantially to the explanation of Race and Resources. The variance pre-
dicted with four variables in the equation is 29.5%.
That the zoning factors are less powerful predictors of SES and
Race and Resources than are the individual variables and logarithms in-
dicates that a better explanation of the urban ecology is to be found
in the zoning variables and logarithms themselves than in the zoning
factors. The use of the zoning factors results in significant data dis-
tortion. Since the zoning factors impede rather than enhance predictive
power, they were dropped in the regression analysis of the second stage.
To address the question of whether exclusionary land use policy
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is related primarily to racial or economic segregation, regressions
using the race variable (PCNONWHI) and the two income variables (PCPR-
FAM and MEDFINC) with the zoning variables and logarithms were calcu-
lated. This methodology separates out the resources or socioeconomic
status variables from the minority variable and analyzes zoning in re-
lation to minorities without regard to their socioeconomic status or
available resources. It also analyzes the relationship of zoning to
income level without regard to race.
The regression of the zoning variables and logarithms with the
percentage of minorities indicates that they are slightly better pre-
dictors of the percentages of minorities than of Race and Resources.
The mulitple R with PCMFAMHO and LOGFRNT, the two variables entered
first, in the equation indicates that approximately 40.3% of the var-
iance in Race and Resources is predicted by the zoning variables and
logarithms. PCMFAMHO predicts 33.4% of the variance in PCNONWHI. LOG-
FRNT increases this percentage by seven points. None of the other eight
variables adds to the explanation. Table 93 shows the relevant statis-
tics for this equation.
Analysis of the simple bivariate correlations indicates that
four variables have moderately strong relationships with the percentage
of minorities. The percentage of multi-family acreage rises with the
percentage of minorities. Conversely, the smaller the single-family
frontage and minimum lot size, taken separately, the greater is the
percentage of minorities. Given the exclusionary zoning hypothesis,
this is as it should be.
However, the path analysis which compares the betas with the
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TABLE 93
THE RELATIONSHIP OF ZONING VARIABLES AND LOGARITHMS
TO THE PERCENTAGES OF MINORITIES
Order of
Entrance
Variable Simple
R
Beta* Multiple Adjusted
R R2
1 PCMFAMHO
.57751
.55744
.57751
2
_LOGFRNT
-.48243
-.77438
.63470
3 BDRMRES
-.16371
.20336 .64707
4 LOGMLS
-.44363
.40668
.66109
5 LOGNOPH
.25834 .10733 .66908
6 LOGSTBK
-.39923
-.10965
.67495
7 LOGMFAC
.45981 .23207 .67891
8 LOGZMF
.16710 .13375 .68509
9 PROMOBHO .24871
-.06264
.68644
10 LOGUNRPH
.32626 .05679 .68695
.32524
_j_38791
.39662~
.40817
.41180
.41258
.41060
.41198
.40600
.39855
.33352
•A°l8iL
".41870
.43704
.44767
.45556
.46092
.46934
.47120
.47190
^Controlling for all other variables.
simple Rs again reveals the apparent peculiar interrelationship of the
two single-family variables, LOGFRNT and LOGMLS, just as it did with
the regression of SES and the zoning variables. When the influence
of LOGMLS and the other variables is controlled, the correlation of
LOGFRNT with PCNONWHI jumps from -.48243 to -.77438. Similarly, when
LOGFRNT and the other zoning variables are controlled, the relationship
of LOGMLS with PCNONWHI radically switches from a moderately strong,
negative relationship of -.44363 to a moderately strong, positive re-
lationship of .40668. However, it was again concluded that this appar-
ent interaction is statistical, that is, the result of the collinearity
between LOGFRNT and LOGMLS.
The examination of the residuals shows that the predicted minor-
ity percentages for four census tracts, C.T.s 8006, 8014 and 8018, all
in Springfield, miss the actual percentages by more than plus or minus
two standard deviations from zero. These outliers are all census tracts
with high minority percentages.
The analysis of the relationships of zoning with the two mea-
sures of income shows a substantial improvement in zoning 's power to
predict income levels over race. The three zoning variables and loga-
rithms which have real explanatory power predict 50.9% of the variance
in the poverty variable, PCPRFAM. Table 94 provides the relevant sta-
tistics for the relationship of zoning to the percentages of poor fami-
lies
.
TABLE 94
THE RELATIONSHIP OF ZONING VARIABLES AND LOGARITHMS
TO THE PERCENTAGES OF POOR FAMILIES
Order of
Entrance
Variable Simple
R
Beta* Multiple
R
Adjusted
R2
R2
1 PCMFAMHO .65000 .87021 .65000 .41537 .42250
2 LOGNOPH .32199 .43446 .67065 .43601 .44977
3 LOGMFAC .35181 -.52856 .71283 .48945 .50812
4 LOGSTBK -.27170 -.05914 .72391 .49964 .52404
5 BDRMRES -.15192 .11637 .72948 .50176 .53214
6 LOGFRNT -.31350 -.56933 .73403 .50238 .53879
7 LOGMLS -.30143 .38155 ,73906 .50385 .54620
8 LOGUNRPH .29924 -.12957 .74184 .50172 .55033
9 LOGZMF .09694 .06554 .74319 .49715 .55234
10 PROMOBHO .14798 -.03344 .74368 .49099 .55307
11 AVRHGT .32774 .02794 .74379 .48401 .55329
*Controlling for all other variables.
The percentage of multi-family housing is the best predictor of
the percentage of poor, with a simple correlation of .65 and a beta of
.87. Where there is multi-family housing, there will also be poor peo-
ple. None of the other variables have more than a slight simple cor-
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relation with PCPRFAM. The single-family variables, frontage and mini-
mum lot size, interact similarly to their behavior in the Race and Re-
sources and PCNONWHI equations. Again, the conclusions here are that
collinearity is responsible, and that no theory can be built on this
statistical interaction.
The residuals indicate that the regression equation fails to pre-
dict the percentages of poor families within plus or minus two standard
deviations from a perfect prediction in only three census tracts, C.T.s
8008, 8010 and 8018 in Springfield.
The last regression of the first stage finds that, of all the
dependent variables, median family income is predicted the best by zon-
ing. The R squared indicates that 63.3% of the variance in MEDFTNC is
predicted by the two powerful zoning variables. The median family in-
come is a better measure of economic status than the poverty or wealth
variables because it includes all households in a census tract rather
than just those at the extremes of income. The relevant statistics for
this equation appear in Table 95.
As in all of the other regressions which use the zoning vari-
ables and logarithms as independent variables, the percentage of multi-
family housing has the highest simple correlation with the dependent
variables. The median income rises as the percentage of multi-family
housing goes down. PCMFAMHO by itself predicts 55.6% of the variance
in MEDFINC.
The percentage of multi-family acreage (R - -.56695), the nor-
malized number of public housing units (R = -.45471), and the normalized
number of unrestricted public housing units (R = -.43136), have moder-
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TABLE 95
THE RELATIONSHIP OF ZONING VARIABLES AND LOGARITHMS
TO MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME
Order of
Entrance
1
2
'
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Variable Simple Beta* Multiple
R R
Adjusted
R2
PCMFAMHO
-.74568
-.81726
.74568
.55056
_LOGNOPH
-.45471
-.51224
.79565
.62389
BDRMRES
.36366
.13188 .80133
.62854
LOGMFAC
-.56695 .38498
.80571
.63118
PROMOBHO
-.37695
-.19911
.81372
.64020
LOGUNRPH
-.43146
.26663 .81916 .64504
LOGSTBK
.20759 -.16593
.82096 .64355
LOGFRNT .36714 .70742 .82189 .64043
LOGMLS .34839
-.59593
.83350 .65709
LOGZMF
-.28041
-.11551
.83662 .65805
AVRHGT
-.39664
-.04609 .83688
.65394
.55604
.63306
".64213
.64917
.66214
.67102
.67398
.67551
.69473
.69992
.70036
Controlling for all other variables.
ately strong simple correlations with median family income.
When controlling for the other variables, the strength of the
correlations of PCMFAMHO and LOGFRNT both Increase. The beta for PC-
MFAMHO is -.81726 compared to an R of -.74568. Similarly, the beta for
LOGFRNT is .70742, compared to a R of .36714. The correlation for LOG-
MLS switches direction under controls, as it has done so frequently in
the other equations. Again, this has no theoretical meaning. However,
that the strengths of the betas here (LOGMLS =
-.59593, LOGFRNT = .70742)
are less than they are in the regression of Socioeconomic Status with the
zoning variables (LOGMLS =
-.65214, LOGFRNT = .91195) suggests that, al-
though income is an important facet in determining what class of persons
buys houses with wide frontages in single-family areas, consideration of
a household's educational and occupational levels adds to the explana-
tion. When socioeconomic status as a whole is considered, there is
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to a perfect correlation between it and the width of frontages (all
other variables held constant.) Although the relationship is still
sizeable wnen income is separated out from education and occupation, it
is not as great.
The residuals of five census tracts, C.T.s 8015.03, 8018 and
8021 in Springfield, C.T. 8220 in Northampton, and Longmeadow, fall
outside plus or minus two standard deviations from a perfect predic-
tion. Three of these residuals, those for C.T. 8021 in Springfield,
C.T. 8220 in Holyoke, and Longmeadow are $3,000 or more, less than the
actual median family income. High class census tracts have higher me-
dian family income than zoning suggests that they need.
The first stage of the regression analysis suggests that some
variables can be eliminated from the analysis. Among the independent
variables, the zoning factors and dummy variables have already been
shown to be less valid predictors than are the individual variables and
logarithms. Consequently, they are eliminated from the second stage.
Of the eleven individual variables and logarithms, six have been
important in the explanations of the five independent variables and have
been selected for retention in the second stage. These include five
multi-family variables: the percentage of multi-family housing (PCMFAM-
HO)
; apartment setback (LOGSTBK) ; bedroom restrictions (BDRMRES) ; the
number of public housing units (LOGNOPH)
;
and, the percentage of acre-
age zoned for multi-family uses (LOGMFAC) . The one single-family vari-
able, frontage requirements (LOGFRNT) is also retained. Elimination of
one of the single-family variables solves the multi-collinearity problem
and may help to uncover important facts which were masked by the multi~
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collinearity. Since large lot zoning is the major exclusionary cul-
prit of the zoning literature, it is important to retain one measure of
large lot zoning. Since frontage and minimum lot size are statistically
interchangeable, frontage can rightly be used as a surrogate for the
concept of large lot zoning.
A review of the bivariate correlations of the six independent
variables is contained in Table 96. None of these variables are highly
correlated which indicates that each variable measures a separate dimen-
sion of zoning, and there is no serious multi-collinearity problem.
Variable
LOGNOPH
BDRMRES
PCMFAMHO
LOGSTBK
LOGMFAC
TABLE 96
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE SIX BEST PREDICTORS
LOGFRNT
-.1895
.4382
-.4220
.6315
-.5299
LOGNOPH
-.1921
.2494
-.0659
.5056
BDRMRES PCMFAMHO LOGSTBK
-.3251
.3965
-.3568
-.3154
.6903 -.3400
Two pairs of variables do have coefficients in the .6 - .7 range.
The percentage of multi-family housing is fairly strongly correlated
with the percentage of multi-family acreage (.6903), as is apartment
setback with single-family frontage (.6315). However, elimination of
any of these variables does not seem justified. The percentage of multi-
family acreage measures localities' direct zoning of land and is the most
common measure of alleged multi-family exclusion. On the other hand, the
percentage of multi-family housing measures multi-family housing which
has been allowed by variance, special permit and non-conforming use. In
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fairness to the towns, both variables should be included.
Both single-family frontage and apartment setback are kept be-
cause they measure two different aspects of alleged exclusionary zoning,
that is, one measures a single-family zoning device, while the other
measures a multi-family zoning instrument. LOGFRNT cannot be excluded
since it is the only single-family measure. Apartment setback has been
indicated by the first series of regressions to be an important aspect of
multi-family zoning policy.
In the second stage of the regression analysis, standard regres-
sions were calculated using the narrowed field of six independent vari-
ables with the five important dependent variables, the Socioeconomic
Status Factor, the Race and Resources Factor, the percentages of mi-
norities, the percentages of poor families, and median family income.
The third stage of analysis further narrows the independent variables in
order to derive the best explanation which is statistically acceptable.
Stepwise deletion eliminates those variables with betas and/or regres-
sion coefficients which are not significantly different from zero. As
a rule of thumb, those betas with an F of 2.5 to 3.5 (depending on the
degrees of freedom) or regression coefficients with a T of 2.0 or more
are significant at the 95.0% confidence level and are retained in the
third stage. The final equations thus retain only significantly strong
variables
.
The first regression of the second stage uses the six important
predictors and Socioeconomic Status. Table 97 presents the figures for
this equation.
The important predictors of Socioeconomic Status are shown to be
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TABLE 97
STANDARD REGRESSION OF THE SIX IMPORTANT
PREDICTORS AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS
Variable Multiple R R2 Beta F Regres.Coef
f
T
LOGFRNT
LOGNOPH
BDRMRES
PCMPAMHO
LOGSTBK
LOGMFAC
.04785
.38481
.42090
.53875
.63005
.63007
.00229
.14808
.17715
.29025
.39696
.39698
.00874
-.26866
.19754
-.39988
-.43020
-.00854
.5
6.5
3.7
10.1
13.4
.3
.06653
-.38790
.73067
-.01211
-1.93237
-.01035
.0674
-2.5422
1.9245
-3.1763
-3.6665
-.0568
Constant 4.0953893
the same four as in the original regression equation. The four multi-
family variables, LOGSTBK, PCMFAMHO, LOGNOPH and BDRMRES have both sig-
nificant and relatively powerful betas and regression coefficients.
Neither the betas nor the regression coefficients of single-family
frontage and multi-family acreage are significantly different from
zero. Using these four independent variables as predictors results in
an overall R 2 of 39.7%.
The requirement for setback for apartments and the percentage of
multi-family housing in a census tract are the most important predictors
of the SES of census tract residents, while the number of public housing
units and the use of bedroom restrictions are also Important. Since all
four of these variables deal with multi-family zoning, the conclusion
to be drawn states that the more restrictive is a jurisdiction's multi-
family zoning policy, the higher will be the socioeconomic status of its
residents. Single-family zoning has little to do with the SES of census
tract residents. The figures In Table 98 give the finally accepted SES
equation.
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TABLE 98
FINAL REGRESSION OF THE FOUR BEST PREDICTORS
AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS
Variable Multiple R R' Beta Regres. Coeff,
LOGNOPH
PCMFAMHO
LOGSTBK
BDRMRES
.38397
.49943
.60471
.63000
,14744
,24942
,36568
39690
•.27232
•.40621
•.42480
.19952
17.4
18.7
4.0
8.8
-.39319
-.01231
-1.90810
.73798
Constant 4.2003900
The standard regression of the six powerful predictors with Race
and Resources pinpoints two variables, PCMFAMHO and LOGSTBK, as impor-
tant predictors, while BDRMRES is borderline. The remaining variables,
LOGNOPH, LOGMFAC and L0GFRNT are not significant by either the F or T-
statistic criterion. Table 99 displays these Race and Resources figures,
TABLE 99
STANDARD REGRESSION OF THE SIX IMPORTANT
PREDICTORS AND RACE AND RESOURCES
Variable Multiple R R2 Beta p Regres. Coef f
.
T
L0GFRNT .45983 .21144 -.16984 1.7 -1.23269 1.3255
LOGNOPH .48204 .23236 .14157 1.8 .19486 1.3546
BDRMRES .48741 .23756 .18660 3.4 .65796 1.8384
PCMFAMHO .58717 .34475 .38040 9.4 .01099 3.0555
LOGSTBK .63985 .40941 -.33460 8.3 -1.43274 - 2.8838
LOGMFAC .64056 .41031 -.05073 .1 -.05857 -.3412
Constant 3.6371340
The stepwise deletion of variables eliminates LOGNOPH, LOGMFAC,
and LOGFRNT. BDRMRES is also eliminated. PCMFAMHO and LOGSTBK are thus
left as important and significant. Table 100 shows these figures.
In spite of the stepwise deletion of LOGFRNT, two facts suggested
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TABLE inO
SEMI-FINAL REGRESSION OF THE TWO BEST
PREDICTORS AND RACE AND RESOURCES
Variable Multiple R R2 Beta F Regres. Coeff.
PCMFAMHO
LOGSTBK
.49722
.60262
.24723
.36315
.38407
-.35878
16.7
.01109
14.6
-1.53630
Constant 1.787973
that this measure of large lot zoning was also important in the explana-
tion of Race and Resources. First, single-family frontage contributes
significantly to the explanations of both the percentage of minorities
and the percentage of poor families, two of the major components of the
Race and Resources factor. The factoring of the dependent variables may
have clouded this importance. Second, when LOGFRNT and LOGSTBK are re-
gressed together on Race and Resources without PCMFAMHO, then LOGFRNT
is both significant and fairly strongly related to Race and Resources,
as Table 101 shows.
TABLE 101
THE REGRESSION OF LOGFRNT AND LOGSTBK
ON RACE AND RESOURCES
Variable Multiple R R2 Beta r Regres. Coeff.
LOGFRNT .45983 .21144 -.26077 4.5 -1.8926
LOGSTBK .52076 .27119 -.31524 6.6 -1.3499
Constant 5.71843
PCMFAMHO may be confounding the relationship of LOGFRNT to Race
and Resources. For these reasons, LOGFRNT was added back to the final
regression equation. Table 102 gives the finally accepted regression.
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TABLE 102
STANDARD REGRESSION OF THE THREE IMPORTANT
PREDICTORS AND RACE AND RESOURCES
Regres. Coeff.
Constant 3.20643
The standard regression of the six major predictors and the
percentages of minorities indicates that only two variables, LOGFRNT
and PCMFAMHO, have both betas and regression coefficients which are
significant and strong, while 3DRMRES is borderline. Table 103 pre-
sents these figures.
TABLE 103
STANDARD REGRESSION OF THE SIX IMPORTANT PREDICTORS
AND THE PERCENTAGE OF MINORITIES
Variable Multiple R R2 Beta F Regres. Coeff • T
LOGFRNT .48243 .23274 -.26647 4. 6 -46.6963 -2. 1521
L0GN0PH
.51152 .26165 .15614 2. 4 5.1889 1. 5462
BDRMRES
.51694 .26723 .17623 3. 2 15.0034 1. 7967
PCMFAMHO
.65562 .42984 .49879 17. 2 .3478 4. 1461
LOGSTBK
.66782 .44599 -.16672 2. 2 -17.2372 -1. 4870
LOGMFAC .67036 .44939 .09845
• 5 -2.7444 —*
• 6853
Constant 104.94973
The stepwise deletion eliminates the four non-significant vari-
ables, including BDRMRES. The final prediction equation of the percen-
tage of minorities includes only single-family frontage and the percen-
tage of multi-family housing, which together predict 40.3% of the vari-
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ance in PCNONWHI. Table 104 presents the finally accepted equation.
TABLE 104
FINAL REGRESSION OF THE TWO BEST PREDICTORS
AND THE PERCENTAGE OF MINORITIES
Variable Multiple R R2 Beta Regres. Coeff.
LOGFRNT
PCMFAMHO
.48243
.63470
.23274 -.29043 9.3
-50.89557
.40284 .45493 22.8
.31721
Constant 98.16322
The standard regression of the six major predictors and the
percentage of poor families finds that three variables, PCMFAMHO,
LOGNOPH and LOGMFAC, have betas and regression coefficients signi-
ficantly different from zero. Table 105 shows these figures.
TABLE 105
STANDARD REGRESSION OF THE SIX IMPORTANT PREDICTORS
AND THE PERCENTAGE OF POOR FAMILIES
Variable Multiple R R2 Beta F Regres. Coeff T
LOGFRNT .31350 .09228 -.11867 1.1 -6.9840 -1.0472
LOGNOPH .41207 .16980 .38506 13.1 3.7397 3.6253
BDRMRES .41242 .17009 .11867 1.7 3.3930 1.3219
PCMFAMHO .67846 .46031 .82923 56.7 .1942 7.5313
LOGSTBK .68414 .46805 -.11287 1.2 -3.9189 -1.0999
LOGMFAC .73403 .53879 -.44891 11.7 4.2027 -3.4142
Constant 13.422963
When the stepwise deletion of the three non-significant variables
of the preceding equation was run, LOGSTBK and BDRMRES were removed.
However, LOGFRNT became significant when it was grouped with PCMFAMHO,
LOGNOPH and LOGMFAC. Thus adding back LOGFRNT to the PCPRFAM equation
became viable, so that the final equation includes these four vari-
ables. Together, the four variables predict 52.3% of the variance in
the percentage of poor families. Table 106 presents the figures.
TABLE 106
FINAL REGRESSION OF THE FOUR BEST PREDICTORS
AND THE PERCENTAGE OF POOR FAMILIES
Variable Multiple R R2 Beta F Regres. Coeff.
LOGFRNT
LOGMFAC
PCMFAMHO
LOGNOPH
.31350
.38239
.67094
.72349
.09828
.14622
.45016
.52343
-.14716
-.45545
.82268
.31923
2.5
11.9
56.2
12.0
-8.6607
-4.2639
.1926
3.5630
Constant 11.48236
In the standard regression with the last dependent variable,
median family income, only two variables, LOGNOPH and PCMFAMHO, have
betas and regression coefficients which are strong and significant. The
remaining four variables, LOGFRNT, LOGSTBK, LOGMFAC and BDRMRES have
both betas and regression coefficients which are weak and non-signi-
ficant. Table 107 furnishes these figures.
TABLE 107
STANDARD REGRESSION OF THE SIX IMPORTANT
PREDICTORS AND MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME
Variable Multiple R R2 Beta F Regres. Coef f
.
T
LOGFRNT .36714 .13479 .08778 .8 1517.7178 • 8956
LOGNOPH .53726 .28865 -.31676 15.7 -1038.6881 -3. 9626
BDRMRES .56612 .32049 .11958 2.4 1004.4873 1. 5402
PCMFAMHO .80133 .64213 -.72405 57.8 -49.8133 -7. 6032
LOGSTBK .80439 .64704 -.09330 1.1 -951.7281 -1. 0512
LOGMFAC .80931 .65499 .15046 1.8 413.8244 1. 3230
Constant 12633.868
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The stepwise deletion of the four non-significant and weak
variables leaves a final equation with the two multi-family variables,
PCMFAMHO and LOGNOPH, as predictors of median family income. These two
variables together predict 63.3% of the variance in median family in-
come. Table 108 presents these statistics.
Variable
TABLE 108
FINAL REGRESSION OF THE TOO BEST PREDICTORS
AND MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME
Multiple R R2 Beta Regres. Coeff
PCMFAMHO
LOGNOPH
.74568
.79565
.55604
-.67422 92.9 -46.3851
.63306
-.28658 16.8
-939.7267
Constant 14139.33
Tables 109, 110, and 111 summarize the overall relationship of
zoning to racial and socioeconomic segregation and the contributions
of the individual variables to the explanation. Table 109 compares
the relative strengths of the final regression equations. Table 110
compares the betas of the individual zoning variables in the final
regression equations in order to rank the most important contributors
to the explanation of racial and socioeconomic segregation. Table 111
provides the regression coefficients for each variable in each equation.
TABLE 109
COMPARISON OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE FINAL REGRESSION
' EQUATIONS
R2
SES RACERES PCNONWHI PCPRFAM MEDFINC
39.7 37.2 40.3 52.3 63.3
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The accepted multiple R2 s for all equations indicate that, taken
together, large lot zoning and multi-family zoning policy predict the
two factors, Race and Resources and Socioeconomic Status, more poorly
than the individual poverty and race variables. The predictions of both
Socioeconomic Status (39.7%) and Race and Resources (37.2%) are only
relatively strong. Among the individual dependent variables, the pre-
diction of the percentage of minorities is also moderately good, while
the predictions of the percentage of poor families and median family
income are the best. Zoning predicts more than half of the variance in
median family income. The conclusions suggested by the final regression
equations are that, while zoning is only slightly related to the socioeco-
nomic status and the racial distribution of the population with or with-
out resources considered, it is moderately related to the distribution
by income level. If zoning can be said to have an exclusionary effect
on minorities and the poor, this causation only slightly effects minor-
ities, and more strongly affects the poor. Economic segregation is more
a function of zoning than is racial segregation, but neither type of
segregation is entirely explained by zoning. The statistical evidence
provides surprisingly limited support of the exclusionary zoning hypo-
thesis, that is, that zoning results in economic and racial segregation.
The analysis of the betas suggests that the percentage of multi-
family housing is clearly the most efficacious predictor overall of
racial and economic segregation. However, it is a better predictor of
income segregation than of racial segregation. This variable, which
measures the multi-family housing that has been permitted by special
permit, variance and non-conforming uses as well as that which is zoned
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for multi-family use in its own right, is the best predictor of many
poor, many minorities, and low median family income. It is a better
predictor than are the actual acreages zoned for multi-family uses.
LOGMFAC has important predictive power for only one variable, the per-
centages of poor families.
The number of public housing units (LOGNOPH) is the second most
efficacious predictor. It is important in the explanation of socio-
economic segregation, as indicated by its contributions to the explana-
tions of SES, PCPRFAM and MEDFINC. However, the number of public hou-
sing units in a jurisdiction has nothing to do with racial segregation.
Apartment setback (LOGSTBK) partially predicts Socioeconomic
Status and Race and Resources, but it is associated with neither race
without regard to income, nor income without regard to race. Large
lot zoning, as measured by minimum frontage requirements (LOGFRNT) , is
important in the explanation of both racial and economic segregation.
It is a better predictor of where minorities live than of where the
poor of all races, or resource poor minorities, live. The larger the
lots required by a jurisdictions 1 s zoning, the smaller will be the per-
centages of minorities.
Bedroom restrictions on apartments make some small contribution
to the prediction of Socioeconomic Status. A slightly higher class
status is associated with jurisdictions which have bedroom restric-
tions.
Table 110 provides the betas and ranking of variables according
to their contributions to the explanations of the dependent variables.
The conclusions which can be drawn from the analysis of the varl-
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TABLE 110
COMPARISON OF THE SIGNIFICANT BETAS OF THE EFFICACIOUS ZONINGVARIABLES IN THE FINAL REGRESSION EQUATIONS
Rank Van' ^Kl a
1 PCMFAMHO
2** LOGNOPH
3** LOGSTBK
4** LOGFRNT
5** LOGMFAC
6 BDRMRES
SES RACE PC PC MED
RES NON PR FINC
WHI FAM
Total*
•.40621
.35181 .45493 .82268
.27232
- _
.31923
..42480
-.28665
-
-.13034
-.29043
-.14716
-
-.45545
.19952 -
-.67422
-.28658
2.70985
.87813
.71145
.56793
.45545
.19952
*The totals of the betas suggest an ordinal scale onlv and are
used as a general guideline to rank the importance of the individual
variables.
**The second through fifth variables are grouped so closely
together in total contributions to the explanations of the dependent
variables that their rankings should be interpreted looselv rather
than strictly.
ables which predict the dependent variables are that, first, multi-
family zoning policy, as measured by the percentages of multi-family
housing units and acreage, the number of public housing units, and the
setback required for apartments, is implicated as the strongest deter-
minant of economic segregation. A restrictive multi-family zoning
policy, to a certain extent, results in high status populations, while
liberal multi-family zoning allows lower status populations to reside
in a community. Second, the percentage of multi-family units allowed
by zoning is important in the partial explanation of where minorities
and poor minorities live. Third, large lot zoning is only a slight
determinant of racial and economic segregation. The race and poverty
level of residents have very little to do with a community's single-
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family zoning policy.
Finally, Table 111 provides the regression equations for the
five independent variables.
TABLE 111
THE SIGNIFICANT REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF THE EFFICACIOUS
ZONING VARIABLES IN THE FINAL REGRESSION EQUATIONS
Variable SES RACERES PCNONWHI PCPRFAM MEDFINC
PCMFAiMHO
LOGNOPH
LOGSTBK
LOGFRNT
LOGMFAC
BDRMRES
-.01231
-.39319
-1.90810
.73798
.01016
-1.22740
-.94602
.31721
-50.89557
.19265
3.56301
-8.66073
-4.26386
-46.38509
-939.72670
Constant 4.20039 3.20643 98.16322 11.48236 14139.33
Canonical Correlation
In order to see if sets of linearly related independent variables
maximize the correlations between sets of linearly related dependent
variables in any comprehensible fashion, the zoning and ecology data
were also analyzed by canonical correlation. This analysis delineates
additional aspects of the interrelationship of zoning and the urban
ecology.
The first pair of canonical variates have a canonical correla-
tion of .94758 and share 89.8% (eigenvalue = .89791) of the variance
in both sets of variables. The coefficients for the individual vari-
ables and logarithms with the canonical variates are contained in Table
112.
The urban ecology canonical variate is composed of relatively
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TABLE 112
CANONICAL VARIATES : SET ONE, DENSE URBAN
AREA ZONING AND URBAN ECOLOGY
Composition of Zoning Variate Composition of Urban Ecology Variate
Variable Correlation Variable Correlation
LOGFRNT
LOGMLS
AVRHGT
PCMFAMHO
.91899
-.84405
.55046
.36408
AVHOUSIZ
MEDFINC
PCNEWHO
-.50395
-.43558
-.40549
small households who have low median income and live in mostly old hou-
sing. The zoning canonical variate is composed of small single-family
minimum lot size requirements, the permission of tall apartments, and
high percentages of multi-family housing. All of this makes sense
under the exclusionary zoning hypothesis, that is, where zoning permits
small minimum lots, tall apartments, and high percentages of multi-
family housing, one expects to find small household sizes, low median
income, and old housing. However, the primary component of the zoning
variate is LOGFRNT, with a positive relationship. Where one finds a li-
beral minimum lot size policy, and a liberal policy towards apartment
heights, and a liberal policy towards multi-family housing, the canoni-
cal variate indicates that a restrictive policy towards single-family
frontage also is prevalent, and this policy prevails in census tracts
that have the inner city characteristics of small households, low in-
come and little new housing. This pattern of intercorrelation among the
variables has no theoretical explanation, and is a result of the collin-
earity of LOGFRNT and LOGMLS.
Additionally, in all the zoning variate sets in which both L0
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MLS and LOGFRNT have strong coefficients (Sets 1, 3, 4, and 8), the
directions of the relationships of these two variables are reversed and
in opposition. That LOGMLS and LOGFRNT behave similarly to their be-
havior under controls in the regression equations is further proof of
the confounding effect of collinearity between these two variables.
In order to see if more sense could be made out of the first
pair of canonical variates, canonical variate scores for each census
tract were computed. Perhaps previous knowledge about census tracts
compared to their variate scores could provide clues to the meaning of
the first pair of variates. Table 113 provides these variate scores.
The census tract scores indicate that the variates are related
to the central city-suburban dimension. Central city census tracts for
the most part have positive scores on both variates. Inner city tracts,
such as those located in the North End and Winchester Square in Spring-
field, have high positive scores (around 1.0). The few census tracts
in the central cities (all in Springfield) with negative scores on one
or both variates are the census tracts with high socioeconomic status
and quality of living conditions. For instance, C.T.s 8016.04 and 8024
have negative scores on both variates and have been previously identi-
fied as wealthy areas with higher than average socioeconomic status.
-
The four census tracts with one negative variate score, C.T.s 8015.03,
8016.01, 8016.02 and 8016.03, are also areas with high or moderately
high socioeconomic indicators.
In contrast to the central city variate scores, suburban census
tracts have mostly negative scores on both variates. Tracts with nega-
tive two to three or less scores on one or both variates, that is,
TABLE 113
CENSUS TRACT CANONICAL VARIATE SCORES FOR THE DENSE URBAN AREA VARIATES
Central Cities
Municipality
Springfield
CT.
Holyoke
8001
8002
8003
8004
8005
8006
8007
8008
8009
8010
8011.01
8011.02
8012
8013
8014
8015.01
8015.02
8015.03
8016.01
8016.02
8016.03
8016.04
8016.05
8017
8018
8019
8020
8021
8022
8023
8024
8025
8026_
8114
8115
8116
8117
8118
8119
8120
8121
Zoning Variate Score Ecology Variate Score
.611860
.172937
.107866
.595245
.644653
1.040486
.981286
1.015139
.684832
1.035772
1.068994
1.033498
1.083749
1.071405
.591147
.170263
.796494
-.041423
-.029487
.113025
-.047774
-.024075
.218737
.760622
.861074
1.000938
1.060500
.752419
.911073
.894365
-.061888
.062161
-•22Z92°_
1.166713
1.183419
1.146829
1.163899
1.010249
.259848
.810979
.505108
.338526
.426931
.111419
.427316
.456982
.973950
.814510
.991954
.877056
1.228901
.896149
.783303
1.280459
.984925
.738783
.502212
.510028
.441126
.034365
-.086377
.259997
-.196491
.381173
.772016
1.221431
.972608
.940245
.581526
.608776
.548421
-.039364
.113623
^441647
"1.038394
1.628514
1.563980
1.367973
1.075611
.573664
1.101344
.886556
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TABLE 113—Continued
Chicopee 8106
8107
8108
8109
8110
8111
8112
8113
.526967
.704986
.969229
.884506
.569800
.896980
.522698
.463483
First Ring Suburbs
.398879
.416791
.385946
.623093
.353550
.555157
.415236
.221502
Ag awam
E. Longmeadow
Hampden
Longmeadow
Ludlow
W. Springfield
Wilbraham
8132
8134
8135
8133
8104
8122
8123
8124
8136
-1.328517
-2.201863
-1.640726
-2.344790
-1.275922
.740007
1.046573
.279558
-2.369944
1.110395
1.514818
1.873810
3.026589
-1.304773
.545190
.790440
-.001703
1.694584
Second Ring Suburbs
Easthampton 8223
-.694174
-.711920
Southampton
8224
-.753752
-.640537
8225
-1.863991
-2.286480
Southwick 8131
-1.362838
-1.463151
Westf ield 8125
-1.274437
-1.179010
8126
-1.368297
-1.294374
8127
-.653499
-.826529
8128
-1.231883
-1.086249
8129
-1.408376
-1.366091
Granby 8209
-1.856220
-1.576111
Hadley 8214
-.978760
-.642590
Northampton 8216
-.264119
-.588292
8217
-.387409
-.730015
8219 .136482
-.302162
8220 .343406
-.233536
8222
-.485352
-.686099
S. Hadley 8210
-1.364238
-1.165367
8211
-1.054034
-1.035983
8212
-.868170
-.641091
8213
-1.407596
-1.435132
Belchertown 8202 -1.494844
-1.996591
Monson 8137
-1.197660
-1.566023
Palmer 8101
-.666601 .125853
8102 -.581074 .271993
8103 -.616456 .302208
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Longmeadow, East Longmeadow, Wilbraham and Southampton, are the high
class and reputationally exclusionary areas. The few suburban tracts
which have positive scores on one or both variates are located in the
incorporated cities of the first and second ring suburbs which have
large percentages of multi-family housing. These include all three
West Springfield tracts, two in Northampton, and all three Palmer
tracts. The highest positive scores are in the mid-town areas in each
city.
The canonical variate scores seem to indicate that the first pair
of variates identifies urbanized census tracts in which zoning has per-
mitted small lots, many and high-rise apartments, and in which relative-
ly poor people in non-traditional households live in old housing. The
very high positive correlation of single-family frontage with the zon-
ing variate remains anomalous. Because of their overall character,
these variates have been named "The Dense Urban Area Variates."
The second pair of canonical variates have a canonical correla-
tion of .87802 and account for 77.1% (eigenvalue = .77091) of the re-
maining variance, that is, 7.9% of the total variance in the zoning and
ecology variables. Although these variates make a statistically ques-
tionable contribution to the explanation, they will nevertheless be
analyzed since a theoretical rationale can be attached to their des-
cription. Table 114 displays the variables of the second pair of vari-
ates.
This pair of variates on the surface appears to be even more con-
tradictory than the first. Relationships of individual variables to
both the zoning and ecology composites appear to run in unanticipated
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TABLE 114
CANONICAL VARIATES
:
SET TWO, WORKING CLASS PROVINCIALISM
Composition of Zoning Variate:
Skillfully Regulated Apartments
Variable
LOGSTBK
BDRMRES
LOGZMF
PROMOBHO
Correlation
.63271
-.48820
.44542
.35635
Composition of Ecology Variate:
White, Blue-Collar Households
Variable
MEDFINC
PCPRFAM
MEDSFVAL
AVHOUSIZ
PCWCOLWK
PCNONWHI
Correlation
-.65295
-.61245
.58772
-.48493
-.48414
-.42543
directions. However, a theoretical explanation can be found for the
apparent contradictions. The variates describe a type of zoning and
urban ecology which can be called "Working Class Provincialism."
According to the zoning canonical variate, in census tracts with
restrictive apartment setbacks and in which mobile homes are permitted,
there will also be no apartment bedroom restrictions and many zoned
multi-family units. These relationships can be interpreted to mean
that some localities zone for many multi-family units but restrict these
by requiring them to be set back a great distance from the thoroughfare.
The setback restriction increases the cost of apartments sufficiently
to exclude the poor, but not the working class. The numbers of bedrooms
are not limited in these apartments, so that the apartment complexes
then can be occupied by families with children who can afford them. The
children also would not be in danger from nearby traffic. The juris-
dictions both opt for apartments as their means to house working class
households, and they permit mobile homes as an alternative form of
inexpensive habitat. The variate would then describe communities
which maintain a provincial, well-planned, monitored and controlled,
lower middle- income apartment policy.
The canonical variate scores on the zoning variate for census
tracts offer support for this interpretation. All but two Springfield
census tracts have negative variate scores. Although Springfield gen-
erally has many zoned multi-family units, it does not regulate apart-
ments in this particular way. Similarly, the suburbs which have been
identified as having restrictive scores on two or more of the zoning
factors which deal with various aspects of the regulation of multi-
family housing, namely, Wilbraham, Longmeadow, and C.T.s 8212 and 8213
in South Hadley,3 have strong negative scores on this variate, indica-
ting that their zoning policy is very different from blue-collar pro-
vincialism. Those high-middle or high class census tracts in Spring-
field in which a policy of severely restricting multi-family housing is
maintained, namely, C.T.s 8016.04 and 8024, also have very strong nega-
tive scores for this reason. The three mid-town census tracts in Spring-
field, C.T.s 8010, 8011.01 and 8011.02, have very strong negative scores
because their land is zoned mostly for commercial uses, and multi-family
housing is excluded incidentally.
Census tracts which have positive variate scores include most
census tracts in the central cities of Holyoke and Chicopee, and Aga-
wam, Hampden, Ludlow, West Springfield, Easthampton, Southampton, South-
wick, Westf ield, Hadley, Belchertown and Palmer. The census tract scores
of Holyoke cluster close to zero, indicating that Holyoke' s zoning is
neither extremely different from nor very much like working class pro-
vincialism. Chicopee's scores are strongly positive. As a blue-collar
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canity, chicopee . s zoning ls che prototvpe o( working ciass
vincial poUcy. The maJ oricy of the suburban tracts^ ^
strong, positive scores are in those
_ities which are not the arche-
typal exclusionary suburb. They are more the solid mlddle
, or louer.
middle class community.
The composition of the urban ecology variate which correlates
with the zoning variate generally describes the blue-collar or lower
middle class locality. Median family income is low, but there are also
very few really poor households. The percentages of white collar wor-
kers and of minorities are small, indicating that the populations are
white and blue-collar. However, two of the individual variables, MED-
SFVAL and AVHOUSIZ, have relationships running in directions which would
not be expected. The median value of single-family housing is likely
to be high in these communities, based on the positive relation of med-
ian single-family value to the variate. A possible interpretation of
this anomaly is that the skillfully regulated apartments' policy pro-
tects the property values of detached housing, and that working class
residents take pride in maintaining their houses.
The negative direction of the relationship of average household
size is also unexpected, considering the composition of the Family Liv-
ing Factor. One would expect blue-collar households to be fairly large,
traditional families. However, the negative relationship may simply sug-
gest that traditional concepts of the relationship of family composition
to socioeconomic status need to be revised in the blue-collar subgroup
as well as in all other socioeconomic class groups.
The canonical variate scores for census tracts on the ecology
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variate identify the blue-collar areas of the metropolis, and those
areas which are definitely not blue-collar (that is, they may be high
socioeconomic status, black, or commercial areas). Those census tracts
with high positive scores (greater than one) include C.T.s 8110, 8111,
and 8112 in Chicopee, C.T. 8123 in West Springfield, both census tracts
in Easthampton, C.T. 8128 in Westfield, Belchertown, and all three cen-
sus tracts in Palmer. Census tracts which are definitely not blue-col-
lar include the two CBD tracts in Springfield, 8010 and 8011.01, and
adjacent Winchester Square tracts, 8012 and 8013 to the east, C.T. 8019
in the Hispanic area, and upper class tract 8024 in Forest Park. In
the suburbs, as is expected, Longmeadow, East Longmeadow, Wilbraham,
and C.T.s 8212 and 8213 in South Hadley also have negative scores of
less than one. The remainder of the central city and suburban tracts
have scores in the middle positive, or middle negative (0 to + 1.00)
range, indicating that they are neither clearly blue-collar nor not
blue-collar.
Table 115 provides the canonical variate scores of census tracts
on the zoning and ecology variates.
To summarize the meaning of the second pair of variates, in
white census tracts with few minorities, blue-collar or working class
households of small size have lower than average incomes, but very few
of them have incomes below the poverty level. These localities permit
mobile homes, and residents keep up their single-family homes so that
their property values are relatively high. As a part of their effort to
"keep up the neighborhood," they allow through zoning, substantial
amounts of multi-family housing, but these are required to be set back
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TABLE 115
CENSUS TRACT CANONICAL VARIATE SCORES FOR THE
WORKING CLASS PROVINCIALISM VARIATE
S
Central Cities
MuniciDal i fv H TL. . 1 . Zoning Variate Score Ecology Variate Score
Sorinef ield oU(J±
-.078099
.186108
oOOz
-.068978
.270364
oUU j
o aa/.
.083846
-.180347
-.026423
.519670O AA C8005
-.430257
-.512857
8006
-.628481
-.244404Q AA"78007
-.066458
.617176Q AAO8008
-.512376
-.214493
8009
-.047481
-.421617
8010
-2.863437
-3.125892
8011.01
-2.569839
-3.050255
8011 . 02
-1.049558
.266949
8012
.759933
-1.039998
8013
-.713395
-1.024010Oat/8014
-.156694
-.884436
8015.01
-.817207
-.211521
8015 . 02
-.620466
-.497163
8015. 03
-.572497
-.048876
8016.01
-.580881
-.669443
Q AT C AO8016 . 02 .170836
-.354385
8016 . 03 .415303
.155334
Q A 1 C A /.oOlb . 04
-1. 681496
-.825385
Q AT £ ACoUlb
.
0j
-.054010
-.261709
Q AT "78017
-.240603
-.832130
Q AT Q8018
-.322180
-.914413
Q A T A8019
-.250881
-1.423077
o no a8OZ0
-.615459
-.213179
O AO T8021
-.359245
-.306617
3022
• JJJ.J7U 1 Q AO Q Q
8023 -.376501
.069110
8024
-1.823664
-1.238322
8025 -.574643
-.684928
8026
-.180583
-.338684
Holyoke 8114 .116638 .0.95746
8115 -.129354 .294080
8116 .120901 .116724
8117 .098964 -.418330
8118 .406491 .459815
8119 .250299 -.122093
8120 .575716 -.013921
8121 .713299 .673759
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TABLE 115—Continued
Chicopee 8106
8107
8108
8109
8110
8111
8112
8113
.973972
1.137213
.972616
1.353996
1.399127
1.537840
1.092518
1.195578
.937349
.914360
.766282
.990650
1.346934
1.422924
1.330397
.583085
Agawam
E. Longmeadow
Hampden
Longmeadow
Ludlow
W. Springfield
Wilbraham
8132
8134
8135
8133
8104
8122
8123
8124
8136
First Ring Suburbs
.378698
-1.518814
.715659
-2.641959
1.557001
.872209
.545575
.733773
-1.672026
.670329
1.130941
-.592256
3.229506
.168325
.737244
1.453170
.267748
1.243515
Second Ring Suburbs
Easthampton 8223
.987466 1.480299
8224 1.013298 1.424959
Southampton 8225
.692831
.711643
Southwick 8131 1.139210
.942939
Westfield 8125
.550695
.924934
8126
.504225
.310262
8127
.895655
.569140
8128
.422025 1.159715
8129
.355052
.143200
Granby 8209 .045120
-.264229
Hadley 8214 .167576
.692748
Northampton 8216 .394424
.165740
8217
-.162114
.182779
8219 .450128
.119925
8220
-.007299
.527923
8222 -.142850
.536294
S. Hadley 8210 -1.257790
-.352251
8211 -.335339
-.337063
8212 -2.063879
-1..914431
8213 -1.415974
-1.433001
Belchertown 8202 1.421639 1.535129
Monson 8137 -.451442 -.402019
Palmer 8101 1.651942 1.165789
8102 1.665458 1.693176
8103 1.753076 1.408546
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fairly far from the street, and they are not limited in the number
of bedrooms that may be included. Screening from the street by dis-
tance may be used to place the cost of apartments out of reach of the
very poor, to protect the value of single-family homes which are near
multi-family areas, and to protect the children who live in them from
traffic. The overall zoning policy of blue-class areas is a somewhat
provincial one. It enhances the working class values of keeping out
minorities, providing multi-family housing for those who work but not
for those on welfare, while preserving the property values of single-
family subdivisions which are interspersed with multi-family housing.
The first two pairs of canonical variates together have ac-
counted for 97.7% of the total variance in the zoning and ecology var-
iables. The third pair of variates account for only 1.7% of the var-
iance. This and subsequent pairs are not statistically important enough
to be analyzed.
To summarize the results of the canonical correlation analysis,
the first set of canonical variates suggests that the central cities
and larger cities in outlying suburban locations show a fairly consis-
tent policy of liberal zoning towards their urbanized areas. They zone
for large numbers of multi-family units which are permitted in mid-
or high-rise buildings. They also permit single-family houses on small
lots, although this liberality may be offset by restrictive single-fam-
ily frontages. Areas which are zoned in this way have little recent
construction, and the residents of these areas are poor, small house-
holds. The more exclusive suburbs do not have areas which are zoned in
this manner.
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These results imply that not all suburbs are exclusionary. The
more populous and urbanized suburbs are as liberal in zoning, in selec-
ted areas, as are the central cities. The findings also imply that
only some areas of central cities are zoned liberally enough to enable
the poor to live there. Many central city areas are not liberally
zoned. The high socioeconomic status of the populations of these areas
and the resources available to their residents are either necessitated
by the restrictive zoning, or the zoning may be a result of the high
status population's desires to protect their status. A last implica-
tion is that zoning of this type is related to socioeconomic and living
conditions factors, but not to race.
The analysis of the second pair of canonical variates also pin-
points a particular subtype of zoning policy. In selected areas of the
metropolis which are predominantly white, blue-collar areas with few
poor people, but with lower that average income and higher than average
valued single-family houses, zoning permits ample numbers of apartments
and requires them to be amply set back from the street, but does not
place bedroom restrictions. Mobile homes are also permitted in most of
these areas. Blue-collar communities such as Chicopee use this type of
provincial zoning to maintain single-family and multi-family housing
values so that people with poverty-level incomes cannot live in their
communities. Few minorities, perhaps because many of them are poor (as
well as for other reasons) live in these areas.
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Conclus ion
Many dimensions of the interrelationship of central city-
suburban location, zoning and the urban ecology of the municipalities
of the Springfield SMSA have been identified. Various statistical
methods have been used to examine both sides of the exclusionary zon-
ing hypothesis and to show that differences in urban and suburban zon-
ing are related to economic and racial segregation to varying degrees,
The various approaches have also focused on and highlighted various
facets of these relationships.
In order further to elucidate the relationships of zoning to
the urban ecology, the next chapter will analyze the exclusionary zon-
ing hypothesis from an entirely different perspective.
CHAPTER IX
A TALE OF TWO TOWNS
Springfield SMSA data have confirmed the parts of the generally
accepted model of exclusionary zoning which maintain that suburbs are
more restrictive in their zoning than the central cities, and that the
first ring suburbs are more restrictive than the second ring. In order
better to understand the underlying reasons for this phenomenon of ex-
clusionary zoning, one suburb from the first ring, Wilbraham, and one
suburb from the second ring, Easthampton, have been selected as repre-
sentatives of the most and least exclusionary suburbs. These two towns
will be subjected to more detailed "qualitative" analysis so that the
public policies, political and sociological developmental characteris-
tics which precisely describe the two ends of the suburban zoning con-
tinuum can be explicated. The historical evolution of their zoning by-
laws, the battles which have been waged or not waged over lot sizes,
public housing, apartments and other related issues illustrate how they
have arrived at their highly exclusionary statuses.
In the course of telling the tale of each town, various perti-
nent events will be compared to the standards set out by the Supreme
Court in the Arlington Heights easel in 1977 for judging whether public
officials have been deliberately exclusionary in their zoning policy.
The statistical analysis showing the disproportionate impact or racio-
economically discriminatory effect of zoning on the urban ecology of
the metropolitan area and the two towns is a starting point. In addi-
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tion, the historical backgrounds of zoning decisions, the sequence of
events leading up to specific instances of restrictive or non-restric-
tive actions, inciuding substantive and procedural departures from the
no™, and official statements as recorded in minutes and reports, will
all be examined. The historical and official evidence will be used to
shew how each town came to lie on opposite ends of the suburban exclu-
sionary continuum.
Similarities and Differenc es
Since the various methods of statistical analysis have focused
on different aspects of zoning policy, they have not established pre-
cisely which individual suburbs are at the extreme ends of the suburban
exclusionary continuum. Taken together, however, the various methods
have grouped small samples of towns which are representative of the ex-
tremes. Although Wilbraham and Easthampton have not been pinpointed
conclusively as the most and least exclusionary suburbs, their respec-
tive zoning policies are prototypical of the two types.
A review of the statistical indicators of the two towns led to
the selection of Wilbraham and Easthampton. Wilbraham requires large
average single-family mimimum lot sizes and frontages, zones few acres
for multi-family housing, provides a small percentage of multi-family
housing units and few zoned multi-family units, limits the height of
apartments to two stories, requires substantial setback for apartments,
prohibits mobile homes, and has small numbers of public housing and
family public housing units. In contrast, Easthampton has non-restric-
tive scores for all but two of these variables (AVRSTBK and PROM0BH0)
.
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Easthampton requires a greater setback for apartments than does Abra-
ham, and both suburbs prohibit mobile homes. Table 116 compares the in-
dividual zoning variable scores of Wilbraham and Easthampton.
TABLE 116
COMPARISON OF WILBRAHAM' S AND EASTHAMPTON
' S INDIVIDUAL
ZONING VARIABLE SCORES
AVR
MLS
AVR
FRNT
PC
MFAM
AC
PC
MFAM
HO
ZND
MFAM
AVR
HGT
AVR
STBK
BDRM
RES
PRO
MOB
HO
NO
PUB
HO
UNR
PUB
HO
Wilbra-
ham
East-
35000 160 0.1 5.3 48 28.0 65.0 1 0 45 5
hampton 16250 93 6.8 49.4 4754 53.4 96.7 0 0 370 250
Perusal of the scores of other suburbs suggests that they are
not as prototypical as Wilbraham and Easthampton. Although Hampden's
single-family zoning is more restrictive than Wilbraham' s (AVRMLS =
50,000, AVRFRNT = 185), all of its multi-family variables are less re-
strictive. Both Hampden and Wilbraham forbid mobile homes and place
bedroom restrictions on apartments so that one is equally restrictive
with the other on these variables. Thus the individual variables indi-
cate that either Hampden or Wilbraham would be representative of the
most exclusionary suburb. However, Hampden is not as good a choice as
Wilbraham for other reasons. The developmental controversy of the post-
World War II period mostly passed Hampden by, perhaps because' it is lo-
cationally more remote from the central cities than Wilbraham. Hampden
did not even adopt zoning until 1973. At the beginning of the 1980s
Hampden remained a sparsely populated, rural community with the battle
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over exclusion in its future and not its past. Consequently, Wllbra.
ha, seemed a better choice as the example of the exclusionary suburb.
Similarly, other suburbs than Easthampton can be eliminated as
potential representatives of the least exclusionary jurisdiction.
Northampton and Westf ield are more liberal than Easthampton in their
multi-family zoning policies. However, Easthampton is more liberal than
both in its single-family policy and is the most liberal of all suburbs
(except Agawam which has a smaller minimum lot size) on the single-
family variables. Additionally, neither Northampton nor Westfield would
be good representatives of suburban zoning because, although they are
locationally classified as suburbs, their large populations establish
them as cities in their own right. If at some point in the distance
past, they could have prevented urbanization, they did not do so. Their
zoning failed to keep them in the small and suburban category. Conse-
quently, their recent zoning past and current indicators reflect at-
tempts to deal with urbanization more than attempts to maintain a sub-
urban community character which has long since been lost. Easthampton
has not reached the point of no return and still remains a bedroom sub-
urb. If it were inclined to do. so, it would have been ripe in the 1970s
for exclusion by zoning. That it has not become excessively restrictive,
makes it the most appropriate example of the least exclusionary suburb.
The factor scores on the zoning factors also suggest Easthampton
and Wilbraham as representatives of the extremes of suburban zoning.
Table 117 reviews each suburb's scores on the zoning factors.
Although none of Wilbraham' s factor scores are the most exclu-
sionary of all suburbs, nevertheless they are all in the highly exclu-
438
TABLE 117
COMPARISON OF THE EXCLUSIONARY ZONING FACTOR
SCORES OF WILBRAHAM AND EASTHAMPTON
General Public
Exclusionary Housing
Zoning
Local
Inclusion
of Apts.
Encumbered
Apartments
Wilbraham
Easthampton*
1.4531930
.4708785
.4012400
.3755905
-1.2813810
.1921385
1.595973
-.286528
*Easthampton's scores are the averages of its two census tracts.
sionary range. Similarly, although none of Easthampton 1 s scores are
the least exclusionary, they are all decently in the least exclusionary
range for suburbs. Wilbraham strongly uses general exclusionary zoning,
has little public housing, excludes apartments and strongly encumbers
those it does permit with restrictions. Easthampton uses little general
exclusionary zoning, allows public housing and includes apartments which
are unencumbered with restrictions.
Wilbraham and Easthampton are well-matched in other respects by
their similarities, and differences. The communities are alike in that
both were settled in the pre-colonial period (Easthampton in 1664,2
Wilbraham in 1731 3 ). Wilbraham was incorporated as a town in 1763,^
while Easthampton was incorporated as a district in 1785 and as a town
in 1809.5 Both had a nineteenth century industrial base which faded in
the twentieth century. With the closing of major plants in the post
World War II period, both were left as bedroom communities for the more
populous urbanized areas. Both towns in 1980 were similar in having
relatively small populations which qualified them as suburbs. By 1981,
both had long histories of zoning, having had zoning regulations for at
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least thirty years.
Since their incorporations both towns have maintained the town
meeting system of government with a Board of Selectmen serving as the
chief executive. Wilbraham, however, buttresses its selectmen with an
Executive Secretary, a semi-professional chief administrative officer.
Wilbraham uses the open town meeting as its legislature with all citi-
zens permitted equal participation, while Easthampton uses a represen-
tative town meeting, electing 178 town meeting members who have voting
privileges. 6 Both towns have no professional planning staff and rely
on lay planning boards to serve as the chief implementors of zoning.
The generally amateur status of governmental officials and the control-
ling influence of the citizenry in the town meeting creates a fluid sit-
uation in which the interests and consensus of the general population on
controversial zoning issues such as low-income housing is more decisive
than in more remote forms of government. Zoning by-law revisions and
rezonings of specific land areas must be put to the vote at the town
meeting. Zoning decisions are directly controlled by it, whereas such
issues in city governments are decided by the more remote city council
who need not answer for their decisions until the next election. Thus
town zoning decisions are mirror reflections of the general feelings of
the citizenry (although perhaps distorted ones). This closeness of re-
lationship between officials and the public has been important in the
evolution of both Wilbraham's and Easthampton's zoning.
Where the similarities leave off, the differences become signifi-
cant in each town's developmental pattern. That Wilbraham adopted zoning
in 1931 and Easthampton did not adopt it until 1951 gave Wilbraham twenty
440
-re years to consolidate its zoning into a systematic pattern of exclu-
sion. Although Wilbraham is about 6,000 acres larger in size than East-
hampton, its population in 1980 was 3,000 persons smaller. During the
1970s, Wilbraham 's population increased only 0.6% in spite of its proxi-
mity to the central cities, while Easthampton had a population growth
rate of 19.7% in spite of its more remote location. These population
growth rates are an additional indicator of Wilbraham' s restrictiveness
and Easthampton »« liberality, as shall be demonstrated in due course.
While Easthampton had a strong tradition of liberal and Democratic
officeholders in the twentieth century, ~> Wilbraham maintained a tradi-
tion of Republican conservatism. 8 Local politics set the stage for a
zoning philosophy of non-exclusion and exclusion in each respective
town.
Table 118 summarizes the similarities and differences between
the two towns.
TABLE 118
DEVELOPMENTAL SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF WILBRAHAM AND EASTHAMPTON
Date
Incor-
porated
1980
Pop.
1970-
1980
Growth
Date
Zoning
Adopted
Acreage Predominant
Political
Party
Wilbraham
Easthampton
1763
1785
12,053
15,580
0.6%
19.7%
1931
1951
14,220
8,512
Republican
Democrat
With these historical and statistical differences as background,
the history of each town's zoning will be examined to see how each ar-
rived at its status as most exclusionary or least exclusionary.
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The Tale of Wilbraham, An Exclusionary Suburb
The analysis of exclusion in Wilbraham begins with the statisti-
cal data of the effects of its zoning on the urban ecology, proceeds
through the evolution of its single-family zoning policy, and ends with
the tale of its attempts to keep out subsidized, multi-family housing.
"The startin g point : disproportionate impact ." The statistical analysis
of Wilbraham indicates that Wilbraham' s restrictive single- and multi-
family zoning policies have had a disproportionate impact on the distri-
bution of the poor and minorities of the Springfield SMSA. The percent-
age of poor households in Wilbraham in 1970 was 3.6% compared to a me-
tropolitan-wide average of 8.1%. The prediction of Wilbraham' s percen-
tage of poor families according to the overall zoning pattern of the
SMSA is exactly 3.6%, its actual percentage. The percentage of minori-
ties in 1980 in Wilbraham was 1.8% compared to a metropolitan-wide ave-
rage of 14.3%. The prediction of minorities in Wilbraham according to
metropolitan-wide zoning is a negative 12.4%, that is, Wilbraham 's zoning
is so restrictive according to metropolitan-wide standards that it should
not only have no minorities, but should have 12.4% less than no minori-
ties. Wilbraham' s combination of zoning for no multi-family acreages,
few multi-family housing units, few public housing units and large sing-
le-family lot sizes has the moderately strong result of keeping the
metropolitan-area poor out of Wilbraham. Its combination of zoning for
almost no multi-family housing units and large single-family lots has a
much stronger disproportionate impact on the residency of SMSA minorities.
This evidence of disproportionate impact serves as a starting point for
the proof of discrtoinatory motivation of public officials and trigger,
the investigation of its official records for additional evidence accor-
ding to the Arlington Heights dicta.
"Legislative and administratis history " The history of Wilbraham's
zoning provides ample additional qualitative evidence that it is not
accidental that few poor and minorities live in Wilbraham, 9 and that
Wilbraham's zoning is related to its segregated urban ecology. An exa-
mination of the evolution of the single- and multi-family zoning poli-
cies from zoning 's inception in Wilbraham in 1931 to 1981 is illustra-
tive.
Wilbraham adopted its first zoning by-laws in 1931.10 Like most
zoning regulations of the early period, these provisions were relatively
primitive. They imposed use districts on pre-existing land uses. Ap-
priate zoning was superimposed on areas already developed in commercial
or two-family uses, while undeveloped land was zoned for single-family
development. 11 The 1931 by-laws provided for one single-family (Res A)
and one two-family (Res B) residential districts, and a single business
district. Both residential districts required a minimum lot size of
7,500 square feet. No frontage requirements were included. 12 Almost
the entire land area of Wilbraham was zoned for single-family use, with
one small area in Wilbraham's northwest corner which borders Springfield
and the Chicopee River zoned for two-families. 13 Apartment houses were
authorized in Business Districts "with written approval of the Select-
men." 1 ^ In effect, multi-family dwellings were permitted in the few
areas zoned for business but only by special permit.
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The original by-laws remained in effect until the end of the
Second World War. However, in 1944, discussions began concerning in-
creasing and refining the original restrictions .^ Although town rec-
cords are understandably skimpy for this period, there was talk of
controlling the type of houses that could be constructed. 16
In 1946, Wilbraham adopted its first major revision of its zoning
by-laws. The single-family residence district was divided into two,
Residence A-l and A-2. Minimum lot sizes were increased to 20,000 and
11,250 square feet, respectively, and minimum frontages were added. The
minimum lot size in the Residence B district was decreased to 5,000
square feet, and a minimum frontage of 50 feet was required. 17 Apart-
ment houses continued to be permitted in Business Districts. 18 Thus in
1946, single-family zoning was made more restrictive, while two- and
multi-family zoning was slightly liberalized.
By 1953 the Town of Wilbraham was feeling the full thrust of the
postwar developmental boom, as were many other close-in American suburbs.
In order to exchange ideas on how to deal with the problems associated
with large scale subdivision development, Springfield area planners
formed the Hampden-Hampshire Federation of Planning Boards. 19 At an
early meeting of this organization, the towns were urged by an urban
planner from Springfield to establish "minimum regulations for lot sizes
in new residential areas.
. .
,"
2 ^ The towns were warned that, like
Springfield, they would "over-crowd themselves if certain zoning was
not enforced. . . ." 21 Planning board members from both Wilbraham and
Easthampton were members in attendance at this meeting, and one member
22from Easthampton was elected president of the fledgling group. ^
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In this spirit, Wilbraham in 1954 again made its zoning by-laws
more restrictive. Single-family and two-family lot minimums were
raised substantially. Minimum lot size requirements in two-family, B,
districts became 11,250 square feet, in A districts, 20,000 square feet,
and in A-l districts, 30,000 square feet. Frontage requirements were
increased by twenty-five feet in each district. 23
While single-family zoning was being openly tightened, almost
imperceptibly Wilbraham' s multi-family zoning policy took an abrupt
reversal. Although existent two-family dwellings were allowed to re-
main in B districts (by law existent uses must be permitted as non-
conforming) additional duplexes were allowed only "by special permit in
existing houses. "24 Thus no new two_family houses could be constructed>
Additionally, apartment houses were no longer permitted by special per-
mit in Business Districts. 2 $ Wilbraham in 1954 abandoned the small ves-
tiges that it had of multi-family zoning. In effect, it stated that in
the future it would be an exclusively single-family community, and the
houses that could be built would be on lots no less than about one-half
acre in some areas, and in the majority of land areas, lots of more than
two-thirds acres would be required. By 1954 standards, these single-
family lots were already exclusionary, as was the fact that Wilbraham
no longer provided multi-family zoning of any kind.
In the public hearing for the revised 1954 by-laws, much atten-
tion was paid to the increased single-family restrictions. Discussion
centered around the minimum frontage requirements rather than the in-
creased minimum lot sizes. Some citizens called for even larger front-
ages, and consensus finally centered on the 150, 100 and 75 feet for-
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mula.26 ^ concentration of discussion Qn frontage requirements
cated that they were considered to be the primary regulatory device. 27
No record was made of any discussion of the modifications of the
multi-family zoning policy. According to the minutes of the hearing,
"some [changes] were of such minor nature that no questions was [sic]
asked. "28 Apparently, the abandonment of multi-family zoning was con-
sidered to be such a minor change. In 1954 it would have been consid-
ered to be insignificant, since cheap and abundant land allowed the
overwhelming majority of suburban construction to take the form of the
mass produced, sprawling single-family subdivision. Apartments every-
where were simply not thought of as viable alternatives to the tract
houses which prevailed as the primary form of development in the 1950s.
In Wilbraham, the general trend of the times was even more pro-
nounced. Illustrative of the Wilbraham philosophy of residential devel-
opment is a contemporaneous statement of a prominent Wilbraham selectman
who donated prime land in the center of town to public use. He stated,
[w]hen and if it may become advisable to consider rendering
available any home sites in the area, we believe that any
planning should be limited to provide large estate-type
sites so arranged as to become a substantial asset to the
town . ^
Consideration of provision of housing for the poor and minorities, or
even the middle-class veteran, was far from the minds of Wilbraham
officials.
The 1954 by-laws largely set the pattern of Wilbraham's develop-
ment as an exclusive and exclusionary suburb. Future revisions would
merely reinforce this pattern with more restrictive provisions when ear-
lier provisions seemed to be inadequate to promote the type of housing
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that Wilbraham desired.
The entering of the 1960s brought with it the heyday of profes-
sional planning throughout the U.S. Rapid suburban growth and ample
funding gave the Impetus to suburbs like Wilbraham who were threatened
by rapid expansion^ to commission the undertaking of Master Plans of
Development. In 1964, Technical Planning Associates, a respected New
Haven, Connecticut planning consultant, prepared such a Master Plan for
Wilbraham. The Master Plan provided recommendations for even further
increases in minimum lot sizes and frontages. These recommendations
were based on two factors, an analysis of soil types and the general
character of the town. 31
The soil capacity-sewerage rationale for increased minimum lot
sizes centered around the septic tank-sewage disposal problem. The
Master Plan stated that
... it is clear that in many areas of town each lot will
have to provide its own water supply and sewage disposal
for a period of a few to many years. 32
Since "there have been problems with sewage disposal in some areas, due
to soil conditions.
. . ,
it is proposed to base the lot sizes on the
drainage. "33 The Plan then proposed the retention of the two-family
zone as it was, increases of minimum lots by 4,000 to 6,000 square feet,
increases of 20 to 30 feet for frontages in existing single-family zones,
and the creation of a new residential zone which would require minimum
lots of slightly less than one acre (40,000 square feet) and frontages
of 200 feet. Almost the entire eastern half of the town would be zoned
for this use. 3^
The second rationale which supported increasing minimum lot
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size requirements centered on Wilbraham's community character and fu-
ture population projections. Since "the town has a rural quality which
is favorable to development at relatively low density, "35 increased lot
sizes would be practicable. In other words, since lot sizes were al-
ready fairly large, and Wilbraham had to this time avoided dense devel-
opment, it was feasible to increase lot sizes even more. Since popu-
lation forecasts anticipated a 1980 population of "between 18,000 and
25,000 people,"36 larger lots would be ^ Qnly feasible ^ necessary
for the rural quality of Wilbraham to be preserved and total population
to be lessened. In this way the continuance of Wilbraham' s community
character would be insured.
While Wilbraham was considering substantial increases in its
single-family minimum lot sizes, the Homebuilder ' s Association of Massa-
chusetts realized the implications for its industry of the suburban
trend to larger lots. It prepared a counterattack in the state legis-
lature by sponsoring a bill which would have forbidden minimum lot re-
quirements of more than 9,000 square feet and 75 feet of frontage with
public sewers available, or 15,000 square feet and 100 feet of frontage
without public sewers. 37 Members of the Wilbraham Zoning Board of Ap-
peals attended the public hearing in Boston on the bill to speak against
it "for many reasons including health. "38 Although the bill was unsuc-
cessful in the legislature, it pointed out the growing conflict between
suburbs who were increasing the restrictiveness of their zoning and
developers who wished to produce inexpensive housing.
The increased lot sizes recommended by the Master Plan were
adopted by the townspeople of Wilbraham in a 1964 special town meet J
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which stretched over three evenings. The retention of the two-family
zone was not adopted. The B zone was converted to single-family, with
provisions for non-conforming use status for two-family houses. 39
The debate at the town meeting is illustrative of the predomi-
nant sentiment of public officials and townspeople towards enlarging
the restrictions. A Wilbraham selectman stated "that the Town of WI1-
braham is not conservative enough and when we get all through we still
will not have been conservative enough. "4°
Nevertheless, some townspeople questioned the wisdom of the in-
creased lot sizes. They wondered "whether or not the larger sized lots
would guarantee a better built house. "41 A prominent Wilbraham builder
made a motion to delete the R-40 (40,000 square feet) requirement and
to lessen the requirement of 34,000 square feet in the R-34 district to
30,000 square feet. This motion failed, and the recommendation for the
increased lot sizes passed without dif f icultv.^ 2
In summarizing the rationale for the increased lot sizes, one
citizen stated that "we wanted to be very careful to keep this town
like the town we came to. "43
Public officials and the majority of citizens had taken up the
community character argument of the Master Plan. Threatened by the
forces of rapid expansion which they did not quite understand and which
they were therefore unable to control on their own, they grasped at
large lot zoning as the major means to preserve their town's exclusive
character from encroachment by urbanization and its attendant problems.
Along with the imposition of large lot sizes, they also, almost in pass-
ing, excluded cluster developments, apartments and mobile homes.
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The Master Plan had recommended that cluster zoning and a Multi-
ple Dwelling District (RMD) be adopted. 44 The cluster 2oning provision
would have permitted smaller lots in exchange for greater premanent open
space. These recommendations were standard practice for professional
planners who generally attempted to round out a community's residential
zoning with provisions that compensated for restrictive residential
uses
.
Town officials proposed the cluster development provision to the
town meeting, but it was voted down. One opponent claimed that cluster
development was "a source of danger, and might be an incentive for
shoddy building."45 Another opponent said that "the town will not gain
anything by having Cluster Zoning; we will just be allowing smaller lot
sizes. "^6
The multi-family zoning provision (RMD) was deleted from the
zoning by-laws by the Planning 3oard. It was not brought before the
town meeting in 1964. The reasons given for this omission were that
"the Board did not have time to adequately study this by-law, and fur-
ther because no one at this time wanted it."47 To rationalize their
omission, the Board promised that they would bring the RMD before the
town meeting at a later date. 48 Thus began a long series of delaying
tactics which would later be used to prevent multi-family housing.
As a final rider to the other restrictive devices, the town also
prohibited the use of mobile homes as residences. Formerly, house
trailers had been allowed by special permits which were renewable every
six months. 4 9 This provision was eliminated.
Public officials and the citizenry, once they had accepted the
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large, single-family iot concept as the^ ^ ^
mental character of the town, were not willing co backtrack to anv less
restrictive provisions.
The refusal of town officials to bring the multi-family zoning
proposal of the Master Plan before the town meeting in 1964 was the
beginning of a multi-year battle to keep apartments out of Wilbraham.
Zoning provisions for small amounts of multi-family housing had been
eliminated without opposition by the 1954 amendments. Zoning officials
were not willing in 1964 to readopt any such provisions. However, the
omission was not overlooked by multi-family housing proponents. The
ink had hardly dried on the 1964 amendments when a developer brought a
proposal for a multi-family zone, coupled with a specific proposal for
multi-family housing, before the Planning Board. 50 The developer pro-
posed that both the Multiple Dwelling District and his specific project
be placed on the warrant at the next regular town meeting. 51 He de-
signed his proposal on the basis of the RMD which had been proposed in
the Master Plan, although he changed the minimum acreage required for a
multi-family project from three acres to one acre. 52
The Planning Board took a hard look at the proposal and reinstated
the three acre minimum with a limitation of eight living units per acre.
Bedroom restrictions allowing no more than fifty percent of units to be
two bedrooms, and requiring the remainder to be one bedroom, were also
added. References were again made to the lack of sewers as a reason
"for keeping the density low." 5 3 Additionally, a fiscal zoning argument
was used to support the three-acre minimum-bedroom restriction combina-
tion. In this manner, "in a typical M.D. District, you might expect to
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have the same number of school age children as If this same 3 acres were
used for [single-family] residential purposes." A third reason advanced
for these restrictions was "aesthetic.'^ Although what was meant by
aesthetic was not explained, presumably this referred to the spacious
appearance of buildings.
Sometime between the developer's initial proposal for both the
RMD district and a specific project in September, 1964, and the town
meeting in March of 1965, the proposal for the project was dropped by
the developer. Although the record provides no explanation, the speci-
fic project did not appear on the town warrant. This pattern is one
which would be repeated innumberable times during the next fifteen
years. A developer would propose an apartment complex which would be
referred to in the Planning Board minutes, and then would be heard from
no more. He and his proposal would inexplicably disappear from the re-
cord, leaving only the possibility of speculation as to the reasons for
his disappearance.
Meanwhile, since the proposal for the RMD district had come from
a private party who by right could ask that it be included on the town
warrant, and since the Planning Board had stated in the 1963 hearings on
the Master Plan that such a proposal would be considered at a later date,
there was little that could be done by public officials to prevent the
proposal from going to a vote, other than to make the conditions of the
RMD as restrictive as possible. When it was clear that the original de-
veloper would not pursue his apartment project, the Planning Board was
careful to emphasize to the town that adoption of the RMD and any speci-
fic project were separate issues. It stated that
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. .
passage of the [RMD] article will not permit MultipleHousxng xn any particular part of town right now. The actualzoning of each area will be controlled by a Town Meeting. 55
With these restrictions, that is, the three acre minimum, the bedroom
limitations, and deletion of the zone applied to the land, the Planning
Board endorsed the RMD proposal. 5 * The town meeting accepted the Plan-
ning Board's amendments to the developer's article and approved the RMD
district. 57 After a hiatus of eleven years, Wilbraham once again had on
its books some small concession to multi-family zoning. However, it had
no land zoned for this use and would fight a protracted and intense bat-
tle to keep the first family apartment complex from being constructed.
In 1968, the Wilbraham Housing Authority acquired public financ-
ing to build forty units of elderly multi-family housing in Wilbraham.
Since public housing authorities are not required by law to seek zoning
approval for their construction projects, 58 Miles Morgan Court for the
elderly was erected between 1969 and 1971, apparently without much con-
troversy. The lack of controversy would be as expected, since, in gen-
eral, multi-family housing for the elderly is not as controversial as
family apartments. The elderly are not associated in resident's eyes
with the vandalism, crime and other social problems that residents feel
are part and parcel of the poor households who live in low-income, fam-
ily housing. If any objections were heard over Miles Morgan Court, they
were not recorded. The records for the years 1969-1972 were poorly kept
and provide no evidence of any pertinent zoning events.
In 1973, Wilbraham made one final constriction of its single-
family zoning requirements. An additional residential zone was added
which required minimum lot sizes of 60,000 square feet (more than one
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and one-third acres) and 200 feet of frontage. Approximately one-third
of Wilbraham's land area was zoned for these large lots. 59
The justification for these increased lot sizes was again based
on the community character and soil capacity-sewerage arguments. The
community character argument was stated at length by one Planning Board
member at the public hearing on the changes. He said,
[y]ou are
.
. .
all interested in having a nice Wilbraham andyou moved to Wilbraham to keep it nice. The Planning Boardis trying to take a long look down the road and retain that
... We are trying to retain for Wilbraham the niceties that
we have and not let it go down grade. 60
The chairman of the Planning Board put it more precisely. He stated,
"It is our desire as a Planning Board to upgrade the town. "61
The soil capacity-sewerage argument claimed that the large area
which would be zoned for R-60 uses contained "severe hardpan" and "bed-
rock," that "some of the lots in this area which have gone in are li -
2 acres in sizes because of this"62 and that the neighboring town of
Hampden already had minimum lot requirements of 60,000 square feet. 63
Thus the jist of the Planning 3oard's reasoning was that these large
lots would not be unreasonable as long as septic tanks were still needed
for sewage disposal. Since Hampden's requirement of such large lots had
already been approved by the state Attorney General on this justifica-
tion, Wilbraham' s doing so would probably also be accepted.
In order to summarize the evolution of Wilbraham's single- and
two-family zoning policy, Table 119 displays the dates, districts, lot
sizes, frontages and averages adopted throughout Wilbraham's zoning his-
tory.
The comparison of the lot sizes and frontages starkly portrays
454
TABLE 119
EVOLUTION OF SINGLE- AND TWO-FAMILY ZONING POLICI-SIN THE TOWN OF WILBRAHAM, MASSACHUSETTS
Year of
Adoption
1931
1946
1954
1964
1973
Zone
MLS in Sq. Ft.
R-40
40,000
R-60
60,000
A-1
A B AVR
7,500
A-2
7,500
B
7,500
AVR
20,000
A-1
11,250
A
5,000
B
12,083
AVR
30,000 20,000 11,250 22,417
R-34 R-26 R-15 AVR
34,000 26,000 15,000 28,750
IT
IT AVR
35,000
Zone
Frontage in Linear Ft.
1931 A B AVR
None None None
1946 A-1
100
A-2
75
B
75
AVR
' 83
1954 A-1
150
A
100
B
75
AVR
108
1964 R-40 R-34 R-26 R-15 AVR
200 170 130 100 150
1973 R-60
200
IT IT it AVR
160
the evolution of Wilbraham's exclusionary single-family zoning policy.
The early zoning provisions were not exclusionary. However, in 1946
Wilbraham began to tighten its zoning restrictions so that its average
minimum lot size was already beyond the quarter acre maximum later esta-
blished judicially as the turning point on the exclusionary-nonexclusion-
ary continuum. 6^ By 1954, Wilbraham's frontage requirement was also in
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3e in-
:er
the exclusionary range. The additional square footages and frontages
added in 1964 and 1973 merely padded these already exclusionary require-
-nts. The 1954 restrictive single-family re.uire.ents established the
base from which greater and greater requirements could be added. Like
the line-item budget so prevalent in public jurisdictions of the time,
the previous decade's zoning established the floor of what could b<
crementally added on to lot sizes and frontages. Thus the 1964 Mast<
Plan's proposals were within tolerable and politically feasible incre-
ments of the 1954 restrictions. By the mid-sixties, the opponents of
exclusion had not as yet coalesced into an opposition vocal enough to
attack such incremental increases. By the time of the 1973 revisions,
the 1964 40,000 square foot minimum lot size of the R-40 zone provided
a sufficient base for an incremental jump to a 60,000 square foot re-
quirement. At this point, the three decade habit of incremental in-
creases was strong enough precedent to squelch any incipient opposition.
Wilbraham's long and strong tradition of large lot zoning had generated
its own momentum and provided its own justification. Large lot zoning
had implemented an exclusive community character. Wilbraham's expensive
and exclusively single-family community character was firmly established,
yet ever increasing lot sizes were necessary to ward off any challenges
and to insure its continuance. Without legal intervention, the 1980s
will undoubtedly bring more increases into the 80,000 square feet or
two acre minimum lot size range. Thus the legislative and administra-
tive history of Wilbraham's single-family zoning policy provides sub-
stantial evidence of a long-standing philosophy of raising the cost and
quality of single-family housing beyond the economic reach of the poor
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and even the middle-class.
The other prong of Wilbraham's historical public policy of exclu-
sivity has been its anti-multi-family zoning. In 1931, Wilbraham al-
lowed two-family houses to be built as a matter of right in one small
land area, and apartments to be built by special permit in business
areas. In 1946, it lessened the minimum lot sizes required for two-
family houses from 7,500 to 5,n00 square feet. In the immediate post-
war years, Wilbraham was unsure that it intended to be an exclusively
single-family community. However, in 1954, Wilbraham eliminated its
minimal multi-family provisions by no longer permitting apartments in
business districts and by allowing no new two-family houses to be built
in existing B zones. In 1964, although Wilbraham's professional plan-
ning consultants recommended that a Residential Multi-Family District
be added, town officials did not present this recommendation to the
citizenry at the town meeting. In 1965, under pressure from a devel-
oper to allow multi-family housing, the town adopted a paper RMD dis-
trict which contained bedroom restrictions that insured that only small
households could live in any multi-family housing. However, no land was
zoned for this use. From 1969 to 1971, the Wilbraham Housing Authority
built forty units of elderly multi-family housing which conformed to
the bedroom restrictions, and which, because they were outside the
authority of the town meeting and zoning officials, went unopposed.
The legislative and administrative history of Wilbraham's multi-
family zoning policy, to this point, was not as suggestive of long term
systematic exclusion as was its single-family history. Nevertheless,
from 1954 to 1965, the boom construction years, Wilbraham did not allow
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any type of multi-family housing to be built. From 1965 to 1969, it
technically permitted multi-family housing by authorizing a multi-
family floating zone, but it failed to appropriate any land as a matter
of right for this use. In 1968, it acquiesced to the construction by
the Wilbraham Housing Authority of forty units of elderly housing.
The year 1969 brought an extraneous event which would have pro-
found effects on Wilbraham's multi-family insularity. In that year the
Masschusetts state legislature passed a statute, Chapter 774, which was
aimed at nullifying exclusionary multi-family zoning policies. Chapter
774 provided that a state agency, the Housing Appeals Committee, could
require minimal amounts of land in every Massachusetts town to be zoned
for multi-family housing when and if developers applied for such zoning
The battles from 1972 to 1980 between Wilbraham officials and potential
developers under Chapter 774, particularly over the Wilbraham Commons
project, provide more precise and detailed evidence of deliberate ex-
clusion. The sequence of events involved in these battles, including
departures from normal procedures, the tenacious adherence to the pol-
icy norm of no low-cost apartments for poor families in spite of sub-
stantive indications that they should be allowed, and the statements of
public officials in Wilbraham's public zoning records will be examined
next
.
"The sequence of events, procedural and substantive departures, and
official statements ." By late 1972 and early 1973, Chapter 774 had
been in effect in Massachusetts, and RMD zoning had been on the books
in Wilbraham long enough for potential developers to organize a variety
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of proposals for multi-family housing in Wilbraham.
Deerfield Village and other projects
. The first proposal in
Wilbraham for multi-family housing did not use Chapter 774 nor propose
low-cost housing. Instead, a local land-holding company sought a re-
zoning to RMD on land bordering the City of Springfield in order to con-
struct condominiums. 65 The site chosen was ideal for apartments in that
it bordered proposed multi-family housing in Springfield and was adja-
cent to the former two-family zone in Wilbraham. Additionally, public
sewers were under construction along Stony Hill Road, the major access
road to the property. However, this proposal was turned down by a
special town meeting in October, 1972.66
Since the first proposal had failed, another developer pre-
pared a quite different proposal, Deerfield Village, for the same land.
Evidently the property owners had made it known that the land could be
bought if zoning approval for multi-family housing could be gained. The
Deerfield Village proposal was submitted to the Planning Board in May of
1973. The developer intended to organize as a limited-dividend corpor-
ation and to bring an application for a comprehensive permit under Chap-
ter 774 before the Wilbraham Zoning Board of Appeals. He proposed to
construct six hundred low- and moderate- income housing units in three
phases of two hundred each over five years. Of the six hundred units,
ten percent would be three-bedroom units and five percent would be for
the elderly. 67 Thus the developer was proposing construction of 570
low- and moderate- income units, including sixty which would physically
permit several children to live in them, in a town which to this point
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had
.apt cut an types of multl-famlly houslng> even fairly
condominiums
.
Public officials and the citizenry of Wilbraham reacted swiftly
and decisively to the Deerfield Village proposal. Within a week the
Planning Board met and moved to delay the in-process installation of
public sewers along Stony Hill Road "in lieu [sic,view] of the pro-
posed use of this property for multiple dwelling under financing . "68
The Planning Board wrote a letter to the chairman of the sanitary sewer
commission asking that the commission "consider a moratorium of 60-90
days in connection with the septic trunk coming up Stony Hill Road" so
that the Planning Board would have the time "necessary to fully study
and research the impact on the Town in light of recent court cases with
respect to multiple dwellings . "69
In little more than three weeks, the Wilbraham Homeowners' Asso-
ciation had prepared a petition protesting the project, garnered twelve
hundred signatures of townspeople, and presented the petition to the
Board of Selectmen. In response, Selectmen "decided to move in at least
two directions to either stall or block" the proposal. 70 The Selectmen
hired a Boston law firm to advise the town "on laws involving multi-
housing" since local officials were only dimly aware of what their obli-
gations were under Chapter 774. The Selectmen also appointed "a town-
wide study committee" to "study all aspects of multiple housing in the
community, including need, impact and other possible obligations." 71
The committee was given until October 1 to make its recommendations,
thus providing the town with four months in which to postpone the be-
ginning of the processing of the application.
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The impact of his project on the town was not lost on the devel-
oper. Within a few weeks he was overwhelmed by the opposition, withdrew
his proposal, and (presumably voluntarily) "left Town." 72
Three examples of departures from normal policy and procedures
were evidenced in the Deerfield Village debacle. A Planning Board does
not ordinarily ask for a moratorium on sewer installation, especially
when three months earlier in the same year the lack of soil capacity to
absorb septic tank effluence was used as a justification for highly re-
strictive minimum lot sizes. Second, Selectmen do not normally seek
outside legal counsel to advise them of their rights, unless they are
seeking some technicality which can be used to deny a petitioner what
he or she is entitled to by law. The implication of the hiring of out-
side counsel was that as a delaying device the issuance of the compre-
hensive permit might be litigated. Third, although study committees
may not be unusual at higher levels of government for complex problems,
there was no precedent for one to be appointed to study zoning matters.
The study committee appointment was admittedly a delaying tactic which
would ordinarily not be used in zoning decisions. The implication was
again that a way was being sought to avoid the necessity of permitting
the project.
If Wilbraham had triumphed in its quashing of the Deerfield Vil-
lage project, that triumph would be very shortlived. In December of
1973, another group of developers made another proposal for luxury con-
dominiums on the Stony Hill Road property. The exchange between the
developers and members of the Planning Board at the December 19, 1973
Planning Board meeting is illustrative of the Board's sentiment towards
461
low-cost housing and low-income families.
Planning Board chairman: Suppose you did have the support ofthe Planning Board and you did get the rezoning [to RMD] what
assurances could you give to the Town that this is indeed whatyou intend to build? What would prevent you from putting in
subsidized housing ? .
.
.
~~ c 12
Planning Board chairman: You would be willing to take it [the
rezoning] on any type of agreement to protect the citizens
of Wilbraham ? . . . ~ ~
Planning Board member: Would you consider renting these as
apartments if you had a problem selling them?
Attorney for developer: ... you would have to get a pretty
decent rent. I think it would restrict the type of people .'
. . .
and you are not going to get low-income families with
several children in two bedrooms.
. . .
Planning Board member:
. . . there are two other groups looking
at this and
. . .
they are looking at it for subsidized housing.
I don't feel that this is the way it should be handled. 73
The exchange suggests at least two points. First, the Planning
Board was interested in preventing subsidized housing and in protecting
the citizens of Wilbraham from those who would reside in it. This was
a clear statement of economically exclusionary motivation. Although
race is not mentioned, one wonders from whom exactly the citizens of
Wilbraham needed to be protected. Was it just the white poor or were
Blacks and Hispanics, who comprise the majority of poor, also included?
If so, then this conversation also contains implicit racial discrimina-
tion.
Second, developers felt that they could build on official anti-
pathy to subsidized housing in order to gain approval of high-priced
condominiums as an alternative to low-cost housing. However, evidently
the developers were wrong in their assumptions, since this proposal was
one of those which mysteriously disappeared from the Planning Board
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records.
The Lindsay proiect
.
In January of 1974, another proposal for
multi-family housing was brought before the Planning Board. This pro-
posal, the Lindsay project, was yet another variation on the apartment
theme. A developer sought a rezoning to RMD of ten acres of land adja-
cent to the one existent elderly housing project in the town in order to
build a modest development of thirty-two units of unsubsidized
, middle-
income apartments. 7A For the first time, the take-care-of-your-own-
argument which had been used in support of the passage of Chapter 774
in the state legislature in 1969 was used in Wilbraham. The developer
stated that he was
trying to cater to young married people who have been brought
up in this Town and educated in this Town and who cannot go
out and buy a new home right now and also the older persons
who no longer feel that they want to maintain a home in
Wilbraham.
. .
.75
However, Wilbraham officials were not persuaded by this argument, since
they had a different, overarching concern. They were afraid that the
floodgates would be opened. The floodgates argument which was expounded
by the local citizenry, asserted that once any kind of rezoning for
multi-family housing, even high-priced condominiums or non-subsidized,
middle- income apartments, was permitted, then the floodgates would be
opened to all types of apartments, especially the highly undesirable
subsidized units. In the words of a local citizen, one rezoning for
multi-family housing "leaves the door open for any builder in the U.S.
You can't rezone for him and not for anyone else. That will be discrim-
ination." Thus the "precedent" would be set which would allow other
developers who were denied a rezoning "to sue the town through the
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courts." Another citizen passionately summed up the argument.
housint
3 beaUti
^
1 T0Wn and the around without multiple
W to'disaster ^ ^'J? that 20ne ^ Wil1 ^ ^*Key . ... If this goes through this Town is gone. 76
To keep the floodgates closed, in the minds of the citizenry, every
multi-family proposal, no matter how laudible, had to be denied.
Not all officials were persuaded by the floodgates argument.
In opposition to it, one Wilbraham selectman made an eloquent plea for
the acceptance of the Lindsay project. He stated,
. . .
the Town of Wilbraham has to make some kind of an honest
effort towards some sort of multiple housing. We are eithergoing to do it ourselves or someone is going to come in and doit for us. They are not going to come in with 32
. . . [apart-
ments, but many more]. The Town of Wilbraham would probablybe required ... to build 250 units of low and middle incomehousing. We could delay it through the courts but probably wouldhave to do it. We have here a project by a very long-time Wil-braham family.
. . .
These 32 units can be used to try and [sic]parry outside of Wilbraham and to show them [state officials and
the courts] that we are trying to provide some multiple housing.
We will probably be buying some time. If the town votes against
this we will be in a worse condition. The fact that you are
opening the door.
. . . once we open the door they still have
to come before the Town and the Planning Board, I don't think
we should be thinking of it as a precedent.
. . . This offer
helps on a very modest scale. 77
The selectman made several points. First, a parrying strategy
was better than a closed floodgates strategy. Wilbraham should allow
some unsubsidized, middle-class apartments in order to placate the
state and other outsiders who had focused in on the fact that Wilbraham
had no family apartments. Allowing this project would take the heat off
and buy time. If the project was not allowed, then Wilbraham was likely
to be forced by the courts (or more precisely, the HAC) to permit many,
more objectionable, low-cost units. The selectman was obliquely as
against subsidized housing as those who advanced the floodgates argu-
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ment, although he thought that the parrying strategy had more chance for
success than keeping the floodgates closed.
The selectman also accepted the delaying tactic as a legitimate
strategy, but rejected it as feasible since he felt that the town would
lose in the end.
Last, the selectman pointed out the flaw in the floodgates argu-
ment. Although developers might certainly be encouraged by a multi-
family rezoning, the town would still reserve the right to review and
judge each proposed project cn its own merits. Approval of one did not
necessarily mean that the courts or the Housing Appeals Committee would
require that all others also be approved. In fact, the state legisla-
ture had made it clear in Chapter 774 that no multi-family housing in a
town was the ultimate reason for overriding local zoning, and that small
amounts of it would mitigate the suburb's exclusionary status, eventually
exempting it from taking on more. The most rational plan for Wilbraham
to have adopted in order to avoid low-income subsidized housing would
have been for it to permit construction of luxury condominiums, middle-
class and elderly apartments up to ten percent of its housing stock.
But the citizenry could not be persuaded by this argument and clung to
the hopes of keeping out all multi-family housing. Wilbraham citizens
and many public officials firmly believed the floodgates argument and
did everything in their power throughout the 1970s to keep the floodgates
closed. Thus seemingly inexplicable denial after denial of apartment re-
zonings, when substantive standards would dictate that they be accepted,
becomes understandable.
The town was not persuaded by the parrying argument. Instead,
465
it chose the delaying tactic for the Lindsay proposal. In March, the
Planning Board voted to postpone any decision pending the release of
the report of the housing study committee. 78 That report, according
to the Selectmen's charge of July, 1973, had been due in October, 1973,
six months prior to the Lindsay proposal. Yet it would not appear un-
til the fall of 1974, more than a year after its deadline. In spite of
the official delay in a recommendation by the Planning Board, the devel-
oper put his project on the March 23, 1974 town meeting warrant
. However,
the citizenry followed the Planning Board's lead and deferred the vote
on the zoning change. 7 ? By the time the report was in in November,
Lindsay had given up and dropped his proposal. 8 0
By ordinary substantive standards, the Lindsay project should
have been approved. The location was excellent, adjacent to the elder-
ly housing project and in the center of town with access to shopping
and public transportation. The number of units was small. Public
sewers and water were available. The site plan and architectural de-
sign were adequate. Yet the town essentially (the delay was as good as
a denial) made a decision opposite to the one that was dictated by ordi-
nary standards of decision-making. The factors usually considered im-
portant by most planners, although not those in Wilbraham, strongly
favored a decision contrary to the one tacitly reached. In delaying
the Lindsay project into abandonment, public officials fulfilled one
of the Arlington Heights standards of exclusionary motivation.
The first Wilbraham Commons project . The evidence of exclusion-
ary motivation on the part of public officials in the records of the
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Deerfield Village and Lindsay project controversies is substantial, yet
it fades to insignificance in comparison to that in the fight that was
yet to come over Wilbraham Commons.
By the Spring of 1975, public officials in Wilbraham realized
that the threat of apartment construction in Wilbraham was real. The
state Department of Community Affairs had prepared quotas for low- and
moderate-income housing for all Massachusetts municipalities based on
the standards of Chapter 774. Wilbraham's quota was 301 units. 81 As
a consequence, Planning Board members took steps to strengthen their
paper RMD district. They raised the minimum acreage required for an
apartment complex from three acres to ten acres and stipulated other
area and site requirements .82 These restrictions were endorsed by the
September 30, 1975 town meeting. 83
The discussion of the revisions of the RMD district illuminates
the motivation for the more restrictive requirements. One citizen, in
objecting to the increased restrictions, stated,
[i]t would almost seem that we have sufficient guide lines to
keep out everything that has come up already. The key here is
subsidized. ... [if we are required by law to build them]
are we restricting the multi—family development ?84
In response, a Planning Board member stated that "we are just trying
to guide [the Board of Appeals]. This will make the guide lines strong-
er. "85 in essence, the Planning Board member stated that the Planning
Board did indeed want more restrictive standards for multi-family hou-
sing. If Wilbraham's zoning already closed the multi-family floodgate,
the Planning Board wished to insure that it remained sealed permanently.
At the same time that public officials were tightening their multi-
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family zoning policy, developers were also regrouping. Like the public
officials, potential developers of low-cost housing in Wilbraham had
learned something from the sequence of events in the 1973 and 1974 pro-
posals. If they were to acquire a rezoning to the RMD classification,
this was not going to come from a Planning Board recommendation and a
vote by the town meeting. They would have to seek a comprehensive per-
mit from the Board of Appeals and eventually the Housing Appeals Commit-
tee. If they were going to build multi-family housing in Wilbraham,
they were going to have to endure a protracted legal battle with all its
attendant economic costs as well as vehement and sometimes vicious oppo-
sition from local residents.
With these lessens in mind, the Wilbraham Commons low- and mod-
erate-income housing project was introduced first to the Planning Board
in April, 1975, but was officially taken directly to the Wilbraham
Board of Appeals for a comprehensive permit under Chapter 774 provi-
sions. 86 The developer proposed to build 154 units of family housing,
with one-fourth receiving rent subsidies for low- income households, and
one-half receiving similar subsidies for moderate- income families. The
remaining quarter would be "market" units, that is, rented at competi-
tive market prices. Some of the subsidized units were to have three and
four bedrooms. The pro j ect would be built at a density of 3.8 units per
acre, well below the permissible density of the RMD zoning provision.
The buildings would be constructed on the forty acres on Stony Hill
Road where several projects had been previously proposed. 8 ?
The public hearing held before the Zoning Board of Appeals on
Wilbraham Commons stretched across three months. One evening session
468
»as held in June, July and August, and a decision was rendered one
month later on September 11, 1975. That the hearing was held only one
day in each of three months rather than on consecutive evenings is it-
self evidence of delay. During the hearing the Wilbraham town attorney
warned the townspeople that stalling was not legally acceptable. He
stated,
.
.
.some towns have deliberately used ... the requirements
of getting information as a device to stall the developer andto force him to spend endless amounts of money.
In other words, it has been used as a tactic.
. thepoint is that there is a limit beyond which the demands by thetown for information probably will not be justified, and wehave to be relatively careful, and, I think, relatively honest
about what we do with that line. 38
This point was well taken by the Board of Appeals who rendered a timely
decision.
The record of the public hearing on Wilbraham Commons is a ver-
batim transcript and contains no omissions. The record itself is volu-
minous, comprising three volumes and more than three hundred pages. The
exchanges among all those in attendance which elucidate the motivation
of public officials or their decision on the project are reported below.
Most of the arguments which had been used in support and in oppo-
sition to the passage of Chapter 774 in 1969 in the State House were
again used in the Wilbraham Commons debate.
The developer introduced himself ("My name is
. . . , and I'm the
enemy, I guess"89 ) and stated the take-care-of-your-own-argument
.
We came into this area principally due to what we will term
need.
. . . The need is based on young people getting out
of college and going into the world and not being able to
afford $500 a month for a home - one need.
The second need is based on old people retiring, selling
their homes and again, not being able to afford the high
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monthly payments of a home. 90
When he had had his say, then various public officials stated
their viewpoints on the project. The legality of a denial was addressed
when the long awaited report of the housing study committee was presen-
ted. A primary question of the committee's concern had been, "Could the
town expect to reject all proposals? ... The answer, [they] found
very quickly ... was no. "91 "As much as tM- type Qf legislation
[Chapter 774] is abhorrent to all of us, it is a fact of life; and,
... we have to deal with it in terms of the best interest of Wilbra-
ham."92 And further, "this is State law. We've got to comply with
it. The developer did not make it. We can only minimize it.
.
."93
This argument of legal necessity was to be the convincing one for the
Board of Appeals who would leave the town and themselves open to lia-
bility if they defied the law.
The chairman of the housing study committee then proceeded to
argue inadvertantly (the criterion of substantive standards had not yet
been iterated by the Supreme Court) that substantive aspects of the pro-
ject favored approval. He stated,
[w]e think there are positive aspects to this subdivision or
this application, if you assume that it may be possible to have
this in town.
. .
sewers,
. . . water system,
. . . architecture,
. . .
density of the units is reallv small,
. . . the street pat-
tern.
. .
.94
If substantive standards favored the project, the fiscal zoning
argument was made as a counterattack from several quarters. The devel-
oper had estimated that the project would pay $77,000-$87,000 annually
to the town in lieu of property taxes, yet school officials estimated
that the added cost to schools alone for children of the project wou]
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be 3150,000.95 A raember Qf ^ school committee ^ ^
fr™ I Zi"?
Start t0 receive additional individuals coming in
Mon If tl ?
— ities, it might necessitate the cons^uc-
In addition, "... when these people start to have problems
[the town would have] to give them social services and other Town ser-
vices." 97
The community character argument against approval was also ex-
pounded. A Planning Board member stated it in mild terms.
We feel that the residents in the Sunnyside Terrace existing
street will be rather severely impacted by this proposed
multiple-housing unit. ... it does obviously impact thatgeneral character of residents - of that residential section
of town, and the neighborhood. 98
The selectman who had so eloquently argued for the Lindsay pro-
ject as the least of all evils, then extended this argument to the under-
lying fear of the town. He said,
.
. .
there is also an obvious concern, the units that will be
subsidized, and the three- and four-bedroom units - the type
of people that we would get in the development ... we recog-
nize that it is our obligation, if the permit is granted and the
place is built, to adequately police the area. 99
Implicit in this statement was a fear of a low-income, criminal element
which would require extra police protection. No mention was made of the
race of these potential miscreants. Only innuendo suggested that the
suspect "type of people" would be poor Blacks or Hispanics from the cen-
tral cities. When the community character argument had been used in
Boston in 1969 against Chapter 774, its racial connotations had been ex-
plicitly stated by several legislators. However, by 1975 Wilbraham
officials had become politically astute enough not to mention race in
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their references to the inhabitants of low-income housing. Thev made
only veiled references to why their concern was so great.
The town attorney suggested that since the proposed rents for
the twenty
-five percent of the units to be rented on the open market
were "in excess of competitive apartment units in the area," the units
might not be rentable. This would "force the entire project to be a
subsidized project - and, [he said] we're not anxious to see that
either. "100 The proj ect would then have 154 subsidized families which
would create an even larger burden.
In response to the community character argument, a representa-
tive of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency which intended to fund
the construction, attempted to allay local fears.
.
. .
low income shouldn't be a naughty word, because ... a
lot of people are caught in the economic cycle today. ... if
we're talking about three and four bedrooms, don't let that
frighten you either. Let's not stop having families.
. . .
you're talking, you know, half the size of our town. But,
this is like my town talking twenty years ago.
. . . You*
just can't stop it - I know you want to keep Wilbraham the
way it is; we all want to keep it the way it is. . . .101
In essence, he said that it would be socially acceptable, young
families of Wilbraham who would inhabit the project, and not big city,
black welfare mothers with hordes of illegitimate children. Wilbraham
and its arguments were twenty years behind other more progressive parts
of the state which had long since accepted low-income housing with only
token integration and with no adverse effects to their community charac-
ter.
Comments from the floor were anything but receptive to the MHFA
representative's reasoning. Examples of two, rundown, crime-inf ested,
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minority projects in Springfield were thrown out from the audience.
The record speaks for itself.
Citizen: Who is overseeing Fernbank [Fernwood] Estates?
(applause)
From the floor: How about Riverview?
MHFA representative:
... I apologize if there's somethingthere that is not right ...
(There were boos from the audience)
.
Citizen:
... I would suggest that before you go back tonight
to avail yourself a very short trip [sic] and look at
that, because there isn't anything, through any stretch
of your imagination
. . . that you can possiblv be proud
of [in] that mess down there.
It's a disgrace. ... The Police Department is
apparently terrified of that situation. 102
On the third night of the public hearing, this approach was car-
ried even further. It degenerated into personal attacks on the devel-
oper. A member of a group called "Concerned Citizens" presented pic-
tures of other projects which were built and managed by the potential
developer of Wilbraham Commons. They showed rundown, slum conditions.
Evidence was presented that liens for unpaid bills were attached, and
that the developer was approaching insolvency .103
A Board of Appeals member stated,
Most everyone in this room has worked hard to either own their
own homes in this town or if they lease property, to at least
maintain it.
And when they see pictures [of slum projects]
. . .
they're concerned for a dam good reason. (Applause) . 104
In sum, no one believed that the proposed multi-family project
would not seriously damage community character by bringing in an unde-
sirable class of people who would turn the project into an immediate
slum. The townspeople would not only subsidize the project through
public construction financing and rental assistance, but would also
have to subsidize it with extra schools, police protection and other
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social services. Worst of all, the town would lose its long-enjoyed
exclusivity as an upper class, virtually all-white enclave which was so
aptly described in the appraisal report prepared by the developer. The
report stated that
of^oTVf Wi'braham • • • has enjoyed the reputationf one of the prime residential areas, where property valueshave been typically higher than many of the other property
values in the other communities surrounding Springfield . 105
In the words of one Board of Appeals member, "I think it's descriptive
of the Town of Wilbraham. "106
As the final day of the hearing was drawing to a close, the over-
whelming sentiment of the town was summarized by one citizen. He stated,
. . .
there was a darn strong consensus here that we don't
want this project. And, if we take this project with that
as evidence, we're nothing more than prostitutes. 107
A final comment stated that "... if we stall this thing, it's
going to go out the window with everything else, [that is, like all the
other prior proposals. ] "108
When the public hearing closed, the Board of Appeals was left
with the tough decision. No one, including the Boardl09 wanted the pro-
ject. Yet the Board felt it was bound to follow the law. Since none of
the land area and housing minimums of Chapter 774 were met by Wilbraham,
the Board found "itself in the unenviable position of finding that Wil-
braham does not have a sufficient quantity of low and moderate housing
inventory as required bv law under Chapter 774.
"
110 It felt that it was
better for the town to issue the permit than for the developer to go to
the Housing Appeals Committee, which he had made clear that he would do.
The Board felt that if the HAC issued the permit, the developer could
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e en-
"construct the project without restriction to the detriment of th
tire town of Wilbraham. "Ill In spite Qf thfi fact ^
granting of a permit to allow construction of i sz. a
^
the middle of a single-fanlly n^n^ho J^SS^Salter the future character of that area and would, in the boar"sview
.
.
.
have a deleterious effect on the monetary value of
site™!? l0Vely Sl^le-f™"V »omes surrounding^he proposed
in Its own words, the Board "reluctantly grant[ed] the applicant a com-
prehensive permit. "H 3
In the aftermath of the decision, the developer was unsatisfied with
the conditions placed on the permit by the Board of Appeals. On October
1 he appealed to the HAC to modify these conditions. On January 14,
1976, the HAC, the Zoning Board and the developer agreed by a stipula-
tion of facts to a relaxing of the conditions . U4
Wilbraham Commons was now legally cleared for construction. How-
ever, the financing necessary for construction to begin was not approved
by the MHFA. The reasons for this failure are unclear. The local pub-
lic hearing on the project suggested that the developer had already
been operating on a shoestring prior to his application for Wilbraham
Commons. The expense of the almost two year long legal battle to ac-
quire the comprehensive permit certainly didn't help his finances any.
The ill-treatment of the MHFA representative at the Wilbraham Commons
public hearing may have had some impact on that agency. Or perhaps
the hostility and vehement opposition of Wilbraham citizens towards the
developer himself caused him to desist from actively pursuing the fi-
nancing of the project. In any event, Wilbraham had once again escaped
the reality of low-income housing within its borders.
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The sewer jgttle
. The year 1976 brought
_ ^ fa ^
of potential developers of low-™ housing. No new proposals _
brought in any theatre In that vear. But the citizenry of WUbraha,
was not inactive. It gathered its forces for future skirmishes which
it now was acutely aware would come.
The fact that the installation of public sewers in the Stony
Hill Road area had made adjacent property suitable for multi-family de-
velopment and other areas suitable for small lot zoning pressed upon the
town's consciousness the importance of stopping further expansion of
sewers. In order to maintain the validity of the soil capacity-
sewerage argument against multi-family and for large lot zoning, it was
necessary to slow or prevent the expansion of public sewers. In 1976,
federal and state monies were available for sewer construction, and
since ninety percent of Wilbraham's residences were unsewered, Wilbra-
ham was one of sixteen communities chosen from more than two hundred
applicants for these sewer construction grants. 115 The sewer commis-
sion, apparently unaware of the connections between public sewering and
the large lot and multi-family zoning issues, pressed for the sewer in-
stallation. It felt that eventually state or federal legislation would
require that all communities phase out septic tanks for environmental
reasons. The acceptance of federal and state monies at this time would
save the town much greater future costs. 1 ! 6
However, the citizenry rejected these arguments and failed to
approve the sewer expansion at the October 6, 1976 special town meet-
ing* 1 "1' 7 Some citizens were unhappy with the loss of $4.9 million in
grant money. They petitioned for another special town meeting to re-
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consider the rejection. This time the project received the necessary
two- thirds approval. H8
A resident who lived on Stony Hill Road where most of the pro-
posals for multi-family housing had so far been made attempted to block
the approval again. He threatened to seek a court injunction to stop
the project. However, his attempt was unsuccessful. 119
The sewering of much of Wilbraham would make small lot zoning
and multi-family housing feasible in a variety of locations so that the
soil capacity-sewerage argument would be moot in future years. Since
this ordinary, substantive standard now favored construction, it could
no longer be used to deny comprehensive permits nor to justify further
increases in single-family lot size requirements.
The second Wilbraham Commons project
. Throughout 1977 and 1978,
the various groups of citizens who were active in the multi-family hou-
sing arena gathered more and more information concerning Wilbraham'
s
need to accept some multi-family housing. In 1978, the Selectmen adop-
ted a housing assistance plan prepared by the housing study committee
which endorsed the concept of some multiple housing in Wilbraham. 120
Sometime in the 1976-1978 period, a proposal for multi-family
housing near Maple Street in the northernmost area of town was made.
However, this project apparently never got off the ground. Like so
many of these proposals, only slight reference is made to it in the of-
ficial records. An exchange between a Planning Board member and a de-
veloper's attorney at a Planning Board meeting hints at the circum-
stances.
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Plann^ w^e,W: U the other pr0posai of, Maple Street
Attorney: No - the Board of Aooeal^ m,-t«^
to the hac but withd^ o^r: e r:o
elu;e r;g0
Ke
?„er
led
svel? buslnesLat the ttoe »a « su
any orter^Ires J-
1
^./V" lnterested »» discussingy ume sice in
. . . Wilbraham with resDect t-n e,,!,^^ „Ldevelopment. It is dead. [Mr. Blank] did Tt.Ul
SUbsldized
The town attorney at this time indicated what the current official
policy was. He stated that
was^ranterlh' T^T'/l^ the Permit [f ° r "Graham Commons]
TtL/, 1 rd ° f App6als and m>'self considered the out-s anding permit as a sort of safeguard against anvone coming inand applying for a permit. As long as that permit was there noone else could come in.
. .
.122 '
Since the Wilbraham Commons comprehensive permit was a fait
accompli, officials had no choice but to adopt the parrying strategy.
They could safely say that the town had made an effort to comply with
Chapter 774, that it was the developer's fault for not pursuing the pro-
ject, and that the town need not authorize any more multi-family hou-
sing. The MHFA had assured them that 154 units were enough for the time
being and that it would not finance additional units. 123
Meanwhile, the one existent comprehensive permit was languishing.
Since no other permits were likely to be granted, and since town offi-
cials had reluctantly accepted the inevitability of some multi-family
housing, another group of potential developers devised a new strategy.
If they could tone down the more objectionable parts of the Wilbraham
Commons proposal [the developers "understand that the townspeople
wanted modifications if they were going to have this project"124 ] they
could succeed in getting the permit transferred to them. The advantage
would be avoiding "starting from scratch" in order to "avoid what he
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[developer no. 1] went through and he went through a lot of law suits,
and I don't want to go to court for the next two years. "125
In 1979, this new group presented a proposal to the Planning
Board for 136 multi-family units with 108 one-bedroom elderly units,
eight two-bedroom units, and eighteen three-bedroom, low-income family
units. Thus, only eighteen units would be for low-income households. 126
The debate over this new proposal was more moderate than that
over the original Wilbraham Commons project. By 1979, "the Town [was]
divided into 2 camps: one we don't want it any way; one we will have it
with changes.""? Some public officials and citizens had been per-
suaded that they had to accept some subsidized housing, but that they
could make restrictions on it sufficient to insure that Wilbraham could
not gain large numbers of urban poor. One Planning Board member stated
this group's policy.
.
. .
there is a need, because this has gone on for so long,
being practical, we need it now. There is no place for the'
young and the old.
. . . How much longer can we procrasti-
nate?^©
However, abut tors to the project held tenaciously to their oppo-
sition with a new argument. The town attorney stated this opposing
view. ".
. .
if I lived nextdoor [sic] to the site I wouldn't want
the site either.*' 129 The Planning Board united behind this group and
unanimously opposed the transfer of the comprehensive permit to the new
developers because the "site is poor." The Planning Board was careful
to state that "[w]e are unanimous in wanting multiple family housing in
this Town and we firmly go on record for that." 1 -50 This, and repeated
similar statements of Planning Board members "for the record," 131 were
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obviously designed to adhere to the standards set out in Arlington
Heights for permissible denial of subsidized housing . 132 That Planning
Board members repeatedly used the phrase "for the record" indicates
that they wanted their statements of nonexclusionary motivation to be
recorded. They claimed that they favored multi-family housing, but sub-
stantive reasons such as poor site selection, or procedural irregulari-
ties made denial of this and other projects justifiable.
Unfortunately for them, however, the argument of poor site had
not been raised in opposition to the original Wilbraham Commons pro-
ject, and, in fact, one public official had stated in 1975 that the
site had all the necessary requirements for multi-family housing. 133 i t
stretches the credibility of the Planning Board to believe that in four
years the same site had changed from appropriate to poor. In fact, in
the interim, sewers had been completed, water pressure had been im-
proved, 134 and a 120 foot buffer zone of "trees ... in a heavy growth"
had been created between the proposed project and neighboring single-
family homes. If anything, the site was better than ever. In the
words of a member of the housing study committee, "I think many opposi-
tions to the site have been unjustified ."136
When the application for the transfer of the comprehensive permit
was brought before the Board of Appeals in July, 1979, the battle lines
of a power struggle had been drawn. The Planning Board was vehemently
opposed to the transfer, while the Board of Appeals felt that, with the
concessions made by the developer and with additional restrictions, the
project should be allowed to proceed in order for the town to comply with
Chapter 774.
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The public debate before the Board of Appeals stretched through
four months of meetings and contained all the usual argents for denial.
"Concerned Citizens" argued that the per.it should be rescinded so that
"the Town can get back in control . "137 They did m^ ^
be "placed in the vulnerable position they faced in 1974.-138
The Planning Board wrote at least two official letters to the
Board of Appeals requesting that the permit be voided "in the best in-
terest of the Town. "139
The Wilbraham Housing Authority entered the fray. In a letter
to the Board of Appeals it stated that
[t]he Wilbraham Housing Authority has applied three times forfunding to build additional housing for the elderly units andthree times were turned down. An unofficial reason that wasgiven for the refusal was the fact that Wilbraham not onlv hasdone nothing to aid in the establishment of family housing buthas actively opposed it. 140 '
An additional letter stated
[s]ome of us feel that the site is not well situated if we truly
wish to integrate prospective tenants into our community and
that we would be effectively pushing the development into Spring-field. Others feel that though not the optimum site, the pro-
posed Stony Hill Site would be viable and fill a need which has
existed for many years. 1^1
The Board of Appeals also came under pressure from the Board of
Selectmen "to 'get on with something. f "142 The Selectmen felt that "the
State would take a better interest in the Town if we show a cooperative
effort to commit what we want as a town. "143
In the political embroilment within which it found itself, the
Board of Appeals consistently maintained that state law required appro-
val. The chairman of the Board of Appeals made this perfectly clear.
Under Chapter 774 Wilbraham would have to grant permits for
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oi ^its^f^ mUSt §rant P^itS f- »P to that
When all the testimony had been taken and all the unofficial
votes were in, on November 14, 1979 the Board of Appeals reissued the
Wilbraham Commons comprehensive permit to the new developers with addi-
tional conditions placed on lt.U5 ^ developer was r£quired ^ ^
"residents of Wilbraham or relatives of said residents
. . . priority
in rental of units to the extent permitted by Federal and State Law."146
In addition, thirty-four units were required to be rented "as market
rental units,
"
1A7
that is, the family units in the project and some
elderly units would not be allowed to be occupied by persons receiving
rental assistance. In essence, the project was converted to a combina-
tion of mostly subsidized elderly units, and a few non-subsidized middle-
class units. No low-income families would be allowed. Since residents
or their relatives were given preference, and since few minorities
lived in Wilbraham, the conditions made it extremely unlikely that any
poor minorities would live in the project. The Board of Appeals had
done everything possible within the law to insure a segregated, almost
all-white tenant group for Wilbraham Commons.
The Planning Board was not satisfied with the efforts of the
Board of Appeals. In spite of the statement by the town attorney that
a suit would be "frivolous,"148 within two weeks, and with the authori-
zation of funds by the Board of Selectmen who had earlier urged the
Board of Appeals to get on with it, 149 the Planning Board sued the
Board of Appeals in Superior Court. The Planning Board alleged that
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the original per.it had lapsed sincg constructiQn had ^^^
two years as required by statute, 150 or alternatively, that the Board
of Appeals had failed to hold a public hearing on the transfer of the
per.it in a timely fashion. The suit also sought a temporary restrain-
ing order against the MHFA to keep it from appropriating funds. 151
In the Spring of 1980, the Superior Court dismissed the suit, 152
which was then appealed by the town to the state appeals court. 153 As
the litigation progressed through the courts, both the town attorney
and outside legal counsel advised the Planning Board that their chances
for success were small. 154 In DeC ember of 1980, the Selectmen and the
Planning Board agreed to withdraw the suit. 155 The suit had been a ^
ditch effort to delay the development and add additional legal and hold-
ing costs to the developer. In this sense, it succeeded, since another
year had elapsed.
With no more obstacles to construction on the horizon, in Febru-
ary of 1981, the MHFA provided rent subsidies for seventy-four of the
proposed 136 units. 156 In July> 1981 the same agency granted a
million loan to the developer to construct the project.
I
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Wilbraham Commons was on the road to reality after more than six
years of delay. Although, in the words of a newspaper editorial,
[t]he 136 units provided in the Wilbraham project are cer-
tainly not going to cause a major change in the town's
racial makeup, particularly when 102 units are reserved
for the elderly, [still] ... the introduction of multiple-
unit, subsidized housing into Wilbraham is certainly a water-
shed to be recognized by sociologists and historians, and
hailed by those who believe that racial and ethnic hetero-
geneity strengthens community life. 158
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Wilbraham Woods, Green Ridge Estates. mA^ r^, r . The
approval of Wilbraham Colons was a signal to potential multi-family
developers that the zoning floodgates were ajar. On January 3, 1980,
a prominent Vilbraham realtor proposed the construction of Wilbraham
Woods, a development of 192 luxury family condominiums on Soule Road,
a rural part of town.^9 Since these un±ts ^ ^ ^
families, the developer was forced to seek a rezoning before the town
meeting. The public hearing and debate on the condominiums sounded like
the Wilbraham Commons argument of 1975 all over again. There was fear
that a zone change would establish a precedent "that has not been esta-
blished in this town. "160 Much discussion focused Qn limlting the num_
ber of bedrooms permitted and insuring that dens or studies would not
be converted into use as bedrooms. 161
In April 1980, the Planning Board endorsed the condominium pro-
ject with strict bedroom limitations . 162 ^ P ianning Board had finally
seen the merits of the parrying strategy which had so long been advo-
cated and which the Board of Appeals had adopted. However, the citi-
zenry was not so enlightened. With a record turnout of 1,100 voters,
the town meeting voted down the condominium project. The citizenry
reaffirmed its commitment to keeping out all multi-family housing. 16 3
The floodgates slammed shut again.
At the same time that Wilbraham Woods was being proposed, a Bos-
ton developer proposed Green Ridge Estates, a 148-unit, $5.5 million
subsidized housing project on that tract on Maple Street which had had
at least one prior proposal. 16^ However, the developer never followed
through on this project. Why he did not do so is not explained. ^-65
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The Wilbraham Housine Authorii-v «ij-ng nor ty was also much encouraged by the
Wilbraham Colons outcome. In May, 1981, the Authority received &^
grant of $2
.58 to construct forty-two new subsidized units, including
eight family units, on an unspecified site."* Apparently the state's
three-year long unwillingness to fund the Authority's proposals because
of the town's active opposition to family housing"? had dissipated.
Conclus ions: the acce PjLancJLj^^ So ended Wilbraham , s
multi-year fight against multi-family housing. Public officials in the
end accepted the inevitable. They could no longer maintain Wilbraham
as an exclusively single-family community. If Chapter 774 had been
unsuccessful in producing large amounts of multi-family housing across
the state, at least it had provided the impetus for one exclusionary
suburb to make a beginning towards permitting such housing. Without
Chapter 774, developers probably would never have proposed subsidized
housing in Wilbraham, and if they had, it would never have been approved
by two-thirds of the town meeting. Undoubtedly, rezonings for multi-
family housing which require town meeting approval will continue to be
voted down, and many potential developers will lack the fortitude to
pursue comprehensive permits in the face of the continued opposition of
the citizenry. However, the official public policy of keeping out sub-
sidized housing has been ameliorated. One of the most exclusionary of
Springfield SMSA suburbs will assume at least a small share of the bur-
den of housing the poor of the metropolitan area, if only to take care
of its own poor and elderly.
A recap of the evidence of exclusionary motivation found in Wil-
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braham according to the standards of includes ^
statistical evidence of the disproportionate impact of its 20ning Qn
area poor and Verities, the history of its single-family ZOning pol-
icy, and the circumstances surrounding its refusal to zone for multi-
family housing. From the inception of zoning in 1931 to the beginning
of the 1980s, Wilbraham used a base of nonexclusionary minimum lot
sizes and frontages from which incrementally to increase lot sizes and
frontages into the highly exclusionary range. From its first aware-
ness that it desired to be an exclusively single-family community in
1954, to the beginning of the 1980s, it did everything it legally could
do to discourage multi-family development. A reiteration of the speci-
fic instances of multi-family exclusion includes the following examples
Wilbraham in 1954 removed even its minimal multi-family zoning
from its by-laws and fought a protracted battle to prevent multi-family
zoning from being reapplied to the land. The multi-family zoning that
it did finally adopt on paper, insured that only the elderly or small
families could live in Wilbraham multi-family housing.
The sequence of events which led up to the withdrawal of the
developers or the denial of official permission to build in the Deer-
field Village, Lindsay, first Wilbraham Commons, Wilbraham Woods, Green
Ridge Estates and other lesser projects supply additional evidence.
Numerous examples of departures from normal substantive poli-
cies were involved. The request by the Planning Board for a moratorium
on sewer construction to the site of the Deerfield Village project and
the 1976 battle by citizens to prevent acceptance of sewer grants con-
tradicted a previous, officially stated need for sewers based on poor
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soil absorption capacity.
The refusal to rezone for the Lindsay project which was adjacent
to the only existent 8MB zone in Vilbrahat, exactly paralleled the facts
of the example of a substantive departure fro. normal practice given in
Arlington Heights
.
The physical features of the project (for example,
few units, no subsidization, middle class apartments, respected, local
developer) all indicated that the Lindsay project should have been
approved
.
The suggestions by the housing study committee that the first
Wilbraham Commons proposal met substantive requirements, coupled with
personal attacks on the developer and the representative of the state
MHFA by citizens in the public hearing on Wilbraham Commons which even-
tually led to the demise of the project were violative of normal sub-
stantive policies.
That the Planning Board contended that the Stony Hill Road site
was poor in the hearings on the second Wilbraham Commons proposal con-
tradicted the policy statement that the site was right in the first Wil-
braham Commons hearing. Additionally, the site had been greatly im-
proved over its earlier condition.
The request for a rezoning for the Wilbraham Woods luxury con-
dominiums, by ordinary Wilbraham standards of exclusivity, should have
been approved, but the fear that it would establish a precedent for
multi-family zoning prevented the approval. The fear of opening the
floodgates to apartments pervaded all the opposition to every multi-
family proposal and contributed to all substantive departures from nor-
mal policies. Even when some few multi-family projects were officially
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approved, they were so restricted as to exclude the urban poor. Allow-
ing restricted multi-family housing, in the end, was used to prevent
low-cost, family housing.
The record also contains several examples of procedural irregu-
larities. The hiring of outside counsel and the appointment of the
housing study committee in order to delay the Deerfield Village project
were departures from normal procedure. Additionally, the continued use
of delay as a tactic in all the projects brought a procedural irregu-
larity close to becoming normal procedure. The filing of a suit by the
Planning Board and the Selectmen against the Zoning Board of Appeals is
the most blatant example of a departure from normal procedure. One
board does not ordinarily sue another on technicalities, especially
when all indications are that they cannot recover. This move can only
be viewed as another delaying tactic.
The Wilbraham record also contains many statements of public
officials which suggest deliberate economic exclusion. However, the
racial undertones of the subsidized housing issue never surfaced in the
public record. The only indication that keeping Blacks and Hispanics
out of Wilbraham was the hidden agenda in the anti-subsidized housing
campaign came in the Springfield newspapers' editorial which praised
the final Wilbraham Commons outcome as a step forward in race relations.
Public officials in Wilbraham mirrored the generally high socioeconomic
status of the Wilbraham citizenry. As well-educated and highly sophis-
ticated persons, they were careful enough to avoid any official bigot-
ry. References were made simply to "individuals coming in from out-
lying communities," this "type of people," concentrating "these people,"
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were
:ing
"protection of the citizens of ^ilbrah*™ " *nA • .
•
HDranam, and provision of housing for
Wilbraham citizens onlv. Thar qs ?«/ -uxy mat 98.^ 0 f the citizens of Wilbraham were
Whites went without saying. The public officials of Wilbraham
politically sophisticated and skillful enough to avoid incriminat
themselves in the record with racist statements. In fact, the Planning
Board's repeated efforts to fill the record with statements of their
general support for multi-family housing in Wilbraham (but not this
project) after 1977 indicated that they were acutely aware of the neces-
sity of maintaining the appearance of nondiscrimination. The Selectmen's
calls for executive session in 1980 every time the Planning Board's suit
against the Board of Appeals was discussed 168 indicated their desire to
prevent any possibly incriminating statements from being recorded.
However, Wilbraham cannot totally escape the accusation of racial
discrimination. Because the Supreme Court implicitly accepted the real-
ity of the metropolitan poor-minority link in the Arlington Heights
decision, the overwhelming evidence of more than twenty years of deli-
berate economic exclusion by Wilbraham officials, together with the
facts that Wilbraham's population is virtually all-White and its zoning
is restrictive, support a conclusion that Wilbraham officials deliber-
ately, systematically and illegally discriminated against minorities.
Their intent was to enhance and perpetuate the white, upper-class exclu-
sivity which Wilbraham had long enjoyed, strongly Implemented by its ex-
clusionary zoning, and had come to demand as a right. Only the Zoning
Board of Appeals recognized, although belatedly, and in their own words
reluctantly, that the reality of state and federal public policy no
longer allowed such a determined exclusionary effort.
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The Tale of Easthamnton. A Least Exclusion Suburb
The quantitative indicators as a starting point for the exami-
nation of Easthampton's zoning history suggest a tale which is differ-
ent fro, that of Wilbraham. In 1970, five percent of Easthampton's
households were poor compared to a metropolitan average of 8.1%. That
the gap between the actual percentage of poor families and the metro-
politan average is there, but small, suggests that although Easthampton
is more exclusionary than the central cities, it is one of the least ex-
clusionary of the suburbs. The racial indicators of Easthampton have a
similar relationship. In 1980, Easthampton had a minority population of
.3% compared to the metropolitan average of 14.3%. That Easthampton has
far fewer minorities than the metropolitan average indicates that its
zoning is not entirely free from exclusion.
That Easthampton has both fewer poor and minorities than the met-
ropolitan averages classifies it as a de facto exclusionary suburb and
triggers strict scrutiny of the past motivation of zoning officials in
their formulation of zoning policy. The record of the evolution of
Easthampton'
s housing and zoning policy, in confirmation of the statis-
tical evidence, indicates that Easthampton' s history is not entirely
free from exclusionary public actions and statements. Nevertheless, the
extent and impact of Easthampton ' s exclusionary public acts, compared to
those of Wilbraham, have not been great. Easthampton's zoning history
supports the statistical evidence that it is one of the least exclusion-
ary suburbs.
The regression analysis has provided predictions for the percen-
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tages of poor families and minorities that should live in Easthampton
according to its own and metropolitan-wide zoning. Easthampton s popu-
lation should be 3.3% poor and 13.7% minority. Both these figures are
higher than Easthampton
s actual percentages and suggest that other
factors besides zoning are influential on where the Poor and minorities
live. According to its zoning, more poor and poor minorities could 1
in Easthampton, yet they do not. The historical development of Easthamp-
ton in relation to the metropolitan area provides some possible explana-
tions for the discrepancies between the predictions and the actualities.
A contrasting legislative and administrative history
. In 1931, Wilbra-
ham adopted zoning by-laws which established its community character as
a predominantly single-family community. In contrast, in the first half
of the twentieth century, Easthampton had no zoning and no official de-
velopmental policy. By 1951, when Easthamton did adopt zoning, more
than two-thirds of what would be its 1970 housing stock had already been
constructed. 16c? Much of this early housing was originally built for two
or more families, while much of it was of the large, many-roomed type
which was easily converted to apartments. Thus Easthampton' s early un-
regulated development established it as an open community with many
apartments and much affordable housing.
At some early point in its twentieth century history, Easthamp-
ton could have adopted zoning which would have prevented the develop-
ment of inexpensive housing. That it did not do so is de facto evi-
dence of inclusionary motivation. Additionally, at least one pre-zoning
event provides positive support of the conclusion that the establishment
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of Easthampton's nonexclusive
_ity character had see rational pub-
lie design to it.
In 1948, a special town meeting established the Easthampton Hou-
sing Authority with a mandate to build subsidized housing. By 1,50, the
Housing Authority had acquired thirty-one new single-family homes which
it rented to low-income, veteran tmUm.™ Thus even prior to zontag,
the citizens of Easthampton had approved the concept of subsidized hou-
sing, and a public agency had rapidly made that concept a reality.
When Easthampton did adopt zoning in 1951, it made no attempt to
exclude further multi-family development nor to make single-family lot
sizes restrictive. The impetus for the adoption of zoning came not
from exclusionary motivation but from the desire of the town to fulfill
the requirements of state law requiring planning and zoning. HI In
order to settle on the restrictions that would be imposed, the Plan-
ning Board examined the zoning of "surrounding communities and of com-
munities of approximately the same size,"172 including "Holyoke, North
Reading, and Ludlow,"!" Mhlch Mere developmentally >lall„ t0 East.
hampton.
The debate of the Planning Board prior to the adoption of speci-
fications was noticeably devoid of discussion of lot sizes and multi-
family zoning. In contrast to Wilbraham, the controversial topics in-
cluded the regulation of parking, the installation of street lights and
utility poles, and the removal of trees, 174 all topics unrelated to
exclusion.
The by-laws presented to the town meeting for adoption in March,
1951 included two single-family residential districts (Residence A and
Agriculture) and one multi-family district (Residence l).173 The lot
sizes and frontages required in each district were: 12,500 square feet
and 80 feet in Agricultural districts; 12,000 square feet and 80 feet
in Residence A districts; and 10,500 square feet and 70 feet frontage
in Residence B districts. The largest lot required was thus slightly
more than one-quarter acre, while the smallest was slightly less than
one-quarter acre. Houses in all districts could be three stories in
height, and trailers could be occupied in residence zones.
Thus while Wilbraham had already had five years of restrictive
minimum lot size requirements by 1951, in that year Easthampton adopted
single-family standards which were very liberal and permitted multi-
family housing in one type of zone as a matter of right. Three years
after Easthampton'
s adoption of liberal single-family and multi-family
zoning, Wilbraham completely excluded multi-family dwellings, adopted
excessive frontages, and enlarged its already restrictive minimum lot
sizes
.
For twenty years after 1951, Easthampton essentially retained
the same zoning requirements. It made no attempts to increase its
minimum lot sizes or to limit the construction of multi-family housing
in any way. During this period it did make some minor changes in its
zoning by-laws. In 1952 it lowered the minimum lot size requirement
in Agricultural zones by 500 square feet making the restrictions in the
Agricultural district the same as those in the Residence A district. 177
At the public hearing on the revision, M [n]o one appeared to op-
pose the change." 178 An additional 1952 revision was the insertion of
a penalty clause with a twenty dollar a day fine for violations of the
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by-laws. 17 '
In 1953, the Planning Board voted to send a representative to the
Han,pden-Hampshire Federation of Planning Boards ,180 th. organl2aWon
which would advocate the use of increasingly restrictive minium lot
sizes to control develops. In spite of the facts that Easthampton
officials attended this group's meetings and that an Easthampton Plan-
ning Board member was elected president of this group, Easthampton did
not adopt this zoning philosophy. Increasing restrictions would appar-
ently have been impossible, since it was having trouble enforcing the
regulations that it already had. m April, 1953 the Planning Board
held a joint session with the Boards of Selectmen and Appeals to devel-
op strategies to enforce the by-laws. "1 In September of the same year,
the Planning Board wrote a letter to the building inspector directing
him to enforce the by-laws against a specific violator, or they would
take "court action. "182 Evidently, the citizenry of Easthampton in the
beginning did not take even these minimal zoning regulations very ser-
iously
.
One of the apparent enforcement difficulties was the inability
of the Planning Board to police the location of trailers. As a conse-
quence, the Planning Board in 1954 prepared an amendment to the by-laws
which would have forbidden trailers or trailer camps in any residential
district. However, this revision was defeated by the 1955 town meet-
183ing. The citizenry wanted to continue its option to live in trailers
in any residential district.
Throughout the 1950s, the trailer problem would continue to be
the only exclusionary zoning issue which would be debated. In June,
.ers
!ince
494
I960, a rezon ing fron Agrlcultural t0 Resldence A requestfid ^^
for a s„all trailer park t0 be developed. At the public hearlng on ^
rezoning, "11 residents, abutters, were for it, four opposed."lS4
Again, those citizens who were interested
-in ^ a im the issue expressed their
support of an open trailer policy.
As a result of their inability to prevent this trailer park, the
Planning Board prepared another zoning amendment which forbad trail,
in residential zones but permitted them in Business B zones. 185 S:
trailers were not entirely excluded, the townspeople this time approved
the restriction. The Planning Board's recommendation was adopted unani-
mously by the town meeting in March, 1961. 13 6
Throughout the post-war period
,
Easthampton continued to imple-
ment its nonexclusionary multi-family policy. While Wilbraham had pro-
hibited multi-family housing in 1954 and would not receive even one
multi-family proposal until 1967, Easthampton public officials rou-
tinely authorized multiple construction in the late 1950s and through-
out the 1960s.
The public records furnish information concerning the attitudes
of public officials and the citizenry towards multi-family housing
during this period.
In 1958, the Easthampton Housing Authority constructed thirty
units of elderly housing without incident. 187 In 1962> a developer pro-
posed Town House Manor, an apartment complex of twenty-two units. The
following excerpt from the public hearing on the complex typifies pub-
lic sentiment.
[A Planning Board member] explained to the abutters [sic] the
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SK.irSS. Pr°3eCt ^ Pr°dUCed * showing
[If^S ejected to this subdivision but after explanation by [the Planning Board member] stated 'I think Sa reasonable plan and have no further ob 3 ections^s"13 13
In 1964, the Ella Clark Howe housing project was constructed in
a pre-existent multi-family zone without opposition and without prior
Planning Board endorsement. 189 m 1965, a proposal for an "eight-
apartment dwelling" was routinely approved. 190 In 1967
, the Zoning
Board of Appeals granted a variance to the Easthampton Housing Author-
ity to construct forty apartments on land zoned Residence A. 191 m
1969, the Planning Board unanimously endorsed a rezoning for apartmencs
when "no objectors appeared" at the public hearing on the project, "2
and a special town meeting also routinely approved the rezoning. 193
In short, subsidized and non-subsidized apartments in Easthampton
in the 1960s were considered to be an acceptable form of residential
development by both public officials, particularly the Planning Board,
and the town meeting. Apartment proposals caused no stir anywhere. No
citizens got up in arms. No public officials devised strategies to
stall construction. No protracted legal battles were fought. No de-
velopers abandoned projects and left town under mysterious circum-
stances
.
In the single-family development area, developers took advantage
of the small minimum lot size requirements of Easthampton ' s zoning. The
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development financed the construc-
tion under the Section 235 program of approximately 700 single-family
houses for low- income persons. 194 These tract houses were built in
what is called "the plains" area of town and came to be called "HUD
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housing." The subdlvlslon of the lots was again routineiy ^^^^ ^
the Planning Board.
In the mid-sixties, the Easthampton Planning Board, under the im
petus of federal guidelines which required that localities have Master
Plans of Development in order to qualify for federal developmental fund
ing,195 began the process of hiring a consultant to prepare such a plan
for Easthampton. A series of meetings was held in 1966 to choose the
consultant for the project. However, other town departments and the
citizenry were less than enthusiastic about the need for a Master Plan.
When the Planning Board sent a questionnaire to all other departments
seeking their input on the Master Plan, only two departments returned
the questionnaires. 196 When the proposal for hiring the consultant
was brought before the town meeting in 1967, the members refused to
authorize the funds. 197
The Planning Board, however, continued to push for town approval,
In May, 1968, they again brought the question before the town meeting,
and this time approval was given. 19 **
The preparation of the Master Plan would take four years to com-
plete. The final document would not appear on the town warrant for
voter approval until 1972. During this period, Easthampton first began
to explore the possibility of using more restrictive zoning.
The beginnings of exclusion
. Between 1968 and 1972, Easthamp ton exper-
ienced an enormous developmental rush. Developers feared that the Mas-
ter Plan would recommend more restrictive zoning which would foreclose
further inexpensive construction. 199 "Everyone [was] rushing to get in
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under the wire before the plan [went] into effect. "200
In response to this onrush of residential construction, the
Planning Board attempted to increase single-familv minimum lot sizes
as a stopgap measure, and for the first time in Easthampton, opposition
was heard to proposals for apartment construction.
The HUD housing builders were the ,ajor concern of the Planning
Board.201 Bacause the pUnning Board ^ ^^^
being built on small lots"202 l£ propQsed c<j ^ ^
size and frontage requirements in Agricultural tones, particularly the
plains area, from 12,000 to 20,000 square feet, and 80 to 125 feet, re-
spectively.
However, these recommendations of the Planning Board were not
unanimous and were not well received by the townspeople. The chairman
of the Planning Board vehemently opposed any increases. He stated that
"he strongly believed that this change would hurt the low income people
and he could not support this motion. "204 At the public hearing held
on the Planning Board's recommendations, thirty-eight citizens attended,
and "thirty-seven
. . .
were recorded opposed to the proposed amend-
ments
. . . while one had no comments. 205
The comments of the Planning Board members and the citizenry are
illustrative of their conflicting views. One Planning Board member
favored the amendment because
there were many homes constructed on such small lots that a
small garage could not be added in the future; there had
been problems of drainage and sewage in one of the devel-
opments; and smaller lots do not always provide sufficient
room for septic tanks where no sewer lines were available.
He noted that small lots do not pay their way in additional
services (such as schools, police, and fire protection)
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needed for residents. 206
Another Planning Board .ember "noted that Southampton had lots of larger
square footage areas, and he was concerned about the town's low require-
ments. "20? ln essence> ^ fUmlag Board use<j some ^ ^ ^^
ments (soil capacity-sewage, fiscal zoning, neighboring towns are doing
it) which Wilbraham officials also used to justify their Increased lot
s.
208
But the citizens of Easthampton, unlike those in Wilbraham, were
not convinced. One citizen said that the changes "would stop the growth
of the town and the State could call it 'snob zoning' and request the
General Court to prevent this." 2 09 Another citizen effectively an_
swered the fiscal zoning argument by stating that tax revenue would be
lowered because
instead of a developer realizing six lots from an area 500feet long, only four lots would be established, thus, lower-ing the tax income for the Town and creating [sic, making]
it impossible for people to afford to buy the larger lots. 2 10
Two different citizens pointed out that many people "don't want to own
large lots." 211 A final citizen commentary stressed the take-care-of-
your-own argument.
[Y]oung people could not afford to buy a house on the increased
lot size since this would increase the cost of building the
home, leaving new homes to be purchased by out of town people. 212
In spite of the opposition of the townspeople to the increased
lot sizes, the Planning Board brought the proposed changes before the
March, 1970 town meeting. Predictably, the town meeting voted them
down. 21 ^
The Planning Board did not give up. Since the larger minimum
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lot size and frontage had been disapproved, they tried once more with
slightly seller sizes. In November they proposed a change to a mini-
mum lot size of 15,000 square feet and frontage of 100 feet for both
Residence A and Agricultural zones.214 These again were^ ^ ^
the town meeting. Twice the town meeting had emphasized that it did
not want restrictive single-family zoning.
In its annual statement to the town in 1970, the Planning Board
emphasized its unhappiness with the people's decisions.
.
.
.Unfavorable action by the Town Meeting on articles re-searched approved, and presented by the Planning Board isthe limiting factor that dictates the amount of improve-
ment and the effectiveness of the Planning Board. TheBoard in its endeavor to improve our communitv will con-tinually strive to present articles that will' benefit thetown in the growth problems of the present and future. 215
At the same time that the more restrictive lot sizes had been
proposed, local citizens attempted to stop construction of an apartment
complex for which a building permit had already been issued. 216 The
opposition stemmed from owners of single-family homes adjacent to the
land in question. They petitioned to have the land rezoned from Resi-
dence B, multi-family, to Residence A, single-family, which would have
the effect of invalidating the building permit. The developer's re-
sponse to this end run was recorded in the Planning Board minutes. He
stated that
[i]f residents were opposed to this they should have taken ac-
tion a long time ago, and not after he applied for a permit and
a building permit for apartment dwellings was issued to him. 217
The chairman of the Planning Board again took a liberal position
on this second issue. He made a motion that the Planning Board "rec-
ommend to the Town Meeting Members that no zone change be made on this
500
2 18land," thus allowing the apartment construction to proceed. However,
no other Planning Board member would second his motion. Instead, they
proposed that "no recommendation be made," and this motion carried.
^
Since the Planning Board had made no recommendation, and in view of the
imminent release of the Master Plan, this article was "indefinitely
postponed" by the town meeting. 220
Since the chairman of the Planning Board had been defeated in
his attempts to hold the line against increasingly exclusionary changes
in minimum lot sizes and the apartment downzoning issue, he tendered
his resignation at the close of the public hearings on these issues. 221
That the town meeting also refused to vote in favor of these increased
restrictions vindicated his position. The three-person majority of the
Planning Board which had supported increased exclusion was at this time
unrepresentative of the sentiment of the citizenry. The town meeting
continued to refuse to make Easthampton an exclusionary suburb. How-
ever, that refusal would be shortlived.
In 1971, two more large-scale developments were proposed. One
was for a planned unit development (PUD) of mixed, single-family and
multi-family units on sixty-five acres. The other was for the construc-
tion of more than seven hundred more HUD-f inanced
,
single-family units.
The petition for a rezoning for the PUD brought more than a hund-
red people to the public hearing on the project. For Easthampton, this
was no small turnout. They came to voice their opposition to the pro-
posal. Typical of their comments is the following statement by a citi-
zen. "I feel that the land is too small to explode and exploit. I feel
that it is impossible to build apartments like these on such a small
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Piece of land. I feel that It would lead to a new ghetto. "222
As a result of the opposition, and because the Master PI,
on the verse of being issued, the Planning Board voted to postpone any
recordation on the PUD until the town meeting could review the Mas-
an was
ter Plan. 223
The HUD housing plans involved the proposals in the latter part
of 1971 of three developers to construct a total of 729 additional low-
income single-family homes on small lots. 224 ^ „ enormous turnout„225
of some two hundred citi2 enS 226 appeared at ^ mvemher and December
public hearings on these proposals. The most exclusionary statements
ever heard in Easthampton were made at these two meetings. The fol-
lowing exchange is typical.
Citizen: How many are you going to approve? Is the sky thelimit?
.
. .
Most of these people are coming from out oftown.
. . .
Citizen: When these people come in to put up homes, the rest
of the people will pay for what these other people are set-
ting. ... 6
Planning Board member: We are a Board here trving to preserve
the town, but you have not given us any teeth to work with. Wehave tried to increase the lot sizes. We had actually asked foryour support.
. . .
Where do you go when we have these town
meetings?
Citizen: Does this town need more housing? No. Will this town
benefit from the project? No! It is a detriment to your wel-
fare [sic]. The project is an encroachment to your homes.
. .
These other project areas have become welfare villages
. It does'
not benefit the people of the town.
. . .
Selectman: I will ask the selectmen to send a letter to HUD
and request a curtailment of these projects. I will work hand
and hand with the Planning Board.
. .
.227
In other citizen comments, the HUD houses were referred to as the
"ghetto in the plains," which would be "infiltrated by outsiders," 228
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It was said that the "ghetto concept
. . . concentrates large numbers of
people in one area" and is the "exploitation of the town for the benefit
of the developer.
. .
."229
The Planning Board finally had the backing that it needed from
the citizenry to tighten its zoning restrictions. However, the Planning
Board was told by the state DCA that it had "no authority to limit these
homes, but can only approve or disapprove a proposed subdivision on its
own merits, with no consideration of the type of construction it will
contain. "230 Since the developers of the low- income housing had met
"all the rules and regulations of the town," that is, the proposals met
the zoning requirements, in its own words, the Planning Board did "not
have the power to stop" them. However, the Planning Board, with an
echo of Wilbraham politics, did feel that "we can delay [them]." 231
The tactic chosen for procrastination was to hasten the "pre-
liminary steps" of adopting the Master Plan in order to implement the
increased minimum lot sizes that the Master Plan recommended. 232 The
Planning Board "felt that early adoption of these changes [would] deter
further construction of houses financed by the federal department of
Housing and Urban Development." 233 Since larger lot sizes would make
the cost of the houses prohibitive, construction for low-income house-
holds would not be economic.
To implement this tactic, the Planning Board hastened to hold a
public hearing in December on the proposed zoning by-laws of the Master
Plan in anticipation of calling a special town meeting prior to the
annual town meeting scheduled in March, 1972. The new by-laws would
create four residential zones. An urban density zone would require a
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minimum lot size of 8,000 square feet for single-family homes and would
permit multi-family housing as a matter of right. A medium density zone
would require lots of from 10,500 to 12,000 square feet and would also
permit apartments as a matter of right. A suburban density zone would
require lots of 15,000 square feet and allow apartments by special per-
mit. A rural density zone would require lots of 25,000 to 35,000 square
feet and would also permit apartments by special permit. 234 The Master
Plan also proposed the authorization of mobile home parks by special
permit and the adoption of cluster zoning which would permit smaller,
15,000 square feet lots in rural density areas in exchange for perma-
nent open space. 235
The discussion at the public hearing concentrated on the pro-
posed lot size requirements. The Planning Board settled on require-
ments of 5,000 square feet in R-5 zones, 10,000 square feet in R-10
zones, 15,000 square feet in R-15 zones, and 35,000 square feet in R-
35 zones. 236 The adopted urban density requirement was the highest
figure recommended.
Citizens voiced strong objections to the cluster zoning and
mobile home provisions. As a result, the Planning Board deleted these
from the proposed by-laws. 23 ^ Although several citizens voiced the
opinion that apartments should not be permitted in any residential zones,
the Planning Board argued in favor of them, saying that "it has been
proven that apartments are tax assets to a community.
. .
."238 The
Planning Board never had accepted the fiscal zoning argument against
multi-family housing, and it overrode the anti-apartment sentiment of
the townspeople.
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In the early days of 1972, the Planning Board continued its attempt to
limit HUD housing on another front because it became apparent that
time limitations would prevent it from getting the new by-laws approved
prior to the regularly scheduled town meeting in March of that year.
The Planning Board repeatedly contacted HUD officials in Boston re-
questing that they not approve additional financing. On February 10,
Planning Board members and "Citizens for Planned Growth" met in a day
long conference in Washington, D.C. with HIT) officials to argue their
case. 239 The Planning Board cited the ten percent minimum standard of
Chapter 774 and claimed that Easthampton had "reached its maximum" of
ten percent of its housing for low-income persons. 240 Citizens also
attacked the developer as dishonest in the newspapers . 241
All of this action had its intended effect. On February 7, HUD
agreed not to finance more than 166 units in 1972. On February 15, the
prime developer agreed not to build more than fifty units in that
year. 2^2 T^e piann ing Board had bought some time until the revised by-
laws could be presented to the town meeting. These by-laws were passed
on March 1, 1972. 2 ^3 The plains area where the HUD houses were being
built was rezoned to R-15 and R-35. 2^ The larger minimum lot sizes
effectively blocked any further construction of inexpensive houses in
the area. In addition, in 1973, the funding of the HUD 235 program was
greatly reduced by the Nixon administration so that the HUD housing con-
troversy largely became moot.
Too little, too late
. By former Easthampton standards, the 1972 zoning
by-laws were quite restrictive. In fact, some planners thought that
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the old by-laws were better since under them it was easier to build
multi-family housing. The new by-laws required a special permit or
variance in order for apartments to be built in R-15 and R-35 zones, 2*5
while the old by-laws had permitted apartments as a matter of right in
B zones. Table 120 compares the differences in the 1951 and 1972 res-
idential zoning restrictions.
TABLE 120
EVOLUTION OF SINGLE- AND MULTI-FAMILY ZONING POLICIES
IN THE TOWN OF EASTHAMPTON, MASSACHUSETTS
Year of
Adoption
Zone
MLS in Sq. Ft.
1951
1952
1972
AGRI
12,500
AGRI
12,000
AVR
(Apts. by R. ) 11,667
12,000 10,000
R-35 R-15 R-10 R-5
( Apts. by Sp. Per .)
35,000 15,000
AVR
11,500
AVR
(Apts. bv Right) 16,250
10,000 5,000
Zone
Frontage in Linear Ft,
1951 AGRI A B AVR
80 80 70 77
1952 n n it
1972 R-35 R-15 R-10 R-5 AVR
120 100 100 50 93
In spite of the increased restrictiveness of the 1972 by-laws
and the opinion of some that these were excessive, by areawide suburban
standards the new by-laws were anything but exclusionary. In 1972,
Wilbraham had an average minimum lot size of 28,750 square feet, almost
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double Easthampton's average, and an average frontage of 150 feet com-
pared to Easthampton's 77 feet. In 1973, Wilbraham raised its average
minimum lot size to 35,000 square feet and its average frontage to 160
feet.
The developers were the first to realize that, other than the
foreclosure of further HUD housing construction, they had lost little
with the passage of the new by-laws. Because Easthampton was still one
of the least restrictive suburbs in the metropolitan area, developers
continued to build in Easthampton throughout the 1970s.
Easthampton's public officials were greatly disconcerted over
their continuing high construction rate. In 1974, they suggested that
a moratorium be placed on further subdivisions. 246 One Planning Board
member stated that the town was
a victim of past inadequate zoning at the present time. No
town within a 20-mile radius of Easthampton has had so much
growth in such a short span of time. 247
A representative of the regional planning commission proposed that
Easthampton change "some of the R-35 zoning to R-70 zoning, "248 in order
to slow the construction rate. In 1975, the town zoning enforcement
officer made a similar request. He asked that the R-15 zones be in-
creased to R-35 and that R-35 zones be increased to R-60.249 However,
the Planning Board did nothing to implement these proposals.
In the middle seventies, the Planning Board began to recognize
that it had failed to do an adequate job of controlling the town's devel-
opment. The Planning Board chairman stated that "in the past the Plan-
ning Board has been second rate. "250 ^ episode from the records illus-
trates the Planning Board's self-declared ineptitude. One subdivision
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was "approved by default" because the Planning Board failed to take any
action on it within the required sixty day time limit. 251
In 1976, in an effort to upgrade the information available to it,
the Planning Board joined with the Easthampton Housing Authority and the
state DCA to prepare a housing assistance plan for the town. The HAP
presented a portrait of the results of Easthampton' s zoning. The new
construction which had taken place was attracting outsiders. It was
not serving long-term (more than ten years) residents. The poorer
classes who lived in the older, more dilapidated sections of town
were identified as long-term residents. These oldtimers could not
afford to move into the newer single-family or apartment construe-
252tion. Renters or owners of newer housing were typically people who
had moved to Easthampton during the past ten years and who commuted to
work in other towns of the SMSA. 253 The accusation in the 1971-1972 HUD
housing battle that the town would be "infiltrated by outsiders" was not
far from the truth.
The survey of residents conducted for the HAP illustrated how
the mood of the town had changed from the 1960s. Strong sentiment for
more restrictive zoning was expressed. The following remarks of inter-
viewees are typical.
Easthampton is fast becoming a bedroom community for Holyoke,
Springfield, Chicopee, Northampton, etc. where racial and ur-
ban problems are unbearable. As a bedroom community, taxes
will continue to rise if better planning control of growth
is not exercised.
Increase the minimum building size of lots. The new homes
are entirely too close together.
. . .
Restrict the building of apartment houses. I don't care
how modern or well designed they are; they still put a
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blemish on the area in which they are constructed.
With the apartment /town houses & other cliff dweelings [sic]
this town will turn into a megopolis = then a gheto [sic].
There are to [sic] many apartments houses [sic] in East-
hampton. Put a freeze on them.
Too many low income houses in neighborhood. 25^
The HAP findings made the Planning Board all the more acutely
aware of its own, and its zoning' s, shortcomings. In order to "have
an alternative to having the developers of the area plan our town," 255
the Planning Board repeatedly sought funds from the town finance com-
mittee to match available federal funds so that they could hire at least
a part-time professional planner. If ever a town was right for a Peta-
luma or Ramapo plan, Easthampton was it. However, the finance commit-
tee repeatedly turned the Planning Board's request down. 256
The Planning Board was not solely responsible for Easthampton '
s
developmental difficulties. The Zoning Board of Appeals also came under
fire for incompetence. It was accused in one instance of granting a
comprehensive permit for subsidized housing in spite of Easthampton'
s
exemption from the requirements of Chapter 774, because the developer's
attorney told them that it "wouldn't do any good not to issue the com-
prehensive permit." 25 ^ Because the Board of Appeals didn't understand
Chapter 774, a law they were supposed to administer, the developer's
attorney was able to fool them into permitting more subsidized housing.
The building inspector was also accused of issuing permits for
apartments on land that was not zoned for multi-family housing. Addi-
tionally, it was alleged that developers built without applying for
building permits, and the zoning enforcement officer did nothing to
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stop them. 258
One knowledgeable Planning Board member summarized the history
of EasthampLon's zoning.
The Town has been raped. A lot of boards don't devote much
time to [their jobs] .... Very few town officials who
administer the by-law know what it is. They let everyone
[developers] do what they want. The ZBA makes all the de-
cisions, but they don't even know the facts. 259
Conclusions. The first twenty years of Easthampton ' s zoning were
entirely devoid of evidence of exclusion. The intention of public
officials and the citizenry from 1951 to 1971 was to permit persons of
all economic levels to live in Easthampton. During the same period,
other Springfield suburbs were increasingly tightening their zoning
restrictions. The combination of Easthampton ' s open policy and restric-
tive zoning in surrounding communities had a funneling effect. Devel-
opers flocked to Easthampton where they could build inexpensive housing
and find a ready market. Federal and state funding policies made this
possible.
When Easthampton began to feel that it had had enough, that it
had done more than its share to house the area poor, it was already too
late. The established developmental pattern and the lack of exclusion-
ary skills prevented it from implementing more than a mildly exclusion-
ary policy. Thus Easthampton in 1979 could be categorized as one of the
least exclusionry suburbs of the Springfield SMSA. That Easthampton had
fewer poor households than zoning suggested that it should have may be
the result of the poor being foreclosed from low-cost housing by middle-
class persons who live below their means. Apparently, some people who
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can afford more expensive housing choose to remain in low-cost housing
in order to have more disposable income for other interests. By not
moving up to more expensive housing when they can afford it, they pre-
vent inexpensive housing from trickling down to the poor in as great a
proportion as it should. 260 In Easthampton> tMs percentage Qf spoil_
ers of the trickle-down theory is apparently around 3.3%.
Like the history of Wilbraham, the history of Easthampton » s zon-
ing contains few references to the racial ramifications of the zoning
issue. Easthampton's early efforts at inclusion were directed entirely
to providing housing for the poor without regard to race. Its early and
current zoning restrictions were and are not racially or economically
segregative to any great extent. Nevertheless, poor Blacks and His-
panics have not moved into Easthampton in any great numbers, and the
possibility remains that they might do so. Between 1970 and 1980 approx-
imately eighty Hispanics moved into Easthampton, increasing its minor-
ity percentage from
.2 to .8%. Although these numbers are very small
absolutely, they could indicate the beginning of a trend of immigra-
tion of Hispanics.
The record indicates that citizens and some public officials are
aware that an influx of minorities would be possible and may be likely
under Easthampton's current zoning. The record provides some indication
that the racial issue lies just below the surface in Easthampton as it
does in Wilbraham. In the early 1970s' controversy over HUD housing,
one citizen continually made references to the town becoming a ghetto
if further construction was not curbed. Repeated use of the term
"ghetto" implied that the racial implications of the issue had to be
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brought home.
The reference by a survey respondent in the 1976 HAP to the un-
bearable racial and urban problems of the central cities for which East-
hampton was fast becoming a bedroom community suggests that additional
newcomers from the central cities might bring these problems to East-
hampton. People are immigrating from other localities, but to this
time, only a small percentage are minorities.
Finally, one Planning Board member stated off the record that
"I get twenty [phone] calls a day [month?] saying that we don't want
the Ricans coming in from Holyoke." The Planning Board member was
quick to add that "that's not the issue. We [local people] need apart-
ments. " 261
In sum, given the comparatively liberal, single- and multi-family
zoning policies of Easthampton, and the housing crises of the adjacent
central cities, Easthampton is the prime candidate in the metropolitan
area for future residential integrative efforts. If its past zoning
history is predictive of its future, the citizen comment in the 1976
HAP may be prophetic. Easthampton in the future may well become a
Holyoke, Springfield or Chicopee, with all the attendant and unbear-
able racial and urban problems.
Two Towns, Two Tales
The unfolding of the zoning histories of Wilbraham and Easthamp-
ton has uncovered highly divergent developmental paths. The similari-
ties of the two localities separate them from the nonexclusionary central
cities and place them on the suburban exclusionary continuum. The dif-
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ferences between the two towns place them on the most and least ex-
clusionary ends of that continuum.
The two towns can be compared and contrasted on at least five
political, sociological and zoning characteristics
.which have influenced
their most and least exclusionary statuses. These include the system
of local government, the socioeconomic status of their populations, the
specific single-family and multi-family zoning policies adopted, and
the issue of race.
In both jurisdictions the internal framework of the town meeting
system of government was significant in determining the evolution of
their zoning and residential development. The governing structure
facilitated the fusion of citizens and public officials into a syner-
gistic, sociopolitical institution. In each town, zoning policies were
jointly set by public officials and the townspeople with each both in-
fluencing and acting as a check on the other. The citizenry set commu-
nity standards which established the parameters of what zoning offi-
cials could do, and they directly determined zoning decisions by their
vote. In turn, public officials led and shaped community standards by
determinimg the zoning agenda. As two separate organic entities di-
rected by diverse communal philosophies, the townspeople and public
officials of Wilbraham and Easthampton imprinted entirely dissimilar
developmental patterns on the two towns.
In Wilbraham, the symbiotic relationship of public officials
and the citizenry in the zoning arena enjoyed a half-century of harmon-
ious evolution. Early in the post-war period, both Wilbraham officials
and the citizenry coalesced around the ideal of an exclusive future for
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Wilbraham. This goal of exclusivity became the guidepost for public
action and citizen response. Since zoning of sorts was already in
place prior to World War II, after the War the early zoning provided
a handy tool for implementation of the pervasive community philosophy.
Because Wilbraham officials knew how to adapt zoning to the exclusion-
ary ideal, the zoning foundation for exclusivity was easily laid. Be-
cause the community goal was ever in the forefront and never seriously
questioned, public officials could, subsequent to the establishment of
the exclusionary base in 1946, regularly, smoothly and efficiently
tighten the zoning noose around unwanted low-cost housing. By the
1970s, the tradition of exclusion was so firmly entrenched that it
seemed almost impenetrable.
Indeed, Wilbraham T s insularity probably would have remained in-
tact if the Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income Housing Act had not
been enacted. This thunderbolt from the state capitol thrust conflict
into the previously harmonious consensus. It created an unexpected and
dire threat to Wilbraham' s traditional community character and the zon-
ing framework that protected it. The majority of Wilbraham officials
united with the public-at-large in an admirably adroit attempt at ward-
ing off the implementation of Chapter 774 which threatened to bring
with it such irrevocable change to the community. Every conceivable
argument and tactic were used to circumvent the state mandate to per-
mit subsidized housing. Only the stubborn adherence of the Zoning
Board of Appeals to a deep felt duty to implement the law as it existed,
no matter how distasteful or threatening to cherished community values,
prevented Wilbraham from continuing ad infinitum as the prototype of
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the exclusionary suburb.
In Easthampton, the organic interaction of officials and the
public worked against the establishment of exclusionary zoning. Prior
to 1970, a harmonious community philosophy of nonexclusivity strongly
predominated. Based on this community consensus, Easthampton' s com-
munity character of inexpensive housing and multi-family dwellings was
firmly established. Zoning was not needed and was not adopted until
public officials felt compelled by relevant state legislation to do so.
When zoning was finally implemented, it embodied non-restrictive single-
and multi-family policies. Zoning mirrored the existent community
character and consensus, and it made no attempts at alteration. Through-
out the 1950s and 1960s, Easthampton continued to develop under zoning
as it had done without it.
However, around 1970, Easthampton' s inclusionary consensus began
to crumble, and a critical realignment began. Town officials had inno-
cently commissioned the preparation of a Master Plan, again in response
to external legal demands. They did not foresee the consequences of
that decision. Developers scrambled to beat what they knew would be
more restrictive zoning. As a result, zoning officials finally recog-
nized the limitations of their liberal zoning policies and attempted to
do something about them. Unfortunately, the Planning Board was in the
unhappy position of being out of step with the still nonexclusionary
consensus of the community. It would take repeated recommendations of
tighter zoning restrictions for the public finally to become aware of
its almost unique, inclusionary position in the metropolitan area and
to be persuaded to accept a more restrictive policy. The townspeople
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would initially resist each attempt, and only later see its efficacy.
That a time lag existed between public officials' proposals and accep-
tance by the public-at-large made the implementation of each proposal
ineffectual. By the time public officials and the citizenry were ten-
tatively realigned on the side of exclusionary sentiment, the adoption
of the 1972 by-laws was too late to prevent most of the unwanted devel-
opment.
Further, even though the 1972 revisions of zoning districts and
lot sizes were more restrictive than Easthampton
' s earlier zoning, they
were still nonexclusionary by metropolitan-wide suburban standards.
For public officials to propose restrictions of the Wilbraham type would
have been politically impossible, since even minimal changes had pre-
viously created so much resistance. Because the new consensus was
tenuous, and the springboard of a previously incremental base of ex-
clusion was lacking, public officials could not even contemplate a
jump in requirements to the extreme side of the exclusionary scale.
As a result, Easthampton continued to be swamped with development of
low-cost, single- and multi-family housing. In turn, the citizenry be-
came increasingly outspoken in its exclusionary desires. In the late
1970s, the new consensus between public officials and the public har-
dened into an exclusionary policy. But zoning officials were at a loss
as to how to implement this new community consensus. They admittedly
didn't even have the skills to enforce the restrictions they already
had. The general apathy of other town boards to the zoning question
prevented them from securing the technical assistance that they needed.
Easthampton ' s history as an open society provided little precedent for
an abrupt reversal in zoning. The resultant uncoordinated and haphazard
attempts at exclusion could only momentarily brake the momentum of a
strong tradition of nonexclusion. Thus the beginning of the 1980s saw
a continuation of Easthampton » s low-cost residential expansion, and
this was more the result of default than design. Easthampton' s zoning
history became a classic tale of too little, too late.
Differences in the socioeconomic status of the populations of
the two communities were also important in the evolution of zoning.
Throughout the twentieth century, Wilbraham was one of the traditional
homes of the wise and the wealthy of the Springfield metropolitan area.
Its high educational level gave it two advantages in the zoning game.
Relatively early on it was able to articulate an exclusionary community
philosophy and to develop the zoning structural framework to make that
philosophy a reality. In contrast, the socioeconomic status of East-
hampton 's population placed it at a distinct disadvantage on the metro-
politan zoning chess board. Its early community consensus reflected the
wishes of the less well-off. The citizenry and public officials did not
want to price their own socioeconomic class out of town. This inclu-
sionary consensus persisted beyond the time when other suburbs had long
since established restrictive zoning. When Easthampton finally reached
a general consensus that protection was needed for the few gains in
living conditions that had been made, the lack of worldliness in the
ways of exclusion prevented it from structuring that protection. The
absence of a large professional class to serve as public officials, to
advise, or to vote at town meetings made Easthampton a loser in the
suburban exclusionary game.
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The specific single-family and multi-family zoning policies of
the two communities illustrate the differences in exclusionary inten-
tion and expertise. At approximately ten year intervals, Wilbraham
regularly increased its minimum lot sizes and frontages in each of the
four post-war decades. This series of actions, although not invidious,
since no one at any point objected to it, still suggests discriminatory
intent. In contrast, Easthampton increased its single-family zoning re-
quirements only once. The increases that it made were not excessive by
its former standards. In comparison to all other suburban single-
family zoning averages in the SMSA, Easthampton 's average minimum lot
size in 1979 was the second smallest, while its frontage requirement
was the smallest. By the standards of both its former zoning and
metropolitan-wide zoning, no discriminatory intent can be found in
Easthampton's single-family zoning policy.
The histories of Wilbarham's and Easthampton's multi-family
zoning policies are similar. Wilbraham from 1954 onward permitted no
subsidized or multi-family housing as a matter of right. In order for
low-cost housing to be built, a developer needed the approval of a re-
zoning by a two-thirds majority of the town meeting. The multi-family
provisions that Wilbraham adopted on paper in 1965 contained restric-
tions on the number of bedrooms so that any multi-family housing that
was approved would necessarily be limited to the elderly or small fami-
lies. In contrast, from 1951 onward, Easthampton provided ample areas
in which apartments could be built without prior approval of even the
Planning Board. Only a building permit from the building inspector was
required. No restrictions were made on the number of bedrooms so that
518
ample low-cost family housing could be built. Since multi-family hou-
sing policy in the SMSA is a prime predictor of the socioeconomic sta-
tus of populations, Wilbraham' s multi-family housing policy can be
linked both as a cause and result to the high socioeconomic level of
its population. Wilbraham intended to make itself a high class commu-
nity and succeeded in doing so. Easthampton T s intention up until the
1970s was not to exclude low status populations. Even when its inten-
tion changed, it did not institute a restrictive multi-family policy by
metropolitan standards.
The histories of zoning in Wilbraham and Easthampton contain few
references to the racial undertones which surround the exclusionary zon-
ing issue. According to the records, the exclusion involved in both
communities was based ostensibly on economic factors alone. Only veiled
references were made to the racial issue in both towns. Nevertheless,
both large lot zoning and multi-family zoning policy, especially the
percentage of multi-family housing units permitted by zoning, are
partially predictive of the racial composition of a locality in the
Springfield SMSA. Wilbraham' s segregated urban ecology can be linked
to the disproportionate impact that its economically exclusionary zon-
ing has had on poor Blacks and Hispanics. Additionally, the implica-
tions are that racial discrimination was the hidden agenda in Wilbra-
ham' s battle to maintain economically exclusionary standards.
On the other hand, Easthampton ' s urban ecology is just as ra-
cially segregated as is Wilbraham' s, in spite of the fact that its
zoning indicates that it could be integrated. That both Wilbraham
and Easthampton are virtually all-white indicates that, although re-
strictive zoning may prevent minority residency in a community to some
extent, liberal zoning by itself will not necessarily reult in an inte-
grated community. Even though a zoning barrier has not been erected
around a community, other factors may prevent minorities from moving
in. Easthampton's fringe suburban location, racial steering, private
lending policies, and the attitudes of minorities themselves could be
such factors. The qualitative analysis of the two towns, like the
quantitative analysis of the Springfield SMSA, indicates that liberal
zoning is an enabling but not sufficient condition for residential
racial integration.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the contention of the exclusionary zoning litera-
ture that the exclusionary zoning hypothesis has attained the status
of a platitude that is no longer questionable, 1 the findings of this
research cast .shadows of doubt over several of the elements of the
exclusionary zoning hypothesis. In order to summarize the findings
and their implications, each set of conclusions from each specific
area of analysis will be compared to previous writings or research
which deal with each specific issue. Certainly, many of the findings
do support both the general conclusions drawn by earlier scholars and
the limited body of systematic research which has previously dealt with
exclusionary zoning issues. For example, this study is quite compati-
ble with previous urban ecology research. In some instances, the find-
ings clarify without contradicting individual points of exclusionary
zoning theory. However, in other instances, the Springfield SMSA anal-
ysis seriously questions various aspects of exclusionary zoning theory
into which there has been little previous systematic research and which
now appear to be' little more than unsubstantiated conjecture.
In addressing the contentions of the zoning literature, the
findings suggest answers to the questions which were initially posed in
this thesis concerning the extent and effectiveness of exclusionary
zoning, its implications for intergovernmental relations, and the appro-
priateness of the remedies which have been undertaken to combat it. Ex-
plication of these answers is the second task of this chapter.
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Finally, the findings indicate that a major clarification and
revision of the exclusionary zoning hypothesis is in order. This
restatement of the exclusionary zoning hypothesis will be the final
task.
The Findings and the Literature
Generally, exclusionary zoning literature and litigation in the
post-World War II era has maintained that the suburbs use restrictive
zoning devices to deny suburban residency to minorities and the poor,
and as a result of this exclusionary intent, the urban ecology of met-
ropolitan areas is racially and economically segregated. The quanti-
tative and qualitative analysis of zoning in the Springfield SMSA only
partially supports this generally accepted exclusionary zoning hypo-
thesis. While zoning has been shown to be purposefully and systemati-
cally exclusionary on its face, that is, the suburbs intentionally make
their single-family and multi-family zoning policies more restrictive
than those of the central cities, exclusionary design and intent, espe-
cially racially discriminatory intent, are not as widespread as is gen-
erally held. Further, even where zoning is intentionally exclusionary,
this intent is only partly effective. Zoning is more effective in pro-
moting socioeconomic than racial segregation. Although racial segrega-
tion between central city and suburb, and within central cities them-
selves, is extensive, the linkage between systemic exclusion and racial
segregation has been greatly exaggerated. Restrictive zoning provides
less than a complete explanation for the segregated urban ecology.
Specifically, a comparison of the major findings of this analysis
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to previous research begins with the statistical description of indi-
vidual zoning devices. In a major study of the analytical zoning lit-
erature, Williams and Norman found that suburban zoning in New Jersey
is exclusionary on its face, but it is not systematically so. 2 Analysis
of the statistics which describe zoning devices in the Springfield SMSA
supports Williams and Norman's first conclusion, while factor analysis of
the zoning variables contradicts their second finding.
In the Springfield SMSA, the suburbs are more restrictive than
the central cities in their zoning policies. The central cities re-
quire smaller minimum lot sizes and less frontage for single-family
homes, zone more acreage for multi-family housing, provide more multi-
family housing itself, zone for more multi-family units, permit higher
apartments with less frontage, place no limitations on the number of
apartment bedrooms, permit mobile homes, and provide more public hou-
sing and family public housing than do the suburbs. When the level of
the scores of the central cities and suburbs on each zoning device are
compared to a continuum of restrictiveness and non-restrictiveness
, the
average scores of the central cities consistently fall on the non-
restrictive side, while those of the suburbs fall on the restrictive
side, with three exceptions. The suburbs do not use bedroom restric-
tions, or prohibit mobile homes to as great an extent, or provide
as small percentages of multi-family housing as would be expected if
they were following a completely exclusionary zoning policy. While
Williams and Norman surmised that the prohibition of mobile homes,
the use of minimum building size requirements and of bedroom restric-
tions were effectively exclusionary in New Jersey suburbs, 3 the evi-
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dence that they are so in the Springfield area is negligible. In spite
of these exceptions to the New Jersey findings, the suburbs in the
Springfield area do maintain more restrictive levels of zoning on the
average than the central cities on all the zoning devices examined.
Unlike the New Jersey suburbs which used only one or two re-
strictive zoning devices, the Springfield SMSA municipalities use a
variety of exclusionary zoning devices which constitute methodical
policies of suburban and intracity exclusion. The factor analvsis of
the zoning variables shows that individual restrictive elements of zon-
ing are related to each other. That there are one or more "systems"
of restrictive devices provides evidence of rationality. A deliberative,
purposeful design which prevails from suburb to suburb (but not all
suburbs) and in some parts of central cities suggests discriminatory
intent. Suburbs look to their neighbors and copy their zoning provi-
sions. If the brashest combination of zoning provisions is ignored by
open housing advocates and is tacitly approved by the attorney general,
the state legislature and the courts, then others feel free to follow
suit. Thus a system of similarly restrictive provisions emerges in the
area.
The General Exclusionary Zoning Factor indicates that large
single-family minimum lot sizes and frontages, small percentages of
land zoned for multi-family housing, and the requirement of large set-
backs and the prohibition of tall structures in apartment zones com-
prise such a system of zoning. The prohibition of mobile homes, more
often than not, is also a part of this system. Zoning is exclusionary
in this manner in all suburbs and in some parts of the central city of
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Holyoke.
The attitude of municipal officials toward subsidized housing
(The Public Housing Factor) is not sharply divided by the central city-
suburban dimension. Some census tracts in the central cities, parti-
cularly in Springfield and Holyoke, have little public housing. What
subsidized housing they do have is restricted to elderly occupancy.
Some suburban census tracts have substantial amounts of public hou-
sing, much of which is open to families. Although the suburbs gener-
ally are more restrictive in zoning for public housing than the central
cities, there are many outstanding exceptions in both locations. Ani-
mous towards public housing knows no locational restriction.
The various ways of measuring a local government's attitude
towards permitting multi-family housing (The Local Inclusion of Apart-
ments Factor) all indicate that apartments are largely confined to the
mid-town areas of the larger central cities and suburbs. Springfield,
Holyoke and Chicopee, as well as West Springfield, Westfield, North-
ampton and South Hadley exhibit this pattern of zoning. If a city or
suburb maintains a very liberal policy towards apartments in its mid-
town section, it is likely also to maintain a very restrictive policy
towards multi-family housing in its remaining areas. South Hadley and
Northampton are two prime examples. Springfield and Chicopee also dis-
play this intracity policy of inclusion-exclusion of apartments. Some
few suburbs, namely, Southwick, Agawam and Palmer, maintain liberal pol-
icies towards apartments. Ten suburbs maintain either very restrictive
or restrictive policies of this type. Municipalities' apartment zoning
does not seem to be related to where they are situated in the metropol-
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itan area. Multi-family exclusion is more of an internal municipal
characteristic.
Encumbering apartments with restrictions on how they can be
constructed (The Encumbered Apartments Factor)
, such as requiring
large setbacks, placing bedroom restrictions and limiting apartment
height, constitutes another systematic exclusionary zoning policy.
Further, encumbering apartments is used in conjunction with placing
limitations on the numbers of apartments. Although the two central
cities, Springfield and Holyoke, designate specific areas within their
boundaries for apartments, only these two jurisdictions do not also
place excessive restrictions on how apartments can be built within
the designated areas. Of the suburbs, only Northampton follows a sim-
ilar, mixed policy. Chicopee, the third central city, does encumber
the apartments that it permits with substantial restrictions.
Similarly, some suburbs which are liberal towards numbers
throughout their areas are restrictive towards developmental require-
ments. These include Palmer, Southwick and Agawam. In these jurisdic-
tions, for all practical purposes, one can build as many apartments as
desired, as long as their construction conforms to the required criter-
ia. On the reverse side of the coin, some suburbs which are restric-
tive in numbers either in whole or in part, do not bother with the de-
velopmental restrictions. These include Westfield, Southampton, North-
ampton, South Hadley, and Belchertown. Developmental restrictions
would be superfluous in these jurisdictions because apartments are
either restricted to a small area, or few are permitted anywhere in
the municipality.
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The largest category of jurisdictions is made up of suburbs
which both limit the numbers of apartments and encumber those they do
permit with developmental restrictions. These include Longmeadow,
East Longmeadow, Hampden, Wilbraham, Ludlow, Cranby, Hadley and Monson,
all of which are located in a north to south arc east of the central
cities. The overall multi-family policy of the anti-apartment arc is
exclusionary
.
Exclusionary multi-family zoning policy thus can take several
forms. Apartments may be limited to the urbanized parts of a munici-
pality, or prevented almost entirely. If they are limited to specific
areas, they are likely also to be encumbered with developmental re-
strictions, except in parts of two central cities and one suburb. If
they are not limited in numbers or to specific areas of a jurisdiction,
then they are likely to be encumbered with restrictions. If apartments
are prevented almost entirely, in many suburbs those few which are per-
mitted are also highly encumbered.
The Springfield SMSA factor analysis suggests that no jurisdic-
tion, either central city or suburb, contains a totally open policy to-
wards multi-family housing. Such a policy would provide high percen-
tages of multi-family housing and acreage, zone for high numbers of
multi-family units, require small amounts of apartment setback, permit
high rise construction, and place no limits on the number of bedrooms
in apartments in all areas or census tracts of a given jurisdiction.
Holyoke, Easthampton and West Springfield come the closest to zoning in
this manner. The remaining central cities and suburbs all use some com'
bination of restrictive zoning devices, either in their entire area or
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in some census tracts, to inhibit or restrain the construction of
apartments.
The primary implication of The Inclusion of Apartments and
Encumbered Apartments Factors is that apartments are not a favored
form of construction anywhere in the metropolitan area. The theses
of Babcock that the predominant objective of zoning is the insulation
of the single-family home from the urban pathology, 4 and of Siegan
that zoning provides government support for suburbanites to maintain
single-family community character 5 are supported by these factors.
Zoning attempts to concretize the American dream of the idyllic single-
family home, in spite of trends towards smaller and one-person house-
holds, high mortgage rates on home purchases, and construction costs
that place new single-family houses outside the purchasing power of the
vast majority of American households. A metropolitan-wide zoning policy
that insists on the detached house as the primary habitat, and which
provides only a few concessions to the realities of the national hou-
sing market surely contributes to the areawide and nationwide housing
shortage.
In the second major area of analysis, the descriptive statistics
and factor analysis of the racial, education, occupational, income and
living conditions indicators of the Springfield SMSA, with some notable
exceptions, support the findings of previous urban ecology research.
The urban ecology of the Springfield SMSA generally conforms to the tra-
ditional ecological model of segregation as formulated and maintained
by such scholars as the Duncans, 6 Reiss, 7 and Berry and Horton. 8
Springfield SMSA is primarily segregated by Socioeconomic Status, and
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to a lesser extent by Race and Resources.
The separation of high and low socioeconomic status populations
in the SMSA roughly conforms to the locational division of municipali-
ties into first ring suburbs, central cities and second ring suburbs.
The majority of high class populations live in a horseshoe-shaped land
area, the bulk of which is first ring suburbs, but which also contains
adjacent parts of the central cities and second ring suburbs. Low sta-
tus populations live mostly in the inner city areas of the central ci-
ties and in the second ring suburbs.
In spite of this general conformity to the ecological model, not
all or even a majority of suburbs can be classified as homogeneous, high
class havens, as such traditional ecological theorists as Poponoe imply .9
Only a few first ring suburbs such as Wilbraham and Longmeadow fit the
prototype. Similarly, the central cities are not entirely composed of
low status populations. Springfield contains high class enclaves, and
Holyoke is dichotomized into higher and lower class areas. The Spring-
field area data indicate that the traditional model of high class sub-
urb and low class city is only a generalization which obscures numer-
able anomalies.
Elements of High Socioeconomic Status include high educational
and income levels, high status occupations, and little unemployment.
Besides these traditional components of upper class status, residents
of the high SES horseshoe also live in high valued, single-family hou-
sing which is spacious and uncrowded. The expansive and expensive sub-
urban house is as much a contributor to upper class status as are the
personal characteristics of the house's occupants. Springfield SMSA
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data show that the traditional SES concept can be expanded to include
living conditions indicators.
Although the variables which compose the Springfield Race and
Resources factor differ slightly from those which comprised the Chi-
cago Race and Resources factor derived by Berry and Horton, 1° and the
national Race and Resources factor calculated by Erickson and Miller, 11
the three Race and Resources factors are fundamentally the same. They
identify areas with minorities with few resources, although the re-
sources minorities lack vary slightly.
The relative strengths of the SES and Race and Resources fac-
tors in Springfield and Chicago are identical, with the SES factor pre-
dominating. Both the Berry and Horton analysis and this study indicate
that socioeconomic segregation among all races is more pronounced than
segregation of minorities with few resources from majorities. Since
economic segregation is more predominant that racial segregation, the
Springfield factor order additionally supports Perin's conclusion that
discrimination in housing is economically motivated and class effective,
a sort of property value protectionism, rather than primarily racially
inspired.-1-- However, the factor order contradicts Farley's findings, i3
and the currently most widely-held interpretation of metropolitan resi-
dential segregation, 1 ^ that is, that race is a more predominant segre-
gative characteristic than class status, and by implication, that ra-
cism is the major motivator of exclusion. Since Farley used a differ-
ent methodology from Berry and Horton, Erickson and Miller, and this
research, a caveat would hold that the differences may be in part due
to differences in methodology.
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In the Springfield SMSA, three central city areas have high
percentages of minorities with few resources. These include the black
Winchester Square area and the Hispanic North End area of Springfield,
and the mid-town Hispanic area of Holyoke. Six isolated suburban cen-
sus tracts have moderately high percentages of minorities with few re-
sources. Some areas of the central cities and the majority of suburbs
have few resource poor minorities. The Race and Resources Factor gen-
erally conforms to the locational, central city-suburban dimension in
Springfield as it did in Chicago, although there are some exceptions.
The Springfield Family Living Factor suggests that larger, pre-
sumably traditional families live in newer housing, little of which is
substandard, and which is generally of high value. These families make
higher than median income. High percentages of these families are fi-
nancially well-off. Solid family living of this type is prevalent in
almost all suburban census tracts. However, this factor is weak and
does not combine quality of living conditions as expected. Consequent-
ly, the Family Living Factor was not analyzed further because of lack
of theoretical and statistical reasons to proceed with the analysis.
The use of the factorial methodology thus supported both the con-
tention of the general political science literature that zoning is more
restrictive in the suburbs than the central cities, and the model of
urban ecology research that the metropolitan area is segregated by class
and race. The suburbs have restrictive zoning, higher class status and
few minorities, while the central cities have liberal zoning, lower
status and substantial minorities. However, there are many exceptions
to these generalizations. The original subgrouping of municipalities
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according to the census definitions of the central cities, and the lo-
cation of the suburbs in relation to the central cities, breaks down
in many instances. Some parts of the central cities display exclu-
sionary zoning of one type or another. Some suburbs are more liberal
in some types of zoning than a total exclusionary zoning hypothesis
would allow. Similarly, some parts of central cities are segregated
by class and race, and some suburbs have low class areas and small en-
claves of minorities. The data indicate that census classifications
of central city and suburb by population size are less than adequate
for this type of research.
The exceptions to the exclusionary zoning hypothesis identified
by the zoning and ecology factor analyses presaged the findings of the
third area of quantitative research, the regression analysis. The ma-
jor conclusion suggested by the regressions is that restrictive subur-
ban zoning, rather than being the single or predominant cause of a seg-
regated urban ecology, is only one among many other unidentified causes.
Although suburban zoning is facially and intentionally exclusionary in
many instances, it is less than totally effective in carrying out that
intent. Economic segregation, but particularly racial segregation, are
by no means entirely functions of exclusionary zoning. Approximately
sixty percent of racial and socioeconomic class segregation, sixty-
seven percent of segregation of minorities with few resources, forty-
eight percent of segregation of poor households, and thirty-seven per-
cent of income segregation are not predicted by restrictive zoning.
Thus zoning is moderately predictive of income segregation, but only
slightly predictive of racial segregation. The theme of the Race and
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ResidenCe s^Posiii™, that federal housing policies such as the *air
Housing Act and subsidized housing programs are ineffectual in combat-
ting residential segregation is substantiated and explained.15 Federal
housing policy cannot be totally effective since it addresses a cause
which is itself only partially responsible for segregation.
To the extent that the studies are comparable, the results of
these regression equations are generally complementary to the results
of two previous studies which used regression analysis to link facets
of zoning to aspects of the urban ecology. Branfman, Cohen and Trubek
found that their several zoning variables predicted approximately fifty-
five percent of the variance in income group clustering, 16 while the
zoning variables in this study predicted sixty-two percent of the vari-
ance in median family income. However, the lack of comparability of
variables used makes comparison of results somewhat hazardous.
Similarly, Stull found that the median values of single-family
homes in the suburbs of the Boston SMSA were partially, inverselv pre-
dicted by the proportions of land zoned for multi-family uses. 17 In
the Springfield SMSA, the percentages of multi-family housing partially
predict inversely the SES of localities' residents, and the median value
of housing is a component of SES. However, again, both the independent
and dependent variables in this research and Stull 's analysis are not
completely similar, so that complete comparability is lacking.
The unimpressive size of the exclusionary zoning-racial segrega-
tion relationship, and the primacy of the relationship of zoning to in-
come segregation rather than racial segregation are the two most impor-
tant findings of this research. These conclusions partially contradict
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one of the major premises of the exclusionary zoning hypothesis,
namely, that local zoning and housing policy systematically result
in illegal, intentional, racial segregation, and the similar findings
of Karl Taeuber. 18
Although the descriptive data indicate that racial residential
segregation in the suburbs is equally persistent in the Springfield
SMSA as Taeuber found nationwide, yet the regressions do not support
Taeuber f s contention, and the general thesis of the literature and
litigation, that it is the racially discriminatory intent behind zoning
and related public policies which creates metropolitan segregation.
However, that exclusionary zoning devices in the Springfield SMSA are
essentially economically, rather than racially, based and effective,
does agree with Anthony Downs' thesis in Opening Up the Suburbs
.
19
Downs contends that exclusion works through economic controls. To the
extent that minorities are poor and zoning is economically exclusionary,
zoning does affect minorities. Thus Downs' plan for dispersed economic
integration to relocate poor minorities out of the inner city20 holds
some hope for lessening racial segregation. Since economic exclusion
is itself incomplete, there are at least some suburban areas in which
this would be economically feasible.
In the Springfield SMSA, however, not all minorities are poor.
The covariance between the percentages of poor households and the per-
centages of minorities is fifty-seven percent, indicating that a large
portion of the poor are not minorities, and a large portion of minori-
ties are not poor. Moreover, the descriptive statistics of the urban
ecology of the City of Springfield itself indicate that the socioeco-
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nomic status of minorities, especially Blacks, is rising, just as
Taeuber found nationally. Since increasing numbers of minorities can
break through economic barriers, they can also escape through those
zoning barriers that do exist into more comfortable living conditions
in the suburbs. However, in the Springfield SMSA, wealthier minorities
have simply not moved to the suburbs in any great numbers. Their climb
up the socioeconomic ladder has been mostly confined to rungs in the
central cities. Something other than zoning must be responsible.
From a different perspective, the qualitative analysis of East-
hampton also indicates that zoning is unrelated to racial segregation.
In Easthampton, zoning is only negligibly, economically discriminatory,
yet Easthampton is as racially segregated as other suburbs. That lack
of restrictive zoning in Easthampton has not resulted in integration
again indicates that zoning is not the cause of segregation. Thus
whether zoning is economically inclusionary or exclusionary, it seems
to have little to do with racial segregation.
To reiterate, when zoning is economically restrictive, growing
numbers of wealthier minorities can overcome it, but they have not.
When zoning is not economically restrictive, poorer minorities don't
need to overcome it and can move to the suburbs, yet they have not.
Since zoning is only a weak, partial explanation for racial segrega-
tion, and since segregation persists, other private and/or public ex-
clusionary devices, as Weaver suggests, are in all probability used as
substitutes for zoning. 21
In the Springfield SMSA, the lack of a school desegregation plan
that extends beyond the boundaries of the central cities may be such a
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factor. Intracity school desegregation in Springfield itself may be
one of the contributing factors to that city's progress in residential
integration. A metropolitan-wide redistricting and/or busing plan
would almost certainly increase minority suburbanization. That the
Springfield SMSA in the 1980s continues to escape the equivalent of
court-ordered, county-wide school desegregation which became so preva-
lent in the South and Midwest in the 1970s can only contribute to the
metropolitan area's continuing lack of residential integration.
The practices of lending institutions and real estate brokers,
and the nature of the mortgage market generally may be other contri-
buting factors to residential segregation. Since the cost of mortgage
money in the later part of the seventies and the beginning of the
eighties has been generally high, and the pool of lendable money has
been small, lenders have had to choose carefully those to whom they
lend. The likelihood is that only the most financially secure, that is,
Whites with high socioeconomic status (given the Race and Resources
Factor) have qualified for suburban single-family purchases. Since
these persons for the most part lived in suburban or the "better"
neighborhoods of the central cities before the mortgage money crunch,
little outward movement of the poor and minorities during the seven-
ties would have been likely. Consequently, one would expect that chan-
ges in minority percentages in the suburbs from 1970 to 1980 would be
small, as indeed has been the case." z
Although racial steering by real estate brokers is illegal under
the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the possibility remains that it has con-
tinued during the seventies in the Springfield area and has contributed
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to residential segregation. Both the state agency, Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, and the President of the Springfield
Urban League contend that steering is common, although representatives
of the real estate industry deny the accusation. 23 Blacks are said tQ
be shown "'typically fewer houses in less of a variety of neighbor-
hoods with less time spent by the realtor' "24 while Whites are m #
directed away
. . .
from the inner city in general.*" 25 The HUD study
of nationwide racial steering conducted during the mid-seventies 26
found that the amount of steering in Springfield is about average
compared to nationwide incidences
.
27 Racial steering thus cannot be
overlooked as a possible contributor to residential segregation.
Racial segregation may persist because minorities themselves
prefer to remain in their traditional neighborhoods. They may prefer
the bustle and vitality of urbanized areas, and the compatibility and
social support system that minority neighborhoods provide, as Cotting-
9 ftham suggests in her Philadelphia study. Or, as Weaver contends,
minorities may be unwilling to move where they would be "different"
or would risk the unacceptance and even hostility of white neighbors. 29
Such fears may be substantiated by the attitudes towards integration of
white, working and upper class suburbanites. Prejudice and neighbor-
hood protectionism are no strangers in the ethnic and upper crust
neighborhoods of the SMSA, as the histories of Wilbraham and East-
hampton have demonstrated.
The Springfield regression series, in addition to interpreting
the relationships between zoning and racial and economic segregation,
has also clarified what aspects of zoning are the most effective in
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Iiverse
producing segregation. Contrary to the contentions of such d:
theorists as the Douglas Commission, 30 Marion Clawson,31 and Robert
Goodman32 that large lot 2Dning ig the major exclusionary dev±Q^
analysis of Springfield indicates that it is not. Large lot zoning
makes only very slight contributions to the predictions of where mi-
norities and the poor live. It has nothing whatever to do with the
Socioeconomic Status, Race and Resources, or median family income of
SMSA residents. As the Davidoffs suggested by their concept of inclu-
sionary zoning, 33 multi-family zoning policy overall, and particularly
the percentage of multi-family housing permitted by zoning, are far
more predictive of economic and racial segregation than large lot zon-
ing.
How much multi-family housing has been permitted by zoning is
the single best predictor of the income, class and race of a census
tract's population. However, it is a better predictor of income and
class than it is of race. Where the percentages of multi-family hou-
sing are high, there will be many persons of low income and class, and
to a somewhat lesser extent, many minorities. The evidence is strong
that multi-family housing is more affordable to the poor and poor mi-
norities. Alternatively, where most housing is single-family, few poor
persons and minorities will live. Whites with high income, educational
and occupational levels for the most part occupy single-family subdi-
visions. The poor and minorities, either because they cannot afford
single-family housing, or for whatever reasons or combination thereof,
do not live in single-family areas in any great numbers. The poor and
minorities gravitate to multi-family areas, and multi-family housing is
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built primarily in poor and minority areas. Minority leaders who balk
when more multi-family housing is proposed for their neighborhood S 3A
have good reason to do so.
Besides how much multi-family housing has been permitted by
zoning, additional elements of an effectively exclusionary multi-family
zoning policy include zoning little or no acreage outright for multi-
family housing, permitting only small amounts of subsidized housing or
none at all, and placing bedroom restrictions on, and requiring large
setbacks for, those apartments that are permitted. Contrary to the
conclusions drawn by the Massachusetts Legislative Research Council
from the descriptive statistics of Massachusetts zoning, 35 to the con-
jectures of Babcock and Bosselman,36 and to the theories of the exclu-
sionary zoning literature generally, the use of minimum floor area re-
quirements, the prohibition of mobile homes, restrictions on the height
of apartments, the number of multi-family units zoned regardless of
whether they are built or not built, and the permission of only elderly
public housing units to the exclusion of family units, have little or
nothing to do systematically with racially and/or economically segre-
gated living patterns in the SMSA under study.
Thus a summary of the major findings of the regression analysis
contains these conclusions. First, restrictive suburban zoning is pri-
marily economically based and effective. Second, restrictive suburban
zoning has only minor influence on racial segregation. Third, multi-
family zoning policy, rather than large lot zoning, is the primary Instru-
ment of an effective exclusionary zoning policy. Last, many of the zon-
ing devices thought to result in segregation cannot be shown to do so.
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In the final quantitative analysis of the data, canonical cor-
relation was used to point out additional facets of the relationship
between zoning and the urban ecology.
Canonical correlation identified two zoning policy subsystems,
one of which is racially and socioeconomically inclusionary
, and one of
which can be interpreted as partially exclusionary. According to the
first subsystem, dense urban areas of the central cities and larger
suburbs are zoned for high percentages of multi-family housing which
can be constructed in mid- or high-rise buildings. Single-family lot
sizes are not restrictive in these census tracts. They contain little
new housing, and households are smaller than average and have lower than
median income available to them.
According to the second subsystem, blue-collar areas of the cen-
tral cities and suburbs maintain a provincial zoning policy. They zone
for high percentages of apartments with unlimited bedrooms, and require
substantial apartment setbacks. They also permit mobile homes. This
type of zoning is linked to few minorities, few white-collar workers,
lower than median income, but few poor people, and single-family hou-
sing values that are higher than the median. Since few poor households
live in these areas, it is possible that setback restrictions make the
cost of apartments more than the poor can afford, but within the econo-
mic reach of employed blue-collar workers. To the extent that minori-
ties are poor, they as well as the white poor would find multi-family
housing in blue-collar areas prohibitively expensive. Minorities would
effectively be excluded from living in blue -collar zoned, multi-
family housing. Thus, that few minorities live in working class
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finds at least partial explanation in the multi-family zoning of these
areas
.
Each subsystem identified by canonical correlation can be lin-
ked to the demographic characteristics of the populations which live in
the census tracts that use the zoning subsystem. The subsystem may
both provide the conditions which permit the particular type of pop-
ulation to live there, and may be a result of the type of population's
desire to prevent other classes of people from intruding. Canonical
correlation did not elucidate what types of zoning and populations are
prevalent in areas which do not have either of the two identified sub-
systems. A wide variety of suburban and central city census tracts
were grouped together on the negative sides of the variates.
The analysis of the zoning histories of Wilbraham and Easthamp-
ton elucidate several other controversies of the zoning literature. The
tale of Wilbraham substantiated Danielson's analysis of suburban poli-
•
~\ 7tics.-*' In Wilbraham, suburban officials responded to constituents'
fears of an influx of urban problems and attempted to prevent such pro-
blems by large lot zoning and the exclusion of apartments and subsidized
housing. However, Easthampton' s history and statistics showed that the
interaction of public officials and the citizenry in the zoning arena
does not necessarily work towards exclusionary goals. If Easthampton
politics are typical, the intent and the power of suburban officials to
implement exclusion may not be as pervasive or effective as Danielson
supposed. Moreover, the passage of Chapter 774 in 1969 over the ob-
jections of some suburban legislators indicated that Danielson's thesis
lacks universality.
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Easthampton's zoning history provides support for the judicial
rulings in the Ramapo 33 and Petaluma 39 decisions, and Burrows'
thesis that restrictive zoning devices are used for growth management
rather than for economic and racial exclusion. *0 Because Easthampton
failed to make its zoning as restrictive as that of surrounding commu-
nities, it was flooded with residential development of all kinds. By
implication, other suburban communities may be legitimately using re-
strictive zoning to avoid the problems of Easthampton rather than for
segregative purposes.
Easthampton's zoning history also enlightens the fiscal zoning
controversy. Easthampton zoning officials failed to adopt a slow-growth
plan, at least in the multi-family housing arena, because they agreed
with Windsor's assessment of the fiscal zoning argument. 41 Their past
experience with apartments upon which they based their open apartments
policy indicated that apartments are not low-tax ratables. On the con-
trary, Easthampton found that apartments, mostly because they contain
fewer children than single-family housing, return more in tax revenues
to the town treasury than they require in service costs.
Thus Easthampton's zoning history expels some of the myths of
the exclusionary zoning hypothesis. Easthampton historically did not
intend to exclude the poor and minorities. Thus not all suburbs can be
accused of exclusion. Easthampton's lack of the use of restrictive
zoning for growth management emphasized the legitimacy of doing so in
order to prevent rapid and uncontrolled development. That Easthampton
suffered no adverse fiscal effects from its conscious decision not to
implement fiscal zoning provides additional evidence that the fiscal
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zoning argument is fallacious.
The Exclusionary Zoning Questions
The findings of this research have provided at least tentative,
if not definitive, answers to many of the questions which were ini-
tially posed about exclusionary zoning. The land use regulations of
some suburbs are indeed intended to exclude the poor and minorities
from suburban residency. However, in reality, that intention is not
as widespread, nor effective, as formerly thought. Although economic-
racial-spatial segregation of the population by central city-suburban
location persists in the metropolitan area studied, zoning and land
use regulation do not stand out in the plexus of causes of the urban
ills that are linked to segregation. Other causal factors must neces-
sarily be as equal or more important than zoning.
Since multi-family zoning policy is the most effectively ex-
clusionary aspect of zoning, the Chapter 774 remedy of the Massachusetts
legislature is decidedly on target. The requirement that those isolated
suburbs which entirely exclude multi-family and subsidized housing dis-
mantle this barrier is a starting point towards elimination of effective
exclusion. The battle in Wilbraham over the initial subsidized, family
housing project is illustrative. Nevertheless, because the standards
of Chapter 774 are minimal and become operative only when a developer
proposes a multi-family project in a locality which does not meet the
minimal standards, Chapter 774 provides less than a total remedy.
To put teeth into the Massachusetts statute, all developing com-
ities could be required to zone outright a certain percentage ofmun
their developable land for multi-family housing in areas of their
choice. Percentages could be the same for all communities and could
take into account land already zoned for multi-family housing, or the
rate could be tied mandatorily to the numbers of households requiring
housing assistance in the region. If this were politically impracti-
cable, the rate could be set by compromise in the legislature. Con-
trols could be set to insure that swamps and cliffs did not become
apartment zones. Such a formula would remove the burden of obtaining
rezonings and building rights from the shoulders of the multi-family
developer. Delay and developmental costs inherent in the current com-
prehensive permit appeals process would be substantially lessened.
Suburban communities which have already reached the multi-family mini-
mums could be held harmless by reason of their excess over standards.
Such suburbs as Easthampton would be freed from taking on additional
subsidized housing and would have sufficient governmental interest to
impose more restrictive zoning for growth management.
The multi-family zoning requirement could be coupled with fi-
nancial compensation to the municipality to offset any apartment-tax
receipt lag, so that the bill for the development's services would
not fall on the current suburban taxpayer. Compensation at a service
cost-plus rate for any acreages zoned above and beyond the minimal re-
quirement could be added as an incentive for communities to exceed the
minimum. Such a system would tie state aid to localities to the im-
portant social value of providing decent homes for all metropolitan
citizens. It would also furnish local governments with a relatively
painless way to recoup some of the fiscal losses which they are suffer-
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ing in the tight public economy of the eighties.
Since the refusal to accept public housing is also a part of
effective exclusion, suburbs could be obligated not only to zone land
for multi-family housing, but also to accept federal and/or state sub-
sidized housing, for both the elderly and larger households, on that
land. This provision would insure that the intent of such federal sub-
sidy programs as community development could not be frustrated by sub-
urban officials who refuse to accept federal housing funds. That the
requirement to accept subsidized housing would come from a state man-
date rather than from the federal government would insure that there
would be no unconstitutional encroachment by the federal government on
the powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
Since the placing of bedroom restrictions on apartments, the
requirement for excessive apartment setbacks, and large lot zoning are
also small parts of an effectively exclusionary policy, supplemental
provisions could be added to address these aspects. Bedroom restric-
tions on apartments and the requirement of more than around fifty feet
of apartment setback could be forbidden. Suburban communities could be
mandated to provide at least minimal percentages of their developable
land for small lots, for example, less than a quarter acre. Or alter-
natively, requirements for single-family lots of more than a certain
size, for example, a half acre, could be made illegal unless environ-
mental or other extenuating circumstances unrelated to specific exclu-
sion justified them. The burden of proof would lie with the zoning
locality to justify its use of large lot zoning as a compelling govern-
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mental interest. However, since large lot zoning is only minimally
related to racial and economic exclusion, such a drastic remedy as this
last does net seem particularly appropriate.
Finally, those public officials in isolated communities who con-
tinue to discriminate intentionally against minorities in their land
use decisions by violation of the Arlington Heights or revised state
standards should remain personally subjected to suit and the penalties
of federal and state equal rights legislation.
In sum, the limited extent of effective exclusion suggests that
a state remedy is an adequate solution for exclusionary zoning. The
findings of this research call for less vigorous remedies than metro-
politan, regional or state-wide zoning, national land use regulation,
or justice department intervention in local land use decisions. Such
steps would be unnecessary interference in local autonomy which would
further imbalance an already top-heavy intergovernmental structure.
Reformulation of the Exclusionary Zoning Hypothesis
Based on the findings of this research, a refinement and restate-
ment of the central themes of exclusionary zoning theory are in order.
The general hypothesis that suburban zoning is exclusionary is highly
ambiguous. It contains several levels of meaning which need to be dis-
tinguished
.
The first premise, and the most commonly held meaning of the ex-
clusionary zoning hypothesis, maintains that suburban zoning is more re-
strictive than central city zoning. This part of the exclusionary zon-
ing theme has been largely substantiated by the findings, and does seem
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to be no longer questionable. Suburban zoning does contain require-
ments for larger lots, fewer provisions for multi-family and subsidized
housing, and more restrictions on permitted multi-family housing than
central city zoning. Facial restrictiveness undoubtedly accounts for
the blanket statements of the zoning literature that zoning is exclu-
sionary
.
A second level of meaning deals with the intentions of suburban
officials in making their zoning requirements more restrictive than
those of the central cities. Do the restrictive elements of zoning
comprise a systematic, purposeful design which indicates that subur-
ban restrictiveness is no accident, but rather is a methodical, coor-
dinated attempt to keep the poor and minorities out of suburbia? The
findings suggest that suburban zoning is intentionally and rationally
exclusionary at least in an economic sense, because it is comprised of
a series of exclusionary zoning factors, with restrictive devices work-
ing together in the same suburban communities to make housing more ex-
pensive and inaccessible to the poor. Both the quantitative analysis
and the tale of two towns offer strong support for the hypothesis that
suburban zoning is purposefully, economically exclusionary.
Further levels of meaning of the exclusionary zoning hypothesis
are not so solidly supported by the evidence. Economically exclusion-
ary intent must be distinguished from racism, because there is little
evidence to suggest that the two are identical. Because clever persons
invariablv conceal their motivations, and the Supreme Court's tests for
uncovering concealed racism are of little help, latent, racially dis-
criminatory intent can only be inferred from explicit, economic dis-
547
crimination to the extent that minorities are the poor, and the poor
are minorities. Although the statistical correlation between the poor
and minorities in the Springfield SMSA is substantial (R =
.76), it
also indicates that a large part of the poor are not minorities, and
that not all minorities are poor. The lack of a one to one relation-
ship between economic and racial segregation makes the inference from
demonstrated, economically exclusionary intent to intentional racial
discrimination tenuous and uncertain.
The last level of meaning of the exclusionary zoning hypothesis
deals with the effectiveness of exclusionary intent. Here, the evi-
dence supports the conclusion that economically exclusionary intent is
at least moderately effective in implementing economic segregation.
The urban ecology is highly segregated by income level, and zoning
statistically accounts for about two-thirds of income segregation.
However, although the metropolitan areas is also racially segregated,
this segregation is not as pronounced as economic segregation, and the
questionable, racially discriminatory motivations of suburban officials
are questionably proficient in effectuating the lesser racial segrega-
tion. The data for the City of Springfield additionally indicate that
more than a few minorities are increasing their relative socioeconomic
status and are attaining residency in high and middle class, central
city neighborhoods. Consequently, even if the intentions of suburban
officials in making zoning economically exclusionary are also to ex-
clude minorities, these intentions cannot be extensively efficient,
because minorities in increasing numbers can afford to move to subur-
bia in spite of restrictive zoning. Since minorities have not taken
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up suburban residency in any great numbers, other factors than discrim-
inatory zoning must necessarily account for continued racial segrega-
tion.
Thus a reformulation of the exclusionary zoning hypothesis based
on the findings of this research states that suburban zoning is facial-
ly more restrictive than central city zoning, and this facial restric-
tiveness is systematically, intentionally and effectively, economic-
ally segregative. However, there is little proof that zoning is exclu-
sionary in the sense that restrictive suburban zoning is purposefully
and successfully, racially segregative. The racial segregation that
persists in metropolitan areas cannot be strongly linked to suburban
zoning.
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APPENDIX A. DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES OF
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND THEIR LOGARITHMS
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APPENDIX B. FACTOR SCORES OF
SPRINGFIELD SMSA CENSUS TRACTS ON THE ZONING FACTORS
659
660
Municipality
Springfield
Holyoke
Census
Tract
8001
8002
800?
8004
8005
8006
8007
8008
8009
8010
8011.01
8011.02
8012
8013
8014
8015.01
8015.02
8015.03
8016.01
8016.02
8016.03
8016.04
8016.05
8017
8018
8019
8020
8021
8022
8023
8024
8025
8026
8114
8115
8116
8117
8118
8119
8120
8121
factor Scores
General Public
Exclusionary Housing
Zoning
Local Encumbered
Inclusion Apartments
of Apts.
-.823341
-1.036059
-1.058066
-1.018626
-1.035066
-.957709
-.743286
-.892023
-.864817
-1.260312
-.913034
-.955681
-.834312
-.796351
-.832515
-.956540
-.839155
-1.133158
-.905690
-.835172
-.877397
-1.057398
-.812581
-.986043
-.882773
-.787129
-.804052
-.963120
-.988781
-.972829
-1.247313
-.895691
-.933396
.145083
.178976
.175621
.183277
.029603
-.113656
.191691
.257574
.708483
-1.045835
-.592445
-1.042394
-1.244119
-.847079
1.317443
.005867
.739978
-2.853982
.871590
-.428373
.363830
.735404
.660683
-.132027
.386198
-1.609329
.470662
1.333389
1.039161
.781420
1.318974
-.843326
.242469
.875413
.743835
-.749329
-.667056
-.804578
-1.229424
.724400
-.241971
.273747
.569838
.673498
.840896
-.405565
-2.258622
.958358
1.368591
.102653
-.483835
.360821
1.248586
.920866
.921769
.661423
-.050432
.675745
-1.026394
-2.000006
-.187485
.036235
-.175097
-.102543
-1.579001
-.506103
-.390718
-1.915333
-.030370
.360274
-1.298695
-.577615
1,331924
.902350
.550507
.187477
-.244632
1.205097
1.296275
-.760860
-1.476758
.469062
1.123981
.622762
1.103056
.996056
2.107441
.187737
1.078097
-.241085
-.449402
-.360423
.087786
-.217738
-.339824
-.525271
-.424813
-.518604
-.143540
-.928132
-.904347
-.599771
-.699847
-.723136
-.478562
-.698328
-.732584
.348192
•.663882
•.128786
.034656
•.075871
.359882
.264677
.321705
.484347
.612042
.540146
.251065
.335059
.073618
.528460
.361453
.364947
.527618
.334450
,309222
.060366
.501001
.196682
.484474
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Municipality
Chicopee 8106
8107
8108
8109
8110
O 111
8112
8113
Agawam 8132
E. Longmeadow 8134
Hampden 8135
Longmeadow 8133
T mm J 1Lua low 8104
w. Springfield 8122
8123
8124
w iibranam 8136
Easthampton 8223
8224
Southampton 8225
Southwick 8131
Westf ield 8125
8126
8127
8128
8129
Granby 8209
Hadley 8214
Northampton 8216
8217
8219
8220
8222
S. Hadley 8210
8211
8212
8213
Belchertown 8202
Monson 8137
Palmer 8101
8102
8103
Census
Tract
Factor Scores
General Public
Exclusionary Housing
Zoning
Local Encumbered
Inclusion Apartments
of Apts.
-.721538
-.894327
-.875166
.934858
-.665058
.399304
-.020479 1.440633
-.583201
.819946
.021170 1.232566
-.633295
.276135
.503611 1.390307
-.719143
-.320286
.465803 1.485005
—
. jjI / / (J 1.030201
.634235 1.416962
691016 - 1 4 61 3Q 9 Q <r / r /•
• ^ 7 JO JD 1.233107
-.602971 740S81
—1
. UJU jy
j
1.157484
.655915
.907044
.218645 1.251139
.822194
.939477
-.840335 1.402668
2.420069
-.900944
-.377235
.399722
.156519
-2.124581
-1.473454 1.013267
.822568
.694698
-.932092
-.196545
1.071450
.394894 1.210179
-.344284
1.058788
-.178729 1.253322
-.594443
1.052704
.694985
-.096064
-.387625
1.453193
-.401024
-1.281381 1.595973
.401191 - 107?AQ £9
1
• oZl jUj -.0/9901
.540566 8 58430 . 9 7 7 0 O £
—
. Z J / ZZu -.413254
1.809510 - 0A88QQ _1 n 1 inn
—
. J11ZUU
-.412557
2.043911 - 43 si nn
• ^ J J X UVJ i . jo4 oiy 1 . 666843
.882218
—
. y
z
j yz^
-.036610
.683784 - 34838=;
.234509
.856740 81178 5« U J- JL / VJ ^ 1 576=190x.j/ o jzy "3 Q C A7 O
.830168 41440? -i i nfiins
— x
. 1UO-+U0 9 1 CUCiC
.682839 - 767011
— * D'+O jy Z
-. U4oo5z
2.074756 - 7A40SS _ 978 1 £ 7
—
. Z / o 14 /
-.
J
jj549
.576881 -1 1?S^Q1i • 4 J J 71 — • / ZOOO J 9 Q 7 Q f"> c: 9Z . o / oU jZ
. 919928
-L • U £ H (J£ X 7 66P9
1
—
.
jU^U/
o
.946203 1 228481X • t-4U4Ul _1 ^QO^A— J.. JJUJJ4
-.yjooyj
.811515 .016193 1.843065
-.182633
.770371
-.391150 2.560978 -.208695
.902001 .744987
-1.465980
-.964739
1.174620 -.815514
-1.716238 -.409030
1.123950 -.957229 2.032274 .544311
1.183796 -1.389159 -1.592308 -.884869
1.077767 -2.271.656 -1.155099 -.614194
1.265049 .750041 -1.029663 -.700887
.577620 -.569239 -.630657 1.689978
1.082018 -.688587 .318255 .433906
1.198936 .761017 .278120 .549174
1.089500 -.106284 .901554 .774689
APPENDIX C. FACTOR SCORES OF THE
SPRINGFIELD SMSA CENSUS TRACTS ON THE URBAN ECOLOGY FACTORS
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663
Municipality Census
Tract
Factor Scores
Socioeconomic
Status
Rac e and
Resources
Family
Living
Springfield
Holyoke
8001
8002
8003
8004
8005
8006
8007
8008
8009
8010
8011.01
8011.02
8012
8013
8014
8015.01
8015.02
8015.03
8016.01
8016.02
8016.03
8016.04
8016.05
8017
8018
8019
8020
8021
8022
8023
8024
8025
8026
8114
8115
8116
8117
8118
8119
8120
8121
-.644394
-.037910
-.206190
-.433151
1.043538
-.920103
-1.738774
-1.254215
-.848573
-.406921
.586951
-1.542669
-.123501
-.644154
-.538013
-.092109
-.075705
.139354
.740410
.777038
.635840
1.606436
1.146573
-.191844
-.866339
.235983
-.561231
1.275754
-.094748
-.175557
1.562631
1.296695
.740510
-1.742206
-1.251455
-.962234
-.944096
-.145788
2.592040
.665288
.386734
-.297964
-.301193
-.601718
-.352725
.358369
1.466780
2.432751
3.728230
.631989
-1.776520
.591349
.049314
.925238
1.363809
1.269469
-.182162
.043496
-.121691
.055560
-.007378
.300093
.123820
-.069733
.894609
3.065949
1.327325
.256439
.299234
-.275957
-.026830
-.012031
.014794
-.069162
1.084394
1.798167
1.502842
.284709
-.085051
1.057193
-.157223
.115117
-.208341
-.486852
-.097441
-.212413
-.703009
-.292745
1.115799
1.622133
-.759077
-2.765225
-1.361401
-.501308
-1.630108
-.276418
.013396
-.755694
-.788308
-.780653
-.066826
.352451
.108535
.137712
-1.101280
-.477682
.595539
-1.121774
-1.631416
-1.097335
-.817020
-.304228
-.464866
.553032
-.915795
.356598
-.543742
-.222092
-1.083782
-.504749
.052767
-1.447187
-.190881
664
Municipality Census
Tract
Chicopee 8106
8107
8108
8109
8110
8111
8112
8113
Agawam 8132
E. Longmeadow 8134
Hampden 8135
Longmeadow 8133
Ludlow 8104
W.Springfield 8122
8123
8124
Wilbraham 8136
Easthampton 8223
8224
Southampton 8225
Southwick 8131
Westf leld 8125
8126
8127
8128
8129
Granby 8209
Hadley 8214
Northampton 8216
8217
8219
8220
8222
S. Hadley 8210
8211
8212
8213
Belchertown 8202
Monson 8137
Palmer 8101
8102
8103
Factor Scores
Socioeconomic
Status
-,432067
-.383066
-.281462
-.413240
-.565940
-.951495
-.702270
-.146979
.232494
.953287
.014949
3.066934
-.576670
.761642
-.621159
1.291122
1.561352
-.918244
-.071689
-1.043277
-.852324
-.335139
.796423
-.492851
-.870501
.921949
-.289581
.064606
.030502
.012105
.205669
2.404994
-.420369
-.141877
-.463019
1.927685
.1.282088
-.942915
-.357128
-.565800
-1.086567
-.592068
Race and
Resources
r amiiy
Liv ing
-.598994
-.311845
-.328758
-.161891
-.438446
-.307704
.024000
-.362262
-.072683
.349179
-.559716
-.543945
-.550504
-.091713
-.505943
.066155
-.512345
.649685
-.401701
.584788
-.588412 1.111572
.010565 2.659787
-.554280 1.329031
-.331913
-1.282654
.036955
-.495202
.052779
.205022
-.200823
.760206
-1.32087'* r\/ c. "i /. n
-.756023 0 7A 1 1 /
-1.721524 1 . lOOlOO
-1.090948 1 "XL1 7 Q 7
-.660662
. U C J 7 J £. Til £ An
. 321699
• -J i. U L. \J 1 /. c c n /
- 784301 i n/.n7m
00508Q 1 . UoUzz4
- 411441 1 . ZjoolO
- 956358 A 7 1 53 n £
. / lo(Jb
- 585479
-.417704 7CIQA1
7
• / \Jy b± /
-.416425
.138335 87S866
-.594164 7 698
- 702*52?
. no 7 Oil j
-.674541
.772482
.774671 .822271
-.105238 .917581
-1.144807 1.215327
-.369256 .828824
-1.060639
-.092667
-.627118 .232702
-.557076
-.004851
APPENDIX D. CANONICAL CORRELATIONS FOR ZONING AND
URBAN ECOLOGY VARIABLES IN SETS FOUR THROUGH ELEVEN
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